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Abstract 
Michael Granleese  
Market organisation and the process of economic development: The case of 
the partially liberalised cocoa market in Ghana. 
Within the last twenty years the link between market organisation and development has 
come under increased scrutiny in response to the implementation of World Bank 
liberalisation policies across many of sub-Saharan Africa’s agriculture markets.  Under the 
neoliberal teachings of the Washington Consensus, liberalised markets have replaced 
systems of government control, with disappointing results.  Recognising the challenges 
created by the universal implementation of liberalisation policies, the attention of 
development economists, including the World Bank, has now turned to alternative modes 
of market organisation.  In light of this, the following study aims to contribute to the post 
Washington Consensus understanding of market development through a detailed 
exploration of the Ghanaian cocoa market as an alternative model for market organisation 
within sub-Saharan agriculture.    
The Ghanaian cocoa market has been selected because, in contrast with its fully liberalised 
cocoa producing neighbours, Ghana has only undergone partial liberalisation.  The 
Ghanaian Cocoa Board [Cocobod] maintains control over several functions across both the 
domestic and international dimensions of the Ghanaian cocoa chain.  Given the span of the 
Cocobod’s influence along the Ghanaian cocoa chain, it has been necessary to develop a 
cross disciplinary theoretical framework, using New Institutional Economics for a micro-
analysis of the domestic cocoa chain, and Global Value Chain analysis for a macro-analysis 
of the international cocoa chain.     
Building on a critique of the universalism inherent within the Washington Consensus, 
methodologically this study has attempted to achieve an in-depth understanding of the 
Ghanaian cocoa market.  In line with the ontological approach of critical realism, this has 
involved the use of semi-structured qualitative interviews, throughout two independent 
rounds of research in Ghana.  Interview data has been systematically organised and 
interpreted using the approach of template analysis.  Based on the construction of six final 
templates it has been possible to deduce that direct government intervention in the areas 
of quality control, enforcement and a monopoly over cocoa exports appear to be having a 
positive impact upon market development in Ghana.  Equally, it has been observed that the 
Cocobod may be failing to leverage the potential of private sector investment, as it 
struggles to adapt to partial liberalisation.  In closing it is recommended that future 
research into models of partial liberalisation should be pursued based on the results of this 
study.    
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 – Introduction  
 
Cocoa is a perennial tree crop, which can only be grown in tropical climatic conditions. 
Global cocoa production is dominated by the West African Region countries of Ghana, the 
Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Nigeria.  In the 2007/08 cocoa season, these countries 
accounted for 71.8% of global production [3,384,000 tonnes], with the Ivory Coast as the 
world’s leading producer, commanding 37% of production, and Ghana the 2nd largest 
producer commanding 21% [ICCO1, 2008].  The significance of cocoa to West African 
development can be seen by the fact that in 2005 cocoa was West Africa’s number one 
agricultural export accounting for $2500 million in trade revenue with the number two 
export, cotton, only accounting for $779 million [UNCTAD, 2008, p33].   
 
Within the last twenty years, all West African cocoa markets have undergone significant 
change and restructuring.   Change has focused on models of market organisation, with the 
World Bank’s model for liberalised markets being prescribed as a replacement for the 
government run systems favoured by West Africa’s colonial governments.  Whilst the basic 
model for change has been largely uniform across countries, each nation’s experience of 
change has been hugely different.  Not only has the liberalisation model been implemented 
at different times and speeds, and with different levels of government commitment, but the 
basic starting position and conditions surrounding liberalisation within each market have 
differed greatly.   Resultantly, both the extent and the outcomes of liberalisation have been 
hugely varied, leading to increased academic attention surrounding the link between 
models of market organisation and the process of market development. 
 
Amongst the markets that have undergone change within West Africa, the experience of 
Ghana has been unique.  Refusing to fully implement the World Bank’s doctrine for 
                                                 
1
 ICCO stands for International Cocoa Organisation.  The ICCO is a non-governmental institution with the 
responsibility to monitor aspects of the global cocoa market including, cocoa prices and cocoa stocks.  
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complete liberalisation, the Ghanaian market has adopted a partially liberalised system of 
market control.  Whilst debates still surround the performance of this system, investigation 
into some of the many unique aspects of the Ghanaian cocoa market undoubtedly has the 
potential to further enhance understanding of the link between market organisation and 
development.   As such, the Ghanaian cocoa market will form the focus for analysis within 
this study.   
 
This chapter will begin with a description of the market liberalisation experience 
throughout West African cocoa markets.  Following a brief discussion of the outcomes of 
liberalisation, the Ghanaian cocoa market will be introduced as an alternative model of 
market organisation.  It will then be possible to outline the research aims and objectives, 
and the research questions for this study.  Finally the chapter will conclude with a brief 
summary of the seven remaining chapters in this thesis.   
 
1.2 – Market Liberalisation and the Washington Consensus  
 
Market liberalisation in the West African cocoa chain has been the subject of many recent 
studies [Gilbert, 1997; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001; Fold, 2002; Losch, 2002; Dorin, 2003; 
Gilbert and Varangis, 2003; Tollens and Gilbert, 2003; Kaplinsky, 2004; ul Haque, 2004; 
Wilcox and Abbott, 2004; Laven, 2005; Teal et al, 2006; Zeitland, 2006].   
 
Prior to the IMF and World Bank’s structural re-adjustment and market liberalisation 
programmes, beginning in the late 1980’s, the cocoa markets of West Africa were largely 
government controlled. Depending on the legacy of each country’s former colonial power, 
there were slight variations in the extent of government control in the market [Akiyama et 
al, 2001].  The cocoa markets of Ghana and Nigeria, both former British colonies, were 
controlled by a parastatal2 marketing board with monopoly control over internal and 
                                                 
2
 A parastatal is a company owned or controlled wholly or partly by the government. 
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external crop marketing3.  The board controlled and executed all aspects of the domestic 
chain, from initial purchasing through to export.  Quality control and the fixing of producer 
prices were also functions of the board. Prices for the season were determined prior to the 
beginning of the crop year and generally remained fixed throughout the season [Sept-Aug].    
Resulting from the large number of functions the marketing boards performed in the 
supply chain, extremely high operating costs were common-place [Akiyama et al, 2001].   
 
In the former French colonies of the Ivory Coast and Cameroon, the government regulated 
all aspects of the internal and external marketing through the use of a stabilisation fund, 
also known as a ‘Caisse4’ [Akiyama et al, 2001].  Whilst the government did not physically 
handle the crop, through the Caisse they were able to maintain control over the supply 
chain.  The Caisse controlled the licensing of, as well as fixing the margins paid to, private 
sector buyers and exporters.  Varangis and Schreiber [2001] find that adherence to this 
schedule was mandatory. The government also intervened by setting producer prices, 
stabilising export market prices where necessary, and enforcing quality control [Varangis 
and Schreiber, 2001].  
 
Both systems of control were justified based on the following benefits: 
 
 Quality assurance, and the potential to establish and maintain national 
reputations for quality on the basis of a single and mandatory system of quality 
control [Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, p 97] 
 The capacity to earn commercial premiums through the sale of quality cocoa and 
the security of forward sales [Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, p 97]. 
 Price stabilisation through seasonal and inter-seasonal minimum producer prices.  
Stabilisation of prices was achieved both through forward sales of cocoa giving 
                                                 
3
 Internal crop marketing refers to all aspects of the domestic supply chain. External crop marketing refers to the 
sale of cocoa either to local processors or international buyers.  
4
 Examples of the Caisse system include the Caistab in the Ivory Coast, and the Office National de 
Commercialisation des Produits de Base [ONCPB] in Cameroon.  
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projection of future income, and also a stabilisation fund that provided a financial 
buffer against market price movements.  
 Extension services to farmers, such as subsidised input purchases [Gilbert and 
Varangis, 2003]. 
 Cheap and effective export tax gathering [Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, p 97] 
 
In the 1980s and 1990’s, however, mounting pressure from the World Bank and the EU 
signalled the beginning of the end for West African government marketing institutions 
[Akiyama et al, 2001].  This trend was not limited to cocoa markets, with market 
liberalisation being encouraged across almost all developing country markets in which the 
World Bank held influence.  Market liberalisation is closely associated with an ideological 
shift towards open market economics within the policy institutions of Washington DC.  This 
approach became widely known as the ‘Washington consensus’ following  Williamson’s 
[1990] paper outlining ten policy options for Latin American development5.  Williamson’s 
[1990] recommendations included tax reform, trade liberalisation, privatisation, 
deregulation, and prudent monetary and fiscal policies.   
 
The original motivation for a change of thinking in this area resulted from both a period of 
extended stagflation6 in the UK and USA, and the failure of import substitution policies in 
Latin American development [Waeyenberge, 2006].  In response to the economic 
downturn, Keynesian welfare economics [Keynes, 1936], which had been prominent in the 
post-war years, began to be discredited and in its place greater support7 was offered for the 
neoclassical economics of Friedman [1962] and Hayek [1944].  Policy changes promoted 
under the Washington consensus were based on neoclassical economic theory [Kydd and 
                                                 
5
 The World Bank and IMF are generally considered the main forces behind the Washington consensus. However, 
as observed by Williamson [2000] the policy options outlined in the original Washington consensus paper 
[Williamson, 1990] were based on the shared beliefs of the majority of influential political and economic 
institutions in Washington at the time.  Hence the term ‘Washington consensus’.  
6
 Stagflation is considered one of Friedman’s strongest arguments against the approach of Keynes.  Friedman 
developed the term stagflation when arguing that the inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation 
did not hold in all circumstances.  
7
 In particular the political leaders Thatcher and Reagan are associated with the open market approach of 
Friedman and Hayek. 
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Dorward 2003], using ‘models that postulate maximizing agents8 who interact through a 
complete set of perfectly competitive markets’ [Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001, pg 444].  Based on 
these neoclassical teachings, neoliberal economists believed that investment and long-term 
growth would be achieved as long as relative prices were right and the private sector given 
freedom to operate.  Under such conditions it was believed that private sector dynamism 
and strong market forces would dominate the institutional and social obstacles that are 
faced throughout the process of development. 
 
The first significant documentation of this approach in relation to African market 
development can be seen in Berg [1981].  Under the neoliberal approach, modernisation 
and transition were no longer considered the primary measures of development, and 
instead development was to be judged by quantifiable measures such as per capita income 
and productivity.  Contrary to the support offered for the government in the Keynesian 
approach, neoliberalists encouraged a reduction in government intervention based on the 
inefficiency of government action and the risk of political rent-seeking [Waeyenberge, 
2006].  In this light, the following arguments were made against the role of the government 
in West African cocoa markets: 
 
 Poor management and continually falling cocoa prices from the peak in 1977, 
caused many stabilisation funds to become insolvent [Gilbert, 1997; Varangis and 
Schreiber, 2001].  
 Opaque, mismanaged accounting reduced the fiscal credibility of marketing board 
budgets [Gilbert, 1997]. 
 Accusations of rent seeking behaviour were commonplace as 
marketing/stabilisation agencies absorbed a significant amount of cocoa export 
earnings [Bates, 1986; Akiyama et al, 2001]. 
 Cocoa marketing costs in Africa exceeded those in other Cocoa producing nations, 
which operated through free markets [Varangis and Schreiber, 2001].   
                                                 
8
 In support of the neoliberal approach for market development, Agenor and Monteil [1996] argue that economic 
agents in developing countries behave with the same perfect rationality as economic agents in developed 
countries.  
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 Exorbitant marketing costs put downward pressure on farm incomes [Gilbert and 
Varangis, 2003]  
 West African governments were accused of crowding out the private sector and 
stifling entrepreneurial activities in rural areas [Varangis and Schreiber, 2001]. 
 
In order to encourage the implementation of market liberalisation policies, IMF and World 
Bank loans became conditional upon developing country governments fulfilling the policy 
changes laid out in the World Bank and IMF’s structural adjustment policies [SAP’s].  Under 
these policies government intervention was typically reduced to the provision of public 
goods.  Within the orthodox economic literature public goods are described as services 
which the private sector will not provide as they are both non-excludable and non-
rivalrous [Samuelson, 1954]. 
 
Proponents of the Washington Consensus predicted that cocoa market liberalisation would 
achieve the following: 
 
 Increase in the producer’s share of the FOB9 price received in the export of cocoa, 
primarily through a reduction in export taxes imposed by parastatals [Gilbert and 
Varangis, 2003]. 
 Alignment of the incentives in production and marketing with world prices, in the 
expectation that this would improve efficiency in the supply chain and increase 
production10 [Gilbert and Varangis, 2003]. 
 Promoting the development of modern agribusiness industries, through increased 
private sector involvement and local entrepreneurship [Varangis and Schreiber, 
2001] 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Free on board price [FOB] is the market value of goods at the point of uniform evaluation. Simply put the FOB is 
the price received for the cocoa beans themselves.   
10
 To some extent this is a contradiction, as increasing production and thus supply of cocoa would lower world 
market prices.  As such, this is often cited as a criticism of the reform agenda [Gilbert and Varangis, 2003]. 
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1.2.1 - The Process of Market Liberalisation  
 
The first West African country to liberalise was Nigeria in 1986, where the hasty removal of 
government controls created chaos in the cocoa market [Varangis and Schreiber, 2001]. In 
a bid to rapidly accumulate capital, inexperienced cocoa farmers offloaded as much cocoa 
as they could, thus flooding the market with low quality cocoa. Resultantly, they eliminated 
the quality premium which Nigerian Cocoa previously commanded [Gilbert, 1997].  Recent 
market reports and market price indicators suggest that the level of control along the 
domestic supply chain remains low and that the Nigerian cocoa market has failed to 
recover from the poor implementation of liberalisation policies11.   
 
Second to liberalise was Cameroon between 1989 and 1995, where reform efforts imposed 
by the EU dismantled the marketing authority of the ONCPB12 over a series of years 
[Akiyama et al, 2001].  To some extent the gradual pace of reform in Cameroon appears to 
have alleviated many of the difficulties experienced in Nigeria.  Nevertheless, quality 
decline and market capture by large multinationals have emerged as negative features of 
change [Varangis and Schreiber, 2001].  Quality decline in particular has been highlighted 
as a disappointment given the high premium that Cameroonian cocoa formerly 
commanded on the market.   
 
Reform in the Ivory Coast took place throughout the 1990’s.  However, complete 
liberalisation and removal of Caistab’s control over pricing did not take place until 1999.  
The final stages of reform in the Ivory Coast were brought about through significant 
pressure from the World Bank, indicating the Ivorian authorities’ reluctance to reduce their 
control of the market [Losch, 2002].  In recent years, government mismanagement of cocoa 
revenues has also been a cause of perpetual civil unrest amongst the nation’s cocoa 
                                                 
11
 Oredein, O. [2007]. ‘SW Nigeria Graded Cocoa Prices at NGN 175,000-180,000/Ton’.  This price equated to 
$1,1384 – 1,423 per tonne. At the same time good quality cocoa would have been trading at around $2000 per 
tonne.     
12
 Office National de Commercialisation des Produits de Base. 
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farmers13.  Rapid quality decline has also been a feature of liberalisation in the Ivory Coast 
[Laven, 2005].  As a result of these problems the Ivorian government has recently ordered 
a total overhaul of the cocoa marketing system14.   
 
Resulting from market liberalisation across these markets, the structure of their supply 
chain is now largely the same, as demonstrated by figure 1.1.   Figure 1.1 shows the basic 
flow of cocoa along the supply chain from the first stage of cocoa production, through to the 
final stages of manufacturing and retail.  
 
Figure 1.1 – The Liberalised Supply Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source – Author  
 
                                                 
13
   Lewis, D [2008] ‘Analysis - Ivory Coast Cocoa Sector Faces Season in Turmoil’, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
GCA-Agflation/idUSLC25967020080912. 
14
 Reuters, March 3
rd
, [2009a] - ‘Ivory Coast Sets 3-month Target for New Cocoa Reform Body’ http://www.flex-
news-food.com/pages/22376/Cocoa/Ivory-Coast/ivory-coast-sets-month-target-new-cocoa-reform-body.html 
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With the exception of Ghana, price stabilisation arrangements and monopolistic export 
marketing have been removed.  This led to increased competition in the local trading, 
exporting, and origin processing segments of the cocoa chain [Losch, 2002; Varangis and 
Schreiber 2001].  As demonstrated by figure 1.1, cocoa producers can now choose to sell 
their product either to a local independent trader, or a trader working for a large 
processing company.  The price of cocoa within these markets is now based on the world 
cocoa price, as determined by the prevailing market fundamentals on the terminal market.    
 
1.3 - The Outcomes of Liberalisation  
 
The individuality of each country’s reform process, coupled with the unique national 
environments in which reform was carried out, has meant that the results of liberalisation 
are widely varied.   As such, there have been arguments both for and against the outcomes 
of liberalisation [World Bank, 2005].  In recent years, however, there is a growing 
acceptance that whilst liberalisation has yielded certain benefits, the overall performance 
of sub-Saharan agricultural markets post liberalisation has been disappointing.  Kydd and 
Dorward [2004], provide a critical analysis of the empirical evidence on sub-Saharan 
agricultural liberalisation.  Using figures from 1979-1998 the authors highlight both the 
negative per capita growth rate in agriculture and significant decline in fertiliser use, as 
indicators that liberalisation policies have been unsuccessful in African agriculture. On the 
basis of this evidence, they find that ‘there is little empirical evidence of liberalisation 
supporting rapid and widespread pro-poor growth in poor rural areas, but there is 
evidence of some successful government intervention’ [Kydd and Dorward, 2004, p 957].    
 
The failure of liberalisation policies to achieve the results expected can also be seen in 
recent literature at the policy level.  In terms of overall economic performance, UNCTAD 
[2008] finds that the results of export market liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa have 
been disappointing.  In particular the value of exports within overall GDP has not improved 
significantly and in many Sub-Saharan countries the balance of trade has worsened due to 
increased imports after the removal of tariff barriers.   Within recent World Bank literature 
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there is also an increased acceptance that the government may have a positive role to play 
in the market [World Bank, 2008].  Table 1.1 shows the disappointing impact of market 
liberalisation in Africa, as represented by key development indicators of export growth and 
the rate of private sector investment. 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 – Liberalisation Outcomes 
 
Development Indicator Before Liberalisation After Liberalisation15 
Imports16 31.0% 34.0% 
Exports17 23.2% 25.7% 
Trade Balance -6.6% -7.7% 
Investment18 17.30% 19.37% 
Source Figures: UNCTAD [2008] 
 
 
Within the literature on the West African cocoa chain the main debates surrounding the 
outcome of liberalisations can be organised in terms of price and cocoa supply, market 
power, quality, supply chain efficiency, and missing markets.  
 
1.3.1 - Price and Cocoa Supply  
 
Varangis and Schreiber [2001] find that producers in the liberalised markets of Cameroon 
and Nigeria received a higher share of the export price, compared with those in the pre-
                                                 
15
 The measure used to define liberalisation here is the Sachs and Warner [1995] measure of liberalisation, which is 
measured mainly by the absence of tariffs below 40%, the absence of government monopoly on exports, and 
market exchange rate premium of 20% or more.  
16
 Imports are measured as ratio of import value to GDP. 
17
 Exports are measured as the ratio of Export value to GDP. 
18
 Investment is measured as the ratio of physical capital investment to GDP. It is estimated that Africa  needs to 
increase its investment to GDP ratio to 34% [around the same as East Asia], if it is going to achieve the millennium 
development goals set for it by the UN [UNCTAD, 2008, p70] 
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liberalisation markets of the Ivory Coast and Ghana.   Studies by McIntire and Varangis 
[1999], Gilbert and Varangis [2003], Teal and Vigneri [2004], Zeitland [200619] have also 
identified the same trend in liberalised West African cocoa markets.  
 
This trend is demonstrated in figure 1.2.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 – Cocoa Producer Price as a Percentage of the Export Price for 1994/95 
 
 
 
Source - Adapted from Varangis and Schreiber [2001, p43] 
 
 
However, Gilbert and Varangis [2003] observe that whilst producers are receiving a higher 
share of the export price, in many cases this price has declined from the pre-liberalisation 
era20.  As such, though producers in the fully liberalised markets were receiving a higher 
                                                 
19
 Teal, Vigneri and Zeitland, all members of the Oxford centre for the study of African economies [CSAE], carried 
out studies on the agricultural supply response to liberalisation in Ghanaian Cocoa. 
20
 Price declines have come about as a result of both declining quality, and also ‘adding up’ problem, which 
represents the uncontrolled increase in global production [supply] that results from the increased producer 
incentives within liberalised markets [Gilbert and Varangis, 2003].  
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share of the export price, producers in government controlled markets were not 
necessarily worse off; as though their percentage share of the export price was lower, the 
export prices being achieved in government controlled markets was higher [Gilbert and 
Varangis, 2003].  
 
Indeed, as can be seen from table 1.2, in terms of income security farmers in the fully 
liberalised market of Nigeria have suffered from declining prices in recent years, compared 
with the price received at the beginning of the liberalisation process.   
 
Table 1.2 – Real West African Producer Prices  
Cocoa Season ICCO Daily 
Price  
Producer Prices in constant 
terms: 1995/96 = 100 
 
 
[US$/tonne] Ghana Ivory 
Coast 
Nigeria 
1995/96 1438 100 100 100 
1996/97 1556 111 104 103 
1997/98 1711 130 123 103 
1998/99 1298 143 161 94 
1999/00 919 121 90 61 
2000/01 990 137 100 64 
2001/02 1580 152 166 74 
2002/03 1873 228 175 69 
2003/04 1534 210 89 62 
2004/05 1571 183 79 59 
2005/06 1557 164 80 59 
2006/07 1854 151 87 59 
Source Figures - ICCO [2008] 
 
Traditionally world cocoa prices have been determined by the interaction of supply and 
demand, as seen by the relatively robust relationship that exists between cocoa price and 
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the stock-to-processing21 ratio from 1961 to 1990 [ul Haque, 2004].   The ICCO [2005] have 
found that given the extended period of low prices cocoa farmers have begun to revise 
their short-run decision to invest in cocoa farming.  This has resulted in a global cocoa 
supply deficit22 of 301,000 tonnes in 2006/0723 and 88,000 tonnes in 2007/0824.  As such, 
whilst production increases were witnessed in the period immediately following market 
liberalisation, at the current time the cocoa market is characterised by a prolonged period 
of supply deficit.  
1.3.2 - Market Power  
  
The prevailing trends of geographic and corporate concentration experienced in recent 
years have come to define the activities of firms involved in the processing, manufacturing 
and branding of cocoa [Fold, 2002].  Concentration has enabled large cocoa processors to 
command significant purchasing power when bargaining with upstream suppliers.   In light 
of this several authors have observed that within the cocoa chain the power of downstream 
sectors may directly translate into price pressure at the producer end of the chain [Gibbon 
and Ponte, 2005; Kaplinsky, 2004; Wilcox and Abbot, 2004; Dorin, 2005].   
 
Removal of government marketing boards has meant that control of the cocoa chain is now 
solely the function of downstream actors, with the exception of Ghana where the Cocobod 
still maintains a large degree of control.  Ul-Haque [2004] notes that 90% of all export 
activity from the Ivory Coast is controlled by multinational corporations based in Europe 
and North America.  In a similar light, Fold [2001] observes that to date one of most 
significant changes resulting from market restructuring, has been the penetration of 
transnational capital in the West African export trade.  At the current time both of these 
trends are of particular interest in Ghana given the recent surge of foreign investment into 
the Ghanaian cocoa processing industry. 
                                                 
21
 Stocks represent the global supply of raw cocoa and processing represents cocoa demand. 
22
 A cocoa supply deficit means that the annual figure for grinding as driven by demand, is greater than the annual 
level of raw cocoa production.   
23
Brough, D, and Nicholson, M [2008] ‘Cocoa prices at over 20-year high http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php 
?id=13804450. 
24
 ICCO, March 3
rd
 [2009] Latest Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics, http://www.icco.org/about/press2.aspx?Id 
=nve11543 
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1.3.3 - Quality 
 
As observed earlier, market liberalisation has been associated with quality deterioration 
across the West African cocoa crop.  Within the literature, it is regularly found that the 
frantic and highly competitive buying practices of local traders do not enable the 
production of good quality cocoa [Shepherd and Farolfi, 1999; Varangis and Schreiber, 
2001; Fold, 2001, 2002; Losch, 2002].   Furthermore, it is found that the private sector have 
been unwilling, or unable, to take on the government’s role in quality control [Fold, 2001; 
Losch, 2002]. 
 
Resultantly, the price premium previously commanded by cocoa from the Ivory Coast, 
Cameroon, and Nigeria has been eroded [Shepherd and Onumah 1997, Losch, 2002].  In 
light of this, the value of Ghana’s reputation for quality is consistently portrayed as one of 
the main barriers to complete liberalisation in the Ghanaian market [Laven, 2007].  To a 
large extent this appears justified by figures showing that between March 19th 2008 and 
May 28th 2008, one tonne of Ghana main grade cocoa was being traded at a premium of 
$110-140 above main grade cocoa from the Ivory Coast and $140-160 above Nigerian main 
grade cocoa25.   
 
Nevertheless, Fold [2002] and Losch [2002] find that large cocoa processors have 
developed a preference for low cost, low quality cocoa in line with the scale economies that 
can be realised by sourcing cocoa in this way.  As such, there remains some debate 
surrounding the level of long-term market support for the Cocobod’s role in quality control.   
1.3.4 - Supply Chain Efficiency and Missing Markets  
 
As observed earlier, increasing the efficiency of the supply chain was one of the primary 
arguments for market liberalisation.   Varangis and Schreiber [2001] find that marketing 
margins before liberalisation were unacceptably high as government institutions had no 
                                                 
25
 The Cocoa Merchants Association publish standard market prices for cocoa on a daily basis - 
http://www.cocoamerchants.com/dailyspotprice/index.asp  
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incentive to be efficient.  However, with the advent of liberalisation, West African 
governments have reduced taxes and abolished the costs associated with the operation of 
marketing boards and stabilisation funds.  As indicated by table 1.3, in 1995 the marketing 
costs for the liberalised markets of Cameroon, Nigeria and Indonesia were much lower 
than those in Ghana and the Ivory Coast26.  
 
Figure 1.3 – Marketing Cost and Tax as Percentage of Cocoa Export Price 1995 
 
 
Source - Adapted from Varangis and Schreiber [2001] 
 
The above figures for the decline in marketing costs may, however, be misleading, as this 
improvement has not been brought about by efficiency gains alone. Following liberalisation 
the government has retracted from the provision of public goods such as input subsidies, 
farmer credit and quality control.  In response to this it was assumed that the private sector 
would fill the void left by government, thus allowing farmers to continue receiving the 
services previously provided by the government.  
 
                                                 
26
 In 1995 the Ivory Coast was still considered a government controlled market. 
25 
49 
13 
53 
22 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Cameroon Ghana Nigeria Ivory Coast Indonesia
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
e
 o
f 
E
x
p
o
rt
 P
ri
ce
 
Country 
31 | P a g e  
 
31 
 
However, the private sector’s failure to engage in the markets for these services has been 
one of the defining features of market liberalisation within sub-Saharan Africa [Shepherd 
and Farolfi,1999; Kherallah et al, 2000; Kydd and Dorward, 2004; Poulton et al, 2006].  The 
prevalence of missing markets in services such as farmers inputs, farmer credit and quality 
control, have made a significant contributed to the negative perception of liberalisation 
policies.  As such, the efficiency gains associated with government retrenchment and 
private sector engagement appear to come at the cost of missing markets.  Indeed, UNCTAD 
[2008, p38] find that whilst the removal of public goods such as input subsidies and 
agricultural research, may have led to improved fiscal discipline, the constraints that 
farmers now face in this area have meant that in many cases the supply response post 
liberalisation has been disappointing. 
 
1.3.5 - Evaluation  
 
Whilst arguments can be made both for and against certain aspects of market liberalisation, 
the results in the sections above clearly show that different models of market organisation 
can have very different effects on market performance.  Despite the relative homogeneity 
of basic cocoa production across West Africa, in recent years there have been significant 
variations in the performance of West African producers in the areas of production growth, 
export market price, and farmer remuneration.  In particular the partially liberalised 
Ghanaian cocoa market appears to have outperformed all of its fully liberalised West 
African neighbours.  In light of this, it appears that market organisation matters and as 
such, policy in this area has the potential to have a significant effect on market 
development.   
 
Responding to the problems associated with Washington Consensus policies, a new 
development agenda has arisen in the post-structural adjustment era [Stiglitz, 1998, 1999; 
Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001; World Bank, 2005].  This new agenda27 questions the purely 
market-centred approach of neoliberalist policies, recognising that in certain situations the 
                                                 
27
 The post Washington consensus agenda.  
32 | P a g e  
 
32 
 
government has a key role to play in market development, and also that each nation’s 
development policies must be tailored to the specific environment in which they are to be 
implemented.   
 
Focusing on the role of government, the work of Dorward et al [1998, 2005a] has been 
highly influential throughout this study.  Recognition of the governments’s role in market 
development has also entered the policy arena, as seen by the World Development Report’s 
for 1997 and 2008 [World Bank, 1997, 2008].  Indeed, UNCTAD [2008] find that whilst 
liberalisation has generally achieved disappointing results across African export markets, 
in countries such as Ghana where agricultural exports have been a success, government 
intervention has played a key role.  Equally, it must be recognised that partial liberalisation 
appears to have had a positive impact on the Ghanaian market.  Within the Ghanaian 
market it appears that the benefits of government control have been balanced alongside 
private sector dynamism, with the effect of improved market performance.   In light of this, 
the Ghanaian market appears to represent a pertinent example of the type of market model 
advocated in recent development economics literature.   
1.4 - Partial Liberalisation in Ghana28 
In contrast to the liberalised cocoa markets described earlier, the system of market 
organisation in Ghana remains predominantly government controlled through the 
operation of the Ghana Cocoa Board [Cocobod]. The hasty policy making, economic 
mismanagement and market failures which beguiled the neoliberal policy doctrine of the 
1980’s and 1990’s have been largely avoided in Ghana, with a process of partial market 
reform and institutional rationalisation being preferred to the wholesale changes 
witnessed elsewhere.  Institutional control, through the Cocobod, continues to shape every 
aspect of the Ghanaian cocoa market and over time the role of the Cocobod has gained 
                                                 
28
 It is important to note that the word partial is used as a descriptive term to describe the model of market of 
market organisation in the Ghanaian cocoa market where liberalisation has deliberately reached a partial stage of 
reform and the roles of government and the private sector have been specifically allocated.  This use of the term 
partial must be differentiated from the partial liberalisation critique, used to describe the uncommitted way in 
which certain African governments have implemented their liberalisation policies [Jayne et al, 2002; Kherallah et 
al, 2000].  
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relative approval from domestic stakeholders, bi-lateral donors, academics and private 
sector investors [LMC29, 1996; Shepherd and Onumah, 1997; Teal et al, 2006; Fold, 2008].   
Despite beginning a process of partial reform in 1992, the Cocobod remains one of Ghana’s 
largest and most important bureaucracies.  The Cocobod’s turnover for 2007 was $1200 
million30, up from $1100 million in 2006 and $888 million in 2005 [Cocobod, 2006].  The 
significance of cocoa to Ghanaian foreign earnings can be seen in table 1.3 where cocoa 
accounts for a consistently high share of Ghana’s total export revenues. 
Table 1.3 – Cocoa exports as share of Ghanaian export revenue. 
Year 1990 1995 1999 2003 2005 2007 
Cocoa Export Share 40% 46% 27% 39% 36% 32% 
Source figures - Tiffen et al, [2002]; ICCO, [2008], Economic Intelligence Unit, [2008].   
Only the Ivory Coast is as reliant as Ghana on cocoa for export revenue, where cocoa 
contributed 39% to total export revenues in 1999 and 42% in 2003 [ICCO, 2008].  The 
importance of cocoa revenue to all aspects of development in Ghana is evident through the 
fact that in 1995 tax on cocoa exports constituted 28% of total government revenue 
[Shepherd and Onumah, 1997, p27].  Cocoa is estimated to employ 3.2 million of Ghana’s 
nineteen million population [ICCO, 1999].   
1.4.1 - The History of Cocoa in Ghana 
The Cocobod31 was set up in 1947 with the duty to secure the most favourable 
arrangements for the purchase grading and selling of Ghana’s cocoa for the benefit and 
prosperity of Ghanaian cocoa farmers [Arhin et al, 1985]. However, despite high 
expectations that Nkrumah’s 1957 election claims that social welfare would lead to 
                                                 
29
 LMC international is an independent business and economics consultancy for the global agri-business sector.  
The 1996 LMC report on the prospect of cocoa market liberalisation in Ghana was commissioned by the Ghanaian 
government and the World Bank.  
30
 Reuters [2008a] ‘Tariff’s undermine Ghana’s cocoa sales to china and India.’ http://www.flex-news-food.com 
/console/PageViewer.aspx?page=16016&str= 
31
 Originally known as the Gold Coast Marketing Board [Arhin et al, 1985]. 
34 | P a g e  
 
34 
 
improved farmer conditions, the CPP government is associated with extremely high farmer 
taxation and the use of cocoa revenues for urban development projects [Bates, 1981].   
The relative neglect of cocoa farmers continued throughout the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s 
[Bates, 1981; Arhin et al, 1985; Rimmer, 1992].  In response, cocoa farmers expressed their 
political voice through the formation of the NLM32 political party. Violent clashes between 
cocoa farmers and Nkrumah’s CPP33 government were also common [Bates, 1981].  During 
this time the Cocobod became highly politicised and the capacity for farmers to gain 
support was often dependent on their political leanings34 [Arhin et al, 1985; Bates, 1981; 
Herbst, 1993].   
Rimmer [1992] finds that far from its original purpose of farmer welfare, the Cocobod 
‘became a byword for inefficiency and the centre of a web of patronage’ [p204]. Bates 
[1981] observes that Cocobod expenses as a share of total cocoa revenue rose from 7.4% in 
the 1950’s to 17% in the late 1960’s. By 1980 the Cocobod was the largest and most 
wasteful of Ghana’s 235 public sector bureaucracies [Herbst, 1993].    
In response to high marketing costs, cocoa prices were exceptionally low, resulting in a 
decline in cocoa production from a high of 557,000 tonnes in 1964/65 to a low of 158,000 
in 1983/84 [Shepherd and Onumah, 1997, p5].  Resultantly, Ghana’s share of global cocoa 
production fell from a No.1 position of 37% in the early 1960’s to about 12% in the early 
1990’s [Shepherd and Onumah, 1997].   Shepherd and Onumah [1997] observe a sharp 
decline in real producer prices in Ghana between 1975 and 1985, at the same time as some 
of the most favourable prices on the world market.  As a result of the economic 
mismanagement and catastrophic economic decline that took place from 1950-1985, 
Ghana earned the nickname of the vampire state [Frimpong-Ansah, 1992; Austin, 1998]. 
 
                                                 
32
 The National Liberation Movement. 
33
 The Convention Peoples Party. 
34
 Bates [1981] notes that it is was a policy of the Cocoa Purchasing Company to only grant a farmer a loan if they 
were a declared member of the CPP governments United Ghana Framers Council. 
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1.4.2 - Market Reform  
Prior to market reform in 1992, the Cocobod continued to have monopoly control over 
internal purchasing through the Produce Buying Company [PBC], as well as monopoly 
control over external sales through the Cocoa Marketing Company [CMC]. Indeed, as can be 
seen from figure 1.4 on the next page the Cocobod had complete control over all aspects of 
the Ghanaian supply chain before 1992 reforms. 
Figure 1.4 also shows the important roles played by the Cocobod’s other subsidiaries.  The 
Quality Control Division [QCD] had the responsibility for the grading and sealing of all 
cocoa in Ghana.  Training and development services [extension35] for farmers and the 
provision of farmers’ inputs36 were provided by the Cocoa Services Division [CSD].  The 
Cocobod also had its own research centre known as the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana 
[CRIG].  The Cocoa Processing Company [CPC] was also a subsidiary of the Cocobod, 
producing a variety of semi-finished cocoa products.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Extension services typically transfer the best practices developed by the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana 
[CRIG] to the farmer level. 
36
 Inputs such as pesticides or fertilisers were provided by the government either through a subsidy or as a free 
public good. 
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Figure 1.4 – The Ghanaian Supply Chain pre-1992.  
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Source: Author 
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Under the auspices of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programme the Ghanaian 
cocoa industry began the process of partial liberalisation in the 1992/93 cocoa season37 
[Shepherd and Onumah, 1997].   
The main reforms to date include: 
 Cocobod staff numbers reduced from over 120,000 in the early 1980’s to around 
11,000 by the mid 1990’s38 [LMC, 1996, p A-66; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001, p61]. 
At the current time Cocobod employs less than 5,600 staff39.   
 The introduction of License Buying Companies40 [LBCs] in 1992 to compete with the 
PBC in the domestic marketing of Cocoa.  In 2008 there were twenty active LBC’s 
involved in internal purchasing41. 
 The removal of all subsidies on farmers’ inputs in 1996/97 [Teal and Vigneri, 2004].  
In recent years; however, the Cocobod have gone back on their commitment in this 
area. 
 The privatisation of the PBC in 2000. The Government is still amongst the PBC’s 
major shareholders owning 39.35% of its shares in 2005 [Laven, 2005]. The 
majority shareholder is the SSNIT42, owning approximately 51% of the company’s 
shares.   
 Rationalisation of quality control operations from five quality checks along the 
cocoa chain to the current system of three main checks. 
 The termination of the cocoa services division and the transfer of cocoa extension 
services to the Ministry of Agriculture in Sept 2000.  
 Cocobod has fulfilled its obligation to increase the farmers share of the FOB price to 
60%+ by 2000 and 70%+ by 2004/05, under the structural adjustment framework 
put forward by donors [LMC, 1996; Laven, 2007]. 
                                                 
37
 The cocoa season typically runs from September to August. 
38
 In 1992 it was estimated that the headquarters of Cocobod employed 32,000 people, however several of these 
were ‘ghost’ workers [LMC, 1996].  Therefore, the scale of retrenchment may not be as impressive as it seems. 
39
 This figure was obtained during a round one interview with a Cocobod official.  
40
 Private sector cocoa buyers.   
41
 This was established during field work in 2008. 
42
 The Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) is a statutory public Trust charged with the 
administration of Ghana's National Pension Scheme [www.ssnit.com]. 
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 The privatisation of the Cocoa Processing Company in 2004/05.  Similar to the PBC, 
the Ghanaian government remains one of the major shareholders in the CPC and the 
chief executive of the Cocobod sits on its board. 
As can be seen from figure 1.5 on the next page, Ghana has stopped short of the complete 
liberalisation witnessed elsewhere in West Africa.  Government institutions remain heavily 
embedded in several aspects of the supply chain.  In comparison with fully liberalised 
markets where the private  sector have total control of all stages of the chain from local 
purchasing to overseas shipment, within Ghana the private sector have to work in unison 
with the institutional structure of the Cocobod.  
Cocobod’s export marketing subsidiary, the CMC, remains in monopoly control over the 
sale of Ghanaian cocoa.  This means that all cocoa purchased from farmers by the LBC’s has 
to be delivered to the CMC for external sales.  The important role played by the CMC was 
seen as one of the main reasons why Ghana should stop short of total liberalisation [LMC, 
1996].  Before cocoa is taken over by the CMC it has to be certified by the QCD and 
therefore LBC’s have to ensure that they buy good quality cocoa from farmers.  The QCD 
remains a subsidiary of the Cocobod and is the only organisation licensed to certify cocoa 
in Ghana.  
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Figure 1.5 – The Ghanaian Supply Chain 2009. 
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Through the CMC, around 60-75% of Ghana’s cocoa is sold to export market buyers on the 
basis of forward contracts43 [LMC, 1996; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001].  Forward 
contracting involves fixing the price44 and quality parameters of a cocoa contract several 
months in advance of the cocoa harvest.  The CMC may forward contract up to two years in 
advance of harvest, however; sales are generally made around 6-12 months in advance 
[LMC, 1996; Rottger, 2000; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001]. The majority of the remaining 
25-40% of the cocoa is sold to local processors on the basis of pre arranged bean supply 
agreements45.  By selling forward the CMC is able to estimate an average export price [FOB 
price] that they will achieve for the season.  On the basis of this future income prediction 
the Producer Price Review Committee46 is able to fix the prices paid to farmers47 and the 
margin paid to buyers before the beginning of the season.  
In recent years the price paid to cocoa farmers has increased steadily in line with the 
Ghanaian government’s commitment to international donors under structural reform.  
Significant increases in production [Vigneri and Santos, 2007] and the maintenance of high 
levels of quality [Laven, 2007] are also heralded as further indicators of good performance.  
The Cocobod’s nation-wide pest and disease control programme, associated with increased 
production has also been observed as a success [Teal et al, 2006].   
Figure 1.6, on the next page, demonstrates Ghana’s positive producer price and production 
performance in recent seasons. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 The alternative to a physical cocoa contract is a futures contract where the price of cocoa may fluctuate in line 
with global price movements until a delivery date is fixed.  
44
 The price of forward sales are based on futures prices at the London terminal market, where futures prices are 
quoted at least one and half years ahead [LMC, 1996, p A-86] 
45
 The exact details of the formula the CMC use to calculate the price and quantity of cocoa sold to local processors 
is largely unknown and has led to disputes over price in the past [LMC, 1996; Rottger, 2000]  
46
 The PPRC consists of the marketing board [Cocobod], government officials, representatives of private cocoa 
buyers, the national cocoa farmers’ organisations, haulers and transporters [Rottger, 2000].  
47
 The committee takes into account expected export prices during the coming year, the operating costs of 
Cocobod and its subsidiaries, the explicit tax, and farmers’ production costs [Vangaris and Schreiber 2001]. 
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Figure 1.6 – Ghana Cocoa Production and Producer Prices 1995/96 - 2006/07 
 
 
 
 
Source Figures – Vigneri and Santos [2007] and ICCO [2008]  
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Despite the Cocobod’s positive performance in recent years, Fold [2002] and Laven [2005] 
report that LBC’s feel there is room for further reform in the domestic market.  Indeed, 
reports by Herbst [1992], Shepherd and Onumah [1996], and Shepherd and Farolfi [1999] 
are equally critically of the Cocobod’s limited reform effort.  In light of this, it appears 
necessary to further explore the partial model in order to appreciate, which aspects of the 
model have helped to achieve Ghana’s good performance, and whether certain aspects of 
the model are in need of further reform. 
Within the domestic market it will be necessary to examine the specific functions of the 
Cocobod, such as quality control, warehousing, enforcement, and input distribution.  Not 
only do these functions have a huge bearing on the performance of the domestic supply 
chain, but they also directly impact on the daily operations of the LBC’s.  As such, it will be 
interesting to explore these functions from the perspective of LBC’s, in order to understand 
both how they affect market performance, and how they affect the incentive for private 
sector actors to invest in the market.  Indeed, an examination of the potential for private 
sector dynamism in Ghana will be particularly important to our understanding of the 
partial model. 
Equally, it is important to examine the impact of the Cocobod’s continued monopoly over 
cocoa exports.  In recent years there has been profound restructuring in the northern end 
of the cocoa chain, raising questions over the impact that this will have over the Ghanaian 
market.  In particular it will be necessary to explore both how the Cocobod’s traditional 
system of cocoa exporting can meet the demands of modern cocoa processors, and how the 
recent surge of investment into the Ghanaian processing industry will affect the Cocobod’s 
model of supply chain control.   
1.5 - Defining Governance  
Liberalisation has led to a significant change in the governance of West African cocoa 
markets.  Before moving on to discuss how these changes have impacted upon market 
performance it is necessary to define the term governance, which will be used throughout 
this study.   Governance is a widely used term within academic and policy discussions and 
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can have varying interpretations dependent on the context in which it is being used.  
Broadly speaking governance can be understood as the act of governing and though the 
term can be applied to the actions of government, it must not be thought of as being only 
related to government.  Governance is much broader and may occur both within and 
between all levels of society including governments, businesses and all types of societal 
organisations.   
 
For the purpose of this study, the overall concept of governance can be defined as; the use 
of institutions, power and influence to coordinate and control the actions of organisations 
and individuals within society and the economy.  From this relatively broad understanding 
it is necessary to refine the concept of governance in order to align the term with the 
specific theoretical perspectives with which it will be used in this study.  Within the 
microanalysis of this study, using new institutional economics [NIE], the term governance 
will only be used in reference to institutions that can apply governance over the Cocobod, 
which itself operates as an institution of the government.  In this context governance can be 
understood as the institutions or rules that regulate the actions of the government and 
organisations empowered by the government [Kaufmann, 2004; ODI, 2006].  Within the 
macro analysis, using global value chain analysis [GVC], governance will be discussed in 
detail and can be understood as ‘the authority and power relationships that determine how 
financial, material and human resources are allocated and flow within the chain’ [Gereffi, 
1994, p 97].  Both the NIE and GVC definitions of governance are consistent with the overall 
definition outlined above; however, the aspects of governance which are highlighted within 
these particular theories are different.  As such, it is necessary to remain aware of the 
nuances that exist within each theories approach to governance.     
1.6 - Research Aims, and Objectives  
In light of the above findings demonstrating the potential impact which market 
organisation can have on commodity market performance the following aims will be 
pursued in this study.  
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Primary aim: 
To carry out a detailed exploration of the partially liberalised model48 of market 
organisation in the Ghanaian cocoa market, in an attempt to contribute towards the post-
Washington consensus perspective on market development in African agriculture.  
Primary aim objectives:  
1.  To critically evaluate the functions of the Cocobod at both the domestic and 
international levels of Ghanaian cocoa chain. Whilst it appears that the Cocobod is 
currently achieving a high level of performance, critical evaluation will take place in order 
to further our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses associated with the Cocobod 
system. 
2.  To achieve an understanding of the implications of having the government and the 
private sector working closely together in the partial model.  In particular it will be 
necessary to evaluate the capacity of the private sector to fully engage in a market 
dominated by government institutions and regulation.  
3.  To build an analytical framework that incorporates key themes from the theoretical 
traditions of New Institutional Economics and Global Value Chain Analysis.  This will 
involve a critical analysis of the literature on these theoretical perspectives, with particular 
emphasis on the strands of theory related to the process of economic development.  
Building on this framework, research findings will aim to contribute towards the 
understanding of market organisation within these particular theories.  
4.  To develop a methodology capable of exploring the real experiences of participants 
within the Ghanaian cocoa market.  Within the research design the objective is to achieve a 
                                                 
48
 Please note that the term ‘partial model’ is not an established theoretical term.  However, the term partial 
model will be used in reference to the system of market organisation used in Ghana throughout this thesis.  
Furthermore, the term partial model will be used in reference to any other national market in which the 
government plays a highly influential role alongside that of the private sector.  As research into partially or semi 
liberalised markets of market organisation grows a new terminology to describe this phenomenon may emerge.  
However, please do not differentiate between the term partial model used in this study and any different 
terminology that may be used to describe a similar model in any other study.   
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methodological approach that balances structure alongside the openness required for 
exploratory qualitative research.  Consistent with the goals of critical realism, the analytical 
process will aim to uncover the causal mechanisms at work within the Ghanaian cocoa 
chain.  
Secondary aim:  
To assess the future reform options facing the Ghanaian cocoa market. 
Secondary aim objectives:  
1.  To make recommendations for change within the domestic cocoa market based on both 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Cocobod model and also the opportunities to further 
maximise the potential of the private sector within the domestic supply chain.  
2.  To evaluate the opportunities and threats facing the Cocobod in the external market, and 
make recommendations as appropriate.  
1.7 - Research Questions  
Primary Research Question 
What can the Ghanaian cocoa market as a model of partial liberalisation teach us about the 
post Washington consensus understanding of market organisation and development? 
Secondary Research Questions  
In order to help answer the primary question, six secondary research questions have been 
developed.   
Within the domestic market aspects of the Ghanaian supply chain, which will make up the 
bulk of the research, the following questions will be addressed: 
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1.  How does the private sector perceive the credibility of the Cocobod’s role in the market, 
and what actions have the Cocobod taken to improve their credibility in this area?  
2.  Based on a critical examination of the Cocobod’s various functions in the domestic 
supply chain, in which areas is the Cocobod’s role most important to market performance?  
3.  Based on both the transaction risks and incentives presented within the model of partial 
liberalisation, what level of engagement can be witnessed from the LBC’s in the 
development of the domestic supply chain?  
4.  In light of both the performance of the Cocobod and the opportunities that exist in the 
private sector, what functions of the Cocobod could be transferred to the private sector?   
At the external market level, analysis will focus on the Cocobod’s role as the link between 
the national market and the external buying market.  
5.  To what extent is the Cocobod able to compete on the global cocoa market using the 
traditional model of monopolised cocoa exporting? 
6.  How are increased investments from large multinational corporations and the 
subsequent increase in origin processing capacity in Ghana likely to impact upon the 
Cocobod’s governance of the Ghanaian supply chain? 
1.8 – Chapter Summary  
1.8.1 – Chapter Two – New Institutional Economics  
Chapter two forms the first of the three literature chapters in this study. The focus of this 
chapter is New Institutional Economics [NIE], and more specifically the branches of the NIE 
that discuss the process of market development within the developing world.  Throughout 
this chapter Dorward et al’s [2005a] model of developmental coordination will be 
developed as a framework through which to assess the roles of the Cocobod and private 
sector buyers in the domestic supply chain.    
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1.8.2 – Chapter Three – Global Value Chain Analysis 
 
Throughout chapter three Global Value Chain Analysis [GVC] will be discussed as a 
framework through which to assess the Cocobod’s competitiveness as a form of governance 
in the global cocoa chain.  In particular, this chapter will focus on the importance of power 
and quality in determining the governance structure of the supply chain.   The GVC 
phenomenon of functional upgrading will also be explored in light of the recent surge of 
industrial investment into the Ghanaian processing industry.   
 
1.8.3 – Chapter Four – Ghana’s Partial Liberalisation Model 
 
Chapter four will involve a detailed discussion of the literature relating to both the 
domestic and international aspects of the Ghanaian supply chain.  The literature in this 
chapter will be cocoa market specific and where possible concepts from the fields of NIE 
and GVC will be applied to the Ghanaian cocoa market, thus highlighting specific areas to be 
explored in the research.   Throughout this chapter every effort will be made to use recent 
literature and market reports to ensure that the current situation in the Ghanaian cocoa 
market is appropriately understood prior to the research analysis. 
1.8.4 - Chapter Five – Conceptual Framework  
Chapter five will describe the theoretical framework to be used throughout the study.  The 
theoretical framework has been designed around the structure of the partial model, where 
the functions of the Cocobod take effect at both the domestic and international level of the 
Ghanaian cocoa chain.  In light of this a cross disciplinary approach has been designed to 
carry out both a microanalysis of the domestic cocoa market, and a macro-analysis of the 
Cocobod’s link with the global cocoa market.  New Institutional Economics will inform the 
microanalysis, whilst Global Value Chain analysis will form the basis of the macro-analysis.  
The chapter will conclude by attempting to resolve some of the tensions that arise in the 
process of cross-disciplinary research. 
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1.8.5 – Chapter Six – Methodology  
 
As discussed in the research aims and objectives, the methodology for this study is of great 
importance in light of the methodological failures of recent development policies.   The 
methodology chapter will begin with a discussion of critical realism [Bhaskar, 1975] as the 
ontological basis for the study.  The central ontological argument of critical realism is that a 
reality exists, but it is both complex and deep and therefore cannot be reduced to our 
surface interpretation based on immediate experiences.  As such, critical realist 
researchers attempt to uncover ‘real’ or ‘deep’ causal mechanisms at work within the 
phenomenon being examined.   This is achieved through a process of iterative abstraction, 
known as retroduction.  
 
Critical realism relies on the use of qualitative data, and therefore, the research design will 
focus on developing a strategy to collect and analyse in-depth qualitative data.  Based on 
the approach of critical realism, potential causal mechanisms are identified within the 
literature, which in turn inform the development of interview guides.  Interview guides will 
be used to carry out two rounds of in-depth semi-structured interviews during two 
separate field trips to Ghana49.   There are three core units of analysis to be interviewed 
including, Cocobod officials, LBC’s, and cocoa processors.   Alongside the core units of 
analysis there will also be a number of key informant interviews.   
 
Both rounds of interviews will be coded and analysed using the approach of template 
analysis [King, 2004].   Template analysis is a flexible technique used to thematically 
organise and analyse qualitative data.  The process begins with the development of an 
initial template where themes are identified either a priori in the literature, or within the 
initial analysis of the data itself.  Themes are organised hierarchically within the template, 
based on both their link with research questions and the richness of the data in this area.  
Once the initial template has been created qualitative data is coded and organised to help 
further the understanding of the data.  Coding and theoretical development is an ongoing 
                                                 
49
 Round one of research in Ghana took place August and September 2007, and round two took place between 
April and May 2008. 
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and iterative process where templates are re-organised and interviews re-coded 
throughout the analytical process.  Research findings are then presented in relation to a 
final template of themes, which address the research phenomenon.    
 
1.8.6 – Chapter Seven – Research Findings  
 
Throughout chapter seven research findings will be presented in relation to the final 
templates developed throughout the analysis.  The key themes on which templates are 
based will be linked to the research questions stated above.  Where possible theoretical 
insights will be developed based on any links between research findings and the literature 
identified in chapters three, four, and five.  
 
1.8.7 – Chapter Eight – Conclusions 
 
The concluding chapter will focus on the extent to which the research project has fulfilled 
the studies aims and objectives.  This chapter will include individual responses to the 
research questions, where the primary research question in particular will be explored in 
detail.  In order to answer the primary research question there will be a discussion of the 
study’s theoretical framework and the study’s contribution to knowledge will be 
addressed.  Towards the end of this chapter it will be necessary to highlight the studies 
limitations and make recommendations for future research.       
 
1.9 – Conclusion  
 
In light of the experiences described in the early sections of this chapter, it appears that 
West African cocoa markets have suffered greatly in recent years due to both the flawed 
policy making of international development authorities and the poor policy 
implementation of government leaders.  Recognising the problems associated with 
complete market liberalisation, the following study puts forward the case of the Ghanaian 
cocoa market as an alternative model for market development.   As discussed throughout 
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this chapter the Ghanaian cocoa market has undergone partial liberalisation, leading to a 
positive market performance in recent years.  In light of this a number of aims, objectives, 
and questions have been put forward linking the subsequent analysis of the Ghanaian 
cocoa market to the theoretical understanding of market organisation.   Following the 
chapter structure outlined above, the seven remaining chapters will now attempt to 
systematically put in place the necessary building blocks required to achieve these goals. 
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 Chapter Two – New Institutional Economics 
 
 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
 
New institutional economics will be used in a micro-analysis of the partial model of 
liberalisation used in the Ghanaian cocoa market.  In particular the framework of 
developmental coordination presented by Dorward et al [2005a] will help to examine the 
evolving relationship between the government institution of the Cocobod and private 
sector buyers.  In recent years, research using the NIE framework has expanded 
significantly in response to increased attention surrounding the role of institutions in 
market development [North, 2005]. Indeed, recent research strongly suggests that 
institutional quality can have a significant effect on a country’s growth performance 
[Rodrik et al, 2002; Jutting, 2003; Shirley, 2005; Pande and Udry, 2006].  In light of this, this 
chapter will attempt to further explore the field of NIE where particular attention will be 
given to the application of the NIE in the developing country environment.  The early 
sections of this chapter will outline the foundations of the NIE approach, whilst the later 
sections will focus on aspects of the NIE that have the potential to enrich our 
understanding of the Ghanaian cocoa market.  
 
2.1.1 - Definition 
 
Whilst there is no universally accepted definition for an ‘institution’ [Jutting, 2003], for the 
purpose of the micro-analysis in this study institutions are defined as:  
 
‘Formal50or informal51 rules of conduct that facilitate coordination or govern relationships 
between individuals or groups’ [Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002].  
                                                 
50
 Formal institutions include; laws, organisations, political systems, contracts and markets.  
51
 Informal institutions include; norms, traditions, customs and religions. 
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2.2 - The Foundations of New Institutional Economics  
 
Ronald Coase’s articles, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ [1937] and ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 
[1960], are widely credited as the first examples of the economic approach that has come 
to be known as New Institutional Economics [NIE]. Coase’s fundamental observation was 
that the neoclassical assumption of zero transaction costs does not hold in real world 
transactions, and that we operate in an environment of positive transaction costs.  
Transaction costs include the costs of information, monitoring, coordination and 
negotiation.  Under the neoclassical assumption of zero transaction costs, institutions did 
not matter; however, in Coase’s world of positive transaction costs, institutions do matter 
and they are crucial determinants of market efficiency through the impact they have on the 
nature of contracts.   
 
Coase’s conception of positive transaction costs is based upon a rejection of the 
instrumental rationality assumption, which underpins orthodox economic analysis.  Based 
on this modification the NIE attempts to extend neoclassical theory and in doing so explore 
a range of issues outside the boundaries of traditional economic analysis [North, 1993].  
The role of the institution is considered fundamental to economic analysis through its 
impact on the costs of transacting, and thus the subsequent performance and development 
trajectory of the economy.  The purpose of the NIE is therefore to explain the development 
of institutions over time, and to evaluate their impact on economic performance, efficiency 
and distribution [Nabli and Nugent, 1989].   
 
However, beyond this basic objective the NIE is a large and diverse field of study.  Figure 
2.1 on the next page outlines the various branches of the NIE. Within this broad 
categorisation, North [1990] and Williamson [1975, 1985] stand out as the major 
contributions to the NIE’s development as a field of research.   
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Figure 2.1 – The Branches of NIE  
 
   
Source – Kherallah and Kirsten [2002, p114] 
 
2.2.1 - The New Institutional Economics of Williamson 
 
Through his seminal works, Markets and Hierarchies [1975], and The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism [1985], Williamson is credited with developing transaction cost 
economics.  Transaction cost economics is the study of how trading partners guard against 
the risks associated with economic exchange.  Such risks arise because both the bounded 
rationality of agents [Simon, 1955] and the incomplete nature of information result in an 
exchange situation where contracts are complex and unavoidably incomplete.  
Economizing is the central goal of Williamson’s approach, where achieving the lowest 
possible transaction cost situation entails the search for efficient institutional solutions to 
variable contracting problems [Williamson, 1985].    
 
The level of transaction cost faced by each trading party will vary depending on the 
conditions of the exchange, including: the frequency of the transaction, the level of asset 
specificity and the perceived degree of uncertainty about the future or trading partner 
[Williamson, 1975].  Williamson finds that asset specificity in particular is the most 
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important of these factors [Williamson, 1985].  Specific assets52 are defined as: ‘durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions’ [Williamson, 1985, 
pg 55].  Parties that invest in relationship-specific investments expose themselves to the 
potential risks of rent extraction and hold-up53 from the other trading party or regulator.   
 
Williamson also introduces the behavioural assumption of opportunism, which represents 
‘strategic efforts to gain local advantage at the expense of the larger group’ [Williamson 
1999, p 311].  More specifically opportunism manifests itself through adverse selection, 
moral hazard, shirking, sub-goal pursuit and other forms of strategic self-interested 
behaviour [Williamson, 1985].  As such, opportunism54 is another reason why 
comprehensive contracting is infeasible [Williamson, 1981, p 544]. Indeed, when contract 
complexity, the level asset specificity, and information asymmetry are all high then threat 
of opportunism is also very great.   
 
Based on the above conditions of exchange and using a deductive logic closely associated 
with orthodox economic reasoning, Williamson develops a framework of potential 
organisational forms that a firm can adopt to economize on transaction costs.  
Organisational forms range from the market at one end, to integration/hierarchy at the 
other.  Within this deterministic framework the goal of economic organisation is to use 
different organisational forms, which differ in their costs and competencies, to carry out 
transactions, which differ in their attributes [Williamson, 1991, p 79].  Firms will typically 
use the market to transact when transaction costs are very low, whilst the decision to 
integrate is motivated by extremely high transaction costs, such as high asset specificity 
and high information asymmetry.  
 
                                                 
52
 Williamson [1981] defines three types of asset specificity: site specificity, physical asset specificity and human 
asset specificity.    
53
 Hold up refers to a situation where one party involved in the contract withdraws active cooperation to back up 
demands [Williamson, 1985].  
54
 Fafchamp’s [1996] study of contractual conditions in Ghana displays how the high incidence of information 
asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour can act as a barrier to exchange. 
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Many of the concepts initially developed in Williamson’s work have acted as the foundation 
behind the development of several approaches in the NIE55, some of which are fundamental 
to the theories explored later in this chapter56.  As such, the value of Williamson’s 
conceptual arguments cannot be disputed.  Williamson is, however, criticised by heterodox 
economists for his orthodox assumption that market forces work to bring about an efficient 
sort between transactions and organisational forms, based on the principle of transaction 
cost economizing [Richter, 2001; Shelanski and Klein, 1995].  As such, Williamson’s 
transaction cost economics is charged with some of the explanatory deficiencies associated 
with deductive economic reasoning [Pratten, 1997].  In particular Williamson’s efficiency 
logic based on the strength of market forces appears least applicable to the developing 
country context where the rate of market failure and the problems defining property rights 
are much higher.  In light of this, North [1990] presents a less deterministic mode of 
explanation, more suitable to the task of institutional analysis within the developing 
country environment.  
2.2.2 - The New Institutional Economics of North and New 
Institutionalism 
 
The work of North [1990] is central to the understanding of the institution in this study.  
Focusing on North’s 1990 book ‘Institutions, institutional change and economic 
performance’, it is possible to see how North’s version of the NIE offers a more 
sociologically enriched understanding of the institution [Groenewegen et al, 1995; Richter 
2001; Nee and Swedberg, 2005; Groenewegen, 2006].  Post 198157, North replaced his 
efficient institution hypothesis with a less deterministic perspective, where the concepts of 
power, societal networks, incomplete information and societal influence have been used to 
critique neoclassical theory [Groenewegen, 1995, pg 472].   
                                                 
55
 Williamson’s arguments have also made a contribution to the development of GVC models of governance 
[Gereffi et al, 2005].  
56
 Williamson’s framework has offered valuable insight into the developing country context through his recognition 
of the risks presented by transacting in ‘thin’ markets
56
 [Dorward and Kydd, 2004].  In the case of thin markets 
where the risks or costs of transacting are high, Williamson encourages the application of ‘non-standard’ 
contractual forms, which are used to coordinate transactions in the developing world. 
57
 ‘In structure and change in economic history [North, 1981] I abandoned the efficiency view of institutions’ 
[North, 1990, pg 7].  
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North finds that information is incomplete and the motivation of agents is difficult to 
decipher58.  As such, transacting is costly and, ‘the major role of institutions in society is to 
reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to human interaction’ [North 1990, p 
6].  Institutions perform this role through the development of both informal and formal 
rules to govern transactions, as well as the required mechanisms of enforcement to ensure 
compliance.  In doing so, institutions significantly affect the costs of transacting and the 
resultant economic performance of an economy.  Where transaction costs are lowered 
individuals are more likely to invest and engage in complex contracts, leading to economic 
development.  However, this is not necessarily an efficient solution and North entertains 
the possibility of long-term institutional inefficiency in his analysis.   
 
In North’s earlier work [North and Thomas, 1973] relative price changes were seen as the 
main source of institutional change. However, in more recent research North deviates from 
a purely transaction cost argument and finds that institutional change is a more 
complicated process.  Change is influenced by a number of factors over time, including, the 
formal rules, informal constraints, and the methods of enforcement operating in a society 
[North, 1990, p 6].   
 
The work of North can be related to the field of new institutionalism, which is also known 
as neo-institutionalism. Similar to new institutional economics, new institutionalism does 
not embody a single unified body of thought, but rather it is made up of three different 
strands of research including; sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalism and 
rational choice institutionalism [Hall and Taylor, 1996].  Focusing on sociological 
institutionalism and historical institutionalism it is possible to see how new institutional 
economics could be enriched by these perspectives59, by broadening the consideration of 
how institutions interact with society and how historical and social pressures can 
determine the nature of institutional change.   
                                                 
58
 North [1990] adopts Herbert Simon’s [1955] conception of bounded rationality to describe the behaviour of 
agents in his analysis 
59
 Rational choice institutionalism will not be discussed because it is more closely associated with North’s pre-1990 
work and the work of Williamson [1975, 1985].   
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Sociological institutionalism was pioneered by the work of Meyer and Rowan [1977], who 
found that organisational structures were not shaped solely by technical demands and 
resource dependencies, but also by institutional effects such educational and professional 
knowledge, public opinions and the rule of law.  The level of analysis within sociological 
institutionalism is the organisational field, within which a large number of organisations 
operate through cooperative and competitive exchanges [Powell, 2007]. As noted by 
Powell [2007], within early sociological institutionalist research organisations were 
considered to be deeply embedded in the social and political environment, with institutions 
creating a level of social stability and routine that led to isomorphism within the 
organisational field.  However, more recent research has highlighted the possibility of 
differences and fragmentation within the organisational field [Powell and DiMaggio, 1991].  
Work in this area observes how the impact of agency within organisations can lead to a 
diverse range of internal influences and different responses to institutional pressures.               
 
Historical institutionalism can be closely linked with the work of North [1990] through the 
concept of path dependency, which acts as one of the central pillars of research within this 
field. Hall and Taylor [2006] note that historical institutionalist’s sought better 
explanations for the distinctive nature of national political outcomes and the inequalities 
that mark these outcomes.   In light of this, power asymmetries and path dependency have 
been explored as two interdependent factors affecting the nature of development within 
the political economy.  Path dependency asserts that the process of development and 
change is mediated by the contextual features of a given situation inherited from the past 
[Hall and Taylor, 2006].  Indeed, due to their persistence over time, institutions have a 
particularly significant effect in linking aspects of the past with future change and 
development [Collier and Collier, 1991; Pierson, 1996; Thelen, 1999].  As noted by Thelen 
[1999, p386];  
 
‘Organisations may come and go but emergent institutional forms will be ‘isomorphic’ with 
existing ones as political actors extract causal designations from the world around them 
and these cause-and-effect understandings inform their approaches to new problems.’     
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In a similar light, North emphasises how the imbedded cultural constraints of a society and 
their association with historical institutional development, as well as the bargaining 
strength of those in power, create a ‘path dependency’ in future institutional change [North, 
1990].  North uses path dependency to show how institutional change may not be 
economically efficient. This may impact negatively on economic development where the 
power of those embedded within the system can allow a weak institution to be sustained 
for many years.  Equally, path dependency may have positive implications where the close 
fit that an institution has formed with the informal norms of a society may be one of the 
main factors in its success [Shirley, 2005]. Indeed, the concept of path dependency is likely 
to be important within this study, where the Cocobod’s economic, social and cultural ties 
with the Ghanaian cocoa market have been developed for many years. 
 
The work of North has also been foremost in the behavioural assumptions adopted within 
this study.  Based on a critique of the rational choice framework, North [1993a] further 
distances himself from the approach of orthodox economics.  North recognises the 
importance of social influences such as a common cultural heritage in shaping the mental 
models and belief structure of the individual.  Over time, North’s work has ‘gradually 
moved from a predominantly deductive explanatory approach to one that is more clearly 
characterised by a back and forth movement between empirically established relationships 
and explanatory models’ [Groenewegen et al, 1995, pg 472].  In doing so, North has 
developed behavioural concepts that place explanatory primacy over the tractability of 
rational choice assumptions.  
 
In assessment of the developing world North observes that given the prevalence of market 
failures, the complexity of the environment and the nature of incentives faced by political 
and economic entrepreneurs, the possibility of institutional inefficiencies are all the more 
likely, compared with the western world [North, 1990, p 9].  Indeed, in the developing 
world, where powerful interest groups often have greater effect in influencing institutional 
change, there is no guarantee that change will take on a pro-development form [Dorward et 
al, 2005, p 4].  It is therefore in reference to the developing world that North finds the 
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neoclassical framework to be of least use in explaining the range of institutional forms 
[Hirsh and Lounsbury, 1996, p877].         
 
2.2.3 - The Developing Country Environment 
 
Bardhan [1989] observes that the developing country environment is highly suitable for 
institutional analysis because the transaction costs, market failures and missing markets, 
which necessitate the role of the institution, are all commonplace in developing countries.  
Closely related to this, Kherallah and Kirsten [2002] provide strong support for the 
adoption of NIE as a framework for analysing the barriers to exchange within the 
developing country environment.  Barriers to exchange are a pertinent issue, and as noted 
in North [1993, 2000, 2005] and Shirley [2005], high transaction costs have a negative 
effect on trade, investment, specialisation, and productivity within developing countries.  In 
recognition of these problems the Ghanaian PRSP [The World Bank, 2003, p 32] describes 
how structural rigidities and high transaction costs in agriculture act as a constraint to 
economic development in rural Ghana. 
 
In many ways the developing country environment represents an extreme case of the 
conditions that lead to contractual incompleteness in Williamson’s NIE approach.  Market 
and environmental conditions create extreme information asymmetries and uncertainty in 
exchange.  Indeed, based on these conditions the behavioural assumption of opportunism 
is a major threat.  Resulting from these conditions, private sector actors face significant 
risks when transacting in this environment, leading to market failures and missing 
markets. Markets that are typically missing include those for rural credit [Hoff et al, 1993] 
and farm inputs60 [Poulton, et al 1998].  
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60 | P a g e  
 
60 
 
Building on the concepts of moral hazard [opportunism], information asymmetry61 and 
missing markets, Stiglitz [1989a], Bardhan [1989], and Hoff et al [1993] have developed an 
approach which focuses on the emergence of specific market and non-market institutions, 
used to overcome market failures and encourage exchange within the rural environment.  
Further literature in this area includes studies examining, interlocking transactions 
[Poulton, et al, 1998], social capital [Lyon, 2000] and farmer cooperatives [Braverman et al, 
1991; Sykuta and Cook, 2001].   
 
Fafchamps [1996] study of contract enforcement in Ghana adopts an NIE approach to 
display how the high incidence of information asymmetry and the failings of formal 
institutions for contract enforcement act as barriers to exchange in the Ghanaian trading 
environment.  In relation to formal institutions, Fafchamps highlights that the threat of 
court action as a method of contract enforcement is seldom credible, because trading 
parties are aware that they are both time-consuming and costly to employ.  As such, 
contractual obligations are generally enforced through informal mechanisms such as trust 
and the desire to maintain beneficial trading relations. These finding’s reinforce North’s 
earlier contention that the informal institutional environment plays an important role in 
developing economies.  
 
2.2.4 - New Institutional Economics and the Role of government  
 
Generally speaking, writers in the NIE recommend a limited but strong government.  
Limited by the boundaries of a minimal policy package capable of achieving market 
stability and secure property rights, but strong in the sense that it is able to constrain itself 
from interfering with private sector led growth [Bardhan and Udry, 1999, p 222].  
However, as observed by Kherallah and Kirsten [2002] questions surrounding the role of 
government in NIE should not be reduced to policy templates, and instead it is necessary to 
ask, ‘what is the role of government in cutting down on transaction costs and decreasing 
                                                 
61
 Information asymmetry is central to the analysis of rural markets.  Developed by Akerloff [1970] and Stiglitz 
[1985], information asymmetry means that market information is not costless and all actors in the market do not 
have equal access to information.    
61 | P a g e  
 
61 
 
the riskiness of market exchange?’ [Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002, p 127].  Therefore, in 
reference to the developing country environment it may be necessary to have a more 
flexible view of the government’s role in response to the depth of market failures that 
constrain the process of development in these markets.  In light of this, the approach of 
‘developmental coordination’ will now be considered in some depth, due to its willingness 
to adapt the traditional NIE framework towards the needs of the developing country 
environment.  
 
2.3 - Developmental Coordination  
 
The approach of ‘developmental coordination’ [Dorward et al, 2005a] offers an alternative 
new institutionalist view on the role of the government in the process of market 
development62.  The foundations of the developmental coordination approach are based on 
a critical assessment of neoliberalist market policies in Sub-Saharan Africa and also the 
success of government intervention in other developing country markets.  Whilst it is 
accepted that the neoclassical theory underpinning liberal market policy may have certain 
benefits in an environment of with better information, more sophisticated institutions and 
more effective regulation, in the case of rural Africa orthodox theory offers an inadequate 
response to development challenges.   
 
The Green Revolution63 [Dorward et al, 2004] and the growth of the Asian Tigers [Dorward 
et al, 2005] are highlighted as examples of successful government led intervention. 
Dorward et al [2004] find that the case of the Green Revolution suggests that active 
government intervention is necessary to stimulate market activity at critical stages of 
agricultural market development [p1]. Whilst not directly related to agriculture the 
experience of the East Asian Tigers64, is widely observed as an example of the government 
resolving the coordination failures that inhibit market growth in developing countries 
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 This approach is developed in a series of papers including Dorward et al [2004], Kydd and Dorward [2004], 
Dorward et al [2005a, 2005b], and Poulton et al [2006]. 
63
 The Green Revolution refers to the agriculture-based development that took place throughout India, South 
America and South East Asia post 1945. 
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 This is also referred to as the East Asian Growth miracle. 
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[Dorward et al, 2005; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Wade, 1990]. Interestingly, however, 
Bardhan and Udry [1999] warn that the administrative difficulties of such aggregate 
coordination may be much too intricate for the institutional capacity of many African 
governments [p 226].   
 
2.3.1 - Transaction Risk and Coordination Failure 
 
Dorward and Kydd [2004] identify transaction risk, as a particularly damaging type of 
investment risk in the rural environment, which undermines ‘the very process of exchange 
and specialisation necessary for economic growth’ [p 959].  Transaction risk is at the centre 
of a ‘mutually self-sustaining cycle of underdevelopment’, known as a ‘low level 
equilibrium’ [Kydd and Dorward, 2004; Rosentein-Rodan, 1943; Hoff, 2000].  As can be 
seen from figure 2.2, the unattractive trading environment [blue], helps to sustain the low 
level of economic development [red], which in turn sustains the unattractive trading 
environment.  As such, the market becomes trapped in a self-sustaining cycle of 
underdevelopment.    
Figure 2.2 – The Low Level Equilibrium Trap 
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The concept of a poverty cycle caused by coordination failures was first seen in Rosenstein-
Rodan’s [1943] ‘big push’ theory.  Rosenstein-Rodan argued that it does not pay for a firm 
to make an investment in a market, where the surrounding market participants are not 
willing to make the investments required to develop other areas of the market.  Therefore, 
a ‘big push’ or series of simultaneous investments is required to lift the market out of its 
stage of underdevelopment.  Similarly, Kydd and Dorward [2004, p960] argue that the 
depth and persistence of coordination failure within a low-level equilibrium prevents the 
standard transaction cost economics solution of negotiation and institutional innovations 
by private actors.  
 
2.3.2 - Overcoming Coordination Failure 
 
The approach of developmental coordination argues that in markets where there are 
extensive coordination failures it will be necessary for the government to take an active 
role in encouraging market development.  Indeed, the level of support for government 
intervention is greater than that suggested in the orthodox NIE understanding.  Where 
appropriate the government must extend its role beyond the provision of public goods, 
through a range of coordinative activities including more active intervention in private 
goods markets [Dorward et al, 2005].  As such, the Cocobod’s functions of providing buyer 
credit, input subsidies, pesticides as a public good, warehousing, and price stabilisation are 
broadly conducive with the developmental coordination model.    
 
Poulton et al [2004] contend that development in rural African commodity markets 
requires a balance of competition and coordination.  Coordination is defined as:  
 
‘Effort or measures designed to make players within a market system act in a common or 
complementary way or toward a common goal. This may also require effort or measures 
designed to prevent players from pursuing contrary paths or goals. Coordination may be 
undertaken by private agents acting collectively or may be orchestrated by state agents 
defining the boundaries within which private agents can act’ [Poulton et al, 2004, p 521]. 
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Coordination can either occur vertically between actors in different segments of the supply 
chain, or horizontally between actors in the same segment of the supply chain.  The term 
horizontal coordination has also been used to describe the role of Africa’s former 
government marketing boards. Where administered by the government, horizontal 
coordination takes place either where the government puts in place constraints that force 
the private sector to act towards a common goal, or where the government uses their 
collective organisational capacity to provide public and private goods themselves.   
 
As noted by Poulton et al [2004], the concept of balance between competition and 
coordination is very important and by no means do the authors promote an interventionist 
government under all circumstances.  The type and level of government intervention must 
be closely linked with the prevailing conditions in the market and therefore a critical 
assessment of interventionist policy is required [Dorward et al, 2005].  
 
Kydd and Dorward [2004] consider two mechanisms through which the government can 
overcome the risk of coordination failure and place a market on a positive development 
path. The first mechanism is named coordination, and the first stage of this process involves 
the identification of the critical missing links in a supply chain that are leading to 
coordination failure.  This is a deliberative process that requires a careful analysis of supply 
chain functions, leading to strategic investment in problematic areas [Kydd and Dorward, 
2004, p 964].   
 
Coordination can take a variety of forms including: 
 
 Local or endogenous coordination, which evolves slowly between private actors at 
the local level. 
 Externally assisted ‘soft’ coordination, such as government or NGO support for the 
development of farmer groups. 
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 Hard coordination, ‘where some strong central coordinating body with a mandate 
from the government ensures investments across the supply chain with highly 
credible coordinated commitments’ [Kydd and Dorward, 2004, p 964].   
 
Several functions of the Cocobod may be viewed as ‘hard’ coordination, and indeed, Kydd 
and Dorward directly associate the parastatal system with this coordination type.  Earlier it 
was noted that coordination failures constrain agricultural intensification by 
simultaneously depressing investments across the same set of mutually dependent 
investors.  However, where the government is active it is able to make the simultaneous 
investments required to kick start markets.  Direct intervention by the government is 
recommended at the early stages of development when market failures such as information 
asymmetries, thin markets and insecure property rights, create a situation where risks are 
too high for private sector investment.  Commenting in the parastatal system Kydd and 
Dorward [2004, p 952] find that: 
 
‘State intervention offered a means of addressing all these problems: it could provide a 
coordination mechanism across trading, infrastructural, research and extension 
investments and activities; it could access official finance sources; it could coordinate with 
farmers; it could both reduce and take on investment risk in ways that the private sector 
could not’.      
 
The authors of the ‘developmental coordination’ approach do not refute that Africa’s 
former government parastatals65 have had a very mixed record of success [Dorward et al, 
1998, Kydd et al, 2001].  They do, however, find that parastatals demonstrated a certain 
degree of success in overcoming the coordination failures, which are pervasive within 
many of the now fully liberalised African agriculture markets.   For example, the 
government was able to avoid the market failures that have now led to missing markets for 
farmers’ inputs and credit within many liberalised markets [Shepherd and Farolfi, 1999; 
Kherallah et al, 2000; Poulton et al, 2006].  Furthermore, Dorward et al [1998a] and 
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 As noted in chapter one the majority of government parastatals were dismantled during the World Bank’s 
structural adjustment programs throughout the 1980’s & 90’s.  
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Shepherd and Farolfi [1999] find that parastatals also had an advantage in quality control.  
Operating as the monopoly seller the government has the capacity to provide such services 
as public goods, without suffering the risk of free-riding witnessed in the private sector.    
 
Dorward et al [2005] find that criticisms66 of the parastatal system, ‘should not mask the 
institutional challenges that they were originally set up to address’ [p 13].  Furthermore, it 
can also be argued that such criticisms are reflective of the macro institutional 
environment and not the micro institutional arrangements, which the parastatals used to 
some success in achieving coordination throughout the local market [Dorward et al, 2005].  
As such, we are encouraged to view parastatals as an investment in specific institutional 
arrangements, providing ‘a particular institutional fix, to a specific set of linkage problems’ 
[Dorward et al, 2005, p13].   
 
In light of this, Kydd and Dorward [2004] argue that where a parastatal is able to 
strategically focus on the areas in which assistance is needed most, it can be a powerful 
mechanism in helping to place agricultural markets on a positive development path.  
Indeed, in the case of the Ghanaian Cocobod, which has undergone restructuring and 
rationalisation in recent years, it will be interesting to observe the performance of a 
strategically focused parastatal.  In its current form the only functions of the Cocobod that 
might be considered ‘hard’ coordination are the provision of pesticides as a public good, 
quality control and the Cocobod’s monopoly control over warehousing.  Therefore, an 
analysis of the Cocobod’s performance in these areas, alongside a consideration of whether 
these functions could be provided more effectively by the private sector, will be key to our 
understanding of the need for ‘hard’ coordination in the Ghanaian case. 
 
The second mechanism identified by Kydd and Dorward [2004] through which the 
government can kick-start market development, is lowering the threshold for private 
sector investment in the supply chain. There are two suggested ways through which to 
lower the investment threshold: by lowering the costs of transacting, and by raising the 
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expected returns of investment [Kydd and Dorward, 2004, p 964].  The process of lowering 
the investment threshold is undertaken at a more advanced stage of market development, 
where based on the institutional development achieved through ‘hard’ coordination, the 
risk of coordination failure has been reduced.   
 
At this stage, the government plays a more supportive role through investment in 
communications and market infrastructure, encouraging the development of farmer or 
trader associations, price interventions, input subsidies, technical research, and farmer 
extension [Kydd and Dorward, 2004, pg 967].  Under this classification, the Cocobod are 
engaged in threshold shifting through the function of price stabilisation, the provision of 
fertilisers on subsidy to farmers, agricultural research, and the provision low interest credit 
to buyers. 
 
Lowering the investment threshold should also lead to the development of endogenous or 
‘local’ coordination mechanisms within the private sector.  Local coordination mechanisms 
include farmer organisations [co-ops], buyers associations, and, interlocked transactions 
between traders and farmers.  During this phase of market development the government is 
no longer the only agent with a mandate to promote coordination and the private sector 
must begin to take responsibility in this area.   
 
2.4 – Private Sector Coordination  
 
The concept of private sector coordination is specifically highlighted as a key process 
within the developmental coordination framework.  In light of this, the following three sub-
sections will examine the type of coordinative mechanisms that develop within the private 
sector, their capacity to contribute to the process of market development, and the 
conditions under which they are developed and sustained.   It is important to observe that 
the literature used in this section is not exclusively linked with the work of Dorward, Kydd 
and Poulton.  Instead the model of developmental coordination has been used as a 
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framework for investigation from which other areas of NIE literature have been identified 
where appropriate.    
 
2.4.1 - Interlocking Investments  
 
Earlier it was observed that the lack of private sector engagement in the markets for farmer 
inputs, such as pesticides and fertilisers, has been highlighted as one of the major failures 
resulting from market liberalisation.  Cash strapped farmers, with very little access to 
credit, do not have the resources to purchase inputs within liberalised markets [Poulton, 
2006; Hoff et al, 1993; Kherallah et al, 2000; Poulton et al, 2006]. Theoretically, however, 
buyers may have an incentive to provide such services in order to enhance farmer 
production levels, compete for market share, and build capacity at the farmer level.  Indeed, 
Poulton et al [1998, p 6] found evidence that ‘where opportunities for profit making exist, 
private sector actors will innovate to overcome failures in important markets, including 
those for seasonal credit and inputs’.  
 
The provision of farm inputs on credit is one such investment that a buyer may choose to 
make in a farmer.  In NIE terms this may be viewed as an asset specific investments being 
made in the farmer.  As such, whilst the buyer has the potential to gain from the 
investment, the buyer also faces a big transaction risk in the form of farmer default 
[opportunism]. In response buyers may use interlocking arrangements as a form of hybrid 
contract structure to overcome the risk of opportunism in the developing country 
environment [Dorward and Kydd, 1994].   
 
Interlocking is defined as the ‘provision of seasonal inputs on credit using the borrower’s 
expected harvest of the crop in question as a collateral substitute to guarantee loan 
repayment’ [Poulton et al, 1998, p88].  The farmer is therefore able to afford the input, 
given that the repayment schedule of the loan is tied to the crop harvest.  Poulton et al 
[1998] promote interlocking arrangements as the best way to overcome the market 
failures of information asymmetry and insecure property rights, when contracting in the 
rural environment.  Similarly chapters eight and nine of Hoff et al [1993] also support 
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interlocking, finding that it goes a long way to reducing the information asymmetry and 
enforcement problems between a borrower and a lender. By reducing the risk of default, 
buyers are able to use interlocked transactions as a mechanism through which to compete 
for farmer loyalty.  Indeed, Dorward et al [1998] find that the incentive to develop 
interlocked input and output transactions is based on the traders’ desire to increase 
market share.    
 
However, as witnessed in Ghana [Shepherd and Onumah, 1997], along with many other 
liberalised African markets [Poulton et al, 1998], interlocking arrangements have often led 
to opportunistic behaviour from producers. This occurs where producers receive an output 
guaranteed loan from one buyer and choose to ‘strategically default’ [Poulton et al, 1998] 
on the loan by selling the contingent produce to another buyer.  By doing so the farmer 
avoids repayment of the output linked loan.   
 
For a number of reasons the problem of strategic default has been particularly damaging in 
sub-Saharan Africa [Poulton et al, 1998 pg 91-92].  Firstly, it is found that because many 
Africa farmers own their land, they face a less immediate need for credit to pay land rent 
and therefore the threat of losing out on a future credit opportunity is not a major incentive 
for repayment.  Secondly, due to weak infrastructure in rural Africa traders face a 
significant challenge in monitoring the actions of farmers67.  Thirdly, it is found that farmers 
in Africa have developed a cultural attitude that any loan or input given to them is a gift 
from the government.  This attitude has been developed based on years of government 
handouts.  Dorward et al [1998] also highlight this problem, adding that politicians who 
have done much to create this mindset need to take a lead role in changing farmers’ 
attitudes towards repayment.  These three factors have together created a very negative 
attitude towards repayment, and as a result inputs are now sold on a cash only basis 
[Poulton et al, 1998].  However, cash payments for inputs are often beyond the immediate 
financial resources of the sub-Saharan farmer.   
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growing areas. 
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Nevertheless, Hoff et al [1993] and Poulton et al [1998] find that due to the relationship the 
trader has with the farmer, traders are recommended as a viable channel through which to 
distribute inputs to farmers.   Coulter et al [1999] suggest that traders can use good 
communication and monitoring, incentives for repayment, punishment, and lending to 
groups as ways to reduce the risk of default.  Indeed, in terms of communication and 
monitoring traders are in the optimal position to carry out these functions.  As such, 
despite the risk of default, it might be suggested that traders are in the best position to take 
over the responsibility from the government in the area of farmer inputs.  In light of this, 
the potential for LBC’s to take on this role in Ghana will be investigated in this study.   
 
2.4.2 - Social Capital  
 
North [1990] finds that informal institutions are particularly important in providing 
structure to uncertain exchange conditions in the developing world.  This may be 
particularly true in Ghana, where Fafchamps [1996] finds that due to the lack of 
infrastructure for formal contract enforcement, alternative ‘informal’ mechanisms are 
required to improve security in the process of exchange [Fafchamps, 1996].  Closely related 
to this, Lyon [2000] also observes the importance of social capital within the Ghanaian 
trading environment.   
 
Social capital is defined as the norms and networks that facilitate coordination between 
trading parties [Putman, 1993; Ostrom, 1999].  Building on this it is possible to consider 
trust and reputation as aspects of social capital that can build up between trading partners 
[Lyon, 2000].  Trust can have a positive effect in trading relationships, lowering transaction 
costs through facilitating cooperation and coordination, and reducing the need to screen 
and monitor trade partners [Putnam, 1993; Lyon, 2000].   
 
Within the context of rural Ghana, the most commonly reported reason for trusting 
someone is the establishment of a long term ‘personal’ trading relation [Lyon 2000].  
Closely related to this, Fafchamps [1996] finds that within the Ghanaian trading 
environment the business relation between two parties is often the best form of collateral.  
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Indeed, Laven [2005] finds that the second most popular reason why a farmer would 
choose to sell to a particular LBC in Ghana is the social relation which the farmer has with 
the buyer. 
 
2.4.3 - Collective Action 
 
Poulton et al [2004] find that collective action amongst buyers helps to facilitate private 
sector engagement in the market. Whilst the provision of public goods is traditionally the 
role of the government, in the absence of the government this responsibility may be 
undertaken by the private sector, especially where the private sector has the potential to 
benefit68 [Poulton et al, 2004, p 522].  This is known as a ‘Coasian solution’, where the 
potential beneficiaries of a public good may pull their resources together in order to 
collectively reap the benefit of the service provided [Coase, 1960].   
 
Larsen [2002] shows how collective action between private sector actors has been used to 
enable the private sector to maintain coordination in the Zimbabwean cotton market.  
Despite the liberalisation of Zimbabwean cotton in the early 1990’s very few changes have 
emerged in the market, as the private sector has taken up the traditional functions of the 
parastatal.  In light of this, the capacity of LBC’s in Ghana to work collectively may to some 
extent determine the appropriate level of government intervention in the market.  
 
In addition to the provision of public goods a group of individuals may choose to work 
collectively in order to influence institutional change.  Indeed, Olson’s [1965] original 
theory of collective action was developed to show why certain interest groups are more 
influential over government policy compared with other groups.  Group size is considered 
the main variable affecting the capacity for collective action, with larger groups finding it 
more difficult to coordinate their actions.  Olson also found that the effectiveness of 
collective action is determined by group heterogeneity and the existence of a common goal.   
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inputs to farmers.  This has resulted in increased production and a reliable flow of high quality cotton for buyers.  
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2.4.4 - The Buyers’ Association (collective action) 
 
In relation to African commodity markets, Poulton et al [2004], find that buyers may 
establish a ‘collective organisation’, such as a buyers’ association to help overcome 
collective action problems.  Hall and Soskice [2001, p 10-11] classify the buyer association 
as an institution that facilitates collective action, by encouraging the relevant stakeholders 
to engage in collective discussion and reach a common agreement. Buyers’ associations are 
referred to as institutions that facilitate ‘deliberation’, reducing the uncertainty actors have 
about each other and allowing them to make credible commitments to each other [Hall and 
Soskice, 2001, p 10].    
 
The buyers’ association can also be used to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour from 
farmers [Poulton et al, 1998; Coulter et al, 1999].  Ostrom [2000] observes that the 
existence of opportunistic players is especially likely where full and accurate information 
about all the players is not known.  However, where the participants of a buyers’ 
association exchange information about opportunistic actors this can build an awareness of 
untrustworthy actors and therefore lead to more effective sanction [Hall and Sokice, 2001].  
For example, if a particular farmer engages in an opportunistic act such as non-repayment 
of a loan, then by creating an awareness of that farmer within the network, the mechanism 
for sanction is more effective because all buyers will then know to avoid that particular 
farmer69.  Closely related to this, Poulton et al [2004] find that collective agreements 
established between buyers in the Zimbabwean cotton market have led to a reduction in 
opportunistic behaviour throughout the market [Poulton et al, 2004].   
 
Whilst buyer networks may be effective in solving market coordination problems, they may 
suffer from internal coordination problems [Ostrom, 2000].  In challenging the logic of 
collective action, Olson [1965] contended that because the benefits of collective action are 
shared within a group the rational agent has an incentive to free ride on the efforts of 
others.  As such, the free-rider problem can pose a significant barrier to collective action in 
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both: the provision of public goods, where funding contributions from all members of the 
private sector are necessary; and lobbying for institutional change where the bargaining 
power is at its greatest when all members are active.  Where the size of the group is large, 
Olson found that the incentive for free riding increased, thus making collective action more 
difficult.  Olson’s theory is commonly used as the basis for why public goods need to be 
provided coercively under the government, and why certain groups are more effective at 
achieving institutional change than others.  
 
2.4.5 - Market Concentration  
 
Building on Olson’s logic of group size, Poulton et al [2004] observe the practice of 
‘relational coordination’ between buyers in the highly concentrated Zimbabwean cotton 
market.  This form of coordination is characterised by informal agreements enforced by 
consensus or private action and it ‘may be the most effective option for many cash crop 
systems in Africa’ [Poulton et al, 2004, p 523].  Given the small number of buyers in the 
network, information is easily exchanged and agreements can be credibly enforced.  
Network activity between a small number of sophisticated firms reduces the transaction 
risk of rent seeking, opportunism and free riding from rival buyers. Based on the 
establishment of competitive agreements and the exchange of information between buyers, 
the threat of farmer opportunism can be greatly reduced, thus enabling asset-specific 
investments in farmers.  
 
These findings are supported by Larsen’s [2002] study of the Zimbabwean cotton market, 
where buyers providing interlocking arrangements with farmers were able to avoid 
strategic default due to a concentrated market structure.  Within this market repayment 
rates of 98% were achieved based on a strong network of competitive agreements and 
information sharing between buyers.  However, Poulton [2006] finds that in recent years 
market entry has increased leading to higher levels of strategic default.  Resultantly there 
has been a reduction in the number of inputs made available to farmers.  Similar findings 
are also found for the Zambian cotton market [Poulton, 2006].  In light of these findings it 
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appears that in certain circumstances it may be necessary to sacrifice a certain degree of 
competition in order to achieve coordination between buyers and farmers at the local level.   
 
2.5 - The Transition Challenge   
 
Similar to the section on private sector coordination above the literature in this section 
does not deal exclusively with the work of Dorward, Kydd and Poulton.  Again, the model of 
developmental coordination has been used as a framework for investigation from which 
other areas of NIE literature have been identified where appropriate. 
 
Kydd and Dorward [2004] predict the transfer from hard government coordination to soft 
private sector coordination is likely to be a difficult process.  Nevertheless, based on the 
understanding of the developmental coordination model, once the foundations for 
development have been laid through constructive government intervention, transition 
towards private sector control will be required to enable further market development.  
Dorward et al [2005, p23] find that, ‘successful state intervention is difficult, demands 
challenging conditions, and is often achieved for only short periods before the dynamics of 
change make it ineffective’.  Building on this, Poulton et al [2006, p249] find that the ‘role of 
the state depends on the evolving structure of the market’.  As such, the transition of 
responsibility from the government to private sector should evolve based on both a regular 
examination of the government’s performance within its various functional 
responsibilities, and the level of investment opportunity for the private sector. 
 
Within the transitory process the role of the government remains one of the key factors 
affecting market performance.  To some extent this was touched upon earlier where it was 
noted that the government can take explicit action to reduce the investment threshold and 
encourage local level coordination within the private sector.  Alongside this, the 
government has another very important role to play, where the credibility of the 
government’s actions in the market is likely to have a significant effect on private sector 
engagement.  In light of this, issues surrounding credibility of government action will be 
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observed throughout the following sections.  With reference to the partial model in Ghana, 
this literature is of interest not only in regard to the possibility of greater private sector 
engagement in the coming years, but it can also be used to assess the credibility of the 
Cocobod’s role within the current market.   
  
2.5.1 - Government Commitment to Reform  
 
Within the Ghanaian cocoa market it is expected that the level of private sector engagement 
will depend heavily on both the perceived credibility of government action and the 
government’s commitment to future reform.  Indeed, this is likely to be particularly 
apparent in the Ghanaian case where the functions of the government have such a 
significant bearing on the operations of the private sector.  Given the history of economic 
mismanagement within African goverments, factors such as unilateral policy decisions, 
biased distribution of resources, discrimination in enforcement, and the threat of policy 
reversal are likely to play a significant role in the private sector’s decision making process.   
Herbst [1993] and Shepherd and Onumah [1996] observe a history of private sector 
mistrust of the Ghanaian government. This is based upon past governments resorting to 
punitive measures such as market raids and the imposition of sudden controls.  Indeed, as 
observed in chapter one, Ghana earned the nickname of the ‘vampire state’, based on the 
extent of the economic mismanagement that took place from 1950-1985 [Frimpong-Ansah, 
1992; Austin, 1998].  In the case of Brazil, Stone et al [1996] highlight the negative impact 
of government intervention on private sector investment.  Government corruption and the 
failure of the formal institutions to act with credibility have created high transaction costs 
and the threat of rent extraction has created reluctance within the private sector towards 
investment. 
Kherallah et al [2000] and Jayne et al [2002] find that where the government cannot 
credibly commit to withdrawal from interventionist policies, this will have a stifling effect 
on private sector engagement in market development.  On this basis it is argued that the 
relative failure of market liberalisation policies under the Washington consensus was 
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caused by the government’s failure to fully implement liberalisation policies.  Indeed, Jayne 
et al [2002] find that it is within cash crop markets, such as cocoa, where governments 
have been most reluctant to fully liberalise.  This reluctance is based on the strategic 
importance of cash crops in the generation of export revenues and subsequent national 
development budgets70.   
 
Kherallah et al [2000] highlight several indicators of incomplete reform that can be 
compared with the partial liberalisation model of the Cocobod.  These include the 
government’s role in price stabilisation and the continued involvement of the government 
buying company71 in a liberalised buying market.  Signs of policy reversal such as the 
government re-entering the liberalised market for inputs, may also be likened to the 
Cocobod.  Indeed, Jayne et al [2002] highlight the cocoa market in Ghana as an example of a 
strategic industry that has suffered from a laboured reform process.  
 
Jayne et al [2002] find that governments have used the argument of social inclusion in an 
attempt to justify their role in the market.  In this way governments have been ‘ostensibly 
adhering to the principle of market reform but taking the stance that the market is unable 
to perform certain social functions, therefore requiring some continued government 
intervention’ [Jayne et al, 2002, p 1975].  Modern African governments have been reluctant 
to retreat from the social contract made with citizens by post-independence government 
regimes. Jayne et al [2002] and Kherallah et al [2000] find that where governments display 
this lack of commitment in policy implementation the resulting climate of uncertainty and 
mistrust has a stifling effect on private investment.   
 
2.5.2 - Organisational Behaviour within Government Bureaucracies 
 
In recent years the understanding of organisational behaviour within government 
bureaucracies has been greatly enhanced by the work of Tirole [1994], and Dixit [2002].   
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 Jayne et al [2002] highlight the cocoa industry in Ghana as an industry of strategic importance.   
71
 The Produce Buying Company [PBC], formerly a government owned buying company, still competes in the local 
buying market.  Though the PBC has been privatised, the Ghanaian government is the majority shareholder.  
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To a large extent this builds upon Wilson’s [1989] work on government bureaucracies as 
well as Williamson’s [1975, 1985] work on the organisational structure of private sector 
firms.  It is argued that in comparison with the high powered incentives used to motivate 
private sector workers, civil servants face low powered incentives72, making public sector 
agencies vulnerable to negative organisational behaviour such as moral hazard, adverse 
selection and low effort.  
 
Tirole [1994] and Dixit [2002] cite three main reasons for why civil servants face low 
powered incentives.  Firstly, due to the multiplicity of tasks facing a civil servant it is often 
difficult to directly measure each worker’s performance at an individual level.  Resultantly, 
high powered incentive contracts linking pay to performance cannot be used.  Secondly, 
there is no benchmark against which to compare the performance of each public agency, as 
there is no competition in the market for public services.  Moreover, monopolies do not 
face any competitive threat and as such civil servants are not motivated by the high 
powered incentive of market survival.  Finally, the CEO or owner of a private sector firm 
will often set targets based on their individual vision for the company.  However, due to the 
multiplicity of principles within the civil service there is no single driving force, and so 
there may be no clear goal or direction for the agency.   
 
Within the public sector, Dixit [2002] considers moral hazard to be the worst and most 
pervasive of the behavioural problems associated with low powered incentives.  Moral 
hazard may occur where the exact nature of an agent’s actions cannot be determined by the 
principle.  This arises due to information asymmetry between the principle and the agent, 
where the principle cannot monitor the agent, and the exact nature of the agent’s actions 
cannot be inferred from the outcome.   As such, the agent has some freedom to act in his or 
her self-interest, without the principle having the information required to punish the agent.  
This may result in some form of corruption [Bardhan and Udry, 1999], most typically 
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 Low powered incentives mean that the agent receives a small fraction of his or her marginal product [Tirole, 
1994, p6]. 
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where civil servants are ‘captured73’ by interest groups within the private sector [Tirole, 
1994].    
 
Tirole [1994, p 14] observes that ‘the scope for capture stems from the government 
officials’ discretionary power, which in turn results from the superiority of their 
information relative to that of their political principles’.  The extent of information 
asymmetry between the principle and the agent is, therefore, key in determining the 
potential for opportunistic behaviour.  Closely related to this, Bardhan and Udry [1999, p 
231] find that this problem may be particularly acute in Africa where typically weak and 
fragmented governments have an inability to stop remote government agencies setting up 
independent corruption rackets.   As such, the extent of rent seeking behaviour from civil 
servants is likely to be an area of great interest within the partial model.   
 
The most typical response to such problems is the introduction of competition under the 
assumption that high powered incentives will help to remove many of the behavioural 
problems associated with public sector bureaucracies [Dixit, 2002].  However, Dixit [2002] 
warns against reckless privatisation and finds that in many recent examples privatisation 
has not yielded the results expected.  One of the main drawbacks of high powered 
incentives is that once such a strong motivation is provided in one particular area, many of 
the other non-incentivised functions of an organisation will be disregarded. In light of this, 
Dixit [2002] finds that whilst privatisation may lead to improved efficiency it may also lead 
to a reduction in less measureable areas such as quality and safety.  As such, it will be 
necessary to pay close attention to service quality when attempting to determine the 
appropriate division of functions between the government and the private sector in the 
partial model.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73
 The private sector may use financial bribes, gifts, and future job opportunities as ways to capture the political 
agent.  
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2.5.3 – Governance  
 
In recent years the performance of national governments has become widely regarded as 
one of the key issues affecting the rate of development within lower income economies 
[Kaufmann, 2004; ODI, 2006].  For developing economies in particular the focus of this 
problem has been the reduction of corruption, which is closely related with government 
bureaucracies, as indicated the previous section [3.5.2].   In order to rectify this problem it 
may be necessary to establish institutions that can apply governance over the actions of the 
government.  Within this context governance is defined as ‘the nature of rules that regulate 
the public realm – the space where the government and economic and societal actors 
interact to make decisions’ [ODI, 2006]. 
 
The solution to this problem may lie in increasing the internal accountability74 of 
government departments through the development of an institution with the capacity to 
monitor and arbitrate over government actions [The World Bank, 2002, Ch 5].  North and 
Weingast [1989, p 808] find that, ‘the development of free markets must be accompanied 
by some credible restrictions on the state’s ability to manipulate economic rules to the 
advantage of itself’. Recognising the challenges that exist in this area North [1990] finds 
that biased enforcement is a major problem resulting from government intervention in the 
market.  Indeed, the risk of government bias in the enforcement of sanctions and contracts 
is a problem that North associates most significantly with the developing world.  Levy and 
Spiller [1994], however, find that regulatory credibility can be developed in the 
unpropitious environments of the developing world.  As such, it will necessary to observe 
whether the Ghanaian government have put in place the necessary institutions to ensure 
fair regulation of private sector actions within the partial model.  
 
Governance may also be enhanced through the establishment of institutions that encourage 
external accountability [Kaufmann, 2004].  External accountability can be achieved through 
enabling greater voice and feedback from key stakeholders that are located outside the civil 
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 Accountability is used as measure of affective governance in Kaufmann et al [2009] and Hyden et al [2004]. 
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service [Kaufman, 2004].  This is consistent with the findings of Hyden et al [2004], who 
find that the participation of market stakeholders in government decisions is a key 
indicator of good governance.   In light of this, it will be interesting to examine the level of 
external voice granted to LBC’s within the Ghanaian cocoa market.     
 
Despite the support that has been shown for the developmental coordination framework 
throughout this chapter, it must be noted that based on its encouragement for a greater 
level of government intervention in the market, there is a relative lack of attention given to 
the credibility of government actions.  In recent years the credibility of government actions 
has been a key issue of debate within academic and policy discussions focusing on 
economic development.  As such, it might be expected that any approach advocating a more 
active role for the government would discuss the potential institutions that may need to be 
put in place to help monitor and regulate the actions of the government.   To some extent, 
Poulton et al [2006, p266] touch upon this issue when they note that ‘given that 
overcoming market-coordination problems will require a more active role for the 
state…increased attention must also be paid to governance issues’.  However, beyond this 
basic discussion there has been little discussion of this issue until Kydd [2009], which 
provides deeper insight into the need for governance institutions and greater 
accountability to help encourage the government to undertake credible actions.    
2.6 - Conclusion  
 
Throughout this chapter, NIE was highlighted as the theoretical framework on which the 
analysis of Ghana’s domestic cocoa market will be based.   At the foundational level, 
insights from the work of Williamson [1975, 1985] and North [1990] have been central in 
developing an understanding of NIE research.  Building on these foundations, Dorward, 
Kydd, and Poulton have created the framework of developmental coordination.  Focusing 
specifically on the roles of the government and private sector in the process of market 
development, this framework is considered highly applicable for use as a guide in analysis 
of the partially liberalised Ghanaian cocoa market.   
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Based on this framework it has been possible to identify a number of specific theoretical 
issues that need to be considered in the development of interview guides for this study.  
Indeed, by integrating the theoretical insights from this chapter into the subsequent 
analysis of the Ghanaian market, it will be possible to maintain a link between research 
findings and the understanding of domestic market development within the NIE.   Leading 
up to this, chapter four of this study will include a focused literature analysis of the 
domestic Ghanaian supply chain.   Through this process it will be possible to relate the 
above literature on the NIE to the specific processes at work within the domestic market.  
In turn this will help enable the focused microanalysis of market processes as advocated by 
scholars working within the NIE [Jutting, 2003; Shirley, 2005; Pande and Udry, 2006].     
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Chapter Three – Global Value Chain Analysis 
 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
 
Global Value Chain analysis will be used to explore the macro dimensions of the cocoa 
chain, and more specifically how changes in this area are likely to impact upon the 
Cocobod’s governance of the Ghanaian supply chain.  Gereffi [1994, 1995, 1999] is widely 
credited with developing the original theoretical approach of GVC analysis, which tackles 
the questions of who controls global trade and industry, how they do so and with what 
consequences for producers in developing countries.  In recent years these questions have 
gained increased importance based on the direct links that now exist between developing 
country markets and multinational corporations in response to the affects of globalisation 
and market liberalisation [Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Daviron and Gibbon, 2002].  Indeed, as 
discussed in chapter one, multinational cocoa processors are beginning play an 
increasingly important role in the Ghanaian cocoa chain.   
 
Chapter three will open with a discussion of the foundations of global value chain analysis.  
The chapter will then discuss the GVC’s treatment of power, quality and industrial 
development [functional upgrading].   The objective of this chapter is to develop a 
foundational understanding of these issues before moving on to discuss their significance 
within the Ghanaian cocoa market during chapter four.   
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3.2 - The Foundations of Global Value Chain Analysis  
 
The GVC approach75 was originally developed in the early 1990s in response to the 
globalisation of industry.  Globalisation has involved the detailed disaggregation in the 
stages of production and consumption across international boundaries.  Building on 
Hopkins and Wallerstein’s [1986] ‘World Systems Theory’, GVC analysis uses the concept of 
a commodity chain to explain the series of stages linking together geographically dispersed 
activities. Gereffi observes how economic globalisation has been accompanied by new 
dynamic forms of organisation that require a structure of densely networked firms to 
achieve coordination [Gereffi et al, 1994, p 1].  Each specific process along the chain is 
defined as a segment or ‘node’ and vertical coordination throughout the chain is achieved 
by linking the individual segments of a chain through inter-organisational networks 
[Gereffi et al, 1994].   
 
Control is analyzed through the concept of governance, which represents the functional 
integration and coordination of internationally dispersed activities, carried out by chain 
actors [Gereffi, 1994, p 96].  Within Gereffi’s original understanding governance is directed 
through a group of ‘leading firms’, which use their power in the chain to determine the 
inter-firm division of labour amongst chain participants.  In more recent years, however, 
various attempts have been made to expand upon and adjust Gereffi’s original framework, 
as noted by Gibbon et al [2008].  Most notably, several authors, including Gereffi himself, 
have developed an understanding of governance as; efforts designed to improve 
coordination along the value chain [Sturgeon, 2001, 2002; Gereffi et al, 2005].   Based on 
this understanding, powerful actors in the chain do not simply use governance to outsource 
lower value functions to less powerful actors, but within certain industries the division of 
labour along the value chain is determined by the specialist skills that exist within different 
                                                 
75
 ‘Global Value Chain’ analysis first appeared in the literature under the title of the ‘Global Commodity Chain’. 
Essentially the term ‘value chain’ has emerged to replace the commodity chain concept as the approach has been 
applied to wider variety of products, some of which lack the specific characteristics of a commodity [Gibbon and 
Ponte, 2005]. Therefore, throughout this thesis, the Global Value Chain analysis or the abbreviation GVC, will be 
used to represent insights from both the original commodity chain analysis and its modern representation, the 
value chain. 
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segments.  Throughout the GVC sections of this study, both understandings of governance 
as power and coordination will be used to examine the relationship between the Cocobod 
external cocoa buyers.      
 
Based on the work of Gereffi [1994, 1999] it is possible to identify three main dimensions 
common across value chains:  
 
1. The input-output structure: a set of products and services linked together in a sequence 
of interlinked value-adding economic activities.  
2. The geographical coverage of value chains. 
3. The governance structure or power relations determining the nature of coordination 
within the chain and the distribution of gains from participation. 
 
The earliest significant application of the GVC approach was on the East Asian garment 
industry [Gereffi, 1994, 1999; Smith, 1996]. Other studies in the area of industrial 
commodities include Sturgeon’s [2000, 2001, 2002] work on the electronics industry.  
Dolan, Humphrey and Harris-Pascals [1999] study horticultural supply chains in Kenya is 
seen as one of the most significant applications of the GVC framework to agricultural 
commodities.  Indeed, subsequent papers on Kenyan horticulture by Dolan and Humphrey 
[2000], McCulloch and Ota [2002], and Humphrey [2004] help to show the significance of 
this work.   
 
The GVC has also gained popularity as a framework for the study of tropical commodities, 
where studies by Fold [2001, 2002] and Losch [2002] on cocoa, Ponte [2002] and Larsen 
[2002] on cotton, and, Talbot [2002], and Daviron [2002] on the history of tropical exports 
have all been highly influential in the understanding of governance developed in this study.  
Key throughout studies on both agricultural and industrial commodities in the GVC has 
been the growing importance of powerful multinational corporations in shaping the 
development trajectory of national markets.     
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3.3 - Governance and Power in Global Markets 
 
Gereffi [1994] identifies power as the dominant factor influencing the mode of governance 
adopted in a commodity chain.  The GVC’s motivation for focusing on power is based on 
both the lack of understanding in this area, and the growing importance of multinational 
firms in global supply chains [Gereffi, 2001].  Gibbon and Ponte [2005] define lead firms as 
those with the capacity to shape all aspects of the supply chain, including who does what, at 
what price, to which specifications and on the basis of which delivery schedule [p81].  
Governance is therefore understood as the patterns of authority and power relations which 
structure the parameters under which actors operate [Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001, p 4].  
As lead firms develop new organisational capabilities, governance patterns will be adjusted 
to accommodate any subsequent changes in lead firms’ strategic priorities [Gereffi, 2001].  
As such, governance patterns will periodically change in order to ensure the supply chain 
operates in line with the requirements of the lead firms.    
 
Originally focusing on the manufacturing sector Gereffi [1994] observed two ideal types of 
governance based on the location of power within the chain. Using the concept of a 
powerful ‘chain driver’ or ‘lead firm’, chains are classified as being either ‘buyer’, or 
‘producer’ driven, based on the location of power within the chain.  Both classifications of 
governance demonstrate that power within the chain is closely linked with the location of 
greatest value added and distribution of gains from trading [Kaplinsky, 2000].  
 
Producer-driven chains are typically found in technology-focused sectors where 
production is capital intensive, such as, computers, aircraft or automobiles.  Within 
producer-driven chains power is located in the ‘upstream’ segments of the chain76. Gibbon 
[2001, p 349] observes how power is developed within the ‘producer’ segment based on 
the possession of capital and proprietary know-how, which present high barriers to entry.  
Profits are achieved through technological proprietorship and innovation.  Coordination is 
                                                 
76
 Within the ‘chain’ concept, producers are always situated upstream, and functions move logically downstream, 
so that processing, manufacturing and retailing are considered downstream functions.  
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directed from large corporations that undertake the biggest capital input in the production 
process, and the nature of coordination is reflective of the strategic needs to protect 
intellectual property and achieve large-scale production.  Producer-driven chains are 
increasingly structured so that activities with lower value are outsourced to upstream 
suppliers, usually located within developing countries [Raikes et al, 2000] 
 
Buyer-driven chains are most commonly found in labour-intensive industries with low 
barriers to entry in production. ‘Buyer driven-ness’ expresses the notion that a lead buyer, 
or group of leading buyers within a specific segment, exercise control over the chain, even 
without direct ownership of enterprises throughout the chain.  Within buyer-driven chains, 
power can be located within any of the downstream chain functions including retailing, 
manufacturing, processing, and trading.  Lead firms within buyer-driven chains have been 
able to transform traditional trade linkages into decentralised production networks, 
enabling them to capitalise on the efficiency gains in production presented by globalisation 
[Gereffi et al, 1994].  
 
The typical characteristics of a buyer-driven chain are the importance of marketing, 
branding and merchandising in downstream segments of the chain, which present high 
barriers to entry for resource poor upstream suppliers typically located in developing 
countries [Kaplinsky, 2000]. Gibbon [2001] notes that through control of the higher value 
functions such as branding and merchandising, downstream actors coordinate the chain 
through sub-contracting lower value functions to a highly competitive network of 
suppliers, located in developing countries. 
 
3.3.1 - Beyond the Producer-Driven/Buyer-Driven Dichotomy 
 
In recent years the original producer/buyer-driven dichotomy has been advanced in 
several studies carried out in both agricultural and industrial supply chains. The main 
insight from a range of studies in this area77 is that whilst the concept of buyer ‘driven-ness’ 
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 Sturgeon [2000] in electronics; Fold [2001, 2002] in cocoa. 
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is prevalent across many supply chains, in practice every chain has its own distinct 
governance structure.  Results from studies show each chain displays significantly different 
degrees of driven-ness, different ways in which driven-ness is manifested, and even 
differences in the number of drivers.  
 
Equally it is important to recognise that governance structures evolve over time, and thus 
in any particular time period new governance structures co-exist and interact with earlier 
forms of governance [Gereffi, 2001]. Therefore, whilst ideal types of governance have been 
identified in the literature, in many ways such typologies are designed to be reflective of 
dominant trends across industries, rather than the dynamism of economic actors and the 
heterogeneity of organisational arrangements that exist in practice.  This understanding 
will be particularly important for the following study of the Ghanaian cocoa chain, where 
both the Cocobod and powerful multinationals represent two lead actors co-existing within 
the same supply chain. 
 
Humphrey and Schmitz [2000] further advanced the understanding of governance in 
buyer-driven chains by asking the question of what determines the ‘mode’ of governance 
pursued by powerful buyers in global value chains78? [p15].  Similar to Williamson’s [1998] 
organisational forms covered in chapter two, Humprey and Schmitz indentify four different 
governance options, ranging from ‘arm’s length’ market relations to ‘hierarchy’.  The 
writers find that buyers choose closer linkages with suppliers, such as hierarchical forms of 
governance when there is a high requirement for product definition79, and when buyers 
face a high risk of loss from supplier failure80.  Indeed, Humphrey and Schmitz [2000, p17] 
find supply risk to be the ‘key determinant’ of governance.  Supply risk is a common feature 
of agro-food chains originating in the developing world where the unstable market 
environments and heterogeneous production conditions, have forced buyers to focus on 
improved coordination as a mechanism to reduce risk [Hobbs and Young, 2001].   
                                                 
78
 The modes of governance considered are market relations, network relations, quasi hierarchy and hierarchy. 
79
 ‘Product definition involves the process of interpreting market demands, creating product concepts and 
translating these into designs and drawings’ [Humphrey and Schmitz 2000, pg 15]. 
80
 Humphrey and Schmitz [2000, p 17] acknowledge that the factors influencing governance, which they have 
identified, can be put in the language of transaction costs. 
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Coupled with this, Humphrey and Schmitz [2001] find that there has been an increased 
importance placed on non-price competition in recent years.  Non-price factors such as 
quality, reliability of supply, and the health and safety of products have increased the 
degree of risk faced by buyers sourcing from developing countries.  In response, leading 
buyers would therefore be expected to pursue modes of governance that facilitate closer 
coordination with suppliers [Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000, 2001; Gereffi et al, 2005].  In 
light of this, the notion of supply risk and its relation to governance will be investigated 
within the analysis for this study.   
 
Building on Gereffi’s framework of buyer driven-ness, Gibbon [2001] contends that 
different modes of governance will emerge depending on both the characteristics of the 
commodity being traded, and changes in the economic and political conditions through 
which the chain operates.  Interestingly Gibbon [2001] categorises the cocoa chain as 
‘trader driven’, where lead agents would be expected to prioritise price and efficiency of 
operations over the quality of product sourced.  Based on Humphrey and Schmitz’s [2000, 
2001] above model of governance lead buyers in the cocoa chain would therefore be 
expected to use looser forms of governance, such as market transactions.  This governance 
structure is selected based on the low importance which Gibbon places on product 
definition and the level of supply risk within the cocoa chain.  If, however, lead buyers had a 
higher quality requirement, then, coupled with the supply risks that can result from market 
disorganisation within developing country markets, buyers would be expected to pursue 
tighter modes of governance.  In light of this, it is possible that the mode of governance 
adopted by lead buyers in the cocoa chain may vary between different producer countries 
based on their assessment of both quality needs and supply risk.  
 
Extending the above argument, Gereffi et al [2005] develop five typologies of governance 
that chain actors can use to organise different transactions.  Adopting a more micro level 
approach to GVC, by focusing on each transaction at the individual level, Gereffi et al’s 
[2005] understanding of governance appears to share some similarities with Williamson’s 
[1985] framework for economic organisation, discussed in chapter two.  In a similar vain to 
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Williamson’s framework, Gereffi et al’s five typologies of governance range from the 
market at one end, used to govern simple transactions, to hierarchy at the other end, used 
to govern more complex transactions.  Though, the authors attempt to extend the 
somewhat limited buyer/producer driven dichotomy is laudable based on what it is trying 
to achieve, it may be argued that by focusing on the micro-level and thus reducing 
governance to something highly similar to transaction cost economics, Gereffi et al [2005] 
fail to make a telling advancement on Gereffi’s [1994] original GVC framework.  Indeed, as 
noted by Gibbon et al [2008], once you begin to focus on governance at a micro level within 
GVC you begin to discard the main advantage of conceptualising economic relations in 
terms of chains at the macro level.   In a similar light, Bair [2008] is critical of Gereffi et al’s 
[2005] micro-level framework and its proximity to transaction cost economics, finding that 
it demonstrates a movement away from the macro sociological traditions in which GVC is 
rooted.    
 
Despite the above criticisms, Gereffi et al [2005] highlight an important lesson, where they 
note that modes of governance are extremely dynamic and variable depending on ‘the 
details of how interactions between value chain actors are managed and how technologies 
are applied’ [p 96].  Furthermore, they broaden the traditional GVC conception of 
governance by acknowledging that national level rules and institutions affect the 
governance arrangements of an industry and thus must be considered in analysis.  In a 
similar light, Neilson and Pritchard’s [2009] study of the Indian tea and coffee chains 
attempts to broaden the GVC understanding of governance by examining the importance of 
local institutions in shaping the governance and change within value chains.  Though the 
Indian tea and coffee chains may be understood as buyer driven, Neilson and Pritchard find 
that lead buyers do not operate in a vacuum, but in markets with embedded suppliers, 
consumers and institutions that are influenced by economic, political and social 
circumstances at the national level.  
 
Indeed, it is interesting to observe the relative scarcity of GVC studies that recognise the 
potential role of the government in the market.  Though, the vast majority of studies in the 
GVC have focused on markets that have undergone a relatively comprehensive process of 
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market liberalisation, it should not be assumed that national based institutions have no 
effect on governance. In light of this, it appears that one of greatest failings of GVC 
literature to date is the scarcity of research that takes account of the various national 
institutions affecting different segments of the supply chain.  Indeed, the role of national 
governments in supply chain governance, which is of great importance within this study, 
has received very little attention within past literature.  The absence of government from 
GVC analysis is criticised by Raikes et al [2000, p 399] who find that ‘the issue of regulation 
is not adequately incorporated into its [GVC] framework’.  Further, they find that in many 
instances privatisation has not seen the complete removal of regulation, but rather a shift 
in the type of regulation, which market actors now have to consider.  This criticism is 
echoed by Gibbon and Ponte [2005] who find that GVC analysis has been flawed in its 
blindness to external regulatory conditions, noting that ‘lead firms do not operate in an 
institutional and regulatory vacuum’ [pp 84-85]. Based on this an analysis of the broader 
institutional framework in which lead firms operate is highlighted as a key priority for 
future GVC research [p85].   
 
Observing both the dynamism and context specificity of governance arrangements is 
crucial to the way we observe governance structures in practice, as in reality governance 
structures are constantly being influenced by a variety of economic, political and social 
factors.  In this light, it is not the intention of this research to predict large shifts in 
governance, or categorise emergent governance arrangements, but rather to observe the 
factors influencing the changing nature of governance throughout the Ghana cocoa chain.  
In doing so it may be possible to make a contribution to our understanding of the way chain 
actors attempt to shape the different governance arrangements in order to fulfil their 
sourcing objectives.               
3.3.2 - Buyer Driven-ness in Tropical Commodity Chains 
 
The importance of vertical coordination and the emergence of ‘buyer driven-ness’ in 
commodity trading has risen markedly in recent years, as the breakdown of international 
commodity agreements, coupled with market liberalisation, has resulted in the virtual 
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termination of government support at the national level [Daviron and Gibbon, 2002].  
Government supports, traditionally used to control the variables of price and quality, have 
been removed placing increased importance on vertical coordination from private sector 
actors.   Daviron and Gibbon [2002] observe how, in the case of tropical agro-commodity 
trading, ‘market liberalisation and buyer driven-ness have had a symbiotic relationship’ [p 
138].  As such, studies of tropical commodity chains have typically focused on the 
emergence of buyer-driven governance structures in response to the economic 
restructuring taking place in developing country markets.  
 
Alongside the process of market liberalisation, Daviron and Gibbon [2002] and Gibbon and 
Ponte [2005] highlight corporate concentration and the outsourcing of lower value added 
activities, as key factors leading to buyer driven-ness in commodity chains.  Indeed, as 
observed in chapter one, the trends of outsourcing and concentration have been extremely 
influential in shaping the modes of governance and coordination witnessed in the cocoa 
chain.  Whilst these trends may have taken place regardless of market liberalisation, the 
impact that they have had on producer countries has been catalysed by the removal of 
marketing boards and the resultant freedom that the private sector now has in these 
markets.  Therefore, in markets where the process of liberalisation has not been completed, 
such as the cocoa industry in Ghana, it will be interesting to see how the emergence of lead 
buyers has affected the market.  Indeed, an awareness of the government alongside leading 
buyers in chain governance raises questions over both: how emergent forms of governance 
and coordination challenge the government’s traditional role in the market; and how the 
dynamics of power between different groups of lead actors will affect the development 
trajectory of the Ghanaian market. 
 
3.4 - Governance and Quality in Global Value Chains 
 
Within the GVC, quality issues are key to understanding the way in which lead firms 
exercise governance [Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, p22].   Indeed, whilst quality issues are not 
commonly considered in economic analysis of the supply chain, GVC analysis offers a 
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valuable framework to explore this important topic.  Daviron and Gibbon [2002] find that 
achieving the required quality is a major priority for any governance structure and, as such, 
power in governance is exercised to achieve coordination at the level at which quality is 
defined. In this light, achieving the required level of quality can be seen as one of the main 
functions of coordination within the supply chain.  As such, quality is an important factor 
within the strands of GVC which consider coordination to be the main component of supply 
chain governance [Gereffi et al, 2005].   
 
Within liberalised markets the removal of government institutions as the traditional 
arbitrator of quality has placed the governance of quality in the hands of lead buyers in the 
chain [Daviron and Gibbon, 2002].  Resultantly, quality security is now a challenge faced by 
the vertical coordination mechanisms of lead buyers.  In response to this, Daviron and 
Gibbon [2002] observe that new definitions of quality and the modes of arbitrating it have 
emerged within global commodity chain.  However, within Ghana, the traditional methods 
of quality signalling are still firmly in place.  As such, before going on to consider some of 
the new forms of quality differentiation, it is first necessary to discuss the traditional role of 
national reputations in supply chain coordination.   
 
3.4.1 - Quality Standards and National Reputation  
 
Daviron [2002] observes how the emergence of quality standards post WWII was a key 
development affecting coordination between agents along the supply chain.  Quality 
standards play a key role in reducing the level of information asymmetry between parties 
to an exchange [Kindelberger, 1983].  Indeed, within the cocoa industry quality standards 
have played a key role in increasing the level of confidence in cocoa exchange, thus 
enabling the development of a cocoa futures market [Daviron, 2002].  
 
In some respects national reputations for quality play a similar role to that of quality 
standards, based on the information that they convey to the market about a product. 
Daviron [2002] observes how reference to national origin became the essential component 
of the qualification system for tropical commodities [p171].  As reputations are built up 
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over time they come to embody unequivocal information about the product being traded.  
Reputations can act as an indication of quality and reliability, informing global buyers of 
the product attributes, thus reducing the risk of sourcing from that origin and affecting the 
nature of vertical coordination employed by the buyer.  Daviron and Gibbon [2002, p140-
141], and Gibbon [2005, p25] observe how reputations enable commodity buyers to 
differentiate basic commodities based on their origin.   
 
Based on their role in conveying information to the market and improving coordination 
between parties to an exchange, national reputations may also be considered as a public 
good [Kindelberger, 1983; Daviron and Gibbon, 2002; Tollens and Gilbert, 2003].  Indeed, 
Fold [2001] classifies Ghana’s reputation for quality cocoa as a public good.  Reputations 
for quality can facilitate the achievement of price premiums, not only by signaling quality, 
but also by enabling forward sales81.  Forward sales attract a price premium, based on the 
supply security they offer the buyer.  Gibbon and Ponte [2005] observe that obtaining price 
premiums through forward sales is one of the advantages of the marketing board system.  
However, the buyer is only likely to enter into such an agreement where the seller has an 
established reputation.  As such, the Cocobod reputation for quality takes effect, both in 
terms of the way in which buyers coordinate with the Cocobod, and also the premiums 
obtained from Ghanaian cocoa exports.  In light of this, the following study will need to 
investigate both the benefits accruable to Ghana based on their reputation for quality 
cocoa, and also, the Cocobod’s role in protecting the reputation of Ghanaian cocoa.   
 
3.4.2 – New Definitions of Quality 
 
Gereffi et al [1994], Daviron and Gibbon [2002] and Humphrey [2004] all observe the 
growing importance of product differentiation as a factor affecting the governance 
exercised by lead agents in global commodity chains. Daviron and Gibbon [2002] highlight 
how new definitions of quality have emerged in response to both consumer demand for 
production information and the breakdown of traditional quality control mechanisms. In 
                                                 
81
 Forward sales were explained in chapter one. 
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addition, Humphrey [2004] observes the factor of an increasingly complex regulatory 
environment related to food safety.  
Reardon et al [2001] identified private grades and standards for product quality as an 
emerging mode of governance in modern agricultural supply chains.  The importance of 
private grades and standards in agro-food chains have emerged both in response to the 
disorganisation of local sourcing resulting from liberalisation and also the mainstream 
emergence of markets for credence goods82.  Reardon et al [2001] find that the role of 
grades and standards have moved from being a signal of basic quality in homogenous 
commodity markets, to being sophisticated tools used to achieve product differentiation in 
line with consumer demand for credence goods.  In order to achieve credence good 
qualification tight vertical coordination is needed resulting in a closer link between 
producers and buyers.  
 
Similar positions are adopted in studies by Henson and Reardon [2005], Ponte and Gibbon 
[2005], and Hatanaka et al [2005], where again the growing importance of process 
standards related to agricultural production are emphasised.  Indeed, research examining 
the importance of private grades and standards continues to grow, with an increased 
emphasis on the inability of some small producers to access these high value chains 
[Reardon et al, 2009].  Interestingly, however, Fold [2008, p 116] notes that product 
differentiation is not traditionally considered to be an issue of great importance in the 
cocoa chain.  As such, it will be interesting to observe if product differentiation has become 
a factor affecting governance in the Ghanaian cocoa chain and how this has shaped the 
forms of governance adopted.  Equally, it will be necessary to observe whether private 
sector buyers are still prepared to use the Cocobod’s traditional methods of signaling 
quality as a form of supply chain coordination, given the modern forms of quality 
coordination that have emerged post market liberalisation.  
                                                 
82
 Credence goods are products with quality and safety aspects where the consumers main concern is not the 
product experience but rather an awareness of the processes that have led to the goods production [Reardon et al, 
2001]. 
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3.5 - Governance and the Process of Upgrading 
 
Upgrading refers to the opportunity for developing country producers to make better 
products, more efficiently, with a higher level of skills and resources [Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005].  The process is facilitated by the linkages that exist between international buyers 
and developing country markets, where studies in the GVC have demonstrated how buyers 
transmit information and resources to the upstream level enabling development 
opportunities.  Gereffi [1994] argues that developing country producers need to participate 
in global commodity chains and where possible gain access to the chains lead agents, in 
order to facilitate upgrading.  Upgrading opportunities have increased in recent years in 
line with the trend of outsourcing, where downstream firms have transferred lower value, 
non-core competence functions to upstream segments of the chain [Daviron and Gibbon, 
2002].   
 
Upgrading is traditionally associated with tighter forms of governance, such as hierarchy or 
quasi-hierarchy [Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000], where lead buyers form close linkages 
with their preferred suppliers.  Tighter forms of governance are associated with value 
chains in which lead buyers face high supply risk and demand specific product 
requirements [Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000]. Humphrey and Schmitz [2000, pg 3-4] 
identify three different types of upgrading that have taken place:  
 
Process upgrading: firms can upgrade processes – transforming inputs into outputs more 
efficiently by re-organising production or introducing superior technology.  
 
Product upgrading: firms can upgrade by moving into higher value product lines.  Product 
upgrading can also involve producing the same product to a higher quality standard, at an 
increased volume and reliability.  
 
Functional upgrading: describes the process through which supply chain actors move from 
low value activities, such as farming, to higher value activities such as agricultural 
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processing. Fold [2000] finds that functional upgrading can act as a catalyst for agro-
industrialisation83 in the developing world.  In light of the recent influx of investment into 
the Ghanaian processing industry from the world’s largest cocoa processors, functional 
upgrading will form the focus of upgrading analysis in this study.  
 
3.5.1 - The Challenge of Functional Upgrading and the Role of Government 
 
Schmitz and Knorringa [2000] find that whilst buyers are often willing to support a 
supplier in the improvement of basic production processes, producers cannot expect to 
receive assistance in the realm of functional upgrading.  By providing assistance that would 
help producers develop the competence to make a functional shift up the value chain, 
buyers would effectively be creating additional competition for themselves and, as such, 
power in governance is used to entrench producers in low value-added segments of the 
chain [Raikes et al, 2000, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000].  Therefore, whilst buyers are 
willing provide assistance in areas from which they gain benefit, such as product and 
process upgrading, there are strict barriers on upgrading at the functional level.  
 
Gibbon [2001] finds that the opportunities for upgrading will depend on which segment of 
the chain is ‘driving’.  In analysis of traditional primary commodity chains such as cocoa, 
coffee, cashew nuts, cotton, and fish, Gibbon [2001] finds that international traders84 have 
emerged as the lead agents in these chains.  Within these particular chains there are a 
limited number of opportunities for functional upgrading, as trader-driven chains do not 
display the tendency for lower profit functions to be outsourced upstream to producer 
segments [p 352].  Furthermore, only scattered evidence exists for product and process 
upgrading.  Gibbon stresses that traders investing in suppliers is rare, even where long-
term relations have developed.  This is reflective of the loose and indirect governance 
                                                 
83
 Agro-industrialisation is defined as the structural transformation of a particular national agricultural branch away 
from a dependency on crop cultivation towards more advanced processing segments [Fold, 2000, p264]. 
84
 It was noted earlier that the traditional ‘trader’ function is no longer as powerful in the global cocoa chain. In its 
place there is now an oligopoly of processing firms. Therefore, Gibbon’s insight into trader driven chains can be 
closely associated with modern day processor driven chains.  
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which characterises trader driven chains, where traders do not attempt to exercise much 
control over the supply function [p 352].  
 
Gibbon [2001] argues that in order to capitalise on the upgrading options available in 
trader driven chains government action is required.  In this light, Gibbon recognises the 
value of the role played by government parastatals such as the Cocobod.  Closely related to 
this, Gereffi [1995] finds that national governments have the capacity to transform the 
traditional export base of the economy and move towards the more advanced stages of the 
chain.  Within the developing country environment government support is of primary 
importance, as functional upgrading requires a level of capital investment that is far 
beyond the reach of most local entrepreneurs.   In light of the level of capital investment 
required for industrial development, governments can encourage functional upgrading 
through attracting foreign direct investment from multinational enterprises.  Whilst this 
may not represent the direct domestic industry development envisaged in the traditional 
form of functional upgrading, recent studies on international trade have demonstrated the 
positive developmental benefits of such investment [Dunning and Lundan, 2008].  Indeed, 
though such investment may not represent traditional functional upgrading of domestic 
industry, the positive spillover effects of foreign investment may contribute to long 
development of the national economy [Dunning and Lundan, 2008].      
 
In this light, Fold [2000] finds that the government has played an important role in 
domesticating the knowledge brought in by foreign direct investment in oil seed chain of 
Malaysia and soya bean chain of Brazil.  More broadly, Fold suggests that governments 
should encourage agro-industrialisation, as it ‘increases value-added in the commodity 
chain, enhances technological and organisational know-how, stimulates capacity in 
supplier- and buyer-linked industries and diversifies exports’ [Fold 2000, p264].  Fold does, 
however, warn that functional upgrading is not encouraged under all circumstances, and as 
such, the government’s industrial policy must be tailored towards both the structure of the 
commodity chain in which they are operating and the physical properties of the crop.   
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Closely related to this, Cramer [1999] stresses that policies must be carefully matched with 
the characteristics of the sector in which they are implemented.  There may be certain 
commodity chains where government upgrading is not encouraged either due to extreme 
competition in the processing segment of the chain, or indeed, superior market demand for 
the crop in its basic raw format.  As such, the following study will need to assess the 
appropriateness of the Ghanaian government’s upgrading strategy in reference to the 
above requirements. 
 
3.6 - Conclusion  
 
Throughout this chapter global value chain analysis has been explored as a powerful 
framework for analysing the link between multinational corporations and developing 
country markets.  Global commodity markets have undergone extreme change since the 
late 1980’s, and in response to this GVC scholars have developed a number of important 
concepts that can be employed throughout this study.  In particular the GVC’s insights into 
the areas of governance, power, quality, and functional upgrading will be of direct use in 
reference to the Ghanaian cocoa chain.  Although the Ghanaian cocoa market is not fully 
liberalised, changes within the external cocoa market are beginning to play an increasing 
role in shaping the Cocobod’s governance of the Ghanaian supply chain.  In light of this, 
chapter four will attempt to explore recent changes in the international cocoa market more 
deeply, leading to an improved understanding of how the GVC framework will be applied 
throughout the macro analysis.    
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Chapter Four – Ghana’s Partial Liberalisation Model 
 
 
4.1 – Introduction  
 
In chapter one it was observed that, unlike other West African cocoa producers, Ghana has 
resisted the external pressure for total market liberalisation.  Resulting from a series of 
targeted market reforms the Ghanaian cocoa sector has adopted a model of partial 
liberalisation.  The Cocobod, which operates as an institution of the Ghanaian government, 
continues to be heavily involved in several aspects of the local supply chain, interacting 
very closely with the local buyers on a daily basis.  This has led to a unique market 
structure in the Ghanaian internal purchasing market, raising some interesting questions 
about the appropriate role of the Cocobod and the private sector in the domestic supply 
chain.  In the external market the Cocobod continues to enjoy monopoly control over cocoa 
sales.  Again this is a unique situation and raises important questions with regards to the 
capacity for the traditional system of the Cocobod to compete in the rapidly evolving and 
highly competitive global cocoa market.   
 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of this chapter will focus on the micro level operations of both the 
Cocobod and the LBC’s, where it will be possible to draw insight from the new institutional 
economics literature observed in chapter two. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 will focus on the role of 
the Cocobod in cocoa supply and the ability of the Cocobod to legitimise itself to external 
buyers in the cocoa export market.  At this level, it will be possible to draw insight from the 
literature on global value chain analysis presented in chapter three. 
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4.2 – The Functions of the Cocobod in the Internal Market 
 
4.2.1 - The Extent of Reform 
 
During chapter one it was observed that in the mid 1990’s Ghana had amongst the highest 
marketing costs and taxation levels of any global cocoa producer.  However, as can be seen 
from table 4.1, reform has reduced both the level of government tax and the marketing 
costs associated with the Cocobod. 
 
Table 4.1 - Basic Cocoa Revenue Breakdown 
 
Cocoa Season 
 
1998/99 
 
1999/00 
 
2000/01 
 
2001/02 
 
2002/03 
 
2003/04 
 
2004/05 
Producer Price 
56.0% 60.0% 62.0% 64.0% 66.0% 68.0% 70.0% 
Marketing/Cocobod85 
18.2% 16.5% 16.2% 15.9% 15.6% 15.3% 15.0% 
Government Tax 
25.8% 23.5% 21.8% 20.1% 18.4% 16.7% 15.0% 
Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: figures from The Cocoa Sector Development Strategy [MOFEP, 1999]. 
 
Nevertheless, Shepherd and Onumah [1997] and Laven [2005] find that whilst certain 
improvements have been made, in reality the level of rationalisation within the Cocobod 
has been relatively small and it continues to control several aspects of both internal and 
external marketing.  Indeed, LMC [1996] report that change has been a difficult process, 
bringing in a period of political and economic uncertainty.  Within the cocoa sector this is 
most clearly exemplified by strike action and protests from Cocobod employees in 
response to the proposed retrenchment plans [LMC, 1996]. To some extent the slow pace 
                                                 
85
 Appendix one expands further on the component parts of the field marked ‘Marketing/Cocobod’. 
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of reform is confirmed by the more detailed data in appendix one, where it can be seen that 
Cocobod expenses86 as a share of the FOB price have not improved in recent years.  In fact 
the figure of 16% of the FOB in 2006/07 is larger than that in 1999/00 [15.6%], and 
2004/05 [13%].  Supporting these findings, Laven [2005, 2007] suggests that at the current 
time there are several opportunities for improvement in the Cocobod system.   
 
Equally, it is important to recognise the role that Cocobod investment has played in the 
strong performance of the Ghanaian cocoa market in recent years.  UNCTAD [2008] 
support the positive role of the Cocobod in Ghana, and find that due to the under-
capitalisation of agricultural and the structural constraints facing farmers in Africa, 
government investment is needed to lift farmers out of the cycle of poverty.  Indeed, similar 
to the model of developmental coordination, UNCTAD [2008] find that successful 
liberalisation requires government support to help farmers overcome supply constraints 
and encourage market development.   
 
In light of the above arguments both for and against Cocobod intervention, it is necessary 
to examine the literature focusing on the specific aspects of the Cocobod system in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of its role in the market.  
 
4.2.2 - Quality Control  
 
As noted in chapter three, under the former marketing board system countries gained 
reputations for the production of low or high quality goods.  Good reputations led to price 
premiums for national governments and within the commodity chain literature reputations 
are considered to be public goods [Tollens and Gilbert, 2003; Daviron and Gibbon, 2002].  
In light of this, governments have an incentive to maintain quality.  The same argument 
cannot, however, be made for the private sector, because working as individuals they are 
not able to internalise the costs resulting from quality decline.   Where this is the case, 
                                                 
86
  Cocobod expenses include the categories: Finance Costs, Other, Administration, and Export Handling.  
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there is an incentive for private sector actors to free ride on the effort made by others to 
maintain quality.  This is considered one of the main reasons why the private sector has not 
been able to uphold quality standards following market liberalisation [Tollens and 
Gilbert87, 2003].  Acting as the monopoly seller, governments do not face the threat of free 
riding as they will be directly accountable for any costs resulting from a decline in the 
nation’s reputation. 
 
In light of this, Fold [2001] argued that market liberalisation in Ghana would lead to quality 
decline. Fold [2001] suggests that under a free market system the costs of maintaining the 
quality control system would not be cost efficient for the private sector, and therefore, 
Ghana’s system of quality control can only be maintained under the Cocobod’s monopoly of 
exports.  Recognising similar problems associated with privatisation, Hart et al [1997], and 
Bardhan and Udry, [1999] find that where the private sector does not face enough 
incentive to replicate the government’s performance in an area of national importance88, 
then the case for public provision of these goods is stronger.  
 
The role of government in quality control is also supported by Ponte [2002]. Based on his 
examination of quality decline in African coffee exports following liberalisation, Ponte 
concludes that ‘preserving quality and reputation is more difficult, if not impossible, in de-
regulated markets’ [p 270].  As such, Ponte finds that there are ‘good arguments against 
liberalisation…where high quality is the main insertion of an origin in a global commodity 
chain’ [p270].  
 
Quality control in Ghana89 begins at the farmer level and it is found that 80% of cocoa 
quality is dependent on farmers adopting the correct pre-harvest growing practices, and 
post-harvest drying and fermentation [MOFEP, 1999, p57; BOG, 2003, p10].  In light of this, 
                                                 
87
 It should however be noted that although Tollens and Gilbert [2003] acknowledge this argument as the one 
which is generally held within the ‘public good’ literature, they do not support it themselves.  Indeed, they argue 
that the private sector will produce an efficient level of quality in the absence of government intervention.  
88
 Wilson [1989] describes such functions as ‘sovereign’ tasks, given their importance to the government.    
89
 For a full description of the stages of quality control in Ghana please see Appendix two.  
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the Bank of Ghana90 [2003, p10] finds that it is crucial that farmers are penalised 
immediately by LBC’s when attempting to sell cocoa that is not up to Cocobod standards.  
Indeed, if LBC’s deliver cocoa to the CMC below grade two standard then they will be fined 
50% of their margin [Shepherd and Onumah, 1997; Laven, 2007].  
 
As such, the buyer has a responsibility to check cocoa purchased from farmers, making sure 
to remove all defect cocoa beans and check the beans are thoroughly dried.  The buyer is 
also required to categorise beans according to size91 and place them in sacks at a weight of 
64kg92.  However, the LBC check is not an ‘official’ quality check and based on recent 
studies by MOFEP [1999], BOG [2003], and Laven [2007] there appears to be some 
confusion surrounding the buyer’s exact role in quality.  In light of this, further research in 
this area is required to help understand how private buyers have been integrated into the 
Cocobod’s system of quality control. 
 
Official quality checking and grading of cocoa in Ghana is carried out by the Quality Control 
Division of the Cocobod [QCD].  The first of the QCD’s three quality checks is carried out at 
the district warehouses, where LBC’s store cocoa once it has been purchased from the 
farmers.  Once cocoa is graded and approved at the district level, the LBC’s then transport 
beans to one of the Cocobod’s three takeover points at Kaase, Takoradi and Tema.  At this 
point the QCD carry out a second quality check.  Once accepted at this level, LBC’s no longer 
have responsibility for the cocoa.  In conjunction with the CMC, the cocoa is then checked a 
third time prior to shipment.  In order to be shipped Ghana grade one cocoa has to meet a 
standard of no more than 3% of defects, whilst the rest of West Africa grade one cocoa is 
                                                 
90
 The Bank of Ghana will be referred to as BOG throughout the rest of this study. 
91
 Cocoa beans are priced and graded according to the level of bean defects and also the size of the beans.  As 
such, beans have to be sorted into different size categories by the LBC’s. Bean sizes are arranged according to bean 
count whereby per 100-120 beans per 100g of cocoa are considered light crop beans and are of lesser value, while 
80-100 beans per 100g are considered main crop and are of higher value.  All cocoa beans shipped from Ghana are 
graded according to the contractual conditions set out by the Federation of Cocoa Commerce [FCC]. 
92
 This was established during field work in 2007.  
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graded to 5% defects93.  As a result, the CMC rarely fails to meet the quality standards fixed 
in their contracts with overseas buyers [Varangis and Schreiber, 2001]. 
 
4.2.2.1 - The Benefits of Quality 
 
As observed in chapter one, the risk of declining quality resulting from liberalisation was 
one of the main reasons why Ghana did not fully liberalise their cocoa market [Shepherd 
and Onumah, 1997; BOG, 2003; Laven, 2007].  Indeed, the maintenance of quality enables 
Ghana to achieve a price premium over other origins available on the international market 
[LMC 1996, Varangis and Schreiber, 2001; BOG, 2003].  
 
Premium figures for cocoa are indicated by any value paid above the standard cocoa 
contract prices quoted by the London and New York futures exchanges.  Tollens and Gilbert 
[2003] find that the lowest premium figure for Ghanaian cocoa of £10 per tonne was 
recorded in 1997, whilst the highest figure of £110 per tonne was achieved in 2001 [p30].  
Recent figures quoted include $60-80 in 2003/04 [GAIN94, 2005] and $150 in 2007 
[Benjamin, 200795].   Even at the early stages of market liberalisation the impact of quality 
decline in West African origins, can be seen by the fact that during 1996 Ghana was being 
traded at a premium of £50 a tonne, whilst the Ivory Coast was trading at a discount of £10 
and Nigeria was trading at a discount of up to £40 per tonne [Shepherd and Onumah, 
1997].  
 
4.2.2.2 - The Cost of Quality 
 
In the early stages of market reform both the LMC [1996] and Shepherd and Onumah 
[1997] reported that due to cost implications of the QCD system, significant steps were 
                                                 
93
 The Federation of Cocoa Commerce [FCC] has two main grades for beans from West Africa – Good Fermented 
Beans – no more than 5% mould, 5% slate, 1.5% foreign matter, and Fair Fermented – no more than 10% mould, 
10% slate, 1.5% foreign matter. 
94
 GAIN stands for Global Agriculture Information Network. 
95
 Benjamin, C [2007] ‘Is 50% cocoa processing a reasonable goal for Ghana?’ 
http://www.thestatesmanonline.com/pages/news_detail.php?newsid=2548&section=9 
105 | P a g e  
 
105 
 
being taken towards the commercialisation of the QCD.  The Cocoa sector development 
strategy [MOFEP, 1999] also acknowledges the need to make efficiency improvements in 
the QCD, where the potential involvement of LBC’s in quality control is seen as a possible 
solution [MOFEP, 1999, pp 69-70].   
 
The BOG [2003] acknowledges complaints from LBC’s over the inefficiency of the QCD.  
Consistent with this Fold [2002] indicates that buyers96 in Ghana find the quality control 
system inefficient and costly, and therefore, ‘movement towards a more flexible and less 
rigid system seems inevitable’ [p 232].  Laven [2007] raises concerns over the financial 
efficiency of the QCD, which is largely unknown due to the lack of transparency from the 
Cocobod in this area.  In light of the above concerns, it will be interesting to observe any 
recent QCD efforts towards improvement, or indeed, whether there is the potential for the 
private sector to provide a more efficient service in this area. 
 
 
4.2.3 - Forward Contracting and Price Stabilisation 
 
In chapter one it was observed that forward contracting enables the Cocobod to fix a 
minimum price buyers have to pay farmers for their cocoa.  The price farmers receive is 
fixed at the start of the season as a percentage of the projected average FOB price97.  This 
percentage has increased from 56% in 1998/99, to around 70% from 2004/05 to the 
current period98 [Laven, 2005].   
 
As can be seen from table 4.2 on the next page, farmers in Ghana have benefited from a 
stable income, whilst their counterparts in the liberalised markets of the Ivory Coast and 
Nigeria have suffered from severe fluctuations and declining prices in recent years. 
                                                 
96
 In recent years LBC’s have also raised complaints surrounding the need for three official checks within the 
system - African Echo News [2006] - ‘Rising Output Costs Strains in Ghana’s cocoa industry’, http://africanecho. 
co.uk/africanechonews20-sept14.html. 
97
 The CMC projects an average FOB price for the season based on the prices they have obtained for cocoa 
contracts sold forward.  By selling 6-12 months forward the CMC is thus able to accurately predict their future 
income stream and thus fix prices for the season in line with this projection. 
98
 In chapter one it was observed that the Cocobod was obligated to increase the farmers’ share of the FOB to 
60%+ by 2000 and 70%+ by 2004/05, under the structural adjustment framework put forward by donors.  
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Table 4.2 – West African Cocoa Producer Prices 
 
Cocoa Season ICCO Daily 
Price  
[US$/tonne] 
Ghana 
Producer Price 
[cedis99/tonne] 
Producer Prices in constant terms 
1995/96 = 100 
 
 
Ghana Ivory 
Coast 
Nigeria 
1995/96 1438 92 100 100 100 
1996/97 1556 133 111 104 103 
1997/98 1711 180 130 123 103 
1998/99 1298 225 143 161 94 
1999/00 919 226 121 90 61 
2000/01 990 351 137 100 64 
2001/02 1580 454 152 166 74 
2002/03 1873 850 228 175 69 
2003/04 1534 900 210 89 62 
2004/05 1571 900 183 79 59 
2005/06 1557 900 164 80 59 
2006/07 1854 915 151 87 59 
Source: figures from ICCO [2008] 
 
 
4.2.4 - Forward Contracting and Offshore Borrowing 
 
Given that forward contracts represent a virtual guarantee of future income, the Cocobod is 
able to use these contracts as collateral for offshore borrowing.  This is necessary to help 
the Cocobod achieve their annual loan agreement from a syndication of foreign banks.  The 
loan is used primarily to provide LBC’s with seed funding [credit] to facilitate the 
                                                 
99
 After the re-denomination of the Ghana Cedi in 2007 the Cedi is now tied to the US dollar and therefore 1 Cedi = 
1 $ [approximately]. 
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purchasing of cocoa.  Figure 4.1 shows how this loan has increased steadily from $149 
million to $900 million in 2007/08.     
 
Figure 4.1 – Cocobod Offshore Borrowing  
 
Source: figures from Tiffen et al [2002], BOG [2003], GAIN [2005] and Kpodo [2008a100] 
 
Whilst the increasing size of the loan is primarily an indication of Ghana’s growing crop 
size, the improved interest rate charged on the loan and the enthusiasm with which lenders 
patronise this facility101, offer some indication of the Cocobod’s good reputation for contract 
fulfilment [Monnier, 2006].   
 
4.2.5 - Seed-funding  
 
Seed-funding represents credit provided by the Cocobod to the LBC’s for use in the 
purchasing of cocoa from farmers.  The syndicated loan described above is used primarily 
for this purpose.  Since 1998 the Cocobod has provided seed-funding to LBC’s at interest 
rates below the average banking level [Tiffen et al, 2002; BOG, 2003].  In 2000 the Cocobod 
                                                 
100
 Kpodo, K [2008a] ‘Ghana see’s 650,000 tonnes for 2008/09 crop, and signs new loan’ - 
http://africa.reuters.com/country/CI/news/usnL3523501.html 
101
 The popularity of this facility in 2006 is indicated by the 47% over-subscription that it received from lenders 
[Monnier, 2006].  
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was providing loans at an interest rate of 30%, plus 3-5% bank charges102, compared to 39-
55% charged by commercial banks [Tiffen et al, 2002, p23].  However, seed-funding can 
only be used for cocoa purchasing and thus LBC’s must seek other forms of finance to fulfil 
their working capital requirements.   
 
Studies of agricultural reform throughout sub-Saharan Africa have concluded that the rate 
of private sector entry into local purchasing markets is significantly affected by the level of 
financial sector development [Shepherd and Farolfi, 1999].  Indeed, it is possible that 
without the Cocobod’s seed-funding LBC’s would struggle to finance their purchases.  
Access to credit is not only restricted by the low collateral base of LBC’s, but also the 
limited capacity of the Ghanaian banking sector103 [Shepherd and Onumah, 1997; BOG, 
2003].  As such, only two banks had supplied LBC’s with finance by 1997 [Shepherd and 
Onumah 1997, p 58].  In light of these constraints, the BOG [2003] contends that within a 
liberalised market domestic companies will struggle to compete with multinationals based 
on their superior credit ratings and access to low cost finance. 
 
4.2.6 - The Provision of Farmer Inputs 
 
Farmer inputs, such as, pesticides used to tackle pest and disease, and, fertilisers used to 
increase soil productivity and sustainability, are very important in cocoa production.  To 
give an example of the impact which pests can have, it is estimated that 25-30% of Ghana’s 
crop is badly affected by Capsids104 and that if left untreated for three years they could 
reduce yields by as much as 75% [Flood et al, 2004, p42].  The impact of both pest and 
disease and poor fertiliser application is indicated by the relatively low productivity Ghana 
achieves compared with other major producers.  Figures reported for Ghana show an 
average annual yield of around 300-400 Kg per hectare [Norde and Duursen, 2003; Teal 
                                                 
102
 In order to gain seed-funding LBC’s have to first gain guarantees from banks as a form of collateral. The LBC will 
normally be charged in the region of 3-5% of the amount being borrowed for this guarantee. Without a bank 
guarantee LBC’s cannot access seed-fund.
 
 
103
 In the 1994/95 season, the finance required for internal cocoa purchases [69%] and LBC operating expenses 
[16.7%] totalled 75.7% of the total credit available in the Ghanaian banking system [BOG, 2003]. 
104 
Capsids are only one of the three main pests and diseases that attack cocoa crops in West Africa.  The others 
include swollen shoot diseases and black pod.    
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and Vigneri, 2004], compared with the Ivory Coast’s 590 Kg/ha [Norde and Duursen, 2003] 
and Indonesia’s almost 1000 Kg/ha [Teal and Vigneri, 2004].   
 
4.2.6.1 - Missing Markets and Government Intervention  
 
Based on World Bank structural adjustment policies all Cocobod subsidies in the area of 
farmer inputs were to be removed by 1996/97105 [Teal and Vigneri, 2004].  The objective of 
this was to encourage market growth and efficiency through private sector input provision.  
However, as has been the case for many African markets that have gone through the 
process of structural adjustment [Kherallah et al, 2000], the private sector input providers 
in Ghana have either been unwilling or unable to fill the void left by the Cocobod in this 
area [MOFEP, 1999; Laven, 2005, 2007].  Similar to arguments presented earlier [Poulton 
et al, 1998; Kherallah et al, 2000], the farmer’s lack of access to credit in Ghana is cited as 
one of the fundamental reasons behind the lack of private sector input provision [MOFEP, 
1999; Tiffen et al, 2002; Laven, 2005]. 
 
Responding to the missing market for farmer pesticides the Cocobod set up the Cocoa 
National Disease and Pest Control Committee [CODEPAC] in 2001. This programme 
provides these inputs for free and cocoa farms are sprayed either with insecticides to treat 
Capsids, or with fungicides to treat Blackpod disease.  The positive impact of the CODEPAC 
program on Ghana’s output in recent years is noted in several recent studies including 
Laven [2005], Teal et al, [2006], and Vigneri and Santos [2007]. 
 
However, the cost of the CODEPAC programme is significant.  Indeed, being provided as a 
public good the cost of this programme is a direct drain on cocoa revenues.  During the 
2005/06 season the government spent 9.7 million106 Ghana cedis on mass spraying107.  By 
                                                 
105
 The restructuring of input delivery to farmers was under the CRP – Cocoa Rehabilitation Programme 
106
 My Joy Online News [2006] ‘Government Spends 97 billion on mass spraying’. 
http://www.myjoyonline.com/tools/print/printnews.asp?contentid=115 
107
 As can be seen from table A-1 on page 399 the 2005/06 expenditure on additional expenses such as mass 
spraying, fertilisers, research, quality control, road building, and warehouse improvements was 51 million cedis 
and therefore mass spraying is almost 20% of the cost in this broad area.  Based on figures quoted for 2007/08 the 
percentage of additional expenses allotted to mass spraying will expand significantly.   
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2007/08 the programme had expanded to such an extent that Cocobod was quoted as 
saying they would spend at least $90 million on the mass-spraying programme [Kpodo, 
2007a108].   
 
The Cocobod have also intervened in the market for fertilisers, where a market report109 
from 2006 indicates that farmer default has been a major problem.  During 2003/04 the 
Cocobod distributed 31.5 million cedis worth of fertilisers on loan to farmers, off which 
only 2.7 million cedis was collected.  As such, it would appear that the risk of farmer 
default, as highlighted in chapter two, is a major problem in Ghana.  In light of this, the 
Cocobod have developed a new program for fertiliser distribution in the 2007/08 season 
where inputs will be sold to groups of farmers at a subsidy of 50% on a cash only basis 
[Ryan, 2007a110].   
 
Crawford et al [2006] suggest a number of stringent conditions that have to be adhered to 
in order for government input programmes to be successful. However, in practice very few 
government programmes adhere to such guidelines, thus leaving subsidy programs open to 
criticism [Kherallah et al, 2000; Crawford et al, 2006; Poulton et al, 2007]. In particular 
subsidy programmes are criticised for their short-term outlook and the negative effect that 
they have on private sector input market development [Jayne et al, 2003]. Political leaders 
do not have the patience required for long-term market development, instead taking urgent 
and short-term action to increase supply [Crawford et al, 2006; Gregory and Bumb, 2006].  
Based on these studies it appears that government intervention is restricting the process of 
transition from public to private sector input provision.  In light of this, it will be interesting 
to investigate the long term objectives of the Cocobod’s input programmes and whether 
any actions have been taken to encourage the development of a sustainable private sector 
input market.   
                                                 
108
 Kwasi Kpodo [2007a] ‘Ghana Bullish for 2007/08 Crop’. http://africa.reuters.com/nbc/GH/. 
109
 My Joy Online News [2006] ‘Government Spends 97 billion on mass spraying’. 
http://www.myjoyonline.com/tools/print/printnews.asp?contentid=115 
110
 Ryan [2007a], ‘Ghana to ease fertiliser bill for cocoa growers’. http://africa.reuters.com/nbc/GH/. 
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4.2.7 - Warehousing   
 
The Cocobod remains in total control of the handling and storage of cocoa delivered to the 
takeover centres by the LBC’s.  It is difficult to obtain an accurate breakdown of the total 
storage capacity available to the Cocobod at the ports due to seasonal variations in rented 
warehouses.  Figures presented by Rottger [2000], show that the Cocobod has a mixture of 
owned and rented warehouse space at each takeover centre amounting to a total of 
218,000 tonnes [124,000 tonnes at Tema, 36,000 tonnes at Takoradi, and 58,000 at Kasse]. 
Recent figures quoted in the Ghanaian media before the commencement of the 2007/08 
season reported a total storage capacity of 350,000 tonnes for the Cocobod [Kpodo, 
2007b]111.   Whilst past studies have shown relatively limited interest in this area, Kydd 
and Dorward [2004] find that the development of supply chain infrastructure has a 
significant effect on the level of private sector engagement in the market.  In light of this, 
the Cocobod’s role in takeover and storage will be investigated in this study.  
 
 
4.3 - The Impact of Liberalisation in the Local Buying Market 
 
4.3.1 - Past Experience of Liberalisation in the Local Buying Market  
 
Throughout the history of the Ghanaian cocoa market various changes in the ruling party 
and their associated economic policies have led to changes in the structure of the local 
buying market for cocoa. Indeed, reform in 1992 represented the third time that the local 
buying market has been liberalised after a period of government controlled buying.  
Recognition of past fluctuations in this area helps to demonstrate the risk of policy reversal 
faced by the current crop of private buyers in Ghana.  
 
During the early 1940’s the first set of private sector buyers to operate in the Ghanaian 
cocoa market were forced out in response to claims of farmer manipulation [Arhin et al, 
1985; Austin 1998]. This led to the establishment of United Ghana Farmers’ Council as a 
                                                 
111
 Kpodo [2007b] ‘Ghana moves to cut cocoa shipment delays at ports’, http://africa.reuters.com/nbc/GH/. 
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government buying company. The UGFC was largely seen as a repository of patronage 
[Rimmer, 1992], and its inefficiencies are evident through it marketing costs of £33 per 
tonne, as compared the £18 per tonne recorded by private buyers [Beckman, 1976].  The 
second major period of private sector buying resulted from the 1966 election of the Busia 
government.  However, in 1977 the government once again forced private buyers out of the 
market and the government controlled Produce Buying Company [PBC] became the 
monopsony buyer of cocoa [Rimmer, 1992]. Similar to previous government supported 
buyers the PBC became a highly inefficient and overstaffed organisation [Rimmer, 1992].  
 
4.3.2 - Market Entry Post 1992 
 
In 1992 the PBC’s monopsony over internal purchases was ended and private buyers were 
licensed to compete in the internal purchasing of cocoa in Ghana.  Nyateng [1995] observes 
that Cocobod strictly enforces the financial and managerial requirements needed to gain a 
licence, and resultantly many smaller operators have been denied access to the internal 
purchasing market112. Buyers receive a fixed margin on each tonne of cocoa113 delivered to 
the CMC as payment from the Cocobod.  Similar to the system of farmer pricing the buyer’s 
margin is fixed as a percentage of the projected FOB price at the start of each season.   
 
As seen from both appendix one and table 4.3, the LBC’s share of the FOB has been coming 
down in recent years.  This has created very tight operating margins [Laven, 2005].  
Varangis and Schreiber [2001] and the LMC [1996], find that due to high start up costs and 
low margins only one LBC had made a profit by 1999.  In recent years the margin has 
decline from 11% in 2001/02, to 8.93% in 2002/03 [Laven, 2005], once again leaving 
LBC’s struggling for survival [Fold, 2002, 2008].  In light of this, Zeitlin [2006] observes a 
high bankruptcy rate among purchasing companies in Ghana.   
                                                 
112
 LBC’s should not be thought of as small under-resourced African businesses.  As observed by Nyateng [1995] 
the Cocobod strictly enforce the financial and managerial entry requirements.  Based on field work in 2007 and 
2008 it appeared that on average the LBC’s interviewed would have around 15-20 office staff, and some of the 
larger LBC’s can have up to 4,000 staff in the field, including their purchasing clerks.  
113
 As noted earlier in the section on quality control, payment is dependent on the cocoa meeting the QCD’s strict 
quality criteria.  
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Table 4.3 – Distribution of FOB   
 
Crop Year 
FOB Breakdown 2001/02 2002/03 
Producer Price 67.00% 68.11% 
Buyers Margin 11.00% 8.93% 
Domestic Transport  3.00% 2.26% 
Disinfestations Costs 0.22% 0.67% 
Crop Finance Costs 3.50% 2.30% 
Quality Inspection114 0.02% - 
Cocobod 2.50% - 
Government Tax 10.9% 16.44% 
Total  100% 100% 
Source: figures from Laven [2005115] 
 
 
In light of the prevailing conditions in the market, Fold [2008] questions whether it is 
possible for an LBC to achieve a satisfactory return on capital in the cocoa market based on 
the Cocobod’s system of FOB sharing. Nevertheless, Zeitlin [2006] finds that despite 
seemingly unattractive market conditions there has been a remarkable rate of entry into 
the Ghanaian internal market116.   
 
As can be seen from figure 4.2 on the next page, initial market growth was slow and by 
1996/97 Cashpro117 was the PBC’s only real competitor.  
                                                 
114
 The lack of clarity surrounding this figure is indicative of the challenge faced in attempting to gain accurate cost 
figures of the Cocobod. There is no cost breakdown in the annual reports and accounts published by Cocobod.  
Rottger [2000, p12] presents figures showing the cost of quality inspection to be 0.92% of the FOB price for 1999. 
115
 Laven [2005] identifies the source of the figures in Table 2 as confidential.  
116
 Please refer to the detailed breakdown of market share in appendix three. 
117
 Whilst several companies have come and gone during the history of the internal buying market post 1992, the 
most notable casualty is that of Cashpro, which was the PBC’s main competitor up until 2000/01 season. Cashpro 
ceased trading in 2001/02 amid claims of financial corruption. 
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        Source: figures from Rottger [2000] 
 
However, by 2000 the market had grown to over 20 companies [Rottger, 2000; Laven, 
2005].  Currently there are 26 registered LBC’s, of which around 19 are actively buying 
cocoa118 [Cocobod Source, 2008].  Vigneri and Santos [2007] find that there is fierce 
competition between buyers in the internal market.  Indeed, the steady decline in the PBC’s 
market-share from 80% in 1996/97 [Shepherd and Onumah 1997], to 35% in 2004/05 
[Laven, 2005] and then 31% in 2007/08119, offers further indication of increased 
competition in the market.   
 
The figure of nineteen active LBC’s may be misleading.  As can be seen from both figure 4.3 
and appendix three, the top companies continue to dominate the market.  For the last four 
seasons, the same nine companies120 have controlled 85-90%+ of local buying 
demonstrating the challenge of breaking into this market121.  The one exception to this is 
                                                 
118
 Please refer to the detailed breakdown of market share in appendix three. 
119
 Daily Graphic [2008] ‘Ghana Must Reduce Stake in PBC’. http://www.modernghana.com/news/157278/1/ 
ghana-must-reduce-stake-in-pbc.html 
120
 Interestingly, at least three of these companies, Federated, Transroyal and Cocoa Merchants, are represented 
by the senior directors of Global Haulage
120
 at board level [Rottger, 2000]. 
121
 The companies classified as ‘Other’ include; Dio Jean, Royal Commodities, Sompa Cocoa, Sunshine 
Commodities, Fereday Commodities, Sika Aba Buyers, West Africa Exchange Commodities and Chartwell Ventures. 
All companies within this classification had a market share of between 0.1-1.5% in 2006/07.   
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the case of Diaby, which has managed to establish a good market share in a relatively small 
number of seasons.   
 
 
 
        Source: documents obtained from Cocobod during 2008 fieldwork. 
 
 
 
 
4.3.3 - Service Provision   
 
Studies by Varangis and Schreiber [2001], Laven [2005], Zeitlin [2006], Teal et al [2006], 
and Vigneri and Santos [2007] display evidence that since the move to partial 
liberalisation, competition in the LBC market has led to increased service provision for 
farmers.  Indeed, in the districts where buyers compete for market share most vigorously 
there is a noticeable improvement in farmer production, based on the incentives buyers 
provide to win sales [Zeitlin, 2006; Vigneri and Santos, 2007].  Vigneri and Santos [2007] 
find that the provision of credit to purchase inputs is the second most common incentive 
used by buyers to incentivise farmers.  Reporting similar results, Zeitlin [2006] observes 
that buyers interlock such arrangements with farmers’ output, thus making them captive to 
a particular LBC.   
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The positive impact of service provision on farmer output is presented as evidence in 
support of structural policies that encourage market entry, thus increasing competition 
between LBC’s [Teal et al, 2006; Vigneri and Santos, 2007]. To some extent, these 
recommendations conflict with the findings in chapter two where it was found that buyers 
operating under a concentrated market structure are able offer more services to farmers 
due to the reduced risk they face in terms of strategic default and farmer loyalty [Larsen, 
2002; Poulton et al, 2004122; Poulton, 2006].  
 
However, it must be observed that despite the positive results reported above, the services 
made available by LBC’s are only reaching a relatively small proportion of farmers [Tiffen 
et al, 2002; Laven, 2005].  Laven [2005] finds that in 2003, more than 65% of farmers 
interviewed claimed they did not receive any benefits from LBC’s and that in 2005 this 
figure had increased to almost 88% [Laven, 2005, 2007].  In light of this, the following 
research will attempt to investigate both the extent to which such services are provided by 
buyers, and also the market conditions under which buyers are most incentivised to 
provide farmer services.   
 
4.3.4 - Quality Decline 
 
Earlier in the section on quality control it was noted that market liberalisation is closely 
associated with quality decline.  One of the most commonly cited reasons for this is the 
introduction of competition, where buyers have been competing through speed of turnover 
and market share instead of quality and price.  Indeed, Vigneri and Santos [2007] and 
Laven [2005] observe that buyers in Ghana have been competing through a strategy of 
increasing market share.  Similarly, Fold [2008] observes that as a result of fixed margins 
buyer revenue is dependent on their ability to increase speed and volume.  
                                                 
122
 It should also be observed that Poulton et al [2004] find that market concentration can lead to improved 
performance in cases where there is not a strong government to control the private sector.  Therefore, in Ghana 
where there is a strong government it may be possible to achieve coordination between private sector actors 
without the need for market concentration.  To some extent this will be dependent on the role of the Cocobod and 
whether it helps to facilitate the conditions necessary for coordination.  
117 | P a g e  
 
117 
 
 
Fold [2002] notes that the inexperience of new market entrants in Ghana has created a 
rush to buy cocoa with little reference to quality.  Working on a flat commission basis123 the 
only way for LBC’s to increase their income is by purchasing a higher volume of cocoa.  As 
such, buyers have been sacrificing quality in order to obtain higher volumes [Laven, 2007].  
In light of this, Fold [2002, 2008] contends that the introduction of private buyers may lead 
to a decline in Ghanaian quality.   
 
The impact of current buying practices in Ghana can be seen most clearly through the 
purple bean124 problem that affected Ghana in the 2004/05 season.  Purple beans result 
from farmers not fermenting cocoa for long enough post harvest.  Fermentation is required 
for Ghanaian cocoa to develop the specific taste profile that contributes towards the 
premium.  In light of the trends observed above, competitive buying practices were blamed 
for the higher incidence of purple beans in 2004/05 [Laven, 2007].  The direct impact of 
purple beans can be seen from the decline in the Ghana premium during 2004/05 from $80 
to $20 [GAIN, 2005; Laven, 2007]. In response to this, the Cocobod announced a 50% 
reduction in the payment for any bag of cocoa containing more than 25%125 purple beans, 
creating serious disarray in the market [Laven, 2007].  
 
Buyer competition has been associated with quality decline in several other commodity 
markets [Shepherd and Farolfi, 1999].  Varangis and Schreiber [2001, pg 50-51] observe 
quality decline in Cameroonian cocoa where, ‘farmers paid less attention to drying and 
fermentation in order to take the opportunity to sell quickly to local buyers’. Further they 
find, ‘it has been suggested that even buyers who would like to buy high quality cocoa bid 
for low quality beans for fear of losing out to a competitor’.  As such, it would appear that 
even where buyers do wish to maintain quality, the intensity of competition at the local 
level may constrain this possibility.   
                                                 
123
 LBC’s are paid the same margin for the delivery of grade one and grade two cocoa. 
124
 Purple beans are beans of inferior quality, where the purple colour is associated with insufficient fermentation 
[Laven, 2005]. 
125
 My own field work indicates that the initial response of the Cocobod was to place this 50% penalty on any bag 
of cocoa containing more than 5% purple beans. 
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In the case of the Ivory Coast, Losch [2002] confirms the quality risk resulting from 
liberalised internal buying.  Losch finds that buyers rush for the product in order to 
increase both turnover speed and market share.  This has resulted in a downward trend in 
quality, where the proportion of top quality grade 1 beans exported produced in the Ivory 
Coast has dropped from 70% to 50%, between 1997 and 2000 [Losch, 2002, p222].  In light 
of this, it will be interesting to investigate the potential for a private sector quality control 
system in Ghana, where many of the same market dynamics have the potential to take 
effect.  
 
Gibbon [2005] highlights the erosion of quality standards in African cotton and coffee 
under liberal market conditions because of the buyer’s inability to reject a farmer’s 
produce.  This is caused by their fear that any rejected produce will be purchased by a rival 
buyer.  Poulton [2006] describes this problem as a local level coordination failure, where 
international buyers who wish to purchase good quality are unable to do so because local 
buyers who favour volume will overpay in order to establish market share creating a 
competitive market for low quality cocoa.  Poulton [2006] finds that within a concentrated 
market this problem can be overcome through collective action leading to the maintenance 
of quality.  Indeed, in absence of a concentrated market structure, Poulton finds that it is 
extremely difficult to implement a model of quality control in a highly competitive market.   
 
4.3.5 - Supply Chain Efficiency 
 
The LMC [1996], Shepherd and Onumah [1997] and Varangis and Schreiber [2001] all 
observe that a by-product of liberalisation in Ghana is the increased speed with which 
cocoa is being transported from growing areas to the takeover centres.  Rottger [2000, pg 
12-13] notes that ‘LBC’s do not intend to lock up cocoa beans in the bush, but target speedy 
secondary evacuation to the takeover points of the CMC in the ports’.  LBC’s prioritise 
speed of turnover because, as touched upon above, their profitability is dependent on the 
efficiency of their capital turnover [Shepherd and Onumah, 1997; Losch, 2002; Fold, 2002].  
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In Ghana, however, the capacity of the Cocobod warehousing system has not responded to 
buyers increased speed of turnover, and resultantly, congestion along the supply chain has 
become a major problem [LMC, 1996; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001].  Indeed, recognising 
this problem the LMC [1996] recommended that the Cocobod transfer responsibility for 
warehousing to the private sector.  Nevertheless, the Cocobod has remained in monopoly 
control over the storage and takeover of cocoa, and therefore, congestion has become a 
contentious issue between private buyers and the regulator.  This was evident in a recent 
market report where the president of the Licensed Buyer’s Association [LICOBAG] was 
quoted as saying that delays at the ports have made it almost impossible for LBC’s to break 
even in recent seasons126.  In light of these problems, it will be necessary to investigate both 
how the Cocobod’s role in cocoa takeover has impacted upon LBC development, and also 
the potential opportunities for future change in this area. 
 
4.3.6 - Collective Action 
 
The License Buyer’s Association of Ghana was established in 2002.  To date there has been 
no in-depth research on its role in the market.  However, as can be seen from the high 
profile media outbursts of LICOBAG during recent market seasons127, collective action 
amongst LBC’s appears to be playing an increasingly important role.  Indeed, Fold [2002] 
contends that in coming seasons LBC’s are likely to become powerful actors in the 
Ghanaian cocoa chain with the capacity to influence change.  Therefore, in light of the 
knowledge gap in this area and also the importance of collective action in NIE, it will be 
necessary to explore the role of LICOBAG within this study.   
 
4.3.7 - Internal Market Conclusion 
 
From the sections above it can be seen that the role of the Cocobod in the market has led to 
a level of control and public good provision in Ghana that has not seen in liberalised cocoa 
                                                 
126
 African Echo News [2006] ‘Rising Output Costs Strain Ghana’s Cocoa Industry’, http://africanecho.co.uk/africa 
nechonews20-sept14.html 
127
 African Echo News [2006] ‘Rising Output Costs Strain Ghana’s Cocoa Industry’,   http://africanecho.co.uk/africa 
nechonews20-sept14.html 
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markets.  Equally, it must be recognised that government control may have restricted the 
level of private sector engagement in the market and as a result the level of benefit 
achieved through partial liberalisation may have been constrained.  If the internal market is 
to develop in line with the developmental coordination model observed earlier [Kydd and 
Dorward, 2004], then the environment for private sector investment will need to improve. 
In light of this, it will be necessary to investigate both the factors affecting private sector 
engagement in the market, and also the potential for the Cocobod to improve market 
conditions for LBC’s.  The Cocobod’s ability to do this without sacrificing the degree of 
market coordination that has been the cornerstone of their good performance in recent 
years, will offer further insight into the strength of the partial model as a form of market 
organisation.     
 
4.4 – The Cocobod and the External Buying Market 
 
4.4.1 - The Role of the CMC 
 
The external marketing of Ghanaian cocoa has been the responsibility of the CMC since 
1947.  The role of the CMC affects not only Ghana’s bargaining power as a monopoly seller, 
but also the nature of coordination along the Ghanaian cocoa chain.  The CMC’s main 
operations are the selling and shipping of Ghanaian cocoa to overseas clients and domestic 
processors.  Ghana main crop cocoa128, which traditionally accounts for about 75-80% of 
the season’s total production, is sold to a variety of registered buyers129 on the basis of 
forward contracts130.  The remaining 20-25% of Ghana’s crop, known as the light crop131, is 
                                                 
128
 Main crop beans are traditionally produced during the months September to May, and have a bean count of 80-
100 beans per 100 grams of cocoa.  Beans of a larger size receive a premium on the export market due to 
additional fat content and reduced waste when processing. 
129
 Buyers have to be registered with the Federation of Cocoa Commerce in London [FCC] and they generally 
include a variety of cocoa traders, cocoa processors and chocolate manufacturers.  
130
 Forward contracts were explained in section 1.4.2 in chapter one.  
131
 Light crop beans are beans of smaller size to main crop beans. They have a bean count of 100-120 cocoa beans 
per 100g of cocoa. Light crop beans are traditionally produced towards the end of the cocoa season [during the 
mid-crop months, May-August] when the weather is less conducive to good cocoa production. However, given that 
weather is changeable and cocoa is an agronomic crop, light crop beans may also come during the early months of 
the season [the main crop months, September-May].  
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distributed to Ghana’s local processing industry on a pro-rata basis, as agreed in the supply 
agreements signed between local processors and the Cocobod.  However, sales to 
international buyers have always been the CMC’s priority, as seen through sources of cocoa 
revenue in table 4.4. 
 
 
Table 4.4 – CMC Revenue Stream  
 
Cocoa Season 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
International 
Sales [Cedis] 
   
221,020,000 
  
275,816,100 
  
590,887,300 
  
901,493,900 
  
809,934,700 
  
969,108,100 
  
942,186,947 
Local Sales 
[Cedis] 
    
39,944,600 
    
51,679,000 
  
137,675,000 
    
90,705,900 
    
78,567,800 
   
131,583,600 
  
133,813,420 
Source – Figures achieved from the Cocobod during field work [2008] 
 
The CMC’s monopoly over cocoa exports was due to end in 2000, with LBC’s being allowed 
to export 30% of their purchases [Laven, 2007].  However, despite the Cocobod issuing 
provisional licences to several LBC’s, the CMC remain the monopoly seller of Ghana’s cocoa 
[Laven, 2007].  Laven [2005] reports that the Cocobod do not believe LBC’s have the 
capabilities required to take over the specialist role of the CMC.   
 
Furthermore, it would appear that there are some additional advantages for the Cocobod 
when operating through the CMC.  LMC132 [1996] find that one of the main reasons why 
Ghana should not rush into external market liberalisation is the countervailing power and 
administrative economies of scale the CMC has in negotiations with buyers.  LMC [1996] 
also report that the CMC operate a professional and fair service for all buyers.  Varangis and 
Schreiber [2001] observe that the CMC has established a reputation for quality produce 
                                                 
132
 The LMC report [1996] is highly influential with regards to the CMC’s continued role in the market. The report 
was commissioned on behalf of the Ghanaian government and the World Bank to assess the future liberalisation 
opportunities for the Ghanaian cocoa market.  
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and reliable service in a market where defaults on contracts are common.  This reputation 
is built upon over 30 years without defaulting on a contract and an international triple ‘A’ 
credit rating [Shepherd and Onumah, 1997].  As discussed earlier, Fold [2001] considers 
Ghana’s reputation for quality and reliability as public good133, and their position as a 
monopoly seller is necessary to avoid free riding on this reputation.  Furthermore, the 
CMC’s reputation for reliability enables buyers to deal with them on the basis of forward 
sales, in turn creating the benefits of price stabilization, offshore loans134, and additional 
price premiums [LMC, 1996; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005] 
4.4.2 - The Quality Requirements of External Cocoa Buyers 
 
In recent years quality decline across cocoa markets has been closely associated with the 
structural adjustments that took place in the intermediary stages of the chain post market 
liberalisation [Fold, 2001, 2002].  Firstly, the use of modern bulk transport and storage 
systems reduce the ability to separate bean quality prior to transportation.  Resultantly 
processors are not willing to pay a premium for shipments of average quality beans [Fold, 
2001].  Secondly, processing technology has been developed to reduce the effect of low 
quality beans and maintain the flavour characteristic of the cocoa product [LMC, 1996135; 
Fold, 2002; Daviron, 2002].   
 
It must, however, be acknowledged that there are still advantages to buying good quality 
beans and that a certain amount of quality is still required in processing.  Indeed, as 
observed earlier, the market is still willing to pay a premium for Ghanaian beans. LMC 
[1996], Fold [2001] and Tollens and Gilbert [2003] highlight the following reasons why the 
market will pay a premium for beans of a higher quality.       
 
                                                 
133
 This can be closely linked with the literature in chapter three where it was observed that the role of the 
government in quality control may be considered a public good [Gibbon, 2005; Ponte, 2002]. 
134
 Given that these two facilities are directly related to forward sales, we must consider them as advantages of the 
CMC.  The BOG [2003] contend that financing cocoa purchases in the absence of the CMC would put a severe 
strain on the domestic banking sector. 
135
 The LMC report [1996, p29] observed how improvements in processing technology, designed to take advantage 
of the large supply of low quality beans on the market, had inadvertently led to reduced demand for Ghanaian 
cocoa and a decline in the Ghanaian premium.  
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 Batches of homogenous beans are less expensive to process. 
 Large beans with a high fat content produce a large quantity of butter. 
 Well fermented beans have a superior flavour and lower level of free fatty acids136. 
 
The main source of demand for Ghanaian beans comes from Europe due to the higher 
standard of chocolate quality demanded in the European market.  As such, 59% of Ghana’s 
cocoa beans were exported to the European Union in 2005/06, with the next largest 
market being Asia137 with 23% [Cocobod, 2006].  The importance of Ghanaian quality can 
also be seen by the fact that Ghanaian beans are stored and transported separately138, 
allowing them to be blended with poor quality in the processing stage [Gilbert, 1997; 
Gibbon and Ponte, 2005].  Further cost savings are reaped due to Ghana’s reputation as a 
high quality producer, reducing the transaction costs faced in negotiating contracts and 
verifying bean quality prior to shipment [LMC, 1996; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001; BOG, 
2003].  However, Ghana is now the only major cocoa origin where national reputation 
remains an important factor [Fold, 2002; Losch, 2002; Daviron, 2002].  As such, the 
demand for quality from Ghana may not be reflective of demand across the rest of the 
market. 
 
Tollens and Gilbert [2003] find that quality decline in Cameroon post-liberalisation should 
be viewed as an efficient market response to changing demand from external buyers.  In 
this light, they argue that there is ‘no role for government in either undertaking or 
requiring quality certification’ [p 340].  This argument is based on their contention that 
when required cocoa quality can be improved post-farmgate by the local buyer.  In 
adopting this position Tollens and Gilbert, accept that they are going against the ‘generally 
held’ position that quality controls are most efficiently imposed at the farmer level.  
                                                 
136
 Free fatty acids have always been seen as an unattractive quality in cocoa beans; however, in recent years even 
greater significance has been placed in this area as a result of EU legislation.   
137
 Asia and particularly Japan also demand a higher quality of chocolate.  
138
 Beans from other West African origins would be bulked together as fair average quality [Fold, 2001; Tollens and 
Gilbert, 2003]. 
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Nevertheless, Tollens and Gilbert argue that where required demand will lead to quality, 
regardless of the effect that local market buying conditions have on supply139. 
 
In other studies, however, it is possible to observe a greater interplay between demand and 
supply factors in the production of quality.  For example, whilst Fold [2002], Losch [2002], 
and Varangis and Schreiber [2001] all acknowledge the changing nature of quality 
demanded from external buyers, they also recognise how the dynamics of highly 
competitive buying at the local level have impacted on quality.  Poulton [2006] finds that 
under conditions where it is difficult to improve the quality of a commodity after purchase 
from the farmer, market demand for quality may not lead to the supply of quality.  This was 
the case in the Zimbabwean and Tanzanian cotton markets where, despite strong demand 
for quality from lead buyers, market liberalisation led to quality decline.   
 
In reference to the challenge of achieving quality in liberalised markets, Ponte [2002] finds 
that external buyers in the Kenyan coffee market were prepared to accept the inefficiencies 
of a government-run auction system in order to preserve Kenyan quality.  As such, it 
appears that external buyers’ level of support for government intervention may be based 
on their quality sourcing objectives.  To some extent, this may be related to the theoretical 
position stated in chapter three, where it was noted that certain writers within GVC 
consider governance structures to be determined by the coordination needs of the chain 
actors [Sturgeon, 2001, 2002; Gereffi et al, 2005; Gibbon et al, 2008].  On this basis, it 
appears that external coffee buyers were prepared to support the Kenyan coffee marketing 
board based on the coordination it offered them in terms of quality sourcing.  In light of 
this, it will be necessary to investigate how the quality requirements of external buyers in 
the global cocoa market impacts on their support for the Cocobod’s governance in Ghana.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139
 In reference to the conceptual framework for this study, Tollens and Gilbert are arguing that the demand 
effects of the macro environment will dominate the micro level supply effects taking place at the local buying level.  
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4.4.3 - Power in the Global Cocoa Chain 
 
The work of Fold [2001, 2002, 2008] acts as an important reference for understanding the 
impact of power in the global cocoa industry. Fold has observed how changes in the 
industrial foundations of the cocoa sector have driven changes in the forms of vertical 
coordination throughout the chain.  Specifically, Fold [2001, 2002] and Gilbert [1997] find 
that the outsourcing of processing operations from chocolate manufacturers to processing 
firms has enabled cocoa processors to become significant power brokers in the global 
cocoa chain.   Alongside the trend in outsourcing, major consolidation has taken place 
between the dominant trading and processing firms, creating an extremely powerful 
oligopoly of firms occupying the intermediate stages of the chain.  Indeed, this has created a 
significant concentration of power amongst the actors directly linked to developing 
country markets [Gibbon and Ponte, 2005].      
 
Strong economies of scale are highlighted as the main driver behind the process of 
consolidation witnessed in recent years [Fold, 2001, 2002; Losch, 2002; Talbot, 2002; 
Tollens and Gilbert, 2003].  Losch [2002] observes how the dominant trading companies of 
the time, Cargill and Archer-Daniels-Midland [ADM], were motivated to vertically integrate 
into the processing segment in order to use their size to reap the available economies of 
scale in trading, transport, storage and processing.   As such, Cargill and ADM have moved 
from being primarily commodity trading companies, to becoming the dominant processing 
companies in the cocoa chain.  Resulting from their wide range of capabilities large 
processing firms have been able to force many of the smaller specialist cocoa traders out of 
the market [Talbot, 2002; Fold, 2002; Dorin, 2003].  As such, large processors in fully 
liberalised markets have been able to remove the risk of using cocoa traders, and in several 
cases processors have been able to vertically integrate to the farmer level.  In turn, this has 
greatly enhanced their control of the supply chain.    
 
Consolidation took place through a series of mergers and acquisitions throughout the 
1990’s.  In the mid 1980’s 70% of grinding was controlled by the top ten grinders, however, 
by the late 1990’s the worlds three largest grinding firms ADM, Cargill, and Barry Callebaut 
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controlled about 50% of global grinding activity140 [Fold, 2001].  In recent years Gibbon and 
Ponte [2005] report a Cr3 ratio of 70% in the cocoa processing industry, showing the 
dominance of these companies.  Recent processing figures in 2006/07 show 500,000 
tonnes for ADM, 440,000 tonnes for Barry Callebuat, and 500,000 tonnes for Cargill [ICCO, 
2008]. 
 
4.4.4 - Origin Processing and Supply Control  
 
Closely related to the processes of market liberalisation and supply chain consolidation is 
the growth of cocoa processing within West Africa.  The development of cocoa processing 
facilities in producing countries is classed as functional upgrading in GVC literature.  
Traditionally cocoa processing has taken place in the cocoa consumer countries of Western 
Europe or North America, close to both the corporate head quarters of the large processors 
and the main markets for chocolate retail.  Indeed, all of the world’s largest cocoa 
processors centre their operations around the Zaanstreek port in Amsterdam, where 
proximity to the major chocolate manufacturers allows for ‘just-in-time’ supply systems 
[Fold, 2002].  However, as can be seen from table 4.5, in recent years Africa’s share of 
global cocoa grinding has increased after a period of stagnation in the 1980’s and early 
1990’s. 
 
Table 4.5 – African Processing Growth 
 
Year  1987/88 1994/95 2003/04 2007/08 
African Total 175,000 220,000 464,000 569,100 
World Share 8.8% 8.7% 14.3% 15.3% 
Source: Figures from LMC [1996], ICCO [2008]. 
 
The Ghanaian PRSP has highlighted the process of agro-industrialisation, as key to helping 
Ghana reach its target of middle-income status by 2020 [The World Bank, 2003].  Within 
                                                 
140
 In the late 1990’s total global grinding was about 2,400,000 tonnes, of which the main three grinders accounted 
for 1,150,000 tonnes [Fold 2002]. 
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the Ghanaian cocoa sector, progress in this area has been slow up until very recently.  
Between 2003 and 2006 the value derived from processed products as a share of total 
value from cocoa exports remained stagnant at 10% [ICCO, 2008]141.  In recent years, 
however, this has changed in line with the government’s stated intention to process 
350,000 tonnes [50%] of Ghanaian cocoa at origin by 2008.  Prior to the 2005/06 season 
the Ghanaian processing industry contained only three active processors.  However, as can 
be seen below, recent seasons have witnessed both the expansion of current processors 
and the arrival of several new processing firms142: 
 
 Incumbent Firms  
 CPC have increased processing from 35,000-65,000 tonnes. 
 Barry Callebaut expanded their capacity to 60,000 tonnes. 
 Wamco has no plans expand its 75,000 tonne capacity. 
 Recent Investors  
 Afrotropic set up in 2005/06 with an initial capacity of 14,000 tonnes, 
and now have plans to expand to 45,000 tonnes. 
 Cargill made an initial $70 million143 investment in a plant with the 
capacity to process 65,000 tonnes, and the ability to expand to 
120,000 tonnes. 
 BD Associates were in negotiations in 2007 to set up a 15,000-20,000 
tonne plant. 
 ADM have set up a factory in Kumasi144 with an initial capacity of 
30,000 tonnes. 
                                                 
141
 In comparison with Ghana the Ivory Coast has experienced much greater growth throughout the 1990’s and 
early 21
th
 century.  Since 1997 the value of processed products as a share of total cocoa exports in the Ivory Coast 
has gone up from 13% in 1997 to 29% at the beginning of 2006 [ICCO, 2008].   
142
 The figures used in the following list have been compiled from two articles on the Flex News website; [1] Flex 
News [2007a] ‘Ghana’s Afrotropic Eyes Expansion’, http://www.flex-news-food.com/pages/8642/Cocoa/Ghana/ 
ghanas-afrotropic-eyes-cocoa-expansion.html. [2] Flex News [2007b] ‘Ghana to boost processing capacity by 
100,000 tonnes’, http://www.flex-news-food.com/pages/12191/Cocoa/Ghana/ghana-boost-cocoa-processing-
100000-tons.html. 
143
 Recent reports have stated that due to the weakening US dollar in 2007/08 the Cargill plant has cost $100 
million: Kpodo, 2008c, ‘Cargill Ghana Cocoa Plant Aims for Nov Start’, http://africa.reuters.com/commodities 
/news/usnLS48796.html 
144
 Despite being inland Kumasi is also an Export Processing Zone [EPZ]. 
128 | P a g e  
 
128 
 
  
Large-scale investment in grinding facilities at origin has been witnessed previously in the 
Ivory Coast during the early 1990’s [Losch, 2002].  The growth of origin processing in the 
Ivory Coast can be closely related to the advent of market liberalisation.  Processing firms 
were able to make investments in the knowledge that they could supply their factories with 
cocoa beans sourced directly from local traders.  In light of this, Losch [2002] observes that 
greater access to Ivorian beans was one of two main reasons why processors invested in 
the Ivory Coast.  By forming alliances with local buyers, processing companies were able to 
stop competitors achieving a dominant position, as well as reducing their competitor’s 
access to the cheapest beans [Losch, 2002145]. 
 
Closely related to this, Fold [2002, p234] observes that ‘market access is absolutely vital to 
the grinding segment’.  By maintaining control over cocoa supply processors are able to 
regulate the price they pay for cocoa on the market, whilst also ensuring they have enough 
supply to fulfill contracts with downstream clients.  In light of such supply concerns, Fold 
[2001, p418] finds that, ‘establishing primary processing facilities seems to be highly 
dependent on the strategic considerations of the transnational primary processors’.   
 
The second main reason why grinders invested in the Ivory Coast was to reduce the 
coordination cost of sourcing beans on the terminal market post market liberalisation 
[Losch, 2002].  As observed earlier, market liberalisation has resulted in the breakdown of 
horizontal coordination within the Ivory Coast.  In turn, this created increased risks 
surrounding quality and the credibility of cocoa contracts.  As noted during chapter three, 
Humphrey and Schmitz [2001] suggest that in cases where supply risk is greatest lead 
firms will choose closer forms of governance.  Therefore, in response to the level of 
                                                 
145
 The close comparison between Losch’s argument for vertical integration and NIE should be observed.  Within 
NIE, it is argued that vertical integration will take place in order to reduce the transaction costs associated with 
using the market.  In the case of the Ivory Coast, processors have vertically integrated in order to bring the 
procurement of beans in-house and removed the transaction cost of using the terminal market.  Losch’s approach 
may be associated with the French Fileire approach, which blends commodity chain analysis with transaction cost 
economics [Raikes et al, 2000].    
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transaction risk they faced when sourcing beans from the Ivory Coast using the market, 
processors made the decision to vertically integrate [Losch, 2002].   
 
Recognition of both of these factors will be crucial in understanding both the reasons 
behind the recent surge of processing investment into Ghana, and how the supply 
requirements of lead buyers may impact upon the governance of the Ghanaian cocoa chain 
in the coming years.  
 
4.4.5 - Origin Processing and National Development   
 
Governments within cocoa producing countries traditionally encourage the development of 
processing facilities for three main reasons [Fold, 2001, 2002; Losch, 2002].  Firstly, the 
ability to attract multimillion dollar investments from the processing sector will 
undoubtedly stimulate the rate of industrial development.  Secondly, it represents an 
opportunity for local entrepreneurs to learn from multinational corporations.  Thirdly, 
‘origin processing’ theoretically represents a viable opportunity to transform a low value 
raw commodity into a value-added146 product prior to export [Fry, 1995; Dand, 1999].   
 
However, despite the above arguments, recent literature on origin processing in cocoa is 
notably sceptical about the actual benefits accruable to both the producer country and the 
processors themselves.  Talbot [2002] and Fold [2002] observe that the existence of strong 
economies scale within the cocoa processing industry creates a significant entry barrier for 
domestic entrepreneurs.  Resultantly, it is often capital rich multinationals that have the 
greatest presence in African cocoa processing [Talbot, 2002].   Indeed, Losch [2002] 
observes that the large multinational processors in the Ivory Coast have been able to use 
their financial power to undercut several of the smaller domestic processors, thus enabling 
them to capture the market.   
                                                 
146
 Value can be added to the raw cocoa bean by processing it into cocoa liquor, cocoa butter and cocoa cake. 
Cocoa liquor is gained after the first stage of processing, where one tonne of cocoa beans will yield 800 kilos of 
liquor
146
 [LMC, 1996, p14]. Cocoa butter and cake require a second stage of processing, where cocoa liquor is 
pressed, resulting in a split of 50% butter, and 50% cake
146
 [Losch, 2002, p209].   
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Fold [2000] finds that origin processing is most successful in cases where the government 
has been able to ‘domesticate’ the technological and organisational knowledge brought in 
by advanced multinationals.  In the case of cocoa, however, Fold [2001] and Wilcox, Abbot 
and Muir [2003] observe very little labour input in the processing stage thus limiting the 
potential for human capital development.  As such, government intervention may be 
required to encourage knowledge acquisition from multinational investments. 
 
Fold [2001] observes that African governments may have to concede some incentives in 
order to attract investment in processing.  This is based on the number of disadvantages 
origin processors face in comparison with their counterparts in North America and Europe.  
Firstly, cocoa liquor produced at origin has to be solidified before transportation147, and 
then re-melted by downstream users [Fold, 2001].  Secondly, processors are only capable 
of producing a limited range of products at origin based on their access to one type of bean 
i.e. Ghanaian beans [Fold 2001].   Thirdly, the quality premium commanded by raw 
Ghanaian beans is diminished when they are transformed into processed goods, such as 
cocoa butter and cake [Fold, 2001; Benjamin, 2007].  Resultantly, processors at origin have 
come to rely on the use of lower quality, cheaper cocoa beans [Fold, 2002; Losch, 2002]. 
 
In light of these factors, LMC [1996] and Benjamin [2007] debate whether origin 
processing is beneficial for Ghana.  This argument is based primarily on the premium 
obtained when selling the raw Ghanaian bean on the international market.  Indeed, LMC 
[1996] find Ghana to be the least well placed of all cocoa producing nations in terms of 
bean suitability for origin processing.  Indeed, it appears that processors do not wish to use 
Ghana’s premium priced beans when processing at origin [Benjamin, 2007, Ryan, 2007].   
 
                                                 
147
 The LMC report [1996] notes that in Europe and North America liquor is transported in 25-30 tonne heated 
tanks and therefore does not need to be solidified. When transporting liquor in bulk from origin this option is 
normally too costly. 
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To date in Ghana processors have been able to avoid this scenario based on the 20% 
discount that the Cocobod has offered origin processors on light crop beans148 [Benjamin, 
2007].  Light crop beans are beans of good quality, though due to their smaller size149 the 
Cocobod do not want to market them alongside their larger premium quality beans.  
However, as Ghana nears its target of 350,000150 tonnes of local processing, there is an 
increased risk of a light crop deficit in Ghana151.  As such, a situation may arise where the 
local processors are not having their supply requirements fulfilled by the Cocobod.  Given 
that all three of the world’s most powerful cocoa processors are now located in Ghana, it 
will be interesting to investigate how this problem may affect the Cocobod’s governance of 
the Ghanaian cocoa market.  
 
4.5 – Conclusion  
 
Throughout this chapter the emphasis has been on creating a firm understanding of the 
Ghanaian cocoa chain.  Given the partial nature of reform in Ghana, the organisation of the 
cocoa market appears to be relatively complex.  However, with deeper exploration, the 
unique aspects of the Ghanaian market can be used to create a clear structure for research.   
Based on the level of interaction between government institutions and various dynamic 
groups of private sector actors, the partial model is constantly being challenged to evolve 
and adapt.  In turn this has created a number of interesting scenarios to be addressed in 
research.  Equally, the various institutional supports of the Cocobod system command 
research attention, based on the good performance of the Ghanaian cocoa market in recent 
                                                 
148
 As noted earlier, light crop beans are beans of smaller size to main crop beans. They are traditionally produced 
towards the end of the cocoa season [during the mid-crop months, May-August] when the weather is less 
conducive to good cocoa production. However, given that weather is changeable and cocoa is an agronomic crop, 
light crop beans may also come during the early months of the season [during the main crop months, September-
May].   
149
 Light crop beans are beans with a bean count of 100-120 cocoa beans per tonne of cocoa. Main crop beans 
have a bean count of 80-100 beans per tonne of cocoa. As seen earlier in section [cocoa quality] beans of a larger 
size receive a premium of the export market due to additional fat content and reduced waste when processing. 
150
 Benjamin [2007] reports that light crop normally amounts to 150,000 tonnes per year. 
151 Ryan, O [2007b] ‘Ghana cocoa grinders fear bean supply crunch’. http://www.reuters.com/article/company 
NewsAndPR/idUSL2136654120070821  
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years.  Therefore, as can be seen from the several research prompts highlighted throughout 
this chapter, the Ghanaian cocoa market is clearly a phenomenon rich in research potential.   
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Chapter 5 - Conceptual Framework 
5.1 - Introduction  
 
During chapter one it was observed that liberalisation within sub-Saharan Africa has led to 
a number of market problems.  Indeed, through recognition of the market failures resulting 
from liberalisation, there is now a greater willingness to accept that sub-Saharan 
governments may have a positive role to play in the process of market development [World 
Bank, 1997; 2008].  In light of this, the partially liberalised Ghanaian cocoa market has been 
highlighted as a highly applicable case through which to build understanding on the 
possible roles for government in market development.   Building on this, chapter five will 
outline a conceptual framework suitable for an analysis of the partial liberalisation model 
in the Ghanaian cocoa market.     
 
As indicated by the research questions in chapter one, the following study will involve an 
analysis of the Cocobod’s role as both the regulator of the domestic supply chain, and a 
supplier of cocoa on the external market152.  This is consistent with the common 
observation that the globalisation of trade and investment increasingly shapes the process 
of national development throughout the developing world.  Indeed, whilst cocoa is a major 
source of economic development at the national level, the vast majority of chocolate made 
with Ghanaian cocoa beans is consumed outside of Ghana.  As such, cocoa is considered an 
export commodity.  In light of this, a cross-disciplinary theoretical framework has been 
developed, enabling a fuller analysis of the different mechanisms at work throughout the 
national and international levels of the market.  New institutional economics will be used 
primarily in analysis of the domestic level of the Ghanaian cocoa chain, and global value 
chain analysis will be used to study the international dimension of the cocoa chain153.   
 
                                                 
152
 The external market includes all the CMC’s customers for cocoa sales.  Cocoa processors fall into this category. 
153
 In terms of the Ghanaian cocoa chain diagram developed in chapter one, the domestic level can be considered 
the Cocobod’s role in all domestic marketing operations up to the point where cocoa becomes the property of the 
CMC. The international dimension involves the CMC’s role in the sale of cocoa on the external cocoa market, and 
all other aspects of the external market such as cocoa trading, processing, manufacturing and retail.    
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This chapter will attempt to outline the foundations of this approach.  The opening sections 
will describe the particular aspects of new institutional economics and global value chain 
analysis that will be applied in the analysis of the Ghanaian cocoa chain.  The middle 
sections of the chapter will offer a justification for why it is necessary to use a cross-
disciplinary approach, as well as providing a diagrammatic version of the conceptual 
framework.  Finally, the chapter will conclude by attempting to resolve some of the 
tensions that may arise as a result of the conceptual framework designed for this study.  
 
5.2 - The Domestic Supply Chain and New Institutional Economics  
 
Based on the understanding of NIE, institutions are crucial in the process of market 
development as they affect the way in which transactions are negotiated, coordinated and 
executed [North, 1990].  Within NIE, institutions can be analysed at the level of either the 
micro institutional arrangements, or the broader macro institutional environment [Davis 
and North, 1971].  Under this analogy we can define the Cocobod as the most influential 
institution within the institutional environment of the Ghanaian cocoa chain.  The 
mechanisms through which the Cocobod takes effect on the daily operations of the market, 
such as quality control, are defined as the institutional arrangements of the Cocobod.   
 
Williamson154 offers an efficiency-based rationale for understanding organisational forms 
in the NIE, where different transactions are aligned with a particular organisational form to 
achieve a transaction cost economizing result [Williamson 1985].   However, whilst the 
notion of a ‘transaction cost’155 is crucial to our understanding of the domestic supply 
chain, the efficiency rationale of Williamson’s framework is not considered suitable for this 
study, where both the theoretical and methodological framework is orientated towards the 
specific requirements of the developing country environment.   Indeed, Williamson’s failure 
                                                 
154
 Williamson is a key figure in the New Institutional Economics. His 1975 book ‘Markets and Hierarchies’ 
introduced the term New Institutional Economics and his 1985 book ‘The Economic Institutions of Capitalism’ was 
key to the development of Transaction Cost Economics [TCE].  
155
 The origins of the term transaction cost come from the work of Coase [1937].  However it was not until the 
work of Williamson [1975] that transaction costs became widely recognised within the economic literature.  
Broadly speaking transaction costs are the costs encountered through economic exchange.      
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to account for the impact of sociological factors, such as, historical and cultural 
dependencies, in shaping organisational forms must be considered one of the greatest 
challenges to the explanatory power of transaction cost economics.    
 
Therefore, adopting a less deterministic understanding of the institution, based on the 
work of North156, institutions are still charged with the task of reducing transaction costs, 
but inefficiency is recognised as a possible characteristic of institutional change.  
Institutional change results from changes in the economic and social incentives facing 
individuals, differential bargaining power, and the notion of path dependency in the 
process of change [North, 1990].  Employing North’s understanding within the analysis of 
the domestic supply chain leads to the consideration of a broader range of social, cultural, 
and historical factors, which typically impact upon the process of institutional change in the 
developing country setting.  
 
Within NIE institutions are charged with the task of minimizing the transaction costs faced 
in economic exchange.  In order to achieve this, institutions should help enable 
coordination between different actors and functions within the market.  In recent years, the 
work of Dorward, Kydd and Poulton [1998a, 2005a, 2006]157 has built on this concept 
describing the market failures that have resulted from liberalisation as a series of 
coordination failures. Coordination failures occur most typically at the early stages of 
development where market actors are unable to coordinate the complementary 
investments that are required to raise the market out of low level equilibrium.  Within this 
study, coordination failures will be explored when looking at the effectiveness of vertical 
and horizontal coordination between supply chain actors.  Both vertical and horizontal 
coordination can be used to overcome the transaction costs facing market actors and 
encourage exchange within the market [Poulton and Lyne, 2009].   
                                                 
156
 North is also a key figure in the NIE.  North’s conceptualisation of the institution adopts a less efficiency based 
rational than Williamsons.  North’s 1990 book ‘Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance’, 
forms the foundation to the understanding of the institution employed in this study. 
157
 These three papers represent the papers which Dorward, Kydd, and Poulton have all worked on together.  
There are a number of other papers involving any one of these three writers that can be associated with the 
developmental coordination approach.  Please see the bibliography for further references.  
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The development coordination approach builds on past research describing the high level 
of information asymmetry [Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz 1985], opportunism, and market failure 
that exist in the developing country environment [Hoff et al, 1993; Bardhan, 1989].  Given 
that market forces are less effective, greater emphasis is placed on capacity of institutions 
to intervene in the market to help solve coordination problems [North, 1990] and avoid 
‘coordination failure’ [Kydd and Dorward, 2004].   
 
The work of Dorward, Kydd and Poulton [1998a, 2005a, 2006], represents an ideal basis 
from which build a theoretical framework to analyse the domestic supply chain.  Dorward 
et al [2005a] developed the term ‘developmental coordination158’ to describe the important 
role that government institutions can play in helping sub-Saharan markets overcome the 
‘coordination failures’ witnessed in recent years. Prior to market liberalisation 
governments provided ‘horizontal coordination’ within the market through the provision 
of public and private goods throughout various aspects of the national supply chain.  
Accepting the challenges that have arisen post liberalisation, Dorward et al [2005b] find 
that similar interventions may still be required from the government.  Kydd and Dorward 
[2004] classify intervention from the government in public and private goods markets in 
the early stages of development as ‘hard’ coordination.  In light of this, the role of the 
Cocobod in hard coordination will be explored throughout the analysis.  
 
Alongside this, Kydd and Dorward [2004] also outline alternative roles that can be taken by 
the private sector in the process of market development.  Once coordination within the 
market improves and the level of transaction costs faced by the private sector is reduced, 
profitable investment opportunities should arise. One of the primary ways in which the 
private sector can reduce transaction costs and increase investment is through the use of 
soft coordination mechanisms, such as, interlocking transactions and collective action in 
                                                 
158
 It should be noted that the term ‘developmental coordination’ is only directly referred to as a model for 
development in Dorward et al [2005a].  Nevertheless, the same developmental coordination concepts from 
Dorward et al [2005a] are developed in all papers by Dorward Kydd and Poulton referenced throughout this study.  
As such, the term developmental coordination will be used throughout this study to describe the model for market 
development that is developed throughout a series of papers by Dorward, Kydd and Poulton.   
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the sanctioning of opportunistic players.  In light of this, the presence of soft coordination 
mechanisms will be explored in the analysis.   
 
Increased market reform and private sector engagement throughout the course of market 
development are considered fundamental aspects of Kydd and Dorward’s [2004] model.  
Whilst complete government withdrawal from the market is not considered the ultimate 
goal in all situations, successful market development requires some degree of government 
withdrawal in order to enable private sector growth.  In order to facilitate this process 
institutional change may be required in the Cocobod, and as such, the capacity of the 
Cocobod to change and adapt to the partially liberalised system of market organisation will 
be an important line of enquiry throughout this study.  
 
The balance between government intervention and private sector engagement is a key 
topic within the developmental coordination framework, as illuminated by Poulton et al 
[2004], where it is found that a balance of competition and coordination may be the best 
organisational model for sustained development within sub-Saharan markets.  As such, the 
capacity of the Cocobod to promote an environment which balances the benefits of 
government intervention alongside the dynamism of private sector competition will be 
examined within the analysis for this study.  Closely related to the issue of creating a 
positive environment for private sector investment is the issue of government credibility 
and the quality of the governments performance in market regulation.  As discussed in 
chapter two the issue of governance over governmental actions has become an increasingly 
important topic of academic and policy debate in recent years, as a result of the corruption 
that has negatively affected market development in recent years.  In light of this, the 
credibility of the Cocobod as a market regulator and the potential role of supporting 
institutions designed to provide governance over Cocobod actions will also be explored 
throughout the analysis.   
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the conceptual framework for the micro analysis 
of the Ghanaian cocoa market has been guided by the approach of developmental 
coordination framework, as developed by Dorward, Kydd and Poulton [1998a, 2005a, 
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2006].  In essence these authors have developed an ideal type of partial liberalisation 
model, outlining the appropriate roles for the government and private sector across 
different stages of market development.  Dorward et al [2005a] do, however, offer a note of 
caution adding that government intervention may not be recommended under all 
circumstances, and that successful government intervention is difficult to achieve.  Indeed, 
whilst Ghana is performing comparatively well compared to their liberalised West African 
neighbours, insights from the model of developmental coordination may help to illuminate 
aspects of the partial model that are in need of change and improvement.  Equally, the 
performance of the Cocobod in Ghana may also help to build on the understanding of 
market organisation presented within the developmental coordination model.  As observed 
in chapter one, models of partial liberalisation are relatively unique, and therefore, the 
level of academic understanding in this area is still limited.        
 
The platform presented by the work of Dorward, Kydd and Poulton has also been selected 
in light of the increased attention which these authors have recently received within 
influential policy papers.  As can be seen in the references section, papers on the 
developmental coordination model have been presented to the World Bank [Dorward et al, 
2006], DFID [Dorward and Kydd, 2006], IFPRI [Poulton et al, 2007], and the African 
Commission [Poulton et al, 2004].  Indeed, within the World Development Report [2008] 
references are made to the positive role the government can take in overcoming the 
coordination problems facing African markets.  In light of this, the conceptual framework 
proposed for the analysis of the domestic cocoa chain in Ghana is in keeping with current 
trends in both the policy and academic arenas.   
 
5.3 - The External Market and Global Value Chain Analysis  
 
Global value chain analysis [GVC] examines the relationship between supply chain 
governance and market development.  Within GVC there are two different understandings 
of governance.  At the micro level GVC highlights the different ‘modes’ of governance, which 
are used at the level of the individual trading relationship [Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000].  
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At the macro level GVC analysis has explored ‘dominant typologies’ of governance, which 
have an impact in shaping the organisational arrangements across the entire supply chain 
[Gereffi, 1994].  It is at this macro level, where GVC analysis offers the greatest insight 
through its focus on the location of power, and how the influence of power within one 
segment can determine the organisation of the entire supply chain.  Indeed, as noted by 
Bair [2008], the GVC framework was built on macro level foundations, and therefore, it is 
most powerful as a tool for analysis when exploring processes within the of the broader 
value chain. 
 
Gereffi159, the pioneer of GVC analysis defines governance as ‘the authority and power 
relationships that determine how financial, material and human resources are allocated 
and flow within the chain’ [Gereffi, 1994, p 97].  As such, the governance structures that 
exist within a chain are not the result of the efficiency rationale of individual actors, but 
rather they reflect the organisational arrangements of the chain’s dominant actors.  
Gereffi’s insight has influenced the framework developed in this study through its 
understanding of how economic actors use power to set the ‘parameters under which 
others in the chain must operate’ [Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002].  Crucially the GVC’s focus 
on the power of external buyers allows us to expand our analysis of market development 
beyond the boundaries of the national institutional environment, by acknowledging the 
impact of global corporations in shaping the development trajectory of African commodity 
markets.   
 
Indeed, whilst the Cocobod is currently considered the dominant form of governance 
within the Ghanaian market, the potential for change must also be considered.  Changes in 
the political, technological and economic landscape of the supply chain promote the 
emergence of new organisational capacities, market opportunities and economic 
incentives, all of which may influence changes in governance.   As such, governance is 
considered a contested terrain.  In order to understand the capacity of a governance 
structure to compete and legitimise itself overtime, it is necessary to examine its ability to 
                                                 
159
 Gereffi and Korzeniewicz [1994] ‘Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism’ is widely recognised as introducing 
the approach of Global Commodity Chain analysis which has since developed into Global Value Chain analysis.  
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adapt to such changes and satisfy the demands of the stakeholders within the chain.    In 
light of this, the potential impact of recent investments by powerful multinational 
processors on governance in the Ghanaian supply chain will be explored within the 
analysis.  
 
As noted in chapter three, the ability to maintain vertical coordination between 
independent units of the chain is considered one of the key measures of an effective 
governance structure.  Mighell and Jones [1963], acknowledged as pioneers in this area, 
through their study of vertical coordination in agriculture, define coordinative mechanisms 
as ‘the set of institutions and arrangements that are used to accomplish harmonisation of 
adjacent stages of a commodity system’ [p1].  Therefore, the degree of harmonisation 
between actors in the market is a reflection of the coordination achieved by the governance 
structure in place.  Mighell and Jones [1963] find that different methods of vertical 
coordination are adopted based on the need to reduce risk, uncertainty, and cost, improve 
market position, gain bargaining power and obtain financing.       
 
In recent years, vertical coordination has gained increased importance as a function of 
governance within the supply chain [Gereffi, 1999a, Daviron and Gibbon 2002].  In cases 
where liberalisation has reduced the government’s coordinative role within commodity 
supply chains, it has been necessary to develop alternative methods of vertical 
coordination [Daviron and Gibbon, 2002].  Resultantly, there are now a number of 
alternative forms of vertical coordination practiced within the cocoa supply chain.  To some 
extent these modern forms of coordination may be considered as competition for the 
traditional form of coordination adopted in the Ghanaian market.   
 
In this light, GVC analysis offers insight into emergent and often competing methods of 
vertical coordination, particularly in the realm of quality control [Ponte 2002, Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005].  Quality is traditionally one of the key aspects defining the governance 
structure used within a supply chain.  Indeed, as observed in chapter four, quality has been 
a highly contentious issue in the cocoa chain in recent years with new systems of supply 
chain governance appearing to define the level of quality produced within West African 
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markets.  The emergence of new definitions and modes of arbitration in quality have raised 
important questions about the government’s traditional role in this area [Daviron and 
Gibbon 2002].  In this light, Fold [2002] suggests that there may be some tension between 
the Cocobod’s traditional role in quality control and the emergent forms discussed in the 
GVC.  As such, the relationship between the governance objectives of cocoa buyers and the 
quality produced within Ghana will play an important role in our understanding of 
governance along the Ghanaian supply chain. 
 
5.4 – Micro-Macro Linkages  
 
Past studies of commodity market development have tended to focus on either the macro 
or micro level of the market.  To some extent this is understandable as certain theoretical 
frameworks are more suited to different types of analysis.  For example, the NIE framework 
is traditionally used for micro level analysis [Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002], whereas the 
GVC’s strength lies within macro level analysis [Raikes et al, 2000].  However, whilst 
studies employing this approach have been able to offer key insight into individual aspects 
of market development, it can also be argued that within the study of global supply chains 
this singular approach may have some serious limitations.  When focusing exclusively on 
either a micro or macro framework it may not be possible to explore the significant 
linkages that now exist between the national and international levels of the global 
economy.  
 
In the case of cash crops, such as cocoa, where the vast majority of the product is traded 
and consumed outside of the producer country, the relationship between the international 
and domestic market is crucially important.  Indeed, Raikes et al [2000] observe that the 
relationship between change in market structure at the national level and the opportunities 
and threats for developing country markets presented by changes in international markets 
has rarely been examined.  Therefore, recognising the apparent disparity of research in this 
area, the conceptual framework for this study adopts a micro-macro approach.    
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The micro analysis will examine the roles of the Cocobod and private sector buyers at the 
national level of the Ghanaian cocoa chain, whilst the macro-analysis will focus on the 
relationship between changes in the external cocoa market and role of the Cocobod.  These 
theoretical boundaries are set as a guide to help achieve focus within the analysis of the 
domestic and international dimensions of the chain.  This does not mean that, where 
appropriate, macro issues cannot be considered in the domestic supply chain, and likewise 
micro issues in the external market.  Indeed, as observed earlier in this chapter, NIE and 
GVC both have branches which stray beyond their respective strengths in micro and macro 
level analysis.  Nevertheless, movement outside of the stipulated theoretical framework 
will not occur with great regularity throughout this study in order to maintain analytical 
focus on the micro level processes identified in NIE, and likewise, the macro level processes 
identified within GVC.    
 
The micro-macro approach adopted in this study is considered fundamental to the analysis 
of the Cocobod, given that it’s levels of performance within the external and domestic 
markets are inextricably linked.   To a large extent, this is exemplified by the importance of 
cocoa quality within the Ghanaian market.  Cocoa quality, although determined by micro 
level processes in the domestic cocoa chain, is judged at the macro level based on the 
quality conventions of global cocoa buyers.  Without the approval of the international 
market the Cocobod would not be able to generate the revenue and stability required to 
carry out their role within the domestic market.  However, it can also be argued that 
without the Cocobod’s role in the domestic market they would not be able to produce the 
cocoa required to meet the quality demands of external buyers.  As such, the Cocobod’s role 
in coordinating quality control at the micro level, and the level of vertical coordination they 
achieve with external buyers at the macro level are deeply interdependent.  
 
Recent research employing micro-macro analysis of commodity markets includes studies 
by Larsen [2002], Losch [2002], Fold [2002, 2008], and Ponte [2002].  Common across the 
majority of these studies is the use of the commodity chain framework160, which ‘permits us 
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 The commodity chain analogy is developed in Gereffi and Korzeniewicz [1994] – ref chapter three. 
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to more adequately forge micro-macro links between processes that are generally assumed 
to be discretely contained within global, national and local units of analysis’ [Gereffi et al, 
1994, p 2].   The GVC conceptualises global production and supply chains as ‘networks’ of 
inter-firm linkages.  Micro-macro linkages in the study of agricultural organisation are also 
recognised within the NIE literature [Menard and Valceschini, 2005].  In particular it is 
observed that key challenges facing policy makers at the micro level of a cash crop market, 
such as quality and producer price, are defined by macro level changes within global supply 
chains [Shepherd and Farolfi, 1999; Poulton et al, 2006].   
 
Larsen [2004] adopts a GVC-NIE framework in her PhD study of the global cotton chain.  
Larsen contends that using this approach leads to a ‘deeper understanding of economic 
restructuring’, through recognition of the interplay between developments at both the 
national and international levels [p2].  Studies that focus exclusively on the global level 
‘ignore local differentiation processes’ [p2].  Conversely, when studies focus only on the 
national level they often downplay larger international processes that impact on socio-
economic changes at the national level.  Similarly, Poulton et al [2006] find that failure to 
recognise both the domestic and international dimensions of the supply chain leads to 
‘catch-all’, or panacea type policies, which reflect neither the specific demand conditions of 
the external market, nor the specific coordination failures constraining development at the 
local level [p 249].   
 
5.5 – Cross-Disciplinary Research  
 
Jeffrey [2003, p539] notes that cross-disciplinary approaches are increasingly used within 
policy research because, ‘real-world problems do not come in disciplinary shaped boxes’.  
In this light, cross-disciplinary research, employing insights from both the NIE and GVC, is 
considered necessary to address the unique market structure of the Ghanaian cocoa 
market.  Within the domain of cross-disciplinary research, there is a large degree of 
variation in approach, based on the level of integration the researcher attempts to achieve 
between the theories used [Rossini and Porter, 1984].  On this basis, the cross-disciplinary 
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approach used in this study can be considered moderate, where each theory will be 
employed independently to address a different set of issues and no attempt will be made 
towards a unified theoretical position.  Whilst it may be possible to develop 
complementarities between the two theories throughout the course of research, this is not 
one of the study’s main objectives.  At their primary level of application within this study, 
the NIE and GVC are to be employed as separate tools of analysis, used predominantly in 
analysis of separate segments of the chain.  In doing so, both theories will offer 
independent insight into the partial model of market organisation.  
 
Hulme and Toye [2006] argue that the ‘ideologies of disciplinary rivalries’ act as an 
unnecessary constraint to progress in disciplined and innovative research into developing 
country markets [p 1102].  Indeed, Olsen [2006] finds that ‘some new institutionalist and 
most political economy authors agree that the role of the government can be probed for 
positive synergies’ [p 1145].  As such, the unique structure of the Ghanaian cocoa market 
may be considered a phenomenon appropriate for the use of a cross-disciplinary approach.   
 
As observed in chapter three, Gereffi et al’s [2005] paper on GVC governance has a 
relatively strong degree of cross-over with the NIE approach of Williamson [1985].  In a 
similar light, Nee and Swedberg [2005] observe that the fields of NIE and new economic 
sociology161 are far from being inimical.  In particular they note that ‘economic sociologists 
have been attracted by the attempts by North to resurrect the concept of the institution and 
improve upon it in the spirit of the NIE’ [p 792].  This highlights the potential for a cross-
over in learning between the economic sociology of GVC and the approach of NIE, 
especially given that the work of North [1990] is used as the foundation for understanding 
NIE in this study.  Indeed, NIE and NES share a common objective in the study of social 
structures and institutions [Richter 2001].   
 
In this light, it is interesting to observe the work of Neilson and Pritchard [2009], who 
discuss the new institutionalist work of North [1990], when working within a GVC 
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 Gereffi’s GVC is considered to be in the field of new economic sociology [Nee and Swedberg, 2005].   
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framework.  The authors do this in an attempt to elevate the understanding of institutions 
within GVC analysis.  Neilson and Pritchard argue that the traditional GVC framework 
focusing on the concept of governance and the power of lead buyers in shaping governance 
structures fails to acknowledge the impact of locally based rules and norms in shaping the 
outcome of value chain restructuring and change.  In doing so, the authors suggest that a 
deeper appreciation of institutions, akin to that which takes place within NIE, could help to 
enrich the GVC framework.   
 
Whilst it is uncommon, direct cross-over between the research communities of GVC and 
NIE can be seen in a few recent studies addressing the problem of African rural economic 
development.  Larsen [2004] adopts a dual theoretical approach using NIE and GVC in 
analysis of the post-liberalisation markets for cotton in Zimbabwe and Tanzania.  Poulton 
et al [2004162] carry out a cross-country analysis of market liberalisation in Ghana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  However, although these studies 
adopt aspects of both the NIE and GVC within their theoretical frameworks, there is no 
discussion of the tensions that may exist between the two approaches.  Within Larsen’s 
PhD study in particular, this lack of detail is a disappointing oversight and leads to 
confusion as to the exact focus of her theoretical framework, how the theoretical 
framework will shape her data analysis, and the overall goals of the study in building on 
this framework.   Furthermore, it may be argued that this lack of clarity greatly reduces the 
studies benefit as a framework for cross disciplinary research.    
 
In light of the above discussion, is interesting to observe the French ‘filiere163’ approach, 
which explicitly employs transaction cost economics within the study of commodity chains 
[Raikes et al, 2000; Daviron, 2002; Losch, 2002; Menard and Valceschini, 2005].  Closely 
related to the following study of the Cocobod, Raikes et al [2000] observe that the filiere 
approach was used throughout the late 20th century in analysis of government intervention 
in Francophone Africa’s primary commodity markets.  To some extent this may influenced 
Losch [2002], who examines liberalisation within the Ivory Coast’s cocoa sector, using 
                                                 
 
163
 The Filiere approach can be related to the field of GVC analysis [Raikes et al, 2000]. 
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elements of transaction cost economics [NIE], within a predominantly GVC framework.  
This framework is used to understand the implications of private sector engagement in a 
formerly government controlled cocoa market, thus offering valuable insight into the study 
of cocoa market liberalisation.  Indeed, Losch’s [2002] study examines a period of 
transition in the Ivory Coast with some similarities to the current situation in Ghana, thus 
further strengthening its position as a highly applicable reference for this study. 
 
5.6 - Visual Conceptual Framework 
 
Figure 5.1 on the next page provides a visual demonstration of the conceptual framework 
for this study.  An explanation and key are presented on page 148. 
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Figure 5.1 – Visual Conceptual Framework 
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GVC - Governance and Power. 
Exploring the power dynamic 
between the Cocobod and local 
processors and how this affects 
the governance of the Ghanaian 
supply chain. 
 
NIE – Development Coordination. 
Exploring the role of the Cocobod in 
aspects of ‘hard coordination’, such as; 
quality control, the provision of inputs 
as a public good and their control of 
warehouses. In addition to this the 
Cocobod’s role in the regulation and 
enforcement of market rules will also 
be considered. 
 
NIE – Supporting institutions such as; 
arbitration bodies and the buyers 
association will be explored based on 
their capacity to support the 
development coordination model.  
NIE – Development Coordination: The 
role of LBC’s will be explored at two 
levels within the developmental 
coordination framework. [1] The 
creation of competition and dynamism 
within the market. [2] Their role in 
achieving the ‘soft coordination’ 
mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
GVC - Governance and Quality.                     
Exploring how the quality offered by 
the CMC effects the governance 
arrangements of international buyers.  
Also, how the role of the CMC effects 
vertical coordination in the Ghanaian 
cocoa chain. 
Cocobod 
Supporting 
Institutions 
CMC 
NIE – Development 
Coordination. The 
relationship between 
the Cocobod and the 
LBC’s: Are the Cocobod 
encouraging transition, 
and is there an 
appropriate balance 
between competition 
and coordination?  
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Diagram Key 
 
               Black connector lines show how different stakeholders in the Ghanaian supply 
chain are linked.  These are the key relationships that will be explored within the analysis. 
 
                                            
                                             Red connector arrows with text boxes demonstrate how different 
segments and the relationships between different segments in the Ghanaian cocoa chain 
will be targeted in the analysis to build on the core aspects of the conceptual framework. 
 
                  Blue circular arrows demonstrate the concept of institutional change that will be 
explored within the micro analysis of the domestic supply chain. 
                         
                       Red circular arrows demonstrate the concept of competing supply chain 
governance   systems, which will be explored in the macro analysis.   
 
 
5.7 - Behavioural Assumptions  
 
It is important to outline the behavioural assumptions being adopted in this study not only 
to facilitate the exchange of ideas between the NIE and GVC, but also to clearly define the 
foundations upon which the research will be based.   
 
Research within the NIE traditionally adopts Simon’s [1955] concept of ‘bounded 
rationality’ to describe the individual.  Simon contends that ‘if we accept the proposition 
that both the knowledge and the computational power of the decision maker are severely 
limited, then we must distinguish between the real world and the actor’s perception of it 
and reasoning about it’ [Simon 1986, pg 210-211].  Building on this, Furubotn and Richter 
[1997] highlight that the neoclassical economic assumptions of individual rationality and 
149 | P a g e  
 
149 
 
zero transaction costs are strongly rejected in the NIE.  Indeed, North contends that ‘a 
modification of these [rational choice] assumptions is essential to further progress in the 
social sciences’ [North, 1990, p 17].  This statement is particularly true within the 
developing world where market failures, incomplete information and inefficient 
institutions encourage a revision of the rationality assumption held within orthodox 
economics164. 
 
Within the NIE, subjectivity and incomplete processing of information play a critical role in 
individual decision-making [North, 1990].  Agents are considered to be partially rational, 
thus leaving open the possibility of socially constructed influences such as cultural 
heritage, social ties and reputation in the decision-making process.  Individuals make 
decisions based on subjective mental models, constructed through the intergenerational 
transfer of knowledge, norms and culture as well as the individual’s direct experience 
[North, 2005].  As such, there is regular interplay between the agent and his/her 
surrounding economic, political and social institutions.  Resultantly, North finds that 
‘individuals from different backgrounds will interpret the same evidence differently; they 
may, in consequence, make different choices’ [North, 2005, p 23]. 
 
Richter [2001] asserts that integration between the approaches of economics and 
economic sociology can be made by relaxing the neoclassical economic assumption of 
individual rationality.  In light of this, it may be contended the socially enriched 
behavioural assumptions adopted within the less deterministic strands of the NIE used in 
this study are also applicable to GVC analysis.   GVC analysis considers individuals to be 
‘embedded’ in networks of economic and social relationships [Granovetter, 1985].   As 
such, the GVC understanding of the individual is not inimical to the environmentally 
influenced individual described in the work of North [1993a, 2005].  In light of this, the 
same behavioural assumptions will be employed throughout both the NIE and GVC sections 
of this study.  Indeed, in many respects the economic sociology of GVC will help to enrich 
                                                 
164
 The behavioural assumption of perfect rationality adopted within orthodox economic thinking is fundamental 
to the economists’ goals of economic modelling and positivist testing.  Within the developed world, where 
market forces signal with greater clarity and economic agents have access to more information, such rational 
choice assumptions will have greater applicability than in the case of the developing world. 
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our understanding of the individual, thus help to avoid the problems associated with 
neoliberal development policies based on the position of individual rationality.   
   
5.8 – Conclusion  
 
The conceptual framework for this study has been designed around two main concerns.  
Firstly, it has been necessary to design a framework suitable for the analysis of the unique 
model of market organisation used in the Ghanaian cocoa market.  Secondly, the theoretical 
approaches used within this study need to be suitable for analysis of a developing country 
market, operating within a rapidly evolving global supply chain.  In particular, the choice of 
theoretical approaches used in this study was based on the theories’ capacity to 
understand the challenges of the economic activity within the developing country 
environment.  Given the specificities of these requirements it was necessary to develop a 
cross-disciplinary theoretical approach using both new institutional economics and global 
value chain analysis.       
 
However, as observed above, the adoption of this framework does not necessarily add to 
the complexity of the research process.  Indeed, in many ways the clear separation that 
exists between the theories based on their different levels of analysis will help to give focus 
to the research process.   As such, the cross-disciplinary framework has been developed 
with the objective of pragmatism, as opposed to the goal of theory unification.   
Nevertheless, there are complementarities between the theories, which will be of greatest 
use when looking at aspects of the market which take effect at both the micro and macro 
levels.  Cocoa quality is one such example of this.  Chapter six will now outline the 
methodology developed for this study.  
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Chapter Six - Methodology 
 
 
6. 1 – Introduction 
  
During chapter one it was observed that the poor performance of the Washington 
Consensus was partly caused by its failure to account for the specificities of the 
environment in which it was implemented. In recognition of this, the methodology for this 
study has been formed around the specific needs of phenomenon being addressed.  As 
described in chapter one, this involves a purely qualitative methodology, where semi-
structured interviews are used to explore the lived experiences of key stakeholders within 
the Ghanaian cocoa market.  This is based on the belief that qualitative research enables the 
researcher to gain a deeper insight into the participants’ experiences, whilst also 
appreciating the specific context and intricacies of the environment being researched.  In 
order to objectivise the process of data collection and analysis within this qualitative 
approach, it has been necessary to develop a highly structured and rigorous 
methodological approach, which will be explained throughout this chapter.  Descriptive 
examples and conceptual models will be used throughout the chapter to help justify the 
methodological choices that have been made, and illustrate the processes that have been 
undertaken.     
 
6.2 - Ontology and Epistemology  
 
6.2.1 - Critical Realism 
 
Critical realism is the philosophical approach to science adopted in this study.  The 
approach was pioneered by the work of Bhaskar [1975, 1986], and has recently been 
actively linked to the field of economics, most notably in the work of Lawson [1997, 2003].  
The central ontological argument of critical realism is that a reality exists; however, it is 
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both complex and deep, and therefore, it cannot be reduced to our surface interpretation of 
it based on immediate experiences.  Critical realists conceive of the world as being layered, 
observing a distinction between the empirical world of experience, and the real world of 
underlying causal powers, also known as generative mechanisms [Walters and Young, 
2001].   Events that take place at the level of the actual cannot be explained solely on the 
basis of empirical evidence or event regularity, but rather they have resulted from the 
underlying processes that operate at the level of the real.     
 
Bhaskar [1975] argues that social reality is an open and evolving system comprised of 
intentional individual agents, who, though being constrained and influenced by the social 
structures surrounding them, are capable of shaping the structures in which they are 
embedded.  As such, there is an ongoing interaction between structure and agency.  Given 
the open and transitive nature of social reality experiment is rendered impossible, and 
thus, purely empirical explanations are not adequate for theoretical constructions of this 
complex reality [Lawson, 2003].  The objective of the critical realist in carrying out 
economic research is therefore to develop ways of uncovering the causal structures and 
generative mechanisms, which govern the flux of events in an essentially open world 
[Lawson, 2003].  
 
There are notable similarities between the critical realist conception of the individual and 
that characterised in the institutional economics of Commons [Lawson, 1996]. In particular 
the interaction between agency and structure is representative of the mutual 
understanding that the two approaches share.  Indeed, critical realists have also observed 
strong similarities between their own ontological position and those adopted by prominent 
academics within various heterodox economic traditions, such as Post-Keynesian 
economics and institutional economics [Lawson, 2003, 2006; Davidsen, 2005].  Indeed, 
based on Lawson’s [2006] assessment of heterodox economics, it may be suggested that 
the strands of NIE and GVC developed in this study are not inimical to heterodox 
approaches, thus rendering them suitable for a critical realism methodology.     
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In association with heterodox economic traditions critical realism has also been highly 
critical of the ontological stance adopted in orthodox165, or ‘deductive’ economics.  
Arguments against the ontological basis behind orthodox economics have been led by 
Lawson [1997, 2003].  These arguments are built upon what critical realists believe to be 
the ‘epistemic fallacy’ [Bhaskar, 1975] occurring within orthodox economics, through 
which questions of being [ontology] have been reduced to questions of knowing 
[epistemology].  Whilst critical realists search for generative mechanisms operating at the 
‘real’ or deep level of an ‘open’ social reality, deductive economists highlight event 
regularity as their mode of explanation [Lawson, 2003, pg 5].  It is argued that the 
deductive method based on event regularity is only applicable in analysis of ‘closed’ 
systems, and not the open social reality envisaged by critical realists.   
 
Critical realists have also been active in their critique of neoliberalist economic policies 
within the developing world [Jones, 2001; Morgan, 2003; Dow and Dow, 2005]. Critical 
realists argue that the influence of orthodox economic thinking has led to the proliferation 
of flawed generalisations based on the principle of universality [Lawson, 2003].  As a result, 
‘the issue of policy credibility, which would seem to lend itself to context specific analysis, 
has instead been addressed with externally designed policy rules’ [Dow and Dow, 2005, pg 
1131].  In light of this, one of critical realisms strongest attributes is its objective to achieve 
a deeper understanding of the context in which causal structures operate.  Indeed, context 
is fundamental to the approach of critical realism based on the belief that the outcome 
produced by a particular causal mechanism is highly dependent on the context in which it 
is situated [Sayer, 1992; Pawson and Tilley, 1997].   
 
Building on the problems associated with the Washington consensus, the methodology for 
this study is focused on achieving a deeper understanding of the partial model.  Both the 
institution of the Cocobod and the developing country environment are unique systems, for 
which the deductive approach of orthodox economics appears to be ill-suited.  The cocoa 
market in Ghana is widely influenced by a variety of social, political, historical and 
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 This may be likened to the neo-classical economics that informed the Washington Consensus.   
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economic factors.  As such, it appears that critical realism may represent the ideal 
ontological grounding from which to investigate the partial model.  Indeed, critical realisms 
belief in a complex social reality and commitment to a context specific understanding, 
present a suitable platform from which to build knowledge of this progressive economic 
phenomenon.     
 
6.2.2 - Critical Realist Methodology  
 
The methodological approach employed in this study has attempted to work within the 
guidance of a critical realist ontology; however, at the epistemological level the value of 
empirical evidence has not been completely refuted.  This is considered a moderate 
interpretation of the epistemological beliefs espoused within critical realism.  There is an 
acceptance that knowledge claims must come about through a give and take between both 
abstract theorising and concrete evidence about the phenomenon being examined.   
 
Using evidence in this way has helped to preserve the relevance of research findings for 
audiences within both the academic community and those working at a policy level.  
Indeed, whilst there is active debate within critical realist literature on the best way to 
treat empirical evidence [Walters and Young, 2001; Downward et al, 2002], this study has 
attempted to employ empirical evidence where appropriate in qualification of the 
generative mechanisms established through the process of abstraction.  This approach 
builds upon Davidsen’s [2005] attempt towards a critical realist inspired economics in 
which systematic ontological reflection will become an integral part of the scientific 
process166.   
 
Methodologically critical realism is operationalised through the process of ‘retroduction’.  
Bhaskar [1986, p11] describes retroduction as the process by which an argument ‘moves 
from a description of some phenomenon to a description of something which produces it or 
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 Davidsen himself draws direct inspiration from Cruikshank [2003], and refers to Lawson’s work on critical 
realism in economics throughout. However, it must be acknowledged that Davidsen does not support several of 
Lawson’s criticisms of mainstream economics.    
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is a condition for it’.  As such, retroduction can be seen as the central logic of inference 
associated with a critical realist epistemology [Downward et al, 2002].  Retroduction is an 
iterative process, which begins with a critique of prior theory developed around the 
phenomena being studied.  From this critique, it is possible to identify potential generative 
mechanisms that may help to explain the phenomenon in question.  The existence of such 
mechanisms in practice must then be ascertained through the collection of data on the 
concrete phenomena.   Throughout data collection, Yeung [1997] observes that it is 
essential to use interactive interviews, enabling a deeper level of investigation than that 
offered by quantitative methods.     
 
After data collection the process of iterative abstraction is used to ‘obtain knowledge of the 
real structures or mechanisms which give rise to, or govern the flux of the real phenomena’ 
[Lawson, 1989, pg 69].  This is the most well known method used by critical realists to 
discover and conceptualise generative mechanisms [Yeung, 1997].   Despite the emphasis 
placed on abstract theorising into deeper causal powers, empirical evidence can play an 
important role in critical realist research [Downward et al, 2002].  Reference to 
appropriate empirical evidence is required throughout the iterative process of 
retroduction, in order to bolster any claims to knowledge and ensure that research output 
maintains a link with the concrete phenomena being examined.  However, regularities are 
not treated as explanation, but instead they are seen as ‘demi-regs167’ [Lawson, 1997], or 
partial event regularities, which are used to help identify generative mechanisms.   
 
The process of retroduction relies on continuous data collection, where fresh input is used 
to revise or reaffirm generative mechanisms identified in the initial abstraction. As such, 
the process moves in an iterative fashion until the point at which the alleged generative 
mechanisms are robust and powerful enough to explain the phenomenon.   This process is 
considered highly appropriate for analysis of the ever changing Ghanaian cocoa market.  
Both at the domestic and international levels, commodity markets are in a constant state of 
flux creating a high number of emerging issues which, in their immediacy, may appear to 
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 Demi-reg’s indicate the occasional, but less than universal, actualisation of a generative mechanism [Lawson, 
1997]. 
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define the market at any one period of time.  Indeed, examples of market shocks, media 
hype, industry speculation, and one off instances have emerged within data collection.  In 
this light, Miles and Huberman [1994] warn about the risk of generalising from non-
representative events when carrying out causal analysis.  As such, the level of critical 
reflection required throughout the retroductive process has helped the analysis go beyond 
the surface level of immediate observations.   
 
Investigating the phenomenon of the partial model itself has also required commitment to 
a deeper level of understanding.  Given that there is limited past research on partial models 
on which to assess the research findings, the process of retroduction has been necessary to 
critically assess the strength and validity of generative mechanisms identified throughout 
the study.  Indeed, the level of critique inherent within the process of retroduction may 
help to establish the credibility within research findings required to transfer the lessons of 
the partial model to commodity markets elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.    
 
6.3 - Research Strategy and Design 
 
6.3.1 – Research Strategy  
 
The research strategy for this thesis is based on the ‘case-study’ methodology, developed 
by Yin [1984] and Stake [2000].  Case-study research involves the investigation of a few 
cases, or often just one case, in considerable depth [Gomm and Hammersley, 2000].  Based 
on Yin [1984] the case study may be defined as an investigation that a] explores a 
contemporary phenomenon in a real life situation, b] where the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and its relations cannot be clearly defined, and c] where it is possible to use 
different sources of information.  In light of this, the decision to adopt a case-study 
approach was based upon the belief that in-depth investigation is required in order to 
understand the partial model in Ghana.   
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The case study approach is closely related to the critical realist research perspective, based 
on the ‘deep’ level of understanding that can be achieved through focused investigation.  
Guba and Lincoln [2000], Perry [1998], Christie et al [2000], and, Healy and Perry [2000] 
closely associate critical realism with case-study style research.  Gomm and Hammersely 
[2000] find that qualitative data is paramount within the case study approach, where based 
on the depth of findings achievable it may be possible to clearly identify important causal 
relationships.  Similarly, Christie et al [2000] contend that ‘case-study research aims to 
locate generative mechanisms that assist in determining inferences about real life 
experiences’ [pg, 17].     
 
6.3.2 – Research Design  
 
The approach of template analysis [King, 1998, 2004] has been central in designing the 
methodology employed throughout this study.   As demonstrated by the fifteen stages in 
appendix four the approach of template analysis has presented a clear structure for the 
research from the stage of developing interview guides, through to the final presentation of 
research findings.  Indeed, whilst the template approach may be viewed primarily as a tool 
for data analysis, insights from template analysis have helped to maintain a consistent and 
structured approach throughout the process of data collection and analysis, thus helping to 
create a strong audit trail in the research process.  
 
Within this study one of the main goals of the template approach is inductive theory 
building.   Eisenhardt [1989], and Miles and Huberman [1994] find that the development of 
theory from a case-study is an iterative process.  Both the research questions and the 
researchers understanding of the phenomenon evolve throughout the course of research 
based on a continuous process of data collection and analysis, until the point where sound 
contributions to theory can be made [Kerssens-van Drongelen, 2001].  Indeed, closely 
related with the goals of this study King168 [2004] finds that the template approach can be 
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 King [2004] references Miles and Huberman [1994] when making this point. 
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used for ‘research which is concerned with discovering underlying causes of human action’ 
[p 21].    
 
Appendix four demonstrates how template analysis has provided a clear structure for the 
iterative process of theory building.  More specifically figure 6.1 on the next page shows 
how the iterative process adopted during the course of research has enabled a re-
evaluation of research questions over time, leading to a clearer focus on the most insightful 
aspects of the partial model.  
 
6.3.3 External Validity  
 
Yin [1984] finds that when adopting the case-study approach careful consideration must be 
given to external validity, internal validity and construct validity.  External validity in 
particular needs to be given thorough consideration in light of the common criticism that is 
targeted at the case study approach in this area [Flyvbjerg, 2006].  Indeed, when adopting a 
single case approach, as used in this study, there is an even greater need to be aware of the 
external validity of findings.  In light of this, Yin [1984] and Healy and Perry [2000] find 
that theoretical relationships are the key to enhancing the external validity of a single case 
study.   
 
Whilst the goal of case-study research is inductive theory building, past theory will also 
play a key role throughout this study.  Although there is only a small amount of literature 
on partial models per say, as demonstrated by chapters two, three, and four there are many 
other valuable theoretical sources from which insight into the partial model can be 
garnered.  Indeed, as observed in the introductory chapter, this study will attempt to build 
upon aspects of NIE and GVC in light of the partial model in Ghana.  Again this can be 
closely related with the approach of critical realism, where the purpose of research is to 
identify generative mechanisms within past literature and then build upon these 
mechanisms through research and analysis. 
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Figure 6.1 – The Iterative Research Process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Author [inspired by Kerssens-van Drongelen, 2001] 
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Focusing on the theoretical gains that can be made through case study research, Yin [1984], 
finds that, through the process of ‘analytic generalisation’, the investigator may attempt to 
generalise a particular set of results to the broader theory underpinning the research 
questions [Yin, 1984, p 39].  Similarly, Bryman, [1988] and Silverman, [2005] both find that 
external validity can be enhanced through the use of a theoretically defined case.  
Therefore, by framing the analysis of the partial model in theoretical concepts that have 
been used previously in the study of commodity markets, every effort has been made to 
increase the external validity of this study. 
Less than twenty years ago the parastatal marketing board system, as currently used in 
Ghana, was the norm across West African cocoa producing countries.  Indeed, as seen in 
chapter one, since the marketing boards were abolished in all producing countries apart 
from Ghana, the Ghanaian cocoa market has outperformed other cocoa producing nations 
in West Africa.  Given that cocoa itself is a relatively homogenous crop across producing 
countries, similar to many other agricultural commodities, it is assumed that market 
organisation is one of the main factors enabling Ghana to outperform their competitors in 
recent years.  Therefore, exploring the potential of a seemingly well functioning parastatal 
can undoubtedly offer valuable insight beyond the boundaries of Ghanaian cocoa. 
6.4 - Units of Analysis  
Three main units of analysis have been selected for the following study: members of the 
Cocobod169, local buyers [LBC’s], and cocoa processors.  The Cocobod has been selected as a 
unit of analysis based on its central role within the partial model.  In many respects the role 
of the Cocobod appears to be fundamental to Ghana’s recent cocoa market success and 
therefore the Cocobod will remain at the centre of analysis throughout the study.   
However, in order to fully understand the performance of the partial model it is necessary 
to also consider the role of other key stakeholders working alongside the Cocobod.  In light 
of this, both the LBC’ and cocoa processors must also be considered in analysis.  Indeed, as 
seen from the figure 6.2 on the next page, both the LBC’s and cocoa processors have direct 
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 This includes members of Cocobod subsidiaries, such as the QCD and CMC.  
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linkages with the Cocobod and are therefore in the ideal position to comment on the 
Cocobod’s role within the partial model. 
Figure 6.2 – Units of Analysis  
      DOWNSTREAM                                                                                                  UPSTREAM 
The Ghanaian Cocoa Chain 
Source: Author   
The two groups of actors directly connected to the Cocobod have been targeted in order to 
highlight the nature of the linkages/coordination along the supply chain.  Sayer and 
Morgan [1985] find that examining groups of actors who are directly linked can lead causal 
explanations in research.  As observed in chapter five the notion coordination is embedded 
within the theories employed at both the micro and macro levels in this study. It is also felt 
that the nature of the relationship between the Cocobod and the two sets of private sector 
buyers will be central in our understanding of the partial model.  Indeed, this may be 
considered one of the most unique and challenging aspects of the model.  This is 
particularly true for the Cocobod – LBC relationship, where there is an extremely high level 
of interdependence between the operations of these two groups of actors.   
Farmers  LBC's Cocobod Cocoa Processors 
Manufacturing 
and Branding  
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Within the segment of local buying companies, the target sample includes the managing 
directors of the top ten LBC’s in the market.  Whilst there are nineteen active LBC’s in the 
market, the top nine/ten have controlled over ninety percent of the market for the last four 
seasons.  As such, it is felt that not only will these LBC’s be the most experienced but that 
given their size they are also likely to be the most influential.  The position of managing 
director has been targeted because it is felt that the MD will have both the greatest 
experience in the market, and more importantly the most experience of dealing with the 
Cocobod.  
Throughout the upstream segments of the Ghanaian cocoa chain there are a range of 
stakeholders that have direct links with the Cocobod through the purchase of cocoa from 
the CMC.  These stakeholders include, cocoa traders, cocoa processors, and, chocolate 
manufacturers.  Within this group of stakeholders, cocoa processors with factories in 
Ghana [local processors] have been targeted as a core unit of analysis for three main 
reasons.  Firstly, the rapid growth of local processing in Ghana has been the most 
significant change in the CMC’s customer base in recent years.  As such, local processors are 
now amongst the most influential actors in the international dimension170 of the Ghanaian 
supply chain.  Secondly, operating within Ghana, local processors are likely to have the 
closest level of interaction with the Cocobod and therefore the most direct experience of 
the partial model.   Thirdly, the three largest multinational processing firms in the world 
have factories in Ghana.  As such, these particular processors will be in a strong position to 
comment on the performance of the CMC not only for local processing, but also for export 
buying as well.   In order to bolster our understanding of the Cocobod’s role in the export 
market171 several key informants172 with experience in this area have also been targeted, 
including: cocoa traders, chocolate manufacturers, and, international cocoa bodies173.            
                                                 
170
 During chapter five it was explained that the international dimension of the Ghanaian cocoa chain involves all 
aspects beyond and including the CMC’s sale of cocoa to external buyers.  
171
 It is important to differentiate between the Cocobod’s role in the export market and their role in supplying local 
factories. 
172
 Key informants are not considered one of the core units of analysis.  
173
 Please see appendix eighteen where these particular key informants have been highlighted with an EB after 
their name.   
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Key informant interviews have also been carried out with a variety of other cocoa market 
stakeholders.  These interviews can be used to offer an alternative perspective on the 
partial model, and where appropriate they may be used to support the findings from the 
core units of analysis.  Key informants can come from a wide range of sectors provided that 
they are in a position to offer insight relative to this study. Given the neutrality of their 
position in relation to the core units of analysis, key informants are likely to offer an 
unbiased perspective.  
Yin [1984] finds that the use of alternative data sources and key informant interviews can 
help to enhance the internal validity of case study research.  Building on this the large 
amount valuable data emerging on a regular basis through cocoa market reports174 has also 
been used to improve the level of validity within the final research output.  Market reports 
can be used to keep up to date with the regular changes taking place within cocoa markets, 
including pricing and production statistics, as well as political, economic and social issues 
within producer countries.  
Within the initial research strategy the farmers segment was not targeted.  This was based 
on both time and resource constraints, as well as the nature of their functional relationship 
with the Cocobod.  Though farmers are very important stakeholders, they do not deal 
directly with the Cocobod at any stage along the domestic supply chain, and therefore, it 
was assumed that their level of knowledge in relation to the research questions may be 
limited.  As discussed throughout chapters two, three, four and five, the concept of 
coordination and the trading relationships between actors is very important within the 
conceptual framework for this study.  Given that the Cocobod is the central unit of analysis 
within the study, it was decided that focusing on the two groups of actors directly 
connected to them would be the most effective strategy for achieving an understanding of 
the partial model.  Furthermore, the relationship between farmers and LBC’s has been the 
subject of a number of recent studies including Laven [2005], Zeitlin [2006], and, Vigneri 
and Santos [2007].  Therefore, by focusing on buyers not only has it been possible to 
explore the previously unexplored relationship between the private sector and the 
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 Congoo News is a very good source for market reports on the cocoa industry: www.congoo.com. 
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Cocobod, but equally it helped to remove the risk of duplication with other recent studies.  
Despite the above arguments against the use of farmers as a unit of analysis, a pilot farmer 
study was carried out during round one of research to assess the validity of prior 
assumptions made with regards to the farmers role in the study.  This involved four twenty 
minute interviews with individual farmers in the Suhum district of the Eastern Region.  
Overall, farmers proved to have relatively little knowledge of the Cocobod’s functions 
beyond price setting and the spraying of farms with free pesticides.  Though farmers 
undoubtedly have knowledge and experiences that would be valuable for understanding 
the partial model, it did not appear that sufficient knowledge could be acquired within the 
time and resource constraints faced.  Farmers appeared to be more suited to survey style 
research methods, with a large sample and mostly closed questions, as opposed to the in-
depth interviews being used in this study.  In light of this, it was decided that farmer 
interviews would not be pursued any further.      
6.5 - Data Collection  
As described in chapter one, the bulk of the data collection for this study has taken place 
during two separate rounds of interviews in Ghana.  It was imperative that the majority of 
data was collected in Ghana itself given the importance of context in development research.  
Where appropriate interviews have also taken place in the UK175, however, it is assumed 
that respondents located in Ghana have fuller experience of the partial model from which 
to draw upon.  Indeed, as described in chapter five, the behavioural assumptions for this 
study describe an individual who interacts with and is affected by the institutions and 
structures within their immediate environment.   
Two rounds of data collection have taken place in order to enable the iterative research 
process described earlier. Using the two rounds of data collection it was planned that 
round one could proceed in a more exploratory fashion investigating a broader array of 
issues, including both, those identified prior to research, and also, issues emerging within 
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 There are a large number of people in the UK have close links with the Ghanaian cocoa market because a 
significant amount of Ghanaian cocoa is traded through the LIFFE futures exchange in London. For example, 
Armajaro and Olam, both of which have LBC’s in Ghana, also have offices in London.     
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the research process.  Analysis of round one data has then been used to create a greater 
awareness of the key issues related to the pre-defined research questions.  Resultantly, in 
round two it was possible to proceed with a more focused interview guide, developing a 
deeper understanding of the key issues identified in round one.  Round two interviews did, 
however, remain semi-structured thus allowing new issues to emerge where appropriate.   
6.5.1 - Round One Interview Guides 
Semi-structured interviews have been selected as the primary method of data collection for 
this study. In light of the criticisms levied at the positivist approach of the Washington 
consensus, it is felt that qualitative data represents the best method through which to 
investigate and understand the partial model in Ghana.  Interview data has given voice to 
the lived experiences of participants in the partial model176, enabling analysis to get to the 
level of the ‘real’ based on the underlying trends within participants’ experiences of the 
market.  
Miles and Huberman [1994, p 147] find that qualitative analysis is a powerful tool to asses 
causality.  In order to uncover the causal relations that exist within the partial model, a 
significant number of questions were structured around the relationships between 
different groups of actors.  Interview guides have been designed to uncover both sides of a 
particular aspect of the relationship between two groups of actors.  As such, many of the 
same topics are covered in the interview guides for Cocobod and the LBC’s, and likewise, 
for the Cocobod and external buyers.   
King, [2004a] finds that interview guides do not represent a formal schedule of questions 
to be asked word-for-word in a set order. Rather the interview guide contains a number of 
topics and probes that can be used to elicit additional detail from respondents, in cases 
where the initial response appears inadequate. Topics within the interview guides for 
round one were developed based on five main criteria. 
 The research questions. 
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 The national language in Ghana is English and therefore language problems were not experienced.   
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 The identification of themes within the theory/literature. 
 The examination of causal relationships between market actors, building on the 
theoretical concept of coordination. 
 Understanding the functional role of each of the three units of analysis. 
 Pilot interviews, discussions with academics and market reports.  
As can be seen from appendix four outlining the process of template analysis, themes 
identified within the literature become embedded in the topics of the interview guide.  King 
[2004] describes the process of developing an interview guide based on a realist 
perspective, where the guide is given structure through the prior identification of 
generative mechanisms or theoretical problems that are to be explored in the research.  
Prior to the development of round one interview guides, three pilot stakeholder interviews, 
three academic interviews, and one conference trip were carried out177.  As a result of these 
studies it was possible to establish a more focused and up-to-date understanding of the 
situation in the Ghanaian cocoa market, leading to greater accuracy in the framing of round 
one questions.   Appendix five shows an example of the key generative mechanisms that 
were identified prior to round one research for the Cocobod interview guide178.   
King [2004a] finds that qualitative research must attempt to see the research topic from 
the perspective of the interviewee.  The interviewer must impose a relatively low degree of 
structure with a tendency towards open questions.   As such, the semi–structured interview 
guide has relied mainly on open-ended questions, giving the respondent the freedom to 
explore whatever they feel are the most important aspects of the partial model.  Whilst the 
literature review, pilot interviews, and market reports all help to develop a moderate 
understanding of the Ghanaian market prior to stage one of data collection, it is still very 
important that enough freedom is given to the respondent in order to allow any new issues 
to emerge.    
                                                 
177
 Please see appendix eighteen for more details on these respondents.  
178
 In order to make the connection between the generative mechanisms highlighted in appendix five and the 
actual interview guide, please refer to appendix six where the round one interview guide for the Cocobod can be 
found.  
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As can be seen from appendices 6-8179 structured interview guides for round one of data 
collection were developed for each of the three main units of analysis.  Key informant 
interview guides were developed on an individual basis, using questions structured around 
both the topics of the study and also the respondents’ specific area of expertise.     
6.5.2 - Round One Data Collection  
Round one of research took place between August and September 2007180.  Throughout the 
first ten months of my PhD in the UK a significant amount of time and energy was spent 
trying to make contacts181 with people in the cocoa industry.  However, despite significant 
effort very little progress was made establishing contacts prior to round one of data 
collection182. Nevertheless, interview guides were prepared in full, and an ideal sample 
frame was set, including: The top ten LBC’s, three local processors, a member of the 
Cocobod, a member of the QCD, a member of the CMC, and at least two key informants.  
I was primarily located in Ghana’s capital city, Accra. This location was selected based on 
the access it would allow me to a wide variety of stakeholders in the cocoa industry.  Accra 
presents a dense network if interconnected cocoa stakeholders including, the Cocobod 
headquarters, all local processor offices, around 50% of the top ten LBC’s, and various 
research bodies/charities. For the remaining 50% of the top ten LBC’s it was necessary to 
travel to Kumasi in the Ashanti region. 
Establishing contacts at the Cocobod was a very challenging process due to their strict rules 
on following the chain of command.  Indeed, several members of the Cocobod were only 
willing to speak with me once their boss had given them permission to do so183.  Within a 
                                                 
179
 In appendix six the interview guide for the Cocobod is flexible to adjust to the various functions and subsidiaries 
of the Cocobod.  For example when interviewing participants from the QCD the sections on quality were used 
extensively; however, when interviewing a respondent from the CMC the sections of the Cocobod’s links with 
external buyers formed the focus of the interview. 
180
 Please see appendix sixteen for a full schedule of round one field work. 
181
 Please see appendix fifteen for an example of the email that was sent to all potential private sector participants.  
182
 In recent years stakeholders in the cocoa industry have become very reluctant to speak with researchers due to 
some high profile industry problems such as child labour on cocoa farms and anti-competitive selling practices.  
183
 Please see appendix twenty, for an example of the type of letter than was needed for Cocobod staff to grant an 
interview. 
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large bureaucracy this was a very time consuming and frustrating process, especially given 
that all members of the Cocobod are well educated civil servants and should therefore be 
able to make their own decisions in such instances.      
With regard to the two buyer segments a large number of contacts were established 
throughout the research process using the snowballing method.  This proved to be highly 
successful as once a participant felt that they could trust you they were happy to give the 
contact information for one of their peers at another company.  As more firm contacts were 
developed the number of interview participants I was able to assemble increased rapidly 
and after the first week my interview schedule was highly intensive averaging around 1.5 
interviews per day184.  Indeed, as can be seen from appendix eighteen, which gives a 
detailed description of all interviewees, there were thirty three participants in round one 
data collection185.  With the exception of purchasing clerk interviews186, all interviews 
carried out in round one lasted between one and two hours, with the average duration 
being one hour and twenty seven minutes.   
As recommended by King [2004a], every effort was made to overcome any respondent 
concerns at the beginning of the interview in order to establish a relaxed and trusting 
environment.  Sociability is a characteristic that I have regularly experienced on all prior 
trips to Ghana187, and therefore using my experiences of interacting with Ghanaians on a 
social level, I was able to establish a good rapport with the vast majority of respondents.   
All respondents were presented with a business card, a letter of recommendation from my 
supervisor188, a declaration of confidentiality and consent189, and a brief guide of the topics 
that would be covered in the interview190.  Interview guides were also structured in such a 
way that the more sensitive issues were not raised until later in the interview process.        
                                                 
184
 Please see appendix sixteen for a full schedule of round one field work.  
185
 This does not include the pilot study with farmers that took place in the Suhum district.  
186
 Interviews at this level lasted around thirty minutes on average.  
187
 Prior to this PhD I had lived and worked in Ghana for eleven months.  
188
 Please see appendix twenty one. 
189
 Please see appendix nineteen. 
190
 Please see appendices 6-8 where the first page of the interview guide is the topic guide that was given to the 
appropriate participants.   
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Where possible interviews were recorded, however, given the sensitive nature of 
information several participants did not wish to be recorded.  Nevertheless sixteen of the 
thirty three participants in round one agreed to have the interview recorded, proving 
hugely important to the depth of information available for analysis.  The remaining 
seventeen interviews were annotated by hand.  Whilst the annotation of interviews by 
hand was undoubtedly a challenge, every effort was made to capture as much of the 
interview as possible.  To do so participants were occasionally asked to wait while the 
fullness of a quotation was noted.  Furthermore, immediately after all interviews of this 
nature, several hours were spent updating interview notes while the memories of the 
interview were still fresh in my mind.    
Throughout all stages of data collection, observation also played a key role in providing 
background material to the interview itself.  It was crucially important to take note of the 
wide variety of environments in which interviews took place, helping to give some 
additional insight into the participants working life.  Observation was particularly 
important for all interviews carried out with participants in the Cocobod segment, given 
the research interest into the organisational culture and work ethic of large parastatal 
organisations191.   
The phrasing of questions within interviews was also crucial to the research process.  
Based on the objective of uncovering deep underlying mechanisms it was necessary to not 
only ask ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, but also ask ‘why not’ and ‘what if’ questions, while 
constantly searching for a fuller explanation of the respondent’s argument or perspective.  
The topic or question highlighted in the interview guide is only designed to act as a starting 
point for the exploration of that particular issue.  Depending on the participants response 
to the question, further probes were used to delve deeper into the issue, regularly asking 
for examples of real life situations to further qualify the participants account.  In this light, 
Kvale [1983, p176] notes that qualitative interview questions must focus on specific 
                                                 
191
 In this regard observation was also very important with reference to the CPC and the PBC, both of which were 
fully owned subsidiaries of the Cocobod in the recent past.  
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situations and action sequences in the world of the interviewee, whilst attempting to avoid 
abstractions and general opinions.          
Whilst it is necessary to probe for explanations from interviewees, it is also very important 
that the respondent does not feel pushed in any one particular direction.  For example King 
[2004a] finds that the interviewer must not ask leading questions, which use phrases such 
as, ‘So you think that....is the case?’. In light of this, leading questions were only used when 
either, the respondent had already revealed their basic position on the issue being 
discussed, or, an additional level of probing was required to encourage the respondent to 
go deeper.  In most cases this technique was not required and the greater majority of 
respondents192 were willing to talk candidly about all topics on the interview guide.  
Nevertheless, it remained important to keep notes on my level of involvement within each 
interview in order to enhance the level of reflexivity within research findings.  
Given the exploratory nature of round one research, fresh insight into each topic of analysis 
was gained throughout the entirety of round one.  New insights would emerge on a daily 
basis and in response regular amendments were made to interview guides193.  
Amendments were made for two main reasons, firstly, to re-focus existing questions where 
required, and secondly, to add additional topics of interest which had not been considered 
prior to round one of research.  This flexibility enabled key emergent themes to be given 
the required level of attention throughout round one.   
6.5.3 – Round Two Interview Guides   
The main objective of round two was to critically assess the key themes identified within 
round one.  Whilst interviews remained semi-structured, allowing the flexibility for any 
major new issues in the market to emerge, there was a much clearer understanding of the 
issues to be covered within the interview.   The greater level of focus within round two 
                                                 
192
 King [2004a, p 18] offers some suggestions on how to deal with uncommunicative respondents.  King also offers 
valuable advice on how to deal with high-status interviewees which was very important particularly during 
interviews with senior level members of the Cocobod [King, 2004a, p19].    
193
 Please see appendix twenty two for an example of a round one interview guide that has been amended during 
the course of field work. 
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research is evident in the interview guides themselves, as seen in appendices 9-11.  For 
example the LBC interview guide in round one194 used theoretical insight from the 
literature to explore the partial model in quite general terms.  Aspects such as the functions 
of the Cocobod, the relationship between the Cocobod and LBC’s and the nature of 
competition in the LBC market were explored with relatively little knowledge of the 
detailed processes taking place in these areas.  However, questions within the LBC 
interview guide for round two195 were much more specific looking at aspects such as; the 
credibility of the quality control division, the Cocobod’s management of the takeover 
centres, the level of organisational risk faced by LBC’s, and the potential for LBC’s to take 
on more responsibility in the area of input delivery.   
To some extent the motivation for this approach was based on the process of ‘theoretical 
sampling’, used predominantly within grounded theory.  Glaser [1978] defines theoretical 
sampling as, ‘the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst 
jointly collects, codes and analyses his data and decides which data to collect next and 
where to find them in order to develop his theory as it emerges’ [p 36].  Indeed, the process 
of refining theoretical ideas and then proceeding to gather more data in order to test the 
validity of research findings is considered a key part of the iterative research process.  As 
such, having nine months between the two stages of data collection, there was enough time 
to fully assess the key themes for round two interview guides based on the analysis of 
round one data.  
Again interview guides were developed for the three main units of analysis as displayed in 
appendices 9-11. Recognising the importance of LBC district managers and purchasing 
clerks from round one analysis, separate interview guides were also developed for these 
groups of actors prior to round two of data collection, as seen in appendices twelve and 
thirteen.  These actors may be considered as sub-groups of the LBC unit of analysis and to a 
large extent this is reflected in the interview guides which simply adapt the topics from 
LBC interview guides based on the experiences of actors at the rural level.  Following the 
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 Please see appendix seven. 
195
 Please see appendix eight. 
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same method as round one, interview guides for key informants were developed an 
individual basis using both the topics employed within the core interview guides and the 
respondent’s areas of expertise as a guide to questioning.   
6.5.4 - Round Two Data Collection  
The months of August and September196, when round one research took place, are quiet 
months for the cocoa market.  In light of this round two of data collection took place at a 
much busier stage of the cocoa season between April and May, 2008.  This was done in 
order to see how people’s opinions of the market may vary depending on the prevailing 
situation in the market, as well as gain firsthand experience of the supply chain capacity 
problems that occur during busy periods of the season.   
Key informant interviews in round two represented a good opportunity to test the validity 
of some of my research findings from round one.  Respondents in this segment were able to 
offer non-biased insight in to some of the aspects that I had identified within round one 
research.  Indeed, given their years of experience in the market key informants were often 
useful in helping to provide a degree of grounding for some of the theoretical propositions 
and ideas that had been developed based on round one data.  
The basic target sample for round two of research was the same as round one.  Indeed, 
where possible every effort was made to interview the same participants as round one.  
This was done for a number of reasons including, a] to clear up any ambiguous information 
from round one interviews, b] to re-visit key issues and check whether the same opinions 
are still intact, and c] to assess how the respondents perception has changed over time.  
Given that April and May are busy months of the cocoa season I was very fortunate to carry 
out repeat interviews with eighteen of the participants from round one.  
While in the UK between rounds one and two of research every effort was made to stay in 
touch with research participants in order to build up a rapport and familiarity prior to 
round two interviews.  Resultantly a strong level of trust was evident in round two 
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 Please see appendix seventeen for a full diary of the field work carried out in round two.  
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interviews, making it possible to explore the more sensitive issues in the market.  
Furthermore, based on my own improved understanding of the market in round two, there 
was a more natural flow of conversation within interviews, leading to a greater level of 
depth in the information achieved within the interviews.    
Within round two I was also able to use the trust that had been established with research 
participants to access a greater number of people at senior levels within my main units of 
analysis.  Compared with round one, the sample frame in round two included two more 
LBC managing directors, one more local processing managing director, the deputy chief 
executive of the Cocobod, the deputy director of research in the Cocobod, the national 
coordinator of the CODEPAC input program [Cocobod], and a principle trader within the 
CMC.  The deputy chief executive of the Cocobod is a good example of an interview which 
took around sixteen months of highly focused networking to achieve.   
As can be seen from appendix eighteen there were thirty six interview participants in 
round two.  Again interviews ranged between one and two hours and the average interview 
time was one hour and thirty five minutes197.  During round two it was possible to record 
eighteen of the thirty eight interviews carried out.  The remaining nineteen interviews 
were annotated by hand, using the same techniques that were successfully employed in 
round one.         
 
6.6 - Data Analysis: Template Analysis 
Template analysis is a flexible technique used to thematically organise and analyse 
qualitative data [King, 2004].  Having been developed by King [1998, 2004] in the late 
1990’s, template analysis is a modern development within qualitative analysis and as such 
there is a relatively little literature in this area.  Nevertheless, template analysis shares 
many similarities with other approaches such as ‘code-book analysis’ and ‘thematic coding’ 
and therefore it is possible to use some additional sources for guidance [Crabtree and 
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This does not include the six purchasing clerk interviews which average around thirty minutes per interview.   
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Miller, 1999; Miles and Huberman, 1994].  Indeed, King himself states that template style 
approaches are widely employed across various types of qualitative research [King, 1998, 
p18].      
To some extent template analysis may also be seen to share some similarities with the 
approach of grounded theory.  Both approaches are inductive, iterative, and, use codes to 
organize and analyse large amounts of qualitative data.  Nevertheless, there are some key 
differences between the approaches, which have led to template analysis being selected for 
this study.  In reference to grounded theory King notes that ‘template analysis may be 
preferred by those who are not inimical to the assumptions of grounded theory, but find it 
too prescriptive in that it specifies procedures for data gathering that must198 be followed’ 
[King, 2004, p 257].  In contrast to grounded theory King finds that, ‘template analysis is, on 
the whole a more flexible technique with fewer specified procedures, permitting the 
researcher to tailor it to match their own requirements’ [King, 2004, p 257].   
The level of flexibility afforded within the template approach allows the analytical process 
to evolve and adjust throughout the course of the study.  Whilst grounded theory 
encourages the researcher to identify a ‘core’ variable at a relatively early stage, within 
template analysis there is the freedom to re-classify the importance and presentation of 
themes overtime.  This is considered a major advantage in light of the relatively explorative 
nature of the partial model study.  Equally, template analysis allows the researcher to 
develop a style of presentation best suited to answering the research questions within the 
study.  Whether this involves focusing on one core theme or several key themes, once 
again, there is the freedom to make such decisions over the course of research.   
However, whilst template analysis’ strengths are found in its pragmatism and adaptability, 
at the current time it is relatively underdeveloped in terms of guidelines for application. 
King [2004] himself finds that it is the researchers own prerogative to tailor the loose 
framework of template analysis towards the needs of their research project. Therefore, 
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 King [2004] places the word ‘must’ in italics based on Straus and Corbin [1990], where it is stated that, 
‘Procedures must be followed in doing research...it is only by practicing procedures through continued research 
that one gains sufficient understanding of how they work, and the skill and experience that enables one to 
continue using the techniques with success’ [Straus and Corbin, 1990, p26].     
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despite the above critique of grounded theory, there may be certain areas where template 
analysis can learn from this approach.  Indeed, King [2004] observes that template analysis 
and grounded theory are not inimical within their approach, thus opening the door to the 
possibility of one approach learning from the other.  In light of this, insights from grounded 
theory have been employed within the process of refining codes/themes, the theoretical 
sampling carried out prior to round two research, and the process of memoing.    
6.6.1 - Coding  
Template analysis, like grounded theory, uses codes to organise and interpret qualitative 
data. King [2004] states that ‘put simply, a code is a label attached to a section of text to 
index it as relating to a thematic issue in the data which the researcher has identified as 
important to his or her interpretation’ [p257].  As such, each code is directly related to a 
theme in the template.  Depending on the researchers style the code may be a number 
representing a theme, or it may simply be an abbreviation of a theme.  Codes enable the 
researcher to transform a seemingly unmanageable amount of rich qualitative data into 
clearly identifiable themes related to the research question.  Closely related to this Crabtree 
and Miller [1999] describe the development of a ‘code manual’, or ‘template’, as a means of 
organizing text within the larger interpretative process.  
King [2004] notes that codes can be simple and descriptive, or deep and interpretative.  
Typically each template will contain a variety of both, depending on both the phenomenon 
being examined and the researcher’s style of presentation.  Within each template, codes are 
organized hierarchically, where a grouping of lower order codes are clustered together 
under a higher order code. Lower order codes are essentially used to more specifically 
define higher order codes, deepening the analysis of the text.  Whilst the researcher may 
choose as many levels of coding as desired King [2004] recommends between two and four 
levels.   
As the researcher reads through the text codes are applied where appropriate to sections 
that relate to a particular theme.  Within template analysis parallel coding is allowed, 
where the researcher is able to classify the same segment of text with two or more codes if 
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required [King, 2004].  Crabtree and Miller [1999, p167] find that through coding, ‘the 
template process reduces the amount of data being considered at any one time and brings 
together related pieces of text earlier in the process, which can facilitate making 
connections’.  By providing structure template analysis also helps to reduce the fabricating, 
discounting and misinterpreting of evidence, which can unconsciously take place in the 
interpretation process [Crabtree and Miller, 1999].  Miles and Huberman [1994], also 
support the template approach, as a means of displaying an objective interpretation of 
complex social phenomena. 
6.6.2 - Data Interpretation: Developing the templates    
Based on the approach of critical realism the interpretation of data from interviews begins 
with the assumption that participant responses give us direct access to their lived 
experiences.  This does not mean that responses directly reflect reality, but rather it is 
necessary to explore the underlying trends within participant experiences in order to 
understand the generative mechanisms at work within the phenomenon being studied.  
Data interpretation has therefore proceeded with the initial objective of appreciating 
respondent’s experiences at the individual level, later advancing to the stage of exploring 
the underlying trends and linkages between respondent’s experiences.  
The approach of template analysis itself does not specify any particular process for the 
interpretation of data. Observing this problem, King finds that, ‘a strategy must be 
developed which fits the aims and content of the particular study’ [King, 2004, p266].  In 
light of this, the interpretative strategy for this study was designed with two main 
concerns: firstly, the exploratory nature of the early stages of data collection, and secondly, 
the study’s aim of presenting a focused response to research questions.  As such, 
interpretation began by using a mechanism to organise and interpret a broad array of 
exploratory, themes, data and conceptual ideas, and overtime it channelled this broad 
amount of data and ideas into a clearly defined understanding of each theme within the 
final template.  This process occurred in two distinct phases: firstly, the selection and 
categorization of codes into templates, which was accompanied by the process of memoing, 
and secondly, the chunking of related sections of text and data immersion.    
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6.6.2.1 - Selection and Categorization199  
Beginning with the initial stages of coding, the process of selecting and hierarchically 
organising concepts into themes was a key aspect of the analysis within this study.  Not 
only does the presentation of themes within the template demonstrate what themes are 
present within the data, but the hierarchical structure helps to show both the varying 
importance and relationship between themes in the data.  As such, the template acts as the 
cornerstone upon which the various elements of data analysis are based, and each stage of 
template development represents a key stage in the journey towards the final research 
findings.   
There were three main factors affecting both the selection of key themes, and the 
organisation of lower order themes within the template for each of the key themes.   
Firstly, themes were ordered based on how they relate with the research questions for the 
study.  Research questions provided a solid bench mark against which all themes, both a 
priori and emergent, could be measured.  This has resulted in a style of presentation for the 
research findings that is both clear and relevant in its connection with the research 
questions for the study.  The central importance of the research questions within the 
methodology of this study is conceptually demonstrated in figure 6.3 on the next page. 
Secondly, themes were organised based the richness of the data related to each theme.  The 
richness of data was considered in equal measure to the link each theme had with the 
research questions.  Data richness was determined by a number of factors including; the 
level of explanation given by each respondent, the quality of examples related to the 
explanation, whether the issue emerged without prompting within the respondent’s 
narrative, the level of emphasis placed on the issue by the respondent, and the respondents 
level of expertise in the area on which they are commenting.  
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 For a full demonstration of the process of coding and template re-organisation please refer to appendices 
number four and fourteen. 
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Thirdly, and least importantly themes were selected based on the regularity with which 
they occurred in the data.  This does not signal a content analysis type approach, but rather 
this technique is used to simply help draw attention to key generative mechanisms, as 
supported in the earlier section on critical realism200.   
Figure 6.3 – Research Questions and the Analytical Process 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
King [2004] notes that the re-organisation of templates will occur throughout the template 
analysis process. Template analysis enables the flexibility for themes to be inserted, deleted 
and re-classified at any stage leading up to the presentation of the final template.  Indeed, 
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 Within the section on critical realism the identification of ‘demi-regs’ was observed as a process within the 
critical realists methodology.  
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Crabtree and Miller suggest, ‘it is important to keep in mind that codes can and usually 
should be flexible and open’ [1999, p168].  Not only should the codes themselves be open 
to change, but the researcher must also stay open to the possibility of new themes 
emerging [King, 2004]. 
For the presentation of findings within this study it was decided that a number of key 
themes would be identified based on the research questions.  Each key theme would then 
form the heading for a template of themes made up of primary themes, secondary themes 
and sub-level themes201. Due to the hierarchical organisation of the template primary 
themes are developed to describe the key theme, secondary themes are developed to 
describe primary themes, and sub-level themes are developed to describe secondary 
themes.   It should be noted that the final organisation of themes within the templates is not 
decided until the final stages of coding and analysis.   
The first stage of template analysis begins with the development of the initial template.  
Themes within the initial template are typically based on a priori themes identified within 
the literature and pilot studies. Indeed, King [2004] finds that when you have a well 
structured interview guide with clear and detailed topics developed from the literature, the 
initial template will be much more complete.  King also notes that a high level of a priori 
themes within the interview guide is typical within critical realist research.  To some extent 
the identification of a priori themes can therefore be likened to the identification of 
generative mechanisms during the critique of literature that takes place in critical realism.  
Indeed, the iterative process of redefining themes and templates overtime, as 
demonstrated in appendices four and fourteen, may also be likened to the process of 
iterative abstraction associated with critical realism.      
Within this study the themes in the initial template have been taken from the interview 
guides used in round one of research.  As discussed earlier, in relation to the development 
of interview guides for round one, the questions within the interview guides were based on 
a] their connection with the research questions, b] themes within the theory/literature, 
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 Please refer to figures 6.3 and 6.4 for an example of the thematic structure.    
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and c] coordination/linkages between supply chain actors.  In light of this, the themes 
extracted from the interview guides and used to construct the initial template were also 
selected based on these criteria.  The role of these three parameters in shaping the content 
and structure of the themes within the initial templates can be seen from figure 6.4 on the 
next page, where the explanation down the right hand side helps to show the origin of the 
themes within the initial template for the key theme ‘Governance and Power’.      
Figure 6.4 [p 181] shows the classic linear style of template presentation as used in King 
[2004].  The linear style of template incorporates a simple structure that can be used to 
display a relatively large amount of information.  This is particularly useful when there are 
a large number of themes in a template.  In contrast to this, the more complex 
diagrammatic style template202 shown in figure 6.5 [p 182] is not able to display a large 
amount of themes; however, its design enables the reader to clearly visualise the structure 
of the themes within the template. 
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 The hierarchical template has been developed by the author for the purpose of this study. 
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Figure 6.4 – Initial Template: Governance and Power 
 
  Logic of Vertical Integration 
o Control supply Risk 
o Market control 
o Processing incentives 
 
 Local Processor Supply Needs 
o Bean Quality 
o Bean Efficiency  
o Local processing supply deficit 
 
 Government governance  
o Benefit of functional upgrading  
o Credibility of government action 
o Communication  
 
 Power  
o Buyer Power 
o Cocobod power 
o Power struggle 
 
 
Key  
 Primary Theme 
o Secondary Theme  
 Sub-level theme [not 
present in this case] 
Chapter 4 – Losch [2002] and Fold [2002] explore 
the issue of why large processors invest in West 
African cocoa markets. The primary theme and 
three secondary themes listed are all directly 
connected to the literature on cocoa processing in 
West Africa.  
Theme Emergence 
Chapter 4 – LMC [1996] and Fold [2002] discuss 
the specific bean requirements of origin 
processing, including bean quality and efficiency.  
Market reports by Benjamin [2007] and Ryan 
[2007] raise the possibility of a supply deficit in 
the local processing market  
Though the role of government is not generally 
considered in GVC analysis, this theme was 
included in light of research question number six. 
The benefit of functional upgrading in the 
Ghanaian cocoa market is raised by LMC [1996] 
and Fold [2002].  The theme of credibility has 
been informed by NIE literature in chapter 2.  The 
theme of communication arose from concerns 
raised by processors in market reports [Kpodo 
2008b]. 
The theme of power is at the foundation of GVC 
analysis as discussed in relation to Gereffi [1994] 
throughout chapter 3.  Fold [2002], Dorin [2003] 
and Wilcox and Abbot [2004] all raise concerns 
about buyer power within the cocoa chain.  The 
theme of Cocobod power has been considered in 
light of the important role of the Cocobod in 
Ghana and research question 6.  Finally, power 
struggle has emerged in response to market 
reports suggesting potential conflict between the 
Cocobod and local processors [Ryan, 2007; Kpodo 
2008b]. 
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Figure 6.5 – Hierarchical Initial Template: Governance and Power   
 
183 | P a g e  
 
183 
 
The key theme of governance and power was identified prior to round one of 
research in relation to the prominent position of these concepts within GVC 
analysis, as seen in chapter three.  Equally, these concepts are considered hugely 
important to addressing research question six, leading to them being given 
additional consideration when selecting key themes prior to research.  The 
primary and secondary themes that are displayed in relation to the key theme of 
governance and power have been structured in order to show their hierarchical 
relationship to the key theme.  At the stage of developing the initial templates, 
this hierarchical relationship was devised based on the understanding of these 
themes that had been developed throughout the literature review and the 
construction of the interview guides.  
Several other key themes were identified prior to round one of research for 
which the same process of developing the initial template was undertaken.  
These themes included; the credibility of reform, the relationship between 
competition and quality, partial model transition, LBC strategy to build market 
share, the role of the PBC, the role of the buyers association, the link between 
quality control and cocoa exporting, and governance and power within local 
processing.  Through the course of analysis the key themes of the role of the PBC, 
LBC strategy to build market share, and the role of the buyers association were 
reduced to lower order themes.  Equally, the theme of supply chain management 
emerged to become a key theme.   Given the emergent nature of this theme, there 
was no initial template at the beginning of round one coding, and therefore, the 
initial template was developed almost entirely within the process of phase one 
coding.    
Although the initial templates were detailed and structured, the initial template 
is only considered a temporary guide, or a starting point, from which the process 
of coding can begin. The aim of the analytical process was not to verify the 
themes within the initial template, but rather to understand how the data 
collected for this study could be used to build knowledge and answer the 
research questions.  As such, where trends within the data were contrary to the 
prior understanding represented through the initial templates this was 
considered an important trend for further analysis and consideration.  In light of 
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this, every effort was made to consider new themes emerging within the data 
throughout the process of data coding.   
In order to facilitate the capture and exploration of emergent themes within the 
data, the technique of memoing was used alongside coding throughout the 
analytical process. The process of memoing is closely associated with grounded 
theory, where it is described as;        
‘The theorized write up of codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst 
while coding...its exhausts the analysts momentary ideation based on data with 
perhaps a little conceptual elaboration’ [Glaser, 1978, pg 83-84]. 
Whilst coding does involve some element of data analysis and contemplation, it 
cannot describe and explore the concepts emerging within the data.  As such, 
memoing is used to elaborate upon and develop ideas whilst coding. Occurring 
simultaneously with the process of coding, memoing is used to record and 
evaluate all aspects of the data including not only what the participant has said, 
but also other aspects of data richness such as; the emotion with which it was 
said, whether they were in any way influenced towards the response they gave 
and whether they appeared to be avoiding certain topics203.  Alongside this, the 
quality of the explanation given can also be evaluated looking at issues such as 
the fullness of the participants account, whether examples were provided and 
the respondents level of expertise related to the issue being discussed.    
Memos were used to consider how the themes and trends within the data related 
to the templates being used for coding. Based on the concepts being developed 
within the memos it was possible to update and re-structure the templates in 
light of the new and enriched understanding of the research phenomenon.  The 
consideration of emergent themes was most important when coding the data 
using the initial template.  As discussed above the initial template represented 
the understanding of themes that had been developed prior to data collection, 
and therefore, it was hugely important to update the initial template in light of 
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 Silverman [2005] finds whilst the researcher should guard against respondent omissions, it is also 
possible to draw insight from what is not being said. 
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the new themes emerging within the data.  Equally, it was necessary to 
constantly consider the validity of the themes currently within the templates.  
Indeed, although the consideration of past theory was important throughout the 
analytical process, the themes that were evident within the data were given 
prominence at all stages of coding and analysis.   
In light of this, all of the templates were constantly evolving throughout every 
stage of coding and analysis.  This was particularly true in the early stages of 
coding, where, as can be seen in appendix four, the conceptual model clearly 
identifies a strong level of interaction and evolution between stages three and 
four of the diagram, leading to the formation of template number two.  Equally in 
appendix number fourteen there are a relatively large amount of emergent 
themes evident within template number two after round one coding.  The 
technique of constantly re-adjusting the template throughout the first stage of 
coding is recommended by King [2004], Crabtree and Miller [1999], and, Miles 
and Huberman [1994], finding that it enables emergent themes to become 
included in the interpretative process as early as possible.   
In order to account for the strong emergence of themes at this early stage of 
analysis, all round one interviews were coded twice before the development of 
template number two204.  Phase one205 of coding took place with the initial 
template, which was constantly evolving based on emergence of themes within 
the data.  After all interviews had been coded once, the initial template was 
adjusted in full and phase two of coding was carried out using the revised initial 
template.  The revised initial template remained unchanged throughout this 
second phase of coding.  The second phase of coding was used to ensure that all 
round one interview’s underwent at least one full phase of coding using the same 
‘revised’ template, prior to the development of template number two.  This was 
considered necessary as template number two was used to form the basis of the 
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 Round one interviews are in fact coded a total of three times, where the final stage of coding will 
take place using template number four, which is used to code both rounds of interviews. 
205
 In total there were four phases of coding in this study.  Phases three and four are explained later in 
section 6.7.2.1. 
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interview guides for round two data collection, as can be seen from appendices 
number four and fourteen.     
The only difference between the process used for the first phase of coding with 
the initial template, as compared all subsequent stages of coding, is that whilst 
the initial template evolved during phase one of coding, for all other phases of 
coding the template was not updated during the particular round of coding for 
which it was developed.  For example, template number three remained the 
same throughout the entirety of phase three coding, until round three coding 
was complete, at which stage template number three was updated based on the 
enriched understanding that hand been achieved through coding and memoing.   
 
Nevertheless, throughout all stages of coding each theme within the template 
was evaluated through memoing, based on the new information emerging in the 
data.  Through the process of iterative abstraction new information was used to 
help refine and enrich the understanding of different concepts related to the 
research phenomenon.  Indeed, where a new understanding of a concept is 
developed, old information then has to be reconsidered in light of this new 
understanding.  To some extent this highlights the subjective nature of 
qualitative research where information has to be reconsidered in light of a new 
understanding or perspective.  In order to overcome any potential 
inconsistencies that may result from a change of perspective or understanding 
throughout the process of analysis, all interviews from both rounds one and two 
of research were recoded a final time with template number four before the final 
stages of analysis.   
 
As discussed earlier, the technique of memoing was a key process in the 
development of the templates, and therefore, the following section will describe 
the process of memoing that was undertaken before moving on to discuss the 
final stage of analysis. 
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6.6.2.2 - The Process of Memoing 
Glaser and Straus [1967] suggest that memos should be orderly, progressive, 
systematic and easily retrievable for sorting and cross referencing.  In light of 
this a very structured process of memoing was enforced throughout the 
analysis206.  For the interviews gathered during round one of data collection 
there were four stages of memoing.  The first stage or ‘preliminary’ stage 
occurred when all round one interviews were coded using the initial template.  
Within the preliminary memo the emphasis was on observing themes emerging 
within the data.  These emerging themes were then used in the construction of 
the revised initial template, which was then used to code all first round 
interviews. 
During the second phase of coding, using the revised initial template, two 
separate memos were recorded.  Memo number one contained notes about the 
participant in the interview, including anything that might affect the manner in 
which the participant responded, such as; their background, recent experiences 
that may create bias, any political or social ties that they have and their level of 
expertise.  Aspects of each participant’s background were particularly important 
in this study given the social and political implications of the cocoa market in 
Ghana.  The second memo taken on each interview was part of an evolving 
document where thematic development and theoretical ideas were explored 
more fully.  These two memos together then guided the process of template 
adjustment, leading to template number two.   
For the interviews carried out in round two of data collection the process of 
memoing was slightly more focused based on the clearer understanding of 
themes that had been established within round one analysis.  Throughout round 
two of research in Ghana individual memos were written after every interview 
based on the themes within template number two.  Based on these memos it was 
possible to make minor adjustments to template number two prior to the coding 
of round two interviews, as can be seen in appendix number fourteen. During the 
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 Figure 6.6 demonstrates the link between the process of memoing and coding. 
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third phase of coding207, using template number three, two memos were 
recorded. The first memo focused on the details surrounding the participant in 
the interview, and the second explored the themes within template number 
three and their connection with theory.   
As demonstrated in figure 6.6, each new round of memos has attempted to build 
not only on the concepts emerging within each new round of coding, but also the 
insights garnered from the previous round of memos.   
Figure 6.6 – The Link between Coding and Memoing [Source: Author] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior to the development of template four, all of the memos recorded throughout 
the entire analytical process were referred to. This was considered a necessary 
stage of analytical reflexivity in order to ensure that all themes had been 
considered in full prior to the development of template four, which would be 
used for the phase four of coding.  During phase four of coding all interviews 
from rounds one and two were coded with template four. The memo taken 
whilst coding with template number four focused specifically on developing the 
key themes identified in previous rounds.  
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 As can be seen from appendices four and fourteen the ‘Phase 3’ of coding is the first time that 
round two interviews are coded.   
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6.6.2.3 – Chunking and Data Immersion  
Following on from phase four of coding, the process of ‘chunking’ [Crabtree and 
Miller, 1999] represented the final stage of data sorting in this study.  Within the 
process of sorting interview data is organised into ‘chunks’ of similarly coded 
text.  Crabtree and Miller [1999] find that categorizing data into empirically 
based and meaningful segments can greatly facilitate the analytical process.   
Given the expansive nature of qualitative data it was beneficial to have a clear 
vision of all the interview data related to each theme.  As such, this process 
greatly facilitated the final stages of analysis.  By collecting all this data in one 
place it was possible to fully assess the validity of some the concepts and ideas 
that had been developed at an earlier stage, when it was not possible to 
appreciate the fullness of all of the information within the interviews.  Indeed, 
this acted as another key stage of reflexivity where I was able to adjust any 
concepts that appeared to be driven by my own predisposition towards an idea, 
rather than the research evidence.   
From my own experience it appears that during the early stages of analysis the 
threat of researcher bias is at its greatest.  Aspects of the research process, such 
as, the literature review, the establishment of research questions, and the 
identification of potential generative mechanisms, may act to create a certain 
predisposition in the researchers mind.  As such, there is a risk of focusing on 
aspects of the evidence which have the closest fit with ideas and concepts that 
were developed prior to data collection.  In light of this, the iterative nature of 
research in this study and the re-evaluation and reflection that takes place 
throughout the process of template analysis, have helped to ensure that the 
validity of ideas are constantly being tested.  This took place not only through 
conceptual reasoning, but also through the re-assessment of old data and the 
addition of fresh data specifically designed to test the robustness of round one 
themes.  
This process was greatly facilitated by the time in between rounds one and two 
of data collection.  Given the nine month break between field trips I was able to 
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fully analyse the results from round one before round two data collection.   
Round one data was subjected to all of the analytical stages including, coding, 
memoing, chunking and immersion, eventually leading to a full write up of round 
one findings before the interview guides for round two were developed.   
Having round ones findings as a standalone document enabled me to accurately 
gauge which themes had remained prevalent throughout both rounds of 
research.  As described earlier, time was a key factor in affecting each 
participant’s account of the market.  Themes that appeared important in round 
one were no longer evident in round two.  Based on only one round of research 
such themes would have been assessed as valid within the final templates.  As 
such, once again the iterative nature of this study has had a key role to play in the 
validity of research findings.        
However, the goal of immersion is not only to compare and contrast the two 
rounds of research.  Rather, the goal is to establish a deeper understanding of the 
partial model based on the structured analysis that has already taken place up to 
this point.  Crabtree and Miller [1999] find that once data has been sorted and 
the templates have been established it is possible to search for deeper 
connections within the data, which may have previously been missed based on 
the overwhelming nature of qualitative data. 
As such, the final stages of immersion attempted to spend less time analysing 
aspects such as the richness data and the strength of each theme, instead 
focusing on the generative mechanisms at work within the partial model, and 
how they relate to the research questions.  To a large extent this process is 
facilitated by the challenge which comes with the writing up of research findings, 
where any element of frailty within the studies arguments would be deeply 
exposed.  Throughout the writing process I was constantly challenged to 
reassess the strength of my arguments, thus considering as many rival 
explanations as possible.  Not only was it necessary to consider the strength of 
each argument in isolation, but moreover, each element of the research findings 
needed to be considered as part of broader narrative on the partial model in 
Ghana.  
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At this later stage of analysis it was possible to see causal processes more clearly.  
In essence the processes of coding, memoing, chunking, and template 
development enabled me to reach a point where it was possible make a more 
legitimate assessment of causation.  Indeed, whilst themes are initially selected 
based on a relatively objective criteria208, as the process of template analysis 
develops through coding, memoing, chunking and immersion, the final templates 
have been able to achieve the deeper causal explanation strived for in critical 
realist research. 
6.7 – Conclusion  
Within the academic literature on research methodlogy its appears that there is 
very little guidance on how to construct a methodlogy for qualitative economic 
research in the developing country environment.  In light of this, the 
methodology developed within this study has been a largely original 
development, where the central objective has been to develop a methodlogy 
suitable for addressing the phenomenon of the partial model.  The approach 
taken within this study has attempted to stike a balance between the explorative 
and adaptable nature of qualitative methods, and the need for rigiour and 
reliability within economic research.  Throughout the research process structure 
has been achieved through the use of template analysis as a foundation on which 
to base the procedural aspects of the methodology.   Equally, the problems 
associated with application of orthodox economic policies within the developing 
country environment have regularly been used as a starting point from which to 
build the socially enriched perspective adopted within this study.   
Together these two foundational aspects have helped to create a methodlogy 
which is both applicable for its application to the developing country 
environment, and rigorous through the use of a highly structured and iterative 
process of thematic development.  Building on this chapter seven will use the 
final templates developed for each of the key themes as a structure from which 
to discuss the findings for this study.  Whilst the template itself will not be 
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 As noted earlier, themes within the early stages of template development themes are organised 
based on the richness of data, and the themes link with the research questions.   
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discussed in great length, the processes described within this chapter have 
helped to demonstrate that the template is in fact the central structure around 
which the research findings have been formed. 
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Chapter Seven – Findings  
 
Section 7.1 - Credibility of Reform 
 
7.1.1 – Introduction  
 
The following section deals with issues surrounding the credibility of reform 
within the domestic end of the Ghanaian cocoa supply chain.  As discussed in 
chapter four, liberalisation within the domestic market has led to a unique 
situation where despite the introduction of private sector buyers the Cocobod 
remains deeply involved in several aspects of the market.  In light of this, the 
issue of reform credibility is expected to play a key role in the level of private 
sector engagement within the market.  Indeed, as observed by Kherallah et al 
[2000] and Jayne et al [2002], the issue of reform credibility has been paramount 
in determining the success of market liberalisation policies across sub-Saharan 
Africa.        
 
In light of the importance placed on reform credibility within the literature 
chapters, the credibility of reform was highlighted as a key theme prior to the 
development of round one interview guides.  However, within the template for 
credibility of reform the primary themes of accountability and organisational 
culture were not identified as factors affecting credibility prior to data collection.  
As such, they are considered emergent themes.   
 
Within this primary theme of accountability, it was possible to identify several a 
priori themes that were observed throughout the literature review.  In fact all 
four secondary themes including linkages with the government, moral hazard 
and rent seeking and good governance were all identified within chapters two 
and four.     
 
The primary theme of organisational culture presents a mixture of emergent and 
a priori themes.  Whilst, the secondary theme of control emerged throughout the 
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research process, the theme of institutional change was foremost in the new 
institutional economics literature highlighted in chapter two.  
 
The structure of themes within the final template can be seen in a linear format 
in figure 7.1.1 and in a hierarchical format in figure 7.1.2. 
 
Figure 7.1.1 – Final Template: Credibility of Reform  
 
 The Accountability of Cocobod Subsidiaries 
o Links with the Cocobod 
o Moral Hazard and Rent Seeking 
o Good Governance  
 Cocobod Sanction 
 Arbitration  
 
 Cocobod Organisational Culture 
o Control  
 Tight Regulation 
 Unilateral Decision Making 
o Institutional Change 
 Collective Action  
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Figure 7.1.2 – Hierarchical Final Template: Credibility of Reform  
 
 
Sub-level Theme 
Secondary Theme 
Primary Theme 
Key Theme Credibility of Reform 
Accountability 
Cocobod Links Moral Hazard Governance  
Sanction Arbitration 
Culture 
Control  
Regulation  Unilateral  
Change 
Collective 
Action 
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7.1.2 – The Accountability of Cocobod Subsidiaries  
 
7.1.2.1 – The Role of Cocobod Subsidiaries  
 
Within Ghana the Cocobod remains active in the cocoa market, not only through 
tight regulatory conditions, but also through its control of the QCD and CMC.  The 
institutions of QCD and CMC impact extensively on the daily operations of the 
LBC’s.  Across both rounds of interviews all LBC participants209, except one, have 
indicated that the Cocobod’s close relationship with these two institutions was 
something they had hoped would change in the process of liberal reform in 
Ghana.  When commenting on the role of the CMC and the QCD one LBC manager 
noted that,  
 
‘The controls being exercised by the Cocobod are not on the decrease as I was 
expecting’.  
 
As observed above change in this area has not occurred and findings from the 
LBC segment strongly suggest that the Cocobod’s continual attachment to the 
QCD and CMC acts as the most significant factor negatively affecting the 
credibility of reform.  The QCD and CMC are negatively associated with market 
credibility because, as subsidiaries of the Cocobod, LBC’s perceive there to be a 
regulatory bias towards these institutions. This can be seen from the following 
passage:      
 
‘If a regulator is only overseeing what people are doing it is fine, but the QCD 
they play a very vital role in the success of the LBC’s, the CMC they do the same, 
but he [Cocobod] controls them and when he does the rules he favours them a 
little bit’. 
 
                                                 
209
 Unless stated otherwise, ‘all LBC participants’ includes all those under the title ‘LBC Participants’ in 
appendix eighteen. This does not include any of the ‘rural participants’ in appendix eighteen.  This 
rule will apply for all findings sections in chapter seven.    
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As observed in chapter two, the government’s lack of commitment to reform has 
been highlighted as a factor leading to the failure of liberalisation policies 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa [Jayne et al, 2002; Kherallah et al, 2000].   In light 
of this, the Cocobod’s strong links with these institutions and the resultant 
perception of bias within their regulatory actions appears to significantly affect 
the credibility of reform in Ghana.  This is particularly so given that the functions 
of these institutions are closely integrated with the daily operations of LBC’s.  
Indeed, all LBC respondents considered these institutions to be the Cocobod’s 
representatives in the field, somewhat diminishing the perception of 
liberalisation within the internal market.   
 
7.1.2.2 – Moral Hazard and Rent seeking 
 
Throughout both stages of research all LBC respondents were highly critical of 
the Cocobod’s regulation of the QCD and CMC.  In particular all LBC respondents 
complained about the Cocobod’s failure to hold QCD agents accountable in cases 
of malpractice.   Within interview accounts the problem of accountability is 
particularly evident in relation to the Cocobod’s response to inconsistent grading 
of cocoa from QCD officers.  Typically this inconsistency involves cocoa being 
passed by QCD’s graders at the first quality check upcountry and then failed by a 
different set of QCD graders once cocoa has been transported to the takeover 
centres where the second quality check takes place.   
 
Despite the Cocobod’s contention that this is not a regular occurrence, every LBC 
participant across both stages observed this problem210 and associated it with 
costly delays incurred when they have to take time fixing quality defects at the 
port.  In criticism of this, all LBC respondents noted that it is much more costly 
and logistically problematic to fix quality problems at the port compared with 
the upcountry level.  If a problem is detected at the upcountry level then given 
the traceability211 system used in Ghanaian cocoa it is possible to get the 
                                                 
210
 On average LBC’s found that between 5-10% of their cocoa would have to be reconditioned at the 
takeover centres before being taken over by the Cocobod. 
211
 Each sack of cocoa in Ghana displays information on the PC who first bought the cocoa, the LBC it 
was sold to and the grader who gave it his/her seal of approval. 
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purchasing clerk, who originally bought the poor quality cocoa, to carry out the 
additional work at no extra cost to the LBC.  However, if the defect is noticed at 
the port, it is more costly and time consuming to rework the cocoa and tracing 
the problem back to the original point of quality failure is much more 
challenging.  Commenting on this problem one LBC manager observed that,  
 
‘The upcountry check, they don’t regard it when it comes to the port’.    
 
Indeed, this problem has been in the system for some time as observed in the 
LMC report [1996]. The most high profile example of this occurred during the 
purple bean problem of 2004/05, where LBC’s were being fined up to 50% of 
their commission for a quality defect, which had not been detected by the 
upcountry QCD graders.  Understandably LBC management consider this to 
represent poor performance on the part of the QCD and therefore not something 
they should have to pay for.   
 
Another scenario, as described by the Deputy Managing Director of the QCD and 
two respondents from the LBC’s, is that QCD staff may be captured by LBC 
district level staff in the form of a bribe.  As observed in chapter two, the risk of 
public agents being captured by interest groups is one of the biggest 
organizational challenges facing public sector bureaucracies [Tirole, 1994; Dixit, 
2002].  Where this problem occurs in Ghana, a financial incentive may be given 
to a member of the QCD’s upcountry staff by an LBC district officer212 to either 
ignore poor quality cocoa or speed up the grading process, in the hope that any 
poor quality that is passed will not be detected at the later takeover centre 
grading.   
 
However, as observed earlier, where any quality problems are detected at the 
takeover centre this will typically result in the LBC having to carry out expensive 
reconditioning on the cocoa.  In light of this, LBC management do not want their 
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 This could include any member of staff working at the district level.  Within appendix eighteen 
such participants are under the title of ‘rural participants’.  
199 | P a g e  
 
199 
 
field agents to act in this way, as indicated by all LBC participants.  This can be 
seen in the following passage taken from an LBC interview, 
 
‘You see it is not in the interest of we the LBC’s for him to take big money, seal 
the wrong product, take it all the way to the port, for it to be rejected and 
confiscated’.  
 
Nevertheless, this problem occurs due to the inability of the top management, in 
both the LBC’s and the QCD, to effectively monitor the actions of the staff in the 
field.   The problem of rent seeking is so extensive within the Ghanaian quality 
control system that all LBC managers, with the exception of one, complain that 
no cocoa will ever be graded and sealed by the QCD without some financial 
incentive being given.  As noted by one LBC manager,  
 
‘As for that, you have pay, there is no cocoa sealed where you don’t pay 
something’   
 
This problem, which was also observed by Laven [2007], is known in the market 
as QCD VAT.  Indeed, as observed by Bardhan and Udry [1999] in chapter two, 
the problem of de-centralized corruption in the form of bribe taking is highly 
problematic within Africa markets.   
 
QCD officers are not remunerated in the form of a high powered incentive 
contracts and instead have fixed rate salaries.  As such, faced with low powered 
incentives, QCD officers have the opportunity to take advantage of the colossal 
information asymmetries that exist between themselves and their managers.   
Information asymmetries in this area exist in a number of forms, and to a large 
extent it appears that this may be the main reason for the frequency of this 
problem.    
 
Cocobod sources have indicated that given the organisation’s centralised 
operations it is very difficult for them to monitor the actions of both their 
subsidiaries and LBC’s in the field.  Indeed, two Cocobod respondents highlighted 
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this as an area where the organisation needs to improve. The vast majority of the 
Cocobod’s monitoring is based on reports submitted from the field, as opposed 
to actual field observations.  Commenting on the Cocobod’s monitoring one 
industry source found that,  
 
‘Everybody [in Cocobod] likes to sit in Accra and look at paper’.  
 
Similarly a Cocobod source noted that,  
 
‘Sometimes we who sit in Accra are not in touch with the reality down there [in 
the field]’.   
 
As such, it is the QCD themselves who are seen as the Cocobod’s monitors in the 
field, thus making it highly problematic to collect information which may render 
a QCD officer culpable in the case of quality failure.  Coupled with this problem is 
the disincentive LBC’s face to report QCD officers in any case of malpractice.  In 
an environment where QCD resources are already thinly spread, the favour of 
QCD officers is something that LBC upcountry staff will attempt to court in order 
to speed up the grading procedure.  All LBC managers therefore find that 
reporting QCD officers is not something which their upcountry staff are willing to 
do. Indeed, this problem is also observed by the DMD of the QCD, finding that,  
 
‘They will try to cover themselves up, they live in the same village, they live in 
the same town, they drink together, they eat together, if there is a problem this 
one will say it is not true’ 
 
Further information asymmetries are caused by the subjectivity of quality 
grading itself, where the QCD upcountry staff and the QCD staff at the takeover 
centre may have a difference of opinion.  Indeed, this problem is observed by the 
LBC respondent in appendix twenty-three.  Resultantly, it appears that QCD 
officers are given some margin of error in the grading process, ultimately 
enabling them greater freedom in terms of moral hazard behaviour.  To a large 
extent this problem is further heightened by the negative effect that weather 
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exposure can have on cocoa quality.  After upcountry grading cocoa will 
regularly sit on trucks waiting for takeover at the port for several weeks.  Under 
the extreme heat, humidity and rainfall of the Ghanaian climate this can cause 
quality to change between the stages of quality grading.    
 
Finally, the actions of the LBC’s themselves have caused an increased level of 
information asymmetry within the quality control system in Ghana.  Over the 
years LBC agents have been caught trying to swap high quality cocoa that has 
been graded and sealed by the QCD, with low quality cocoa beans in the process 
of cocoa transit.  This act is highly illegal and this breach of trust by LBC staff has 
created a further variable of doubt when attempting to determine the cause of 
quality failure.  Indeed, the impact which such actions have had on the mindset of 
Cocobod staff can clearly be seen by the fact that, within six of seven 
interviews213 where Cocobod officials were asked to comment on the issue of 
inconsistent grading, the problem of LBC’s switching cocoa was cited as one of 
the main reasons for this.    
 
7.2.1.3 – Good Governance 
 
7.2.1.3.1 - Cocobod Sanction 
 
In light of the above problems associated with opportunism from QCD staff, it 
might be expected that both the Cocobod and QCD management would have 
taken a strong stance in sanctioning malpractice amongst their staff.  However, 
based on the responses of all LBC participants in round one it appears that 
inconsistent grading and rent seeking very rarely leads to any form of sanction 
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 To avoid ambiguity the respondents who make up these seven Cocobod interviews have been 
marked with the symbol  in appendix eighteen.  These seven interviews will be referenced with 
some regularity throughout sections 7.1-7.4, as they make up the core group of Cocobod interviews 
where questioning covered the Cocobod’s role in the domestic supply chain.   For example 
information from the two interviews carried out with members of the CMC will not be referenced 
with regularity throughout sections 7.1-7.4.  Within sections 7.1-7.4 information from CMC interviews 
will only be used in cases where it is either stated that a member of the CMC has expressed a certain 
opinion, or where it is stated that ‘all’ respondents from the Cocobod segment have expressed a 
certain opinion.  The same rules will apply for the interview with the Coordinator of the CODAPEC 
program, who was also not questioned in detail on the role of the LBC’s in the market.     
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for the QCD officer who has under-performed.  Throughout both stages of 
research this is expressed as a concern for all LBC’s respondents, as 
demonstrated by the interview passage in appendix twenty-three.  Indeed, the 
lack of accountability for Cocobod subsidiaries and regulatory bias exemplified 
by this problem highlights a significant failure in the credibility of the partial 
liberalisation model.   
 
As discussed earlier the level of information asymmetry in this area is a major 
challenge for the regulator when assessing who is at fault for any change of 
quality between the stages of grading.  Nevertheless, the Cocobod must be 
criticised for their method of sanctioning in this area.  Interview findings 
strongly suggest that the Cocobod’s judgment in this area may be biased against 
the LBC’s.   From stage one interviews with LBC’s, the Cocobod, and the QCD it 
could be seen that in cases where collusion has taken place between LBC 
upcountry staff and a QCD grader, it is the LBC who takes the majority of the 
blame for such behaviour.  
 
Within all seven of the interviews where respondents Cocobod respondents 
were asked to comment on the issue of malpractice, the respondent displayed 
the preconception that it is always the LBC’s who have acted opportunistically in 
cases of malpractice.  This can be seen from the following quotes taken from 
interviews with the Cocobod, ‘invariably they [LBC’s] are on the wrong-side, 
buyers are full of tricks’, and, ‘LBC’s are in the habit of trying to cut corners’.  As 
such, the Cocobod and QCD management need to adopt a more balanced 
perspective, thus enabling them to address cases of malpractice in an impartial 
manner, as would be expected of a credible market regulator.  
 
Furthermore there is a need to increase the level of equality within the 
distribution of punishment in cases of mal-practice.  Interview findings show 
that in cases where a QCD agent is at fault, the responsible agent will be 
sanctioned individually. However, in cases where an LBC agent is at fault, the 
entire LBC organisation is punished.  As such, the comparative risk faced by the 
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QCD organisation appears to be less than that faced by the LBC’s.  This is seen in 
the following statement from an LBC manager  
 
‘Why when the LBC agent misbehaves they sanction the LBC as a company, but 
when the Cocobod agent misbehaves they deal with the agent separately’.   
 
By condoning this behaviour the Cocobod is clearly sending out the wrong 
message to QCD management.  In turn this may reduce the QCD’s incentive to 
monitor their staff, thus creating an environment where QCD employees may 
consider opportunism a priori possible.  Indeed, given that it is the QCD who are 
empowered with the ultimate authority to uphold the quality of Ghana’s cocoa it 
should perhaps be they who take the greatest responsibility in such instances of 
connivance.   
 
Stage two interviews do, however, indicate that the QCD may be increasing the 
accountability of upcountry graders.  Eight of fifteen LBC managers interviewed 
in stage two found that Cocobod has been making some effort in this area.  
Similarly all Cocobod respondents in stage two noted both increased awareness 
and action in relation to staff accountability.  The need for the QCD to take 
greater responsibility in this area was made especially clear in the stage two 
interview carried out with the Deputy Managing Director of the QCD.  This can be 
seen from the following passage taken from that interview, 
 
[R] At the upcountry level who has the greatest responsibility for quality?  
 
[QCD] ‘It is the QCD, because at the end of the day parcels would not be moved 
down to the takeover centres if they had not been certified by the QCD’. 
 
Later in the same interview, he also expresses his desire to try and hold 
employees more accountable for failure in this area,  
 
‘If you grade cocoa upcountry we expect you to do a diligent job …we have 
sacked a lot of people because of this’.   
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Indeed, this must be considered a positive sign of change as compared the stage 
one interview with the same person where despite acknowledging that QCD 
officers may be at fault, there was much greater responsibility placed on the role 
of the LBC.  However, whilst QCD management did appear to be taking more 
responsibility for the performance of their graders, based on interview findings 
it does not appear that the QCD have put in place a formal programme to deal 
with this problem.  Building on this, it is possible to reference the 
recommendation of Dixit [2002], who finds that when it is not possible for the 
principle to directly observe the actions of the agent and therefore punish the 
agent in instances of moral hazard, it is necessary for the principle to devise a 
system to measure long-term performance.  Through such a system it would be 
possible for QCD management to identify patterns of poor performance amongst 
upcountry graders whose cocoa is regularly rejected at the takeover centres.  As 
such, despite information asymmetries long-term performance data would 
enable the principle to effectively measure the level of effort being applied by the 
agent.   In doing so, performance measurement214 would increase the 
accountability of staff operating the field and thus increase the credibility of the 
Cocobod’s subsidiary operations. 
 
7.2.1.3.2 - Arbitration  
 
Building on the recommendation above, the accountability of civil servants 
operating in the partial model is an area in need of improvement.  This finding is 
not only based on the institutionalised rent seeking of QCD staff, but also recent 
problems involving the staff of the CMC215.  Closely related to this, Bates [1981], 
North and Weingast [1989] and Levy and Spiller [1994] find that in order to 
achieve the perception of credibility within government intervention, there must 
                                                 
214
 Kaufmann [2004] recommends rigorous performance monitoring through empirical measures as 
an effective method to increase the accountability of civil servants.  
215
 In October 2007 it was discovered that CMC and QCD staff had defrauded the Cocobod out of 
several thousand tonnes of cocoa, by sending short weight shipments of cocoa to the Cocobod’s 
overseas clients.  This resulted in a claim against the Cocobod and the payment of $460,000.  In 
response to this problem the Cocobod sacked thirty-seven staff at the CMC. The Insight Newspaper 
[2007] ‘Ghana loses ¢46 billion from cocoa export’ http://www.myjoyonline.com/business/200710 
/9716.asp. 
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be an institution with power to constrain arbitrary behaviour by the 
government.  Indeed, within the partial model, where government institutions 
are so heavily integrated with private sector operations, the necessity of such an 
institution is magnified.   
 
At the very basic level this would involve a credible mechanism of appeal, 
through which LBC’s could voice concerns over decisions made by the Cocobod.  
Within all interviews seven of the Cocobod interviews discussing the topic of LBC 
sanction, it is observed that at the current time LBC’s may use an informal 
method of appeal against sanctioning.  This most commonly involves writing a 
letter to the chief executive.  However, when questioning LBC’s on this, 71% of 
respondents across both stages of research indicated that this is not a credible 
method of appeal.  Indeed, within stage two alone six well-established LBC 
managers found that throughout their time in the market they had never been 
informed of any formal process through which they could appeal a Cocobod 
decision. Therefore, establishing a credible method of dispute resolution may be 
considered hugely important within the partial model.  This is especially true 
given that due to the unique structure of the market the Cocobod is not only the 
regulator, but a player as well.  In cases where there is a dispute between an LBC 
and the QCD, it is presumed that the Cocobod will be inherently biased towards 
their own subsidiary due to both financial and cultural reasons.   This can be 
seen in the following passage taken from an interview with two senior managers 
of an LBC.   
 
[R 1] ‘We think that their [the Cocobod] attachment to the other key players in 
the industry is one of, or, the main reason, why we see them the way we see 
them…because they have vested interests in the QCD, in the Cocoa Marketing 
Company, so you find that if the cocoa marketing company are not efficient, who 
talks to them? It is like a baby of the Cocobod’. 
 
[R 2] ‘They cannot be objective…if it was an independent institution which 
doesn’t have anything to do with either the LBC’s or the Cocobod…they would be 
more objective in their statements, in their judgements’.    
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Moreover, it can be seen that the relative incapacity of LBC’s to hold the Cocobod 
accountable for their actions, presents a significant imbalance within the partial 
model.  Under this structure LBC’s could perform very well, but still suffer due to 
the inefficiencies of the Cocobod, as seen from the following statement from an 
LBC respondent:    
  
‘While the Cocobod has a lot of sanctions it can apply to LBC’s it does not hold 
itself accountable for any value loss, or cost it passes on to an LBC because of its 
inefficiencies’.    
 
However, within all seven of the Cocobod interviews discussing the topic of LBC 
appeal, it was indicated that the Cocobod have not considered either a more 
formal method of appeal, or an independent arbitrator.  Indeed, within three 
Cocobod interviews the question of appeal and arbitration is often linked with 
the inherent assumption that LBC’s are always at fault, thus creating the 
perception that there is little need for such a mechanism.  The apparent apathy 
demonstrated by the Cocobod in this area is not surprising in light of the 
Cocobod’s dominant position of power within the partial liberalisation model.  
The omission of a credible appeal system does however represent a significant 
failing in the partial model, and may to some extent restrict the potential for 
learning and development within the Cocobod itself.    
 
The Cocobod has improved its performance in several areas since the externally 
enforced changes of structural readjustment in 1992.  Indeed, as indicated by all 
Cocobod respondents across both stages of research the pressure of reform in 
the early 1990’s did encourage some positive changes within the Cocobod.  
However, as suggested within recent development literature [Kaufmann et al, 
2009], governance and accountability can have a significant effect on market 
performance, and as such, there is a need for the Cocobod to address the current 
accountability issues amongst their staff.  In light of this, it is recommended that 
the Cocobod implement an independent arbitrary body with the capacity to 
increase the accountability of the Cocobod and all of its subsidiary institutions.     
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7.1.3 – Cocobod Organisational Culture 
 
Given its well-documented historical background and the significance of its 
influence within the Ghanaian cocoa market, it is not surprising that the culture 
of the Cocobod as an organisation emerged very strongly throughout the 
research process.  Within this section we are interested in two main aspects of 
the Cocobod’s organisational culture, firstly, how it manifests itself on their style 
of market regulation, and secondly, the challenge of encouraging change within 
an old and traditional organisation.  
 
7.1.3.1 - Control 
 
7.1.3.1.1 - Tight Regulation  
 
Across both stages of research it is clearly evident from all interviews within the 
Cocobod sample that as a regulator they like to have a tight grip on all that takes 
place in the market.  For LBC’s this is reflected in a very rigid operating 
environment where the sanctions that result from operating outside of the 
Cocobod’s guidelines are both numerous and severe.  As reflected in the sections 
above, this is partly due to the Cocobod inherent suspicion of LBC’s.  This is 
observed in all interviews within the Cocobod sample and can be seen in the 
following statements from Cocobod officials,  
 
‘The cocoa industry is not the place where when you’re handling you must be 
smiling, when you smile they do too many things, you need to keep them on their 
toes’. 
 
‘From the regulators’ point of view if you do not apply the big stick everything 
will go haywire’.  
 
To some extent the Cocobod’s attitude towards LBC’s may be based not only the 
mal-practices that have taken place since 1992 reforms, but also the Cocobod’s 
208 | P a g e  
 
208 
 
experience with private buyers in previous eras of liberalisation.  In chapter one 
it is noted that one of the Cocobod’s first tasks after being established in 1947 
was to protect farmers from the manipulative practices of private buyers.  As 
such, this preconception with the need to control the private sector may be 
firmly embedded in the Cocobod.   
 
Interestingly, the Cocobod’s current scepticism towards the LBC’s may be 
somewhat justified in light of the admission from all LBC respondents across 
both stages of research that there is a large amount of malpractice in the local 
buying market.  This can be seen in the following observation of an LBC manager,  
 
‘Honestly there is fraud in the field, some buying companies close their eyes to 
these sorts of things because they enjoy from it’.   
 
Indeed, as noted by Poulton [2006] liberalisation in other cocoa markets has led 
to various problems associated with a decline in coordination both in terms of 
the decline in government provided public goods and the removal of government 
enforced constraints on private sector action.  Therefore, whilst the Cocobod’s 
authoritarian style of regulation may be criticised for the impact it has on private 
sector freedom within the market, it is equally important to recognise the 
benefits of this approach in the case of developing country markets.  To a large 
extent it appears that the Cocobod’s cultural tendency towards control has 
enabled them to achieve a level of stability in Ghana that has been absent in 
other examples of liberalisation.  In light of this, significant changes in the 
Cocobod’s style of regulation would not be recommended.  Indeed, any 
adjustments in this area, which may be somewhat justified based on the 
objective of private sector encouragement, must not compromise the Cocobod’s 
position as the clear ruling authority within the market.     
 
7.1.3.1.2 - Unilateral Decision Making 
 
Whilst the Cocobod’s cultural tendency towards control can clearly yield certain 
advantages, it may also engender an attitude of neglect towards the needs of 
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other participants in the market.  Coupled with this is an unyielding perception 
of self-belief that can be seen in all Cocobod interviews, and also through the 
observation of Cocobod respondents.  After many years of total monopoly 
control in the market the Cocobod have clearly become accustomed to the habit 
of taking decisions unilaterally.  Across both stages of research all LBC 
respondents highlight this as a major problem, as reflected in the following 
statements by LBC managers,  
 
‘We think we are the major participants, we think we must be involved by way of 
discussion instead of just being involved by way of information, they normally 
take decisions before they inform us, before we protest’.  
 
‘If they would sit down and talk it will help everybody because at least they will 
hear our views before they make changes’. 
 
Despite their position of considerable importance in the supply chain, LBC’s do 
not participate in Cocobod decision making beyond a few very basic 
considerations.  The most high profile example of this was the Cocobod’s failure 
to consult LBC’s before increasing the price they have to pay farmers for their 
cocoa mid-way through the 2007/08 season216.  This was highlighted by nine of 
the fifteen LBC respondents in stage two. Increasing the farmer price by 26% 
mid season is clearly going to have a serious effect on the LBC’s not least in the 
amount of extra money they would have to borrow to purchase the cocoa.  
Interestingly, the problem of unilateral action is also observed by three 
respondents in the external buyers segment that and key informant.   
 
As observed by Poulton et al [2006] and Kherallah and Kirsten [2002], unilateral 
action from the government can reduce the perception of market credibility and 
increase the level of transaction risk faced by private sector investors. Therefore, 
                                                 
216
 The farmer price in Ghana is normally fixed for the entire cocoa season, thus enabling LBC’s to plan 
their finances quite accurately.  The Cocobod’s decision to change the price in the 2007/08 season 
was based on the large price increases in the global cocoa market that meant that farmers working 
under a free market system in the Ivory Coast were getting a higher price than in Ghana. Before 
Ghana increased its price this led to around 60,000-100,000 tonnes of cocoa being smuggled from 
Ghana into the Ivory Coast. 
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whilst it is not the Cocobod’s natural tendency to involve stakeholders in 
decision-making forums, change in this area will be required.  Indeed, 
throughout all LBC interviews this was strongly emphasised as a change that 
would greatly increase their perception of belonging within the partial model 
system.  Furthermore, the positive contribution that additional stakeholders 
could make in the Cocobod’s decision making process cannot be overlooked.  
Based on the attitude displayed by all but one of the respondents in the Cocobod 
sample there appears to be a relatively homogenous and institutionalised way of 
thinking within the Cocobod, which may have been developed through years of 
total market control.   
 
This finding may be linked with North’s [1990] conception of path dependency 
within institutional change, where the cultural and social attachments that 
individuals form with an institution over time will influence the pace and 
direction of change.  Such attachments may stagnate the process of change, 
where embedded individuals can use their authority to affectively entrench 
themselves within the traditional structures of the institution.  Indeed, when 
commenting on the Cocobod’s organisational culture one industry informant 
noted that, 
 
‘When parastatals get too big people will get entrenched and presume certain 
powers.’ 
 
As such, the Cocobod’s strong organisational culture and the level of power 
afforded to those in senior positions may be contributing to the slow pace of 
reform in Ghana.  However, as observed by Kydd and Dorward [2004] change 
and reform is a necessary process within the partial model, enabling both the 
role of the government and the private sector to respond to the emerging 
conditions in the market.  In light of this the Cocobod might be advised to accept 
a greater level of input from outside stakeholders in order to help them adjust to 
new challenges as they emerge within the partial model. 
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7.1.3.2 – Institutional Change 
 
7.1.3.2.1 - Collective Action  
 
In light the above problems relating to the slow pace of reform in Ghana, it is 
necessary to draw attention to Olson’s [1965] argument that effective collective 
action can lead to institutional change.  Within Ghana the platform through 
which collective action could take place between LBC’s currently exists through 
the licence buyers’ association, also known as Licobag.   Earlier in the section on 
arbitration it was observed that regulatory credibility would be improved by 
establishing an institution to provide some level of constraint against arbitrary 
government action.  Whilst it is more typical for a court of law, or independent 
council to perform this role, to some extent the Licobag may help to provide 
some constraint against arbitrary action from the Cocobod. Support for this 
argument comes from the finding that across both stages of research all LBC 
respondents found that the number one objective of the Licobag was to present a 
common voice against the Cocobod.  This can be seen in the following extract 
taken from an interview with an LBC manager, 
 
‘Most of Licobag’s agenda is concentrated on Cocobod, Cocobod is a very very 
strong counter-party and considering they control everything in the chain if you 
don’t have a strong platform in which you can give feedback to the Cocobod you 
would not be able to get the Cocobod to listen to you’. 
 
Indeed, collective action between LBC’s in recent years has contributed to some 
positive change with regards to both market conditions and the attitude of 
Cocobod towards LBC’s.   This was particularly evident in the 2004/05 season 
when Licobag organised a public press conference to protest against the poor 
market conditions they faced at that time.  During interviews four Cocobod 
indicated that this show of strength from the LBC’s was a major surprise for the 
Cocobod and forced them to take greater regard of LBC concerns in order to 
avoid such an incident occurring again in future.   
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However, despite this clear sign of potential, around 75% of LBC respondents 
across both stages of research expressed the opinion that the Licobag was largely 
ineffective at representing the LBC’s in front of Cocobod.  Whilst all respondents 
felt that the Licobag was gradually improving, the same respondents also felt 
that there was room for significant improvement in the future.  As observed by 
all LBC respondents, the most obvious reason for this problem is that LBC’s are 
much more committed to their own self-interest than they are to the collective 
goals of Licobag.  As observed by one LBC manger, 
 
‘Every member will have their own self-interest in mind because they are all 
private players at the end of the day’.     
 
The role of the PBC also presents a constraint to the Licobag’s level of success 
towards the Cocobod.  Commanding over 30% market share and having a close 
relationship with the Cocobod, the significant influence of the PBC is widely 
observed by all LBC respondents.  However, whilst all LBC respondents find that 
the PBC is becoming increasingly involved in Licobag, 75% of respondents across 
both stages of research find that they are not fully committed on the issues that 
really matter.  As a former Cocobod subsidiary the allegiance of the PBC is 
somewhat divided, as can be seen from the extract below taken from an 
interview with an LBC manager,  
 
‘Because of their background it is sometimes difficult for them to come along 
with us on certain issues… whatever issue that we fight for without their 
involvement cannot work’  
 
Besides the role of the PBC, Licobag appears to be constrained by its own 
management structure.  In round two of research six of the fifteen LBC 
respondents found that the most significant improvement that Licobag could 
make would be the appointment of an independent chief executive.  Respondents 
felt that because the chief executive of Licobag is also a manager for an LBC, he is 
not able to aggressively pursue the association’s objectives without fear of 
victimisation from the Cocobod.  Interviews with all LBC respondents also 
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indicate that whilst LBC’s share the common agenda of lobbying the Cocobod, 
there is little clarity surrounding the associations detailed goals or plans for 
action.  In this light, Olson [1965] notes that without a clear common goal the 
strength of collective action is diminished.  As such, the appointment of an 
executive with both the time and independence to establish a clear agenda for 
action should be the next step in Licobag’s development.   
 
The potential benefits of collective action between LBC’s can also be seen from 
interviews carried out with Cocobod officials.  In all five of the Cocobod 
interviews where the respondent was questioned on the Licobag, it was found 
that the Licobag is considered to be a positive development in the market.  
Cocobod support is primarily based on the communication channel that has been 
created through Licobag.  Indeed, the deputy chief executive of the Cocobod 
observes that the Licobag has an important role to play in reporting on the 
problems that LBC’s face within their operations.  To a large extent the Cocobod’s 
warmer embrace in this area is also noted by the LBC’s, where all LBC 
participants across both rounds of research observe an improved relationship 
with the Cocobod in recent years.  As such, there may be some future potential 
for the LBC’s to leverage the platform of the buyers’ association in order to 
achieve a greater level of integration into the Cocobod’s decision-making 
process.   
 
Building on section 7.2.1.3 on good governance, collective action amongst LBC’s 
has the potential to increase the level of accountability within the Cocobod.  
Kaufmann [2004] finds that the type of external accountability provided through 
key stakeholders outside the government is necessary to augment the type of 
internal accountability provided by institutions such as arbitration councils.  
Feedback from LBC’s has the potential to stimulate positive change in areas 
where the Cocobod may otherwise remain negligent.  As such, an improved 
system of appeal may not only lead to the perception of market credibility from 
LBC’s, but equally it may encourage a more responsive and affective Cocobod.   
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Furthermore, by involving LBC’s in decision making forums the Cocobod will 
help to increase the level of transparency217 and credibility within the system.  
However, as indicated earlier, the Cocobod’s culture of control and the resultant 
practice of unilateral decision making suggest that they have little ambition to 
involve the LBC’s at this level. To a large extent this is confirmed within all seven 
Cocobod interviews discussing the LBC’s role in the market.  As such, further 
change in both the Cocobod’s attitude towards stakeholder involvement and 
LBC’s commitment towards collective action will be required before greater this 
possibility could be realised.   
 
7.1.4 – Conclusion  
 
Throughout this findings section several challenges have been presented 
surrounding the credibility of reform within the Ghana market.  Equally, it must 
be acknowledged that whilst there are some problems associated with 
credibility, at the level of application many of the Cocobod systems are 
performing very well.  Indeed, given the findings of past studies examining the 
credibility of reform within African commodity markets, it might be suggested 
that the Cocobod have performed with credit in a market system where there are 
many opportunities for rent-seeking.  In light of this, radical change and overhaul 
is not recommended.  There is, however, a need to address issues surrounding 
the structures of governance that are designed to control the actions of civil 
servants within the partial model.   
 
Furthermore, it has been found that balancing the needs of different stakeholder 
groups appears to be one of the most significant challenges facing the Cocobod as 
a result of the move to partial liberalisation.  Whilst the Cocobod’s stern 
regulatory approach has enabled them to achieve control over LBC actions, it 
appears that based on their predisposition towards market control the Cocobod 
have been failing in their responsibility to address some of the challenges facing 
                                                 
217
 Transparency, which can be defined as ‘the degree of clarity and openness with which decisions 
are made’ [ODI, 2006, p2], is considered a key indicator of good governance [Kaufmann et al, 2009; 
Hyden et al, 2004].  
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LBC’s.  To some extent this may be caused by the embedded nature of the 
Cocobod’s organisational culture that has been developed throughout their long 
history of total market control.   
 
There are some positive signs that the Cocobod’s attitude towards this problem 
may be improving.  As such, the Cocobod and the LBC’s may have an opportunity 
to work towards a greater level of engagement within the coming years.  Indeed, 
by making minor changes required to improve the standard of governance 
within Cocobod departments, the Ghanaian cocoa market may be able to avoid 
the sort of ‘knee-jerk’ and damaging changes that can result from prolonged 
periods of disharmony within the market.   
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Section 7.2 – Supply Chain Management 
 
7.2.1 – Introduction  
 
Despite being largely overlooked in recent studies of the Ghanaian cocoa market 
[Fold ,2002; Laven, 2005], the Cocobod’s management of supply chain 
infrastructure emerged throughout the research process as one of the most 
important issues facing the credibility of the partial model.  Indeed, in many 
ways this issue very clearly highlights the challenges arising from the high level 
of interdependence between the government and private sector within the 
partial model.  For LBC’s, the speed at which they can turnover their purchases is 
vitally important to their profitability, placing a great deal of pressure on the 
Cocobod’s supply chain infrastructure to manage the demands of the LBC 
delivery schedule.  As observed in chapter four there have been some problems 
in this area in recent seasons leading a clashes between the LBC’s and the 
Cocobod [Varangis and Schreiber, 2001].  In light of these problems, the 
following section will explore the causes of this problem in more detail, using the 
insights gained from interview data to make recommendations for future 
changes in this area.   
 
As observed in the introduction above the theme of supply chain management 
has emerged strongly throughout the research process.  Resultantly all of the 
themes within the template for this section are considered emergent themes.  
Nevertheless, the template does build upon some of the theoretical insights 
covered in chapter four.  In particular the theme of ‘restrictive environment’ 
explores the appropriate balance between competition and coordination 
[Poulton et al, 2004], whilst the theme of public sector management explores 
both the government’s role in infrastructural development [Kydd and Dorward, 
2004], and the process of change within a public sector bureaucracy [Tirole, 
1996].     
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Figure 7.2.1 – Final Template: Supply Chain Management 
 
 Speed of Turnover 
o Finance Costs 
 Infrastructural Limitations 
o Restrictive Environment  
 LBC Growth 
 Incentive to Build Market share  
 Public Sector Management 
o Civil Servant Motivation 
o Change  
 Cocobod Constraints 
 Privatisation  
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Figure 7.2.1 – Hierarchical Final Template: Supply Chain Management   
 
 
Sub-level Themes 
Secondary Themes 
Primary Themes 
Key Theme Supply Chain Management 
Speed  
Finance 
Infrastructure 
Restrictive  
Growth I.T.B.M.S 
P.C.M 
Motivation Change  
Constraints  Privatise 
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7.2.2 – Speed of Turnover 
 
Throughout both stages of research all LBC respondents emphasised that speed 
of turnover was one of their greatest concerns in the market. Speed of turnover 
is crucial for three main reasons.  
 
Firstly, the margin LBC’s receive on each bag of cocoa delivered is calculated 
based on the assumption that buyers will be able to achieve at least 2.2 
turnovers of the seed-funding provided by Cocobod.  If buyers do not achieve 
this figure of 2.2 then the cost and revenue streams which the Cocobod forecast 
for the LBC’s prior to the fixing of the buyers margin are not accurate. As such, 
LBC’s are required to achieve at least 2.2 turnovers if they wish to make any 
profits, as determined by the fixed buyer’s margin set by the Cocobod.  
 
Secondly, due to the finance constraints facing LBC’s, they are forced to operate 
with a limited amount of working capital. Therefore, by recycling their capital 
quickly, LBC’s are able to go back into the market to buy more cocoa and increase 
their market share.  Indeed, as noted by Fold [2008],Vigneri and Santos [2007], 
and Laven [2005] LBC’s have been competing with a strategy of market share 
maximisation. In support of this, eleven out of the thirteen LBC respondents in 
round one indicated that they were following a strategy of market share 
maximisation. As noted by one LBC manager, 
 
‘Each LBC would like to have a larger market share, because that is where you 
are able to break even or maybe make some profit, the smaller your share of the 
market the lesser your profit and the more difficulty breaking even’.  
 
Thirdly, the faster LBC’s recycle their finances the quicker they are able to pay 
back any loans accrued, thus lowering their finance charges.  Again, the link 
between finance charges and speed of turnover has also been noted in past 
studies by Fold [2002] and Losch [2002].  
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These points were emphasised by a former employee of the Cocobod now 
working for an LBC, 
 
‘When I came here I realised that time is a very important factor to the licence 
buyer, a very very important factor, if you are able to turn around very fast, in 
the first case you cut down your interest charges, in the second case you increase 
your margin because the higher the turnover the better’.   
 
7.2.2.1 – Finance Costs 
 
Whilst the buyers margin and market share are clear incentives to improve 
speed of turnover, throughout interviews the main concern emphasised by all 
LBC respondents in relation to speed of turnover was cost of finance.  Cocoa is an 
expensive crop and all buyers have to borrow money in order to enable 
purchasing.  As noted in Chapter four, the majority of LBC’s gain ‘seed-fund’ 
financing from the Cocobod to purchase cocoa218 at an interest rate of around 10-
15%219.  However, interview findings indicate that all of the top ten LBC’s gain 
between 30-70% of their financing for crop purchases from external sources 
including bank overdrafts or parent company financing.  As noted by a manager 
at one of the largest LBC’s,  
 
‘Cocobod is not able to give you all the money that you need to buy cocoa, so 
LBC’s have to resort to overdrafts or short term loans’  
 
Indeed, it appears that external financing may be a competitive necessity for the 
top LBC’s, enabling them to achieve the required volume and flexibility in their 
purchasing activities.  In this light, all of the LBC’s interviewed observed that 
because the Cocobod recall their seed-fund loans in February it is necessary to 
take bank loans if you wish to purchase cocoa later in the season. Furthermore, 
when there are delays along the supply chain and LBC’s are unable to recycle 
                                                 
218
 As noted in chapter four seed-funding can only be used to purchase cocoa.  All other expenses 
have to be covered using company finances or bank loans. 
219
 The seed-fund rate is closely linked with the prime bank rate in Ghana, and is usually around 1-2% 
points below the prime rate.   
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their seed-fund efficiently, external funding is required to support purchasing.  
As noted by one LBC manager,  
 
‘We do make arrangements of up to 50% in overdrafts to tie ourselves up in 
between the takeovers and deliveries...we do that so that we can continue to 
operate’.  
 
External financing does, however, increase the LBC’s cost of capital as bank loans 
will be borrowed at an interest rate of around 20-23%.  As such, the extra cost 
faced by external financing gives LBC’s an additional incentive to work efficiently 
and maximise their use of the Cocobod’s cheaper seed-funding, thus minimising 
the extent of expensive external financing they have acquire.  The additional cost 
of external financing can be seen in the following passage, 
 
‘Currently we are paying 11% from the Cocobod, but 22% from the banks, which 
is outrageous, when you consider what happens in Europe with regards to 
interest rates then even 11% is killing, so if you are supposed to pay 22% it is out 
of place’.  
 
In light of the above problem it would appear that the level of underdevelopment 
within the Ghanaian banking sector is a major problem facing LBC’s.  
Furthermore, whilst the Cocobod may be commended for offering LBC’s a lower 
rate of interest through their seed-funding, in reality this rate of interest is still 
much higher than that which could be achieved on the international market.  As 
noted by Shepherd and Farolfi [1999] local buyers within fully liberalised 
commodity markets have been able access low cost financing through links with 
external buyers.  However, within Ghana, the vast majority of LBC’s do not have 
access this market due to the Cocobod’s monopoly over export sales.  Indeed, as 
noted by LMC [1996], Shepherd and Farolfi [1999], and Fold [2002], LBC’s in 
Ghana have high expectations surrounding their ability to gain international 
financing in absence of the Cocobod.  This finding was supported by eight of the 
fifteen LBC participants interviewed in round two.   
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In order to facilitate such linkages major changes would be required in the 
structure of the Ghanaian market. Recognising the current level of success 
enjoyed by the Cocobod on the external market, such drastic changes are not 
recommended in this study.  Nevertheless, the findings in this section suggest 
that given both the Cocobod’s monopoly over exports and the significance of 
finance costs for LBC’s, the Cocobod would appear to have a responsibility to 
assist LBC’s with their finance charges.  Based on research findings the most 
logical and cost effective way for the Cocobod to achieve this aim would be 
through the maximisation of supply chain efficiency, thus leading to an improved 
speed of turnover for LBC’s.  In recent years, however, significant problems have 
been encountered in this area as will be discussed throughout the remainder of 
this chapter. 
 
7.2.3 – Infrastructural Limitations  
 
Within all agricultural supply chains there is a limitation to the amount of crop 
that can be efficiently handled any point in time based on the capacity limitations 
of the supply chain infrastructure.  As such, in order for efficiency to be achieved 
each supply chain should have an infrastructural capacity equal to the level of 
agricultural production.  However, as indicated by Varangis and Schreiber [2001] 
in chapter four, the Cocobod have failed to achieve this balance.   The growth of 
production, as demonstrated in chapter one, has not been matched by an equal 
level of development in supply chain infrastructure.  Resultantly, LBC’s have 
suffered serious delays along the supply chain.  Delays are not only due to the 
insufficiency of warehouse space at the takeover centres, but also the Cocobod 
use very outdated and labour intensive procedures for the offloading and 
weighing of cocoa220.    
 
This problem has been further exacerbated by the fact that since liberalisation 
buyers have steadily increased their efficiency and turnover speed.  As such, 
                                                 
220
 The problems associated with both the limited capacity of warehouses and the use of outdated 
modes of takeover are observed by all LBC respondents, and are highlighted by the respondent in 
appendix twenty-four. 
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cocoa is now moved from the rural areas to the port in an increasingly short 
time.  Whilst this should be heralded as a liberalisation success, in reality it only 
further exposes the insufficiencies of the Cocobod’s supply chain infrastructure. 
Indeed, as a result of this problem, all LBC respondents argued that it is not 
appropriate for the Cocobod to set such a difficult standard as 2.2 turnovers, 
when it is in fact Cocobod who control the ability of buyers to meet this standard.   
 
The level of negative feeling expressed by all LBC’s in this area is highly 
illuminating, as even amongst those LBC respondents which displayed a high 
level of support for the Cocobod, supply chain inefficiency was highlighted as a 
major problem. The following extract taken from an interview with an LBC 
manager highlights the problems in this area,  
 
[R] ‘With regards to the Cocobod’s standard of 2.2 turnovers of the seed-fund per 
season, what are the implications of this for you as a buyer?’ 
 
[B] ‘In fact, over the years the system has run to make it impossible for us to 
achieve that, especially because of the quota system, the various regulations and 
restrictions with regards to the limited capacity the Cocobod have, even in terms 
of grading and sealing it has not been fast enough for us to meet the 2.2 turnover 
time’. 
 
[R] ‘And if you don’t meet the 2.2 turnover standard?’ 
 
[B] ‘You definitely can’t make the profit you want, or need, or is 
reasonable…because that is the parameter with which they measure and give out 
margins to the licensed buying companies’.     
 
7.2.3.1 - Restrictive Environment  
 
In the above passage it is observed that the quota system used by the Cocobod is 
a constraint to the speed of turnover achievable by LBC’s.  With the exception of 
one respondent, all LBC personnel interviewed across both stages of research 
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greatly criticised the quota system.  The quota system was put in place by the 
Cocobod during the 2005/06 season in order to alleviate the supply chains 
congestion problem by regulating the flow of LBC deliveries to the takeover 
centres. 
 
At the beginning of each season, all LBC’s are individually granted a certain 
delivery quota at each of the three takeover centres, based on their purchasing 
performance in the previous year.  The quota will state how much cocoa they are 
allowed to deliver each week to Ghana’s three takeover centres.  If an LBC 
attempts to deliver cocoa outside of their allotted quota they will face delays and 
may be subject to sanction from the Cocobod.  Whilst, all LBC respondents 
complain that it is unjust to regulate deliveries, and thus dictate speed of 
turnover, the Cocobod feel that the quota is necessary to maintain control over 
deliveries.  Indeed, this perspective is indicated in all seven of the Cocobod 
interviews where the quota system in discussed.   
 
Despite the imposition of the quota system, twelve of the fifteen buyers 
interviewed in round two observed that once cocoa is ready to be evacuated it 
will be sent to the takeover centres.  Resultantly trucks arrive at the takeover 
centres outside of their delivery schedule creating mass congestion.  As such, the 
imposition of the quota does not appear to have solved any of the problems 
associated with the Ghanaian markets limited infrastructure.  Indeed, as will be 
seen in the following section the impact of the quota system at the current time 
appears to be largely negative through the affect that it has had in stifling private 
sector dynamism.   
 
7.2.3.1.1 - LBC Growth 
 
Based on research findings it appears that the implications of the Cocobod’s 
infrastructural limitations extend beyond finance costs and into the competitive 
strategies of individual LBC’s.  In essence the quota that you are granted by the 
Cocobod places a direct restriction on the amount of cocoa that you can 
efficiently buy and deliver.  In the opinion of the Cocobod the distribution of 
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quota can be most objectively decided through the performance of the LBC in the 
previous season.  However, due to the insufficiency of supply chain 
infrastructure each LBC’s quota allocation is very tight, giving LBC’s very little 
flexibility to expand purchasing beyond last season’s performance.  Indeed, any 
additional cocoa that LBC’s purchase beyond their quota will most likely suffer 
long delays in the takeover process.  As such, LBC’s have to rely on their ability to 
lobby the Cocobod for additional quota if they wish to expand their purchasing 
beyond the previous year’s performance.  As can be seen from the passage below 
taken from an LBC interview, LBC’s place great importance on quota additions, 
 
‘You may find some companies using all methods to take advantage of the system 
[quota], because without that you cannot grow as a company, the offloading will 
determine your general performance’.   
 
However, based on the responses of all LBC managers in round two, there is no 
formal process through which the LBC’s can apply for additional quota.  This 
would appear to be a serious oversight given the importance of quota allocation 
to each LBC’s performance.  Indeed, as can be seen from the passage in appendix 
twenty four the respondent is under the assumption that there is no channel 
through which you can apply for quota additions.  
 
Based on interviews with the Cocobod it appears that if an LBC wants to acquire 
additional quota then they will have to physically demonstrate expansion either 
by acquiring additional resources such as building new upcountry warehouses, 
or through QCD field reports showing the volume of cocoa that has been 
purchased.  However, based on the accounts of all LBC respondents it appears 
that even when they have demonstrated to Cocobod their capacity to increase 
their level of buying, gaining the required quota additions can be highly 
problematic221.  Where additional quota is granted during the season, this may 
be some weeks or even months after the LBC has increased its purchasing level, 
thus leading to costly delays while waiting for the cocoa to be taken over. 
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 This point is made by the buyer in appendix twenty-four. 
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In light of the above challenges surrounding quota expansion eleven of the 
fifteen buyers interviewed in round two observed that the quota restricts your 
capacity and incentive to grow.  Facing extremely high finance costs, the threat of 
delays in the takeover process acts as a major disincentive for any LBC to expand 
beyond their quota allocation.  Indeed, when asked ‘do you think the Cocobod 
restricts your capacity to grow and develop?’, eight out of the fifteen LBC 
participants in round two indicated that this was the case due to the quota 
system.  In response to this question one LBC manager observed that, 
 
‘As for constraint, it is there...like the quota system...Cocobod will decide how 
much to give you depending on your size or the perception that they have about 
your company’. 
 
In a similar light another LBC manager noted that,  
 
‘This system doesn’t give the LBC’s room to naturally grow’.   
 
Based on interviews with two relatively young LBCs, Evadox and Diaby, it 
appears that the restrictive impact if the quota system is particularly damaging 
to new entrants into the market.  Every year the market receives a number of 
new entrants however, every year some of the smaller companies drop out of the 
market having failed to make an impact.  Quota is distributed based on the LBC’s 
purchasing performance in the previous season, and therefore without an 
established track record new entrants will receive a minimal quota.  Growth 
beyond this minimal quota is highly problematic due to both the costly delays 
associated with exceeding the quota, and the investment required to achieve 
additional quota.   
 
Whilst it is understandable that the Cocobod do not give large quotas to new 
market entrants, the inability of the quota system to respond to LBC purchasing 
activity is highly problematic.  Both the tightness of each LBC’s quota allocation 
based on the Cocobod’s limited capacity for takeover, and also the inflexibility of 
the quota itself based on the Cocobod’s bureaucratic management have created 
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an environment where it is very difficult for LBC’s to grow.  In light of this there 
is a clear need for both an expansion in infrastructural capacity and also more 
responsive management of quota allocations in order to enable greater freedom 
in LBC purchasing activity.  
 
 
7.2.3.1.2 - Incentive to Build Market Share 
  
In the above section on speed of turnover it was observed that eleven out of the 
thirteen LBC participants from round one suggested that market share 
maximisation is the dominant strategy for an LBC to pursue.  However, during 
round two seven of the fifteen LBC respondents suggested that based on the 
conditions they were facing in the market they had come to realise that a 
strategy of building market share is not always the best option.  Due to costly 
delays incurred in recent years, partly as a result of a volume buying strategy, it 
appears that a greater number of LBC’s have either moved to, or are considering, 
a strategy of buying a lower volume of cocoa in an attempt to lower costs and 
maximise efficiency.  As noted by one LBC manager,  
 
‘I now want to look at buying some reasonable quantity of cocoa with minimal 
risk and cost’.  
 
For one LBC in particular this has resulted in a radical change of focus, moving 
away from the most competitive buying region222 and also choosing to buy at a 
time of the year when purchasing activity is lower.  By doing so this LBC has 
successfully reduced both the amount of cocoa that it delivers to Takoradi 
port223, and the amount of cocoa it delivers at the peak period of congestion224.  
Despite resulting in a significant decline in market share, the manager in charge 
                                                 
222
 The most competitive region is the Western Region where over 50% of Ghana’s cocoa is produced.  
Cocoa purchased in this region is taken over at Takoradi port   
223
 All LBC respondents find that Takoradi port experiences the worst congestion as it is the takeover 
centre for the Western region. 
224
 LBC’s highlight that between the months of October and December around 70% of the total cocoa 
for the season is purchased and evacuated.  
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of this strategy has found it to be highly successful based on the cost reductions 
achieved.  As noted by the manager of this particular LBC, 
 
‘We have restricted ourselves from buying at certain times and we have also 
restricted ourselves from buying in certain areas...this has led to a volume drop, 
but also an efficiency improvement’. 
   
Although it is too early to predict the impact of this strategy, the trend that 
appears to be developing in this area may be interpreted in one of two ways by 
the Cocobod.  On one hand it appears that the quota system enforced by the 
Cocobod may be encouraging a greater degree of coordination between the 
Cocobod and LBC’s in the areas of purchasing and delivery.  Certain LBC’s now 
appear to be controlling their purchasing volumes in line with the infrastructural 
limitations of the Ghanaian supply chain.  On the other hand, the increase in 
coordination taking place between Cocobod and LBC’s in this area, may also lead 
to a trade off in the form of reduced competition at the farmer level.  To some 
extent this is consistent with the findings of Poulton et al [2004], who find that 
coordination measures, whilst helping to improve the level of stability in the 
market, may also lead to a decline in the level of competition.   
 
Indeed, within sub-Saharan markets such coordination measures may be 
encouraged to reduce some of the negative aspects that have resulted from the 
introduction of competition, such as quality decline [Poulton et al, 2004].  
However, Poulton et al [2004] also encourage balance, where elements of 
competition are required alongside coordination.  As such, it is necessary to 
question whether LBC competition in the form of increased turnover speeds is 
an area in which coordination measures should be enforced.  The only concern 
that may be raised in regards to increased turnover speeds is the pressure this 
may put on quality control, as suggested by the link between speed of turnover 
and quality decline observed in chapter four [Losch, 2002; Fold, 2002].  In this 
light, the extent to which the quality control of the QCD is able to control the 
affect of increased turnover speeds will be an important factor in determining 
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the appropriate policy response in this area.  This will be investigated in greater 
detail during section 7.3. 
 
However, in support of increased turnover speeds it must be noted that change 
in this area would not only increase the level of LBC profitability, but it would 
increase each LBC’s turnover of working capital, thus enabling them to compete 
and invest more actively at the farmer level. Results from both the current and 
past studies of local marketing in Ghana indicate that since liberalisation in 1992 
intense competition between LBC’s has led to improved marketing opportunities 
for farmers.  Indeed, the benefits of LBC competition are widely heralded by 
members of the Cocobod, particularly by the deputy chief executive Mr Charles 
Ntim.   
 
As such, there appears to be a relatively strong argument in support of increased 
turnover speeds, especially where there is already a control mechanism in place 
to reduce quality decline.  Indeed, in many respects the dynamism that LBC’s 
have shown in the area of turnover efficiency should be embraced as a positive 
sign of liberalisation.  Within the partial model, the Cocobod has the power to 
take advantage of such dynamism, whilst also enforcing coordination measures 
in areas of significant strategic importance, such as quality control.   
 
Whilst the Cocobod may argue that the quota is necessary to maintain control 
throughout the supply chain, in the opinion of all LBC respondents the quota 
represents an insufficient response in the Cocobod’s responsibilities towards 
infrastructural development.  In order for the partial model to progress and for 
the Cocobod to maximise the potential of private sector dynamism, it will be 
necessary for the Cocobod to make some changes and adjust to the way in which 
the private sector operate.  Increasing the infrastructural capacity of the system 
to enable a larger and more flexible quota offering to LBC’s would be one such 
example of compromise in is this area.   
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7.2.4 – Public Sector Management  
 
Within the closing statements of the previous section some doubts were raised 
over the Cocobod’s willingness to embrace the dynamism that is inherent within 
the private sector.  In many ways this represents one of the fundamental 
problems facing the success of the partial model of market organisation, where 
the juxtaposition between the public and private sectors attitude towards 
business creates a number of tensions within the system.  Concerns in this area 
were raised throughout both rounds of research by all LBC participants, with the 
exception of one.  In light of these concerns the following sections will explore 
the challenges resulting from public sector control of a liberalised market.  
 
7.2.4.1 – Civil Servant Motivation  
 
Within round two of research, ten of the fifteen LBC participants associated 
delays in the supply chain with the work ethic of public sector employees.  To 
some extent this point builds upon the findings in section 7.1, highlighting the 
behavioural problems resulting from the low powered incentives facing public 
sector employees [Tirole, 1996].  LBC respondents observe that Cocobod agents 
employed in functions related to coca takeover and documentation do not have 
the same financial performance incentive as private sector actors.  Indeed, 
throughout both rounds of interviews the absence of a strong incentive to 
motivate Cocobod employees towards an efficient approach was an issue of great 
importance to several LBC respondents.  This can be seen from both the extract 
below and also the passage in appendix twenty-four.  
 
‘Because we as private companies we are interfacing with the public sector and 
our output depends on the impact of the public sector and our attitudes are 
different from their attitudes…the QCD, the CMC they work as public sector…so 
when I send a document there, I do my calculations and it is money, everything 
should be money, but they don’t look at it that way’.  
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Observations made in relation to the work ethic of Cocobod employees are often 
linked with the Cocobod’s bureaucratic mode of operation.   The Cocobod is a 
very large and hierarchical organisation that relies on very traditional and 
systematic processes.  All paper work has to go through a long chain of tiresome 
checking and all decisions have to be verified by superiors.  As observed by one 
LBC manager,  
 
‘It takes time, it is a civil service, it is a bureaucracy…you know the civil service, it 
is slow’.   
 
Further evidence in support of this is found in the long delays LBC’s suffer 
waiting for their payments from the Cocobod’s.  Once takeover receipts have 
been granted by the CMC, in accordance with Cocobod standards LBC’s should 
have to wait no longer than ten days.  However, as noted by all LBC participants 
this is rarely the case and it was regularly noted that LBC’s are made to wait for 
one month before payment is issued.  Furthermore, whilst this process is being 
delayed LBC’s are still paying interest charges on loans taken.  As noted by one 
LBC manager, 
 
‘I personally think that once I give over cocoa you must give me instant money, at 
times you wait for one month for your documents to claim your money’ 
 
Unlike the infrastructural problems leading to delays in the takeover process, the 
issue of delays in payment is more closely related to the effort and efficiency of 
Cocobod employees.   As such, similar to the problem of moral hazard identified 
in section 7.1, the issue of delays in payment may be addressed using the 
understanding of public sector organisational behaviour developed by Tirole 
[1996] and Dixit [2002].  Whilst, it was not possible to interview the CMC and the 
Cocobod in the performance measurement system put in place for staff involved 
in LBC payments, it may be the case that based on the performance of staff in this 
area, efficiency is not a major goal on which performance is measured.  To some 
extent this suggestion is supported by round two findings, where twelve of the 
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fifteen LBC managers interviewed indicated that Cocobod staff are encouraged to 
emphasis caution over efficiency225.  As noted by one LBC manager, 
 
‘The delays [in payment] this year are much more than any other year…they are 
being careful and that carefulness costs us a lot of money’. 
 
In light of this finding, it may be recommended that the Cocobod should place a 
greater emphasis on efficiency when monitoring staff performance.  Again this 
problem may be related to the challenge of achieving a balance between 
competition and control [coordination] in a market where the dominant actor 
has a clear preference for control.  Nevertheless, it should not be beyond the 
realms of possibility for the Cocobod to increase the efficiency of staff 
performance without jeopardising the diligency of their work.  To some extent 
this may require an increased resource expenditure on performance monitoring 
throughout the Cocobod.   However, based on LBC interview findings this is 
clearly an issue of great importance, where the trickle down affects on LBC 
profitability and motivation would be expected to more than compensate for any 
additional Cocobod expenditure. 
 
7.2.4.2 - Change  
 
In light of the above findings it is not surprising that all LBC respondents 
highlight the takeover process as the one aspect of the market in which they 
would most like to see improvement. To achieve this goal change is required in 
several areas, including, an expansion of warehousing capacity, the installation of 
modern machinery226, the development of an effective IT system for recording 
deliveries and making payments, and also behavioural improvements amongst 
Cocobod employees.   
 
To some extent there are now positive signs that change in this area is being 
carried out.  In the 2007/08 season the Cocobod opened a new 50,000 tonne 
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 This point is observed by the respondent in appendix twenty-four.  
226
 Modern equipment is required to takeover, weigh, and store the cocoa. 
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warehouse at Tema port, and a 100,000 tonne warehouse has been 
commissioned for Takoradi port.  Whilst buyers welcome this as a positive sign 
of change, the overriding emphasis of LBC responses in this area is related to 
their concerns regarding the sluggish nature with which the Cocobod have 
addressed this problem.  In light of this issue it is necessary to examine the 
reasons why it has taken the Cocobod a relatively long time227 to make changes 
in supply chain infrastructure.  
 
7.2.4.2.1 - Cocobod Constraints   
 
Within section 7.1 organisational culture was emphasised as a key factor in 
determining the Cocobod’s style of market regulation.  Closely related to this, six 
out of the fifteen LBC respondents and three local processors in round two, 
indicated that the Cocobod’s organisational culture engenders a very 
conservative attitude with regards to change.  Indeed, further evidence in 
support of the argument that a conservative culture exists within the Cocobod 
was found in interviews with all Cocobod respondents across both stages of 
research. When questioned about the need to upgrade supply chain 
infrastructure, the risk and cost of over expansion are often emphasised over and 
above the efficiency improvements that such change would bring.  As noted by 
one Cocobod respondent, 
 
‘The buyers are sometimes unhappy with us, but we cannot do any different...we 
cannot increase warehouse capacity on the basis of one years crop228’.   
 
Once again in close relation to the findings on organisational culture in section 
7.1, it appears that the Cocobod’s conservative attitude towards change may be 
sustained by their unwillingness to embrace external input from other 
stakeholders in the market. The Cocobod’s reluctance to embrace new ways of 
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 The LMC report [1996] observed problems with delays in the takeover process, demonstrating the 
length of time supply chain infrastructure has been a problem in Ghana.  
228
 As can be seen from figure 1.6 in chapter one, Ghana’s cocoa production has been consistently 
around the 700,000 mark since 2002/03.; however, at the time of fieldwork LBC’s complained that 
Cocobod were still operating with supply chain infrastructure suitable for an annual production of 
400,000 tonnes.   
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thinking was observed by nine of the fifteen LBC respondents in round two.  
Indeed, when questioning an LBC manager on the Cocobod’s attitude towards 
change he responded,  
 
‘Not good enough! They normally don’t think outside the box, anytime we meet 
and you want to introduce change, they think no, this is the way we have been 
doing it…and this is the normal public sector attitude’.   
  
This finding may be related to North’s [1990] conception of path dependency.  
During interviews with two industry sources it was suggested that the Cocobod’s 
reluctance or conservatism towards change is driven by the older generation of 
senior management.  Interview findings suggest that personnel working at this 
level have been involved in the Cocobod for a long time and their mindset is 
closely associated with the Cocobod’s traditional mode of operation.  
Furthermore, as suggested by North [1990], it is quite possible that the more 
senior members of the Cocobod have a strong interest in maintaining the 
traditional institutional structure, in which they yield power and influence.  In 
light of this it is appropriate to draw upon a recommendation from section 7.1, 
where it was suggested that in the coming seasons the Cocobod need to draw 
upon input from outside stakeholders.  Indeed, the example of supply chain 
infrastructure further strengthens the case made in section 7.1 that increased 
external voice may be required to encourage progress and harmony within the 
partial model in future seasons.   
 
7.2.4.2.2 - Privatisation  
 
In light of the above problems, it is very interesting to observe that towards the 
end of round two research the deputy chief executive of the Cocobod raised the 
possibility that in the coming seasons they may tender a contract for the 
privatisation of the takeover centres.  Amongst LBC’s support for such a change 
would be strong, as indicated by ten of the fifteen buyers interviewed in round 
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two who recommended that takeover should be handled by the private sector229. 
Buyers in support of privatisation feel that the private sector would not hesitate 
in extending warehouse capacity and installing modern takeover equipment.   
There are three main arguments why the private sector would face a greater 
incentive to improve the takeover process as compared the Cocobod.  The first 
argument is quite simply that based on the contentions of LBC managers in 
Ghana it is felt that the private sector has a more dynamic attitude towards 
change.  This was indicated by ten of the fifteen LBC participants from round 
two, and is demonstrated by the passage in appendix twenty-five.  Indeed, 
further support for this argument is found in the earlier section on the Cocobod’s 
conservative organisational culture. 
 
Secondly, LBC’s suggest that because private sector organisations are financially 
accountable for their performance they are more willing to make risky 
investments that will reap financial rewards further down the line.  To some 
extent this builds on the low powered incentives argument of Tirole [1996] and 
Dixit [2002], as discussed in chapter two.  Indeed, Tirole [1996] and Dixit [2002] 
both acknowledge that privatisation may be used to overcome the problem of 
low powered incentives.  Not only may public agents face a lower motivation 
towards effort, but equally, because they do not face the same financial incentive 
as private sector actors, they may lack the desire to make high risk and reward 
investments.  Furthermore, this attitude may exist within the Cocobod based on 
the lack of financial incentive presented by increased turnover speeds.  Whilst, 
the private sector may logically conclude that higher speeds of turnover could 
equally correspond to higher charges for takeover, the Cocobod system does not 
operate with such an incentive structure in place.     
 
Thirdly, there is a strong efficiency argument for introducing modern technology 
in the process of takeover.  Whilst the initial investment in modern technology is 
high, interview findings with LBC’s and cocoa processors suggest that the long-
term savings in time and labour costs are colossal.  At the current time the 
Cocobod individually offload, weigh and store each bags of cocoa using manual 
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 Please see appendix twenty-five.  
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labour.  Using modern equipment all of these tasks could be performed manually, 
in a fraction of the time.  For the Cocobod, however, there is a major constraint to 
such change.  Within Ghana there is great pressure on the government to provide 
jobs, and operating as a government institution the Cocobod faces similar 
pressures.  Therefore, just as labour issues were a major issue at the time of 
initial reforms in 1992, in recent years they have contributed to the slow rate of 
change at the takeover centres.  As observed by an industry source,  
 
‘If we could mechanised the warehouses, we don’t need all that labour…we still 
carry cocoa on our back…maybe this is the way we want to create employment’. 
 
Being somewhat removed from the social responsibilities that occupy the 
conscious of government, the private sector would be able to make such 
efficiency improvements without the same fears of a public backlash. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that not only do the Cocobod face a labour 
incentive to maintain the traditional methods of takeover, but they may also face 
an incentive to maintain a slow rate of LBC turnover.  In cases where the rate of 
LBC turnover is low the Cocobod is able accrue a greater amount of interest on 
the seed-funding that they provide for LBC’s.   Whilst it is not the aim of this 
section to argue that the Cocobod may deliberately slow down the rate of 
takeover, this issue is raised within twenty of the twenty-eight LBC interviews 
across both stages of research.  Indeed, given their dual role in both the takeover 
centres and LBC financing, it appears that the Cocobod’s willingness to maintain 
interest charges in periods of high congestion has become credibility issue facing 
the regulator.    
 
Given the breadth of credibility issues surrounding the governments role in sub-
Saharan markets [Jayne et al, 2002; Kherallah et al, 2000], the Cocobod should 
make every effort to avoid this problem through a more appropriate division of 
responsibility within the partial model.  Both the labour and finance issues 
currently associated with the takeover process raise concern surrounding the 
Cocobod’s role as a regulator within a liberalised market.  Such problems could 
easily be solved by transferring responsibility in this area to the private sector. 
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In this light, it may be argued that, if exercised correctly, one of the partial 
models greatest strengths should be the governments ability to strategically 
select and divorce itself from any functions in which there are credibility issues 
surrounding its role.  Indeed, the case for privatisation of the takeover centres is 
particularly strong given that, unlike the previous section on quality control, 
there are relatively few perceived advantages to the Cocobod remaining in 
control of takeover. 
 
In order to understand the benefits that may result from privatisation it is 
possible to look at the example of the PBC that was privatised in 2000. Results in 
this area are generally positive. Indeed, based on the change in LBC attitude 
towards the PBC, evident between rounds one and two, it appears that the PBC is 
increasingly operating in the manner of a private sector organisation.  This is 
associated with a more efficient performance in recent seasons, evident in the 
steadily improving performance figures published in Feb 2008, and Jan 2009230.   
 
Two interviews with the deputy Managing Director of the PBC also confirm the 
positive impact which privatisation has had on the organisation.  He notes that 
before privatisation PBC employees operated with the knowledge that 
regardless of their performance the Cocobod would always support them. 
However, now employees recognise that you have to perform in order to 
compete and survive in the market. Equally, the fact that PBC have to publish 
their performance figures as a publicly traded company means that their 
performance can be closely monitored.  Therefore, to some extent privatisation 
in the PBC has yielded the sort of private sector accountability that buyers found 
to be missing from the performance of the QCD and CMC in the earlier section on 
credibility of reform.       
 
However, the privatisation of the PBC has not been an easy process and it 
appears to have taken several years to change the organisations attitude away 
                                                 
230
 Daily Guide Newspaper [2008] ‘Good News for PBC Shareholders.’ http://www.dailyguideghana. 
com/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=3696:  
Odoi-Larbi, S [2009] ‘PBC on a Flying Note.’ - http://www.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id 
=10103&title=PBC%20on%20flying%20note 
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from that of a public sector organisation.  To a large extent this challenge 
appears to have resulted from the organisations continued links with the 
government.  Part owned by the government, and with the Cocobod chief 
executive sitting in the PBC’s board, it is understandable that the process 
towards privatisation has been uneasy.  This finding builds upon the studies by 
Kherallah et al [2000] and Jayne et al [2002] highlighting the government’s 
failure to remove itself from liberalised aspects of the market as one major 
constraints to successful private sector development.   
 
Within the model of developmental coordination observed in chapter two, Kydd 
and Dorward [2004] suggest that the government has a key role to play in 
encouraging the private sector to make investments that contribute towards 
market development.  Improving the takeover centres in Ghana will require a 
significant investment of both time and money from any potential developer. As 
such, it would appear that in order for privatisation of the takeover centres to be 
successful in Ghana, the Cocobod may have to loosen their traditionally harsh 
regulatory approach, in order to give developers the necessary freedom and 
incentive to make the investments required.   
 
In closing it must be noted that in light of the Cocobod’s conservative 
organisational culture, there is no guarantee that the initial interest expressed in 
privatization will develop into the level of commitment required for reform in 
the area of cocoa takeover.   
 
7.2.5 – Conclusion  
 
This findings section has explored the problem of congestion within the 
Ghanaian cocoa supply chain.  As indicated by past literature, congestion has 
been a problem for several years [LMC, 1996; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001].  
Research findings suggest that in the opinion of LBC management congestion is 
the most significant problem that they face in the market.  As observed 
throughout this section, this problem has resulted from the Cocobod’s failure to 
update supply chain infrastructure in line with both Ghana’s increased cocoa 
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production, and also the increased speed of cocoa turnover resulting from the 
introduction of LBC competition.  In light of the importance that LBC’s place on 
the issue of congestion, the Cocobod must be criticised for their failure to 
respond more effectively in this area.  
 
Equally, it is important to recognise that as a public sector body the Cocobod face 
a significant challenge in responding to the changes that are required in supply 
chain infrastructure.  Not only does infrastructural development require a 
significant financial investment of already limited public finances, but equally the 
retrenchment that will result from such changes may result in political unrest.  In 
light of these problems, the majority of LBC participants from round two have 
recommended the privatisation of the takeover centres.  Indeed, throughout this 
section it has been suggested that the private sector may face a greater incentive 
towards change in the takeover centres, as compared the public sector actors 
currently in control.  
 
However, in closing, it is necessary to add the caveat that, based on the 
experience of liberalisation across other sub-Saharan countries, there is no 
guarantee that privatisation in this area will prove successful.  As such, it is 
suggested that under a privatisation scenario the Cocobod’s regulation will be 
one of the key determinants of success.   If this can be achieved then it would 
serve to further strengthen the case for partial models of market organisation, 
demonstrating the optimal division of responsibility that can be achieved 
between the government and the private sector.   
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7.3 - The Relationship between Competition and           
Quality Enforcement 
 
7.3.1 – Introduction  
 
Throughout its history as a cocoa trading nation Ghana has established a 
reputation for quality, which has enabled it to achieve several advantages such as 
price premiums and the stability of forward contracting.  Building on this, the 
literature in chapters one and four observed that cocoa quality has become an 
issue of national importance in Ghana [Fold, 2002].  Equally, during chapter four 
there were several studies reporting the negative impact that the introduction of 
competitive buying has had throughout liberalised commodity markets 
[Shepherd and Farolfi, 1999; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001; Losch, 2002; Ponte, 
2002].  Indeed, building on the common trend observed in this area Laven 
[2007] finds that in recent seasons competition between LBC’s has led to quality 
decline in Ghana.  In light of these findings the following section will attempt to 
further explore the link between competition and quality in Ghana.  
Furthermore, given the unique structure of the Ghanaian market, this section will 
also attempt to explore how the role of the QCD in Ghana has affected the 
seemingly natural trend for buyer competition to lead to quality decline.   
 
Building on the relatively large and conclusive body of literature linking buyer 
competition to quality decline, the key theme of competition and quality was 
identified a priori in this study.   Alongside this key theme, the primary theme of 
quality decline and the secondary theme of buyer practice were also identified 
within the literature.  The secondary themes of organisational risk231 and farmer 
training are, however, considered as emergent themes.  Whilst the issue of 
farmer training was identified a priori and was therefore present within the 
                                                 
231
 Organisational Risk is in fact considered the most emergent theme within this study, having not 
been covered in any past studies.  The theme of organisational risk will be raised again in section 7.4.  
My findings in this area have attracted interest from academics working with the Overseas 
Development Institute, for whom I have contributed a draft paper to be used in support of an ESRC 
research grant application.          
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round one interview guides, its link with quality decline was largely emergent.  
The theme of organisational risk is emergent, and is an original finding from this 
study. 
 
Based on past studies of the Ghanaian cocoa market [Shepherd and Onumah, 
1997; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001; Laven, 2005] the primary theme of quality 
control was identified a priori.  At the secondary level, the theme of quality 
sanction was also identified a priori in light of both the importance placed on this 
area in studies such as Laven [2007], and the key role of enforcement within NIE 
literature.  The themes of quality incentive and increased responsibility have, 
however, emerged within this study.  In particular the theme of increased 
responsibility emerged within the second round of interviews, once again 
demonstrating the importance of the iterative research process.    
 
The structure of themes within the final template can be seen in figure 7.4.1. 
 
 
Figure 7.3.1 – Final Template: Competition and Quality 
 
 
 Quality Decline  
o Buyer Practices 
o Organisational Risk 
o Farmer Training 
 
 Quality Control 
o Quality Sanction 
o Increased Responsibility 
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Figure 7.3.2 – Hierarchical Final Template: Competition and Quality  
Secondary Themes 
Primary Themes 
Key Theme Competition and Quality 
Quality Decline 
Buyers 
Organisational 
Risk 
Training  
Quality Control  
Sanction Responsibility  
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7.3.2 – Quality Decline  
 
7.3.2.1 – Buyer Practices 
 
At the beginning of this section it is important to qualify that the scale of quality 
decline in response to market liberalisation in Ghana cannot be compared with 
that of other liberalised cocoa markets.  Nevertheless, high quality cocoa is the 
backbone of the Cocobod system and therefore recent studies indicating a 
negative trend in Ghanaian quality have been a cause of great concern [Laven, 
2007].  In particular the purple bean problem of 2004/05, as highlighted in 
chapter four, has been associated with quality decline [Laven, 2007].   
 
In light of this it was very interesting to observe that during round one the 
impact of the purple bean problem was still very recognisable within interview 
responses.  In particular, three respondents from the Cocobod sample232, and all 
of the LBC participants from round one observed that to some extent the purple 
bean problem could be related to LBC competition.  Indeed, whilst findings from 
round one indicate that purple beans are no longer a problem in the market, 
round one interview responses from the Cocobod still display an automatic 
negativity towards the LBC’s role in quality control.  This can be seen from the 
passage below taken from a round one Cocobod interview: 
 
[R] ‘What is the buyer’s role in quality control?’ 
 
[Cocobod] ‘They must buy according to the standards set by the Cocobod...if not 
your cocoa will be rejected! QCD does not compromise on quality!’   
 
Findings from round one indicate that to some extent the Cocobod’s concerns 
surrounding the buying practices of LBC’s may be justified.  Past studies of 
quality decline in the Ghanaian cocoa market have found that buyers have been 
encouraging farmers to sell their cocoa before post harvesting is complete in 
                                                 
232
 These three round one Cocobod respondents are highlighted with a  symbol in appendix 
eighteen.  Amongst the three Cocobod respondents is the deputy executive director of the QCD.  
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order to avoid the threat of competition [Laven, 2007].  In support of this all LBC 
respondents from round one of research observed that this practice does take 
place.  Indeed, all LBC’s participants in round one accepted that they have 
suffered problems with purple beans.  As observed by one LBC manager,  
 
‘When competition came on the scene people were clamouring to buy the same 
quantity of cocoa, so the farmer would only ferment for four, not six, 
days...because somebody is standing there ready to buy.’ 
 
As noted in both the passage above and the beginning of the respondents’ 
account in appendix twenty-six, operating in this way was often justified based 
on the intensity of competition at the local level.  Furthermore, it appears that 
given that the pressure of competition is somewhat unavoidable, once a certain 
percentage of LBC’s begin to adopt bad practices, such as buying a farmer’s crop 
early, then other LBC’s may be forced to follow suit in order to compete.  This 
finding is similar to those reported by Gibbon [2005] and Poulton [2006] in 
chapter four, where buyers that search for quality have been undercut by those 
with a volume strategy.  This is described as a coordination failure by Poulton 
[2006], and to some extent LBC’s in Ghana may be displaying a similar problem. 
 
Within Poulton’s [2008] example buyers are unable to respond to the price 
signal of the market due to the intensity of competition at the local level.  In a 
similar light, LBC’s in Ghana may be failing to respond to the sanctioning threat 
of the QCD due to the pressure of competition.   Indeed, during round one all LBC 
participants indicated that in order to secure market share, buyers had become 
accustomed to accepting lower quality cocoa.   This can be seen from the passage 
below,  
 
[R] ‘Can you reject bad quality cocoa?’ 
 
[LBC] ‘Oh yes, we are supposed to, but in practice it doesn’t happen because if 
you reject another company will buy...and we work on commission, the more you 
buy the more you get’.  
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Furthermore, recognising the threat of predatory buying another LBC manager 
observed that, 
 
‘As early as 3 am you get people running around the society picking cocoa 
because if you don’t get there early, the hawks are already there.’    
 
In light of these findings, it appears that there is a coordination failure between 
LBC’s and the QCD in terms of the failure of LBC’s to respond to the QCD’s threat 
of sanction.  This problem is partly driven by the atomistic competition and lack 
of collective action between LBC’s, both of which result in LBC’s buying low 
quality cocoa to protect their market share.  As such, this problem could be 
overcome through an increased level of collective action from LBC’s in order to 
establish a minimum level of quality that should be accepted by buyers.  Under 
this condition, all LBC’s could benefit by reducing the threat of sanctioning from 
the QCD and increasing the efficiency of the supply chain.  However, based on all 
interviews carried out with LBC’s in round one it was established that such 
collective action could not be upheld due to the intensity of competition and the 
risk of a competitor free riding in order to enhance market share233.  
 
As such, the buying practices of LBC’s in Ghana appear to support the argument 
that quality decline within liberalised buying markets has resulted intense and 
uncoordinated competition amongst local traders [Shepherd and Farolfi, 1999; 
Varangis and Schreiber, 2001; Losch, 2002; Gibbon, 2005; Poulton, 2006].  
Within chapter four this was described as an upstream supply side effect in 
response to the impact which such competition has on the farmers and traders 
ability to supply downstream buyers with quality.    
 
In combination with supply side effects several writers also observe the 
importance of demand side effects in quality decline, where downstream buyers 
have not been encouraging the production of high quality cocoa [Fold, 2002; 
Losch, 2002; Tollens and Gilbert, 2003].  However, within Ghana, there appear to 
                                                 
233
 This is consistent with the findings of Poulton [2006] who finds that it is much easier to uphold 
competitive agreements on quality within markets that are highly concentrated, leading to greater 
coordination amongst buyers and lower free-riding.  
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be very few demand effects encouraging a decline in quality.  Indeed, the 
Cocobod demands high quality cocoa and any LBC that does not meet this 
standard will receive strict sanction234.  As such, the LBC is strongly encouraged 
to deliver quality, and therefore any quality decline may be considered the result 
of up-stream supply side market dynamics. This argument is of particular 
interest as it appears to counter that made by Tollens and Gilbert [2003], who 
suggest that quality decline in West African cocoa was entirely the result of 
changing demand patterns from downstream buyers.  
 
Nevertheless, Tollens and Gilberts [2003] argument does offer some insight into 
another possible cause of quality decline in Ghana.  Tollens and Gilbert suggest 
that in cases where downstream buyers offer sufficient price signals for high 
quality cocoa, upstream traders will take the appropriate action to make sure 
this quality is delivered.   In light of this it is necessary to question the strength of 
the incentive LBC’s face to buy quality cocoa, beyond the threat of sanction from 
the QCD.  LBC’s receive the same commission from the Cocobod for the supply of 
grade one and grade two cocoa.  As such, whilst it was acknowledged earlier that 
LBC’s have a clear financial incentive to maximise volume [commission], there 
appears to be less of an incentive to maximise quality.  Indeed, recognising the 
immediate need to compete for market share, LBC’s may lower their quality 
standards aware that grade two cocoa is sufficient to obtain their margin. In 
support of this, the findings above suggest that LBC’s have been willing to 
sacrifice a certain degree of quality in order to maximise market share.  
Therefore, whilst there is no demand side affect directly encouraging lower 
quality, it may be argued that the incentive on the demand side [buyer’s margin] 
is not sufficient to dominate the supply side incentive [commission].  
 
One possible solution to this problem would be to introduce a system of 
differential pricing in which LBC’s would receive a larger commission for 
delivering grade one cocoa, compared with grade two.  However, based on 
evidence of sub-Saharan markets, Poulton [2006] warns that where such 
                                                 
234
 As noted in Chapter four, cocoa that is below grade two standard will, [a] require costly 
reconditioning, [b] lead to the LBC receiving only 50% of the standard buyers margin, [c] be 
confiscated with the LBC receiving no payment.      
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premiums are not significantly large the buyer may still be faced with a greater 
incentive to follow a volume buying strategy.   As such, if the Cocobod were not 
committed to this change, offering LBC’s an insignificant premium for the 
delivery of grade one cocoa, then there is a risk that quality searchers would 
continue to be undercut by volume buyers.  In light of this it is interesting to 
observe that on two occasions the deputy chief executive director of the QCD 
rejected the possibility of a differential pricing system based on the following 
concern,  
 
‘I know my people [LBC’s], they will cheat the farmer and buy all cocoa as grade 
two cocoa...if the system will not benefit the farmer then I don’t think we should 
bring it in.’    
 
Indeed, this same concern was echoed by two other Cocobod respondents.  It 
therefore appears that the Cocobod has not considered a change in its pricing 
system, instead preferring to focus on the buying practices of the LBC’s.  As such, 
the maintenance of quality in Ghana may be based on the Cocobod ability to 
enforce constraints on LBC supply side buying practices through the institution 
of the QCD.  The most obvious way to achieve this would be to increase both the 
vigilance of the QCD and the level of sanction faced for delivering cocoa below 
grade two standard. 
 
7.3.2.2 – Organisational Risk 
 
Building on the above concerns surrounding the link between quality decline and 
the buying practices of LBC’s, it appears that to some extent the challenges in this 
area may be exacerbated by the problem of organisational risk.  The concept of 
organisational risk, developed entirely based on research findings within this 
study, can be closely associated with the problems of rural transacting identified 
in chapter two. Organisational risk represents the transaction risk faced by LBC’s 
as a result of their inability to affectively control, monitor, and sanction the 
behaviour of their purchasing clerks [PC’s].   
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PC’s are buying agents used by the LBC’s to purchase cocoa of farmers at the 
local level.  Due to the highly atomistic nature of cocoa production in Ghana, 
LBC’s find it very difficult to monitor the actions of their PC’s.  Compounding this 
monitoring problem, all LBC participants indicate that PC’s show very little 
loyalty, moving between LBC’s with relative ease.  As such, the threat of 
opportunistic behaviour from the PC was highlighted as a major transaction risk 
facing LBC’s in the market235. 
 
In relation to the topic of cocoa quality, organisational risk manifests itself 
through PC’s showing less regard for cocoa quality than demanded by their LBC 
principles.  Indeed, during both rounds of research around 50% of LBC 
respondents indicated that the PC may have less regard for quality than the LBC 
itself.  As noted by one LBC manager,  
 
‘Sometimes if you are not checking well he will want to pull a fast one because 
there is plenty of money...when the sack comes in you don’t know if he has put 
something inside’.  
 
PC’s work on a commission only basis, where each individual PC will be paid in 
proportion to the amount of cocoa he delivers throughout the course of the 
season.  As such, the PC’s main objective is to maximise his market share.  
Further evidence in support of this argument comes from interviews with four 
PC’s where it is found that at the busiest periods of the season the PC will bypass 
the stage of quality inspection in order to maximise the time available to 
purchase cocoa.  All PC respondents also found that unless cocoa is of a very bad 
quality they will not reject it for fear of losing out to a competitor.   
 
As such, it appears that the PC’s level of risk aversion, in terms of cocoa quality, 
may be lower than that of the LBC’s.  This may be caused by two main problems.  
Firstly, the PC may be willing to take advantage of the information asymmetry 
between themselves and the LBC, knowing that because the QCD’s upcountry 
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 This problem between the principle and the agent may be closely related to ‘agency theory’, as 
developed by Eisenhardt [1985, 1989]. 
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quality grading procedure is not 100% accurate236, the LBC may not be able to 
accurately determine the quality of the cocoa supplied by the PC237.  Indeed, as 
observed in section 7.1, on credibility of reform, once cocoa is passed by the 
upcountry graders and transferred to the takeover centres it then becomes very 
difficult to determine the exact point of quality failure.  
 
Secondly, LBC’s may be more risk averse, as it appears that they face a greater 
threat of sanction in cases of quality failure as compared the PC’s.  As observed in 
the earlier section on the credibility of reform, in cases where cocoa is rejected at 
the takeover centres, this comes at a great cost to the LBC’s.  Not only do LBC’s 
suffer the time and efficiency cost238 of re-working the cocoa, but they also face 
the threat of financial sanction from the Cocobod.  In cases where cocoa is 
rejected at the upcountry level by the QCD the cost facing the PC is much less 
severe.  Firstly, they do not face the same time constraint as LBC’s, and secondly, 
there is no threat of financial sanction from the LBC’s.   
 
In order to counteract this problem seven of the fifteen LBC participants in round 
two observed that they were making a greater effort tracing quality problems 
discovered at the port back to the PC level.  As observed by the LBC manager in 
the passage below in certain cases this has led to improved performance from 
the PC,  
 
[R] Last time you said the PC would not reject cocoa is that still the same? 
 
[LBC] No, no, no...now you bring cocoa, when cocoa is rejected on the basis of 
quality, we have a way of reporting...so when it comes to the time when the PC 
should be paid his commission the value of the cocoa is taken away from it’.    
 
                                                 
236
 Please refer to section 7.1 on credibility of reform where the performance of the QCD’s upcountry 
grading was questioned.  
237
 This is an example of ‘adverse selection’ on the part of the PC, where they may withhold superior 
knowledge about the product being supplied in order to gain an advantage [Akerlof, 1970]. 
238
 As discussed in section 7.2, the finance charges faced by LBC’s in the market are very severe and 
therefore speed of turnover is a major issue facing LBC’s.  
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As such, it appears that increased enforcement from LBC’s, which helps to reduce 
the level of information asymmetry between themselves and the PC, may help to 
improve the PC’s performance in quality control.  However, as noted by the 
respondent in appendix twenty-six, it is not easy to trace to quality problems 
discovered at the takeover centres back to the PC.  Indeed, during section 7.1 it 
was observed that there are a number of reasons why quality of cocoa may 
change in transit between the upcountry check and the takeover centres.  
Therefore, building on the findings of section 7.1 it is necessary for the QCD to 
improve the accuracy of their upcountry grading so that any quality problems 
can be discovered at this stage, thus reducing the level of information asymmetry 
between the PC and the LBC.  If the QCD were able to lower the volume of 
defective cocoa passed at the upcountry then this would increase the LBC’s 
ability to monitor the quality performance of their PC’s.  In turn this may 
increase the PC’s risk aversion towards the act of buying low quality cocoa and 
reduce the level of transaction costs faced by LBC’s in this area.   
 
7.3.2.3 – Farmer Training  
 
As observed in chapter four the role of the farmer is paramount in the 
production of quality in Ghana [MOFEP, 1999].  In light of this it is interesting to 
observe that, based on findings from eight Cocobod interviews239 and all LBC 
interviews, it appears that in recent seasons the farmer’s attitude towards 
quality has deteriorated.  In the opinion of the Cocobod, this deterioration has 
been brought about by the competitive buying practices of LBC’s, as observed in 
the following statement by the executive director of the QCD, 
 
‘With the influx of private buyers because the farmer had a choice sometimes the 
preparatory stages were short circuited…the farmer thinks if I can sell my cocoa 
anyway why should I go through all the tedious work’. 
 
                                                 
239
 This includes the seven interviews marked with  in appendix eighteen, plus the interview with 
the director of the CODAPEC program.  
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Whilst the findings above would corroborate with the suggestions that buyers 
have influenced farmers in this way240, there may be another factor contributing 
to the decline in farmer attitude in recent seasons.  During the process of market 
reform in recent years the extent of training given to the Ghanaian farmers has 
declined significantly.  The decline in farmer training has resulted from the 
termination of the CSD in 2000 and the resultant transfer of farmer extension 
services to the MOFA.  As observed in chapter four the CSD formerly operated as 
a subsidiary of Cocobod, focusing independently on cocoa farmer extension.  
However, once the CSD’s responsibilities were absorbed by MOFA, cocoa was 
only given equal priority amongst all other agricultural crops. 
 
Based on an interview with a former CSD extension officer now working for 
MOFA, the level of both time and resources being invested in cocoa farmer 
training has declined greatly since 2000.  This perspective is also supported in a 
recent study by Baah et al [2009] which finds that Ghana’s agricultural extension 
officers involved are under-resourced and de-motivated.  Interviews with four 
key informants working in the sector of agricultural practice indicate that cocoa 
farming requires a high level of farmer training and therefore the rationalisation 
of extension services is likely to have a noticeable effect on the farmer’s 
production of quality.   
 
In support of this, eight of the thirteen LBC participants in round one found that 
the decline in farmer training has had a significant role to play in the quality 
problems experienced in recent years.  This can be seen from the passage below 
taken from an LBC interview,   
 
[R] Why did purple bean only become a problem in recent seasons? 
 
[LBC] ‘Ok, ok, ok...Cocobod had done away with the system that had been with 
the farmers telling them what to do’. 
 
                                                 
240
 The influence of buyer competition on farmer attitude is acknowledged by the respondent in 
appendix twenty-six.  
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The decrease in farmer training may help to explain why despite the 
introduction of competition in 1992, no serious quality problems were reported 
until 2004/05, at which point the impact of the decline in training would have 
been felt.  Indeed, both interview findings and market share data indicate that 
the level of competition between LBC’s did not increase significantly around the 
time of the purple bean problem, and therefore additional factors beyond 
competition may have contributed to the decline in quality.    
 
In response to this, there is clearly a need for the Cocobod to adjust the current 
policy on farmer training.  As observed by one LBC manager,  
 
‘Having gone through this we are all under the realisation that it [extension] 
should be back with Cocobod’ 
 
The need for farmer training is particularly apparent in light of the competitive 
buying conditions facing LBC’s, as observed earlier.   Under current market 
conditions it is very difficult for an LBC to reject a farmer’s cocoa if they wish to 
maintain their market share.  The challenge of maintaining quality within a 
highly competitive market clearly requires a collaborative effort from all actors 
involved at the local level.  Under the former monopsony system not only were 
farmers receiving better training, but the buyer was also under no pressure to 
accept low quality cocoa from the farmer.  This was observed by the deputy 
executive director of the QCD when commenting on the monopsony system,  
 
‘The kind of quality cocoa the buyer wants is what the farmer will bring…it was a 
bit easier for us to make an impact on the farmers because if you don’t do what 
we are asking you to do then selling your stocks will be a bit difficult’. 
 
Within the competitive market system the Cocobod, acting as the market 
regulator, have an obligation to assist the LBC’s with their difficulties in this area.  
This could be achieved through the introduction of rigorous farmer training 
program.   As indicated within the following passage the deputy executive 
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director of the QCD also believes that farmer training is the key to balancing 
competition and coordination,  
 
‘We have to talk to the farmers and if we intensify our education it will not 
matter how many LBC’s are there’.   
 
As noted by Poulton et al [2004], the regulator should be encouraged to achieve 
a balance of both competition and coordination with developing country 
markets.  In light of this, it appears that, if implemented correctly, farmer 
training could be used as a coordination measure used to enable competitive 
buying, whilst also providing an element of restraint against quality decline. 
Increased training may help to increase the farmer’s attention to cocoa quality, 
thus enabling buyers to compete for cocoa with less risk of the cocoa being sub-
standard.  Whilst it is unrealistic to assume that increased training would 
completely alleviate the risk of quality decline, it may be argued that training has 
the potential to augment the quality control efforts put in place by the QCD.  
 
7.3.3 – Quality Control 
 
7.3.3.1 – Quality Sanction  
 
LBC’s are encouraged to purchase high quality cocoa in two main ways; firstly, 
the threat of cocoa rejection, and secondly, the risk of sanction.  Without a 
system of differential pricing the Cocobod’s capacity to maintain cocoa quality 
within Ghana’s current competitive market setting is largely dependent on the 
effectiveness of these two mechanisms.   
 
As observed throughout section 7.2, speed and efficiency are particularly 
important aspects of an LBC’s competitive strategy.  Resultantly the threat of 
delays caused by cocoa rejection provides an effective incentive towards LBC 
quality control.  This was observed by all LBC respondents in round two 
interviews.  As noted by one LBC manager, 
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‘Even though the two grading system helps quality, it is a financial cost for the 
LBC’s, if cocoa is passed upcountry and then failed at the ports it is a huge 
expense for us’.   
 
Coupled with the additional finance costs that LBC’s incur through the process of 
cocoa rejection is the threat of financial sanction for delivering low quality cocoa.  
As observed in chapter four, when an LBC delivers cocoa of sub-standard quality, 
then the LBC will either receive only 50% of the cocoa’s value, or the cocoa will 
be confiscated.  Furthermore, the Cocobod records every case in which an LBC 
presents low quality cocoa and financial sanctions are issued at the end of the 
season in accordance with the LBC’s level of indiscretion.   
 
Based on the two interviews carried out with the deputy executive director of 
the QCD, it appears that the sanctioning of LBC’s in the case of quality failure is 
considered key to the maintenance of cocoa quality within Ghana.  During the 
seven interviews from the Cocobod sample discussing the issue of quality control 
it was regularly observed that the LBC’s are assumed to be culpable in almost all 
cases of quality failure.  As can be seen from the following extract taken from an 
interview with a Cocobod official, LBC’s were held entirely responsible for the 
purple bean problem, 
 
‘Because the LBC’s were not allowing the farmer to do the right thing, we 
punished the LBC’s’. 
 
Furthermore, within all seven Cocobod interviews discussing quality control it is 
suggested that strong sanctions against LBC’s are necessary in order to achieve 
an improved attitude towards quality.  To some extent this mentality is 
consistent with the earlier finding in credibility of reform, where the Cocobod 
was found to have a firm regulatory approach.  The following extract taken from 
an interview with the deputy executive director of the QCD, helps to demonstrate 
this firm approach,  
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‘The kind of foolhardiness that goes on in this industry if you don’t tighten the 
sanctions you may not be solving any problems’.   
 
In response to this treatment, eight of the thirteen LBC managers interviewed in 
round one found that the Cocobod’s method of sanctioning in the case of quality 
failure was both an unfair and ineffective way of dealing with quality issues.  
Interestingly, however, in round two the LBC’s stance on this issue appears to 
have softened.  Indeed, the nature of LBC responses in round two would appear 
to indicate not only a greater acceptance of the QCD’s sanctioning, but also a 
greater acceptance of the buyer’s responsibility in quality control.  To some 
extent the LBC’s change in attitude may be related to the passing of time since 
the purple bean incident of 2004/05.  During round one interviews the harsh 
treatment that LBC’s received throughout the purple bean problem was at the 
forefront of all discussions surrounding quality control.  However, within round 
two the influence of the purple bean problem appears to have passed suggesting 
that it may have been an extreme case and therefore unreflective of the normal 
market conditions in Ghana.  
 
During round two all fifteen LBC participants found that, whilst competition may 
have the capacity to put pressure on quality, due to the sanctioning of the QCD 
there is no room to compromise.  Indeed, the unanimity of LBC responses in this 
area during round two was quite remarkable.  The passage below taken from an 
LBC interview indicates the effect the quality control is having on reducing 
quality decline, 
 
‘Because of the amount of money chasing the cocoa the farmer tends to fasten 
the process…but that is getting regulated by the QCD, because the QCD would 
keep on rejecting any cocoa that would come in at a lower quality’.   
 
Within both the QCD and the Cocobod there is a keen awareness that this firm 
approach in the sanctioning of LBC’s is yielding positive results.  Both interviews 
with the deputy executive director of the QCD indicate a high level of confidence 
with regards to the way in which the QCD has responded to the reported decline 
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in Ghana’s quality.  When commenting on the purple bean problem the deputy 
executive director of the QCD noted that,  
 
‘We put in measures to stem that difficulty and I can say that as of now we have 
almost overcome that difficulty’.  
 
Indeed, whilst round one findings alone would suggest that this tough approach 
was achieving little besides resentment from the LBC’s, the findings from round 
two of research are much more positive.   It appears that by increasing the threat 
of sanction against low quality the QCD have been able to reduce the 
coordination failure previously taking place in the realm of quality control.  
Whereas previously buyers may have been prepared to sacrifice quality in order 
to pursue market share, there now appears to be an acceptance amongst LBC’s 
that this is not satisfactory practice.  As such, by increasing the threat of sanction 
the QCD have implicitly increased the level of coordination amongst LBC’s, 
without significantly hampering their ability to compete241.  This positive 
situation242 should be maintained provided that the majority of LBC’s continue to 
prioritise the threat of quality sanction above the need to enhance market share 
at the expense of quality.        
 
7.3.3.2 – LBC responsibility  
 
Within round two of research, it was possible to observe various examples of 
LBC’s taking greater responsibility for upcountry quality control.  The two most 
regularly observed examples of this are the increased rejection of poor quality 
cocoa and the reconditioning of poor quality cocoa.   Earlier it was observed that 
                                                 
241
 In theory the same number of LBC’s will still be competing for the same volume of cocoa, albeit in 
less of a rush than they were before.  As such, the level of competition at the farmer level should not 
be significantly different.  It must however be noted that the threat of sanction may deter certain 
LBC’s from competing in the market. 
242
 This outcome is considered positive within the Ghanaian example.  Within a perfectly efficient 
market there would be some value loss in the form of the additional finance costs that LBC’s face 
waiting 2/3 extra days for farmers to harvest quality cocoa.  However, within Ghana where there are 
severe supply chain inefficiencies causing LBC’s to store purchased cocoa for several weeks, the 2/3 
day buffer required for the farmer to achieve first class quality may be relatively insignificant, thus 
making the affect of recent QCD sanctioning largely positive.  Furthermore, the financial gain from 
avoiding sanction should compensate for any LBC value loss.  
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during round one of research LBC managers and PC’s regularly found that due to 
competition in the market it was not common for a buyer to reject cocoa.  
However, when questioned about this during round two, ten LBC managers 
claimed that PC’s would now reject poor quality cocoa.  This was often qualified 
with the belief that purchasing low quality cocoa was pointless due to the 
vigilance of the QCD in quality control.  As noted by one LBC manager in round 
two, 
 
‘Well for quality there is nothing you can do about it, because if you don’t buy 
quality cocoa Cocobod will not take it...even if they take it they will pay you 
less...so for quality you have to abide by the Cocobod’s rules’.   
 
Amongst the remaining five round two LBC participants, who found that their 
PC’s would not reject poor quality cocoa, again the results were positive for 
quality control.  In light of the competitive threat faced by rejecting a farmer’s 
cocoa, these five LBC participants found that rather than reject poor quality 
cocoa, PC’s will now help the farmer recondition the cocoa to an acceptable level 
of quality.  Reconditioning would typically involve further drying of the cocoa or 
the separation of good from bad beans243.  Interviews with PC’s in round two also 
confirmed the practice of reconditioning.  All six PC’s interviewed in round two 
found that they would very rarely reject a farmer’s cocoa for fear of losing out to 
their competitors, but instead they would recondition the beans where possible.  
As observed by one LBC manager,  
 
‘You need a very good relationship [with farmers], especially where there is 
competition, so you have to pet them....you may have to take on jobs that 
ordinarily you would not have done’.   
 
To some extent, this finding may be related to the Tollens and Gilbert [2003] 
study covered in chapter four.  Tollens and Gilbert argue that competition does 
not reduce the level of quality produced by farmers, because the local buyer has 
                                                 
243
 Please note that fermentation deficiencies, such as those leading to purple beans, cannot be fixed 
by PC reconditioning.  This is also acknowledged by Tollens and Gilbert [2003]. 
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the capacity to improve any low quality cocoa purchased from the farmer.  As 
such, if the market is willing to pay for quality then the buyer will take time to 
prepare the cocoa to a higher standard.  However, whilst this argument may hold 
for certain minor quality defects, such as drying, interview findings indicate that 
reconditioning by the PC is a second-best approach in the achievement of good 
quality.  Reconditioning cannot improve aspects such as fermentation, which is 
the key process affecting the flavour characteristic of the cocoa bean.   
 
Furthermore, because of the degree of urgency in local buying the PC is always in 
a rush and therefore any secondary reconditioning work carried out may not 
receive the time and care that the farmer can give.  Interview findings suggest 
that local traders face a significant time constraint due to several factors.  Firstly, 
because of the organisational risk associated with PC’s, district managers keep 
very tight control of any money released to the PC.  As such, the PC must account 
for any money received with physical cocoa in a short period of time.  Secondly, 
the PC does not want to devote a large amount of time to reconditioning as this 
will inevitably reduce the amount of time they can spend in the field competing 
for more cocoa, and ultimately more commission.  This was indicated in all eight 
PC interviews carried out across both stages of research.  
 
As such, whilst reconditioning may be considered an indication of the buyer 
taking extra responsibility towards quality, it may not in fact lead to the high 
level of quality that the QCD requires. In support of this, all buyers and Cocobod 
officials, along with four key informants found that the role of the framer is 
paramount in quality.  As noted one LBC manager, 
 
‘I would say the main reason behind Ghana’s high quality cocoa is actually the 
effort the farmer puts in after he has produced the cocoa, he goes through the 
fermentation process correctly’.  
 
To a large extent this builds upon the earlier recommendation of increased 
farmer training in Ghana.  As discussed earlier farmer training could help to 
improve the balance between competition and quality control in Ghana.  Within 
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the partial model it has become too easy for the Cocobod to shift the emphasis of 
quality responsibility on to the LBC’s, effectively making them a scapegoat for 
any quality problems in recent years.  Resources have been transferred away 
from farmer education, at the same time as competition entered the market.  
Under such circumstances it is understandable that quality problems have been 
experienced.   Increased farmer training could help to provide balance in this 
area, enabling LBC’s to pursue their competitive instincts to some extent, whilst 
reducing the threat of buying poor quality cocoa.  
 
Building on the argument of competition and coordination [Poulton et al, 2004] 
and in reference to section 7.2, it may also be suggested that increased quality 
control in the form of farmer training could provide a further check against the 
quality decline that may result from the modernisation of the takeover centres.  
As discussed in section 7.2, the quality decline that may result from increased 
turnover speed needs to be considered by the Cocobod.  With the potential for 
LBC’s to turnover cocoa faster, the pressure on farmers to sell cocoa early may 
increase.  The findings from this section do, however, suggest that the QCD is 
now firmly in control of quality within the Ghanaian cocoa market.  LBC’s have 
responded positively to the constraints put in place by the QCD and there is now 
a greater degree of coordination between LBC purchasing habits and Cocobod 
quality requirements.  As such, in reference to section 7.2, the modernisation of 
the takeover centres may be endorsed as a competition inducing change, 
provided the Cocobod continue to be vigilant in the maintenance of their quality 
controls.  Should this take place it would be a positive example of the balanced 
regulatory approach that may be required to sustain development within the 
partial model.   
 
7.3.4 - Conclusion  
 
Throughout this section it has been observed that the danger of quality decline 
resulting from buyer competition is clearly an issue that the Cocobod take very 
seriously.  To some extent these concerns may be justified,  as based on the 
findings reported throughout this section it appears that the practices pursued 
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by LBC’s in Ghana are somewhat similar to those employed by traders in the  
fully liberalised markets of the Ivory Coast and Cameroon, where severe quality 
decline has been experienced [Varangis and Schreiber, 2001; Losch, 2002].  
However, whilst the degree of importance placed on this issue by the Cocobod is 
quite severe, in reality any decline in the quality of Ghanaian cocoa in recent 
years has been relatively marginal.      
 
In light of this praise must be given to the controlling role played by the QCD 
within the Ghanaian market.  Experience has proven that the maintenance of 
quality alongside competitive market buying is a challenging process, and 
therefore it is not appropriate to criticise the QCD’s firm approach to quality 
control.  Equally, it must be recognised that the Cocobod’s simultaneous pursuit 
of both competition and quality has led to tensions within the partial model. 
Indeed, as seen in the previous section on speed of turnover, it may be argued 
that trade-offs between the objectives of competition and coordination are an 
inherent feature of the partial model in Ghana.  Reducing the tensions that exist 
between quality control and competition will require both compromise and 
collaboration between the major stakeholders in the market.   
 
Such compromises may, however, be required in order to achieve the sustained 
development, made possible by a balance of competition and coordination 
[Poulton et al, 2004].  The performance of the Ghanaian market to date in the 
realms of both competition and quality strongly suggests that a balance in this 
area may yield positive benefits throughout the entire market.  As such, it is 
recommended that the Cocobod re-direct some resources to the objective of 
farmer training, so that farmers, LBC’s, and the Cocobod can all begin to 
contribute, as appropriate, to the maintenance of Ghana’s quality.     
 
 
 
 
261 | P a g e  
 
261 
 
Section 7.4 - Partial Model Transition 
 
7.4.1 – Introduction  
 
Despite beginning liberalisation in 1992, reform in the Ghanaian cocoa market 
has been slow and the Cocobod has maintained many of the traditional functions 
of the old government parastatals.  Alongside the role of the QCD in quality 
control and the CMC in cocoa exports, the Cocobod has also remained heavily 
involved in the provision of farmer inputs.  Fungicides and insecticides are 
provided twice annually as a public good, and in recent years there have been a 
number of different fertiliser subsidy programs.  However, whilst quality control 
and cocoa exports are two areas in which the Cocobod has no intention of 
relinquishing any control, interview findings suggest that there may be scope for 
greater private sector involvement in farmer inputs.  
 
Gradual reform is a key component of Kydd and Dorward’s [2004] model of 
developmental coordination.  Within this model there is a deliberate transition of 
responsibility in certain functions of the market from public to private sector. 
One such function is the provision of farmer inputs, and as pointed out by 
Spooner and Smith [1991], this is typically one of the first functions to be 
privatised in the process of reform.  However, successful and sustainable 
privatisation presents a major challenge.  Recent studies show that the 
development of private sector input markets in Sub-Saharan agriculture has 
proven very difficult and missing markets have been the norm in many recent 
examples of market liberalisation [Kherallah et al, 2000; Shepherd and Farolfi, 
1999].   
 
Nevertheless, there may be a need for such change within the Ghanaian cocoa 
market.  The total proposed government expenditure on farmer inputs for 
2008/09 is 161.5 million Ghana cedis244.  Whilst recent global cocoa prices have 
been abnormally high, thus enabling the Cocobod to make such significant 
                                                 
244
 Ghana News Agency [2008] ‘Government Raises Cocoa Producer Price By 36 Percent’, 
http://ghana.gov.gh/ghana/government_raises_cocoa_producer _price_36_percent.jsp 
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investments, given the cyclical nature of cocoa price movements [Ruf, 1995] 
there will come a time when such surpluses are not available to invest.  
Recognising this, five Cocobod participants245 accepted that overtime it will 
necessary for the Cocobod to transfer responsibility for these services to the 
private sector.   In light of this the following section will attempt to explore both 
the constraints facing LBC’s in input provision and future possibilities for the 
development of private sector input markets.    
 
In recognition of the emphasis placed on transition within the model of 
developmental coordination [Kydd and Dorward, 2004], the theme of partial 
model transition was identified a priori as a key theme in this study.   
Furthermore, based on past studies [Poulton et al, 2004; Larsen, 2002], the 
potential for buyers to take on more responsibility in the market for farmer 
inputs was also targeted within interview guides.    
 
Within the key theme of transition, however, the primary theme of buyer 
constraints, alongside the secondary themes of interlocking, collective action and 
buyer attitude are considered as emergent themes.  Indeed, whilst it was 
anticipated that buyers may face some constraints in the market for farmer 
inputs, the extent to which these particular themes emerged as constraints was 
unexpected.  The sub-level theme of organisational risk is also an emergent 
theme, and as discussed in section 7.3, this is an original finding from this study.  
The sub-level theme of strategic default was identified a priori based on the 
analysis of this problem within recent studies of sub-Saharan input markets 
[Poulton et al, 1998].  
The theme of public private partnership is also an emergent theme.  Indeed, this 
theme emerged specifically in response to a new Cocobod program that was 
being implemented during round two.  In recognition of the highly emergent 
nature of the primary theme private public partnership, the secondary themes of 
LBC interface and partnership are also considered to be emergent themes.  
                                                 
245
 These five Cocobod officials include four of the respondents with a  in appendix eighteen, plus 
the director of the CODAPEC program.  
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The structure of themes within the final template can be seen in a linear format 
in figure 7.4.1 and in a hierarchical format in figure 7.4.2. 
 
Figure 7.4.1 – Final Template: Partial Model Transition 
 
 LBC Constraints  
o Interlocking 
 Strategic Default  
 Organisational Risk 
o Collective Action 
o Buyer Attitude 
 
 Public Private Partnership 
o LBC interface 
o Partnership  
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Figure 7.5.2 – Hierarchical Final Template: Partial Model Transition 
 
 
Sub-level Themes 
Secondary Themes 
Primary Themes 
Key Theme Transition 
Constraints  
Interlocking  
Default  
Organisational 
Risk 
Collective  Attitude  
PPP 
LBC Interface Partnership 
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7.4.2 - LBC Constraints  
 
7.4.2.1 – Interlocking 
 
During chapter two it was observed that interlocking arrangements between 
buyers and farmers can be used to overcome the financial constraints facing 
farmers by enabling buyers to provide farmers with either financial credit, or 
inputs on credit.   Building on this, Zeitlin [2006] finds that LBC’s have used 
interlocking arrangements to facilitate the provision of inputs/credit to farmers 
in Ghana.  Indeed, Teal et al [2006] and Vigneri and Santos [2007] also find that 
this is one of the major positives resulting from the introduction of competition 
into the Ghanaian cocoa market.  As such, it was very interesting to observe that 
all LBC respondents report a very negative experience of using interlocking 
transactions in Ghana.   In light of this the following two sections will explore the 
constraints LBC’s faced in using interlocking arrangements.  
 
7.4.2.1.1 - Strategic Default  
 
Within chapter two it was observed that strategic default has been a major 
problem in several sub-Saharan markets, causing buyer to retract from 
interlocking arrangements, instead selling inputs on a cash only basis [Poulton et 
al, 1998; Poulton, 2006].  Strategic default occurs when a farmer takes credit 
from one buyer based on an interlocking arrangement and then sells the 
contingent produce to a different buyer in order to avoid repayment [Poulton et 
al, 1998].  Building on these findings, all LBC respondents in round one indicated 
that in response to the high level of strategic default experienced in recent years, 
they have stopped offering any form of credit/inputs to farmers246.   
 
Poulton [2006] suggests that increased levels of default, and the resultant 
retraction of buyers from the provision of credit, may be explained by an 
increased number of buyers in the market.  However, based on interview 
                                                 
246
 The high level of default experienced in the past is acknowledged by the respondents in 
appendices twenty seven and twenty eight.  
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findings, and also the market share data in appendix three, it appears that the 
level of competition in the internal market has not changed significantly in 
recent years.   Whilst there were three LBC respondents in round two who felt 
that the level competition had increased, the general consensus of the remaining 
twelve respondents was that although competition is currently intense, it has 
been the same for several years.  This can be seen in the following passage: 
 
[R] ‘How has the level of competition between buyers changed in recent years?’ 
 
[LBC] ‘The level hasn’t changed.’ 
 
[R] ‘Has the intensity changed?’ 
 
[LBC] ‘It is always intense cause they are all fighting to get more cocoa’  
 
As such it appears that whilst buyer competition clearly facilitates strategic 
default amongst farmers, an increase in competition cannot be used to explain 
the retraction of LBC credit in Ghana. Recognising the insufficiency of increased 
competition as an explanation in this case, it has been necessary to explore 
alternative explanations for why buyers have retracted from the provision of 
credit/inputs in recent seasons.  In this light, it interesting to observe that when 
questioned on the topic of interlocking all LBC respondents across both stages of 
research found that the Ghanaian farmer has a negative attitude towards the 
repayment of credit.  As observed by one LBC manager,  
 
‘The farmer in Ghana does not operate on credit to anybody’.   
 
This problem is also acknowledged during six interviews with members of the 
Cocobod247 and four key informant interviews, where it is found that based on 
years of receiving inputs in the form of government handouts farmers in Ghana 
have developed a cultural problem towards repayment.  Closely related to this 
                                                 
247
 This includes all five of the Cocobod interviews marked with  in appendix eighteen, plus the 
director of the CODAPEC program. 
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Poulton et al [1998] and Dorward et al [1998b], find that the cultural impact of 
government handouts on farmer attitude towards repayments can help to 
explain why strategic default has become such a major problem in sub-Saharan 
markets.  
 
During an interview with a Cocobod officer it was observed that this attitude is 
deeply embedded in the farmers psyche and dates back as far as the 1960’s when 
Cocobod began a program of free pesticide spraying for farmers.  Over the years 
Cocobod have not attempted to engender an attitude of self-sufficiency amongst 
farmers, and as such farmers have come to expect to receive inputs for free.  To a 
large extent the negative impact of government hand outs can be seen in the 
Cocobod’s current mass spraying programme.  Within this program the farmers 
are encouraged to spray their farm twice a year, in combination with the two 
free sprayings offered by the Cocobod.  The majority of farmers have not been 
doing this, however, rather than let farmers learn from the negative results of 
not spraying, the Cocobod have been providing additional inputs for free.  As 
observed by one LBC manager this type of support has led to an engrained belief 
amongst farmers towards inputs, 
 
‘When some of these issues settle in peoples minds it takes a long time to get rid 
of…they think that for cocoa anything that comes their way is for free’.  
 
In reference to the above findings on competition it is also found that strategic 
default was a problem in the Ghanaian market prior to 1992 when the PBC was 
the monopsony buyer.  As noted by a Cocobod official, 
  
‘The farmers had their own way of doing things, even though the company was 
only one [PBC], the farmer wouldn’t sell to you where his records are, he can 
travel to another marketing clerk and sell the produce, so that the marketing 
clerk who sold the input to the farmer, the cocoa wouldn’t go to that marketing 
clerk’.  
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In light of this it is argued that, although strategic default has been made easier 
for farmers with the introduction of a multi-buying system, the farmers cultural 
negativity towards repayment pre-dates the introduction of private buyers.  As 
such, having experimented with farmer credit as a form of competitive strategy, 
LBC’s have only recently learned that, due to the deeply embedded nature of the 
Ghanaian farmer’s reluctance towards repayment, it is very difficult to make this 
strategy a success.  LBC’s have had to experience the extent of this problem, 
before making the decision to retract from the provision of framers inputs.  In 
light of this it appears that, without a concerted effort towards a change in 
framer attitude, it is difficult to see how strategic default will cease to be a 
constraint to LBC involvement in farmer inputs.  
 
7.4.2.1.2 – Organisational Risk  
 
As discussed in section 7.3, LBC’s face a significant challenge when attempting to 
monitor and control the actions of their PC’s.  This creates the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour by PC’s.  Indeed, throughout research it was found that 
PC’s have previously used interlocking arrangements with farmers as an 
opportunity to defraud LBC’s.   Aware of the Ghanaian farmer’s reputation for 
strategic default, PC’s have been stealing LBC money and then reporting that the 
money was lost as a result of farmer default.  This problem was acknowledged by 
nine of the thirteen LBC participants interviewed in round one.  In such cases it is 
often very difficult for management to determine who is at fault, due to the 
problems of monitoring and information asymmetry at the local level.  In light of 
this, one LBC manager noted,  
 
‘That is why sometimes we send them to the police, some of them [PC’s] have 
collected the money and tell me that they gave it to my farmers...and it is very 
difficult for me to go from one farmer to another... the executive time wasted’.  
   
This loss of trust appears to be a strong constraint to the use of interlocking 
arrangements, as the LBC is somewhat dependent on the honesty of the PC in 
this area.  Not only is the PC required to deliver inputs and collect payment, but it 
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is also very important that the PC monitors the actions of the farmer to avoid the 
risk of the farmer selling his cocoa to a different buyer.  As such, there is a need 
for LBC’s to improve upon the monitoring and control of PC actions in order to 
reduce the level of transaction risk associated with interlocking arrangements.  
 
7.4.2.2 - Collective Action 
 
In theory the threat of strategic default from farmers and organisational risk 
from PC’s can be reduced through a greater level of collective action between 
LBC’s [Larsen, 2002; Poulton et al 2004].   
 
In relation to strategic default, collective action can take place in two main forms.  
Firstly, buyers may collectively contribute to a central fund for farmer inputs, 
which are then distributed as a public good.  This is known as a ‘Coasian 
solution’, where the potential beneficiaries of a public good may pull their 
resources together in order to collectively reap the benefit of the service 
provided [Coase, 1960].  Buyers may be motivated to do this aware that without 
certain inputs farmer production will decline and buyer profits will suffer. 
Coasian solutions require a very strong degree of collective action between 
buyers.  Within Ghana, however, the required level of collective effort and 
infrastructure necessary to sustain collective action at the local level has never 
been implemented by the LBC’s.  In light of this, all LBC respondents in round 
one strongly indicated that there no chance of buyers working together to 
provide inputs as a public good.  As noted by one buyer,  
 
‘As a group they could have a bigger yield, but individually because of the 
competition...individually it is difficult to see the association coming together to 
raise some money to help the farmers’.  
 
The second form of collective action that may be used to reduce default is simply 
a greater degree of coordination between LBC’s in the implementation and 
enforcement of market practices.  Such coordination can take the form of 
enforceable competitive agreements and codes of conduct amongst LBC’s.  For 
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example, a rule that stops rival LBC’s buying cocoa from a farmer, if another LBC 
has made a substantial loan to the same farmer.  Indeed, as observed in chapter 
two, studies by Poulton et al [2004], and Larsen [2002], have demonstrated that 
buyers in the Zimbabwean cotton market have used this type of ‘relational 
coordination’ to achieve low default rates and high quality output.  However, 
when LBC participants were questioned about the possibility of coordination in 
this area, again they were unanimous in their belief that this would not be 
possible.  As was the case in the earlier findings section on organisational risk, 
the extent of competition in the market is cited by all respondents in round one 
as the main reason why this could not happen.  
 
In this light, it is interesting to observe that Poulton et al [2004] find that when a 
farmer strategically defaults, the buyer to whom the farmer sells his produce is 
considered to be free-riding on the investment [input loan] of the buyer who 
originally gave the farmer the inputs.  However, based on interviews with LBC 
respondents in Ghana, it appears that buyers do not find strategic default to be a 
form of free-riding.  Indeed, all LBC respondents questioned on this issue in 
round two found that all buyers are free to compete for all available cocoa in the 
market, regardless of any investments that have been made in a farmer.  As 
noted by one LBC manager, 
 
‘In the spirit of competition farmer loyalty is what everybody wants...if he not 
selling to me, but selling to someone else, that person would not worry.’   
 
This finding is not presented as a challenge to Poulton et al’s [2004] 
understanding of free-riding, but rather it is used to illustrate how the atomistic 
competitiveness of the market in Ghana, and the mindset which this creates, acts 
as a constraint to collective action.  Indeed, the results recorded in the Ghanaian 
study in many ways corroborate with the contentions of Poulton et al [2004].   As 
discussed in chapter two, Poulton et al [2004] find that the strongest degree of 
collective action amongst buyers has been recorded in cases where the market is 
highly concentrated.  Indeed, at the time of the Zimbabwean cotton studies there 
were only three major buyers in the market and therefore collective action 
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amongst buyers was much more possible[Poulton et al, 2004; Larsen, 2002].  
However, within the Ghanaian market there are nineteen active LBC’s. 
Furthermore, amongst this group many of the peripheral players are not active 
members of the Licobag.  As such, it is unrealistic for LBC’s to achieve the level of 
collective action required for the ‘relational coordination’ described by Poulton 
et al [2004].   
 
The above finding may also be related to the LBC’s failure to work collectively in 
the sanctioning of PC’s that behave opportunistically.  During round two of 
research all LBC participants found that even in cases where a PC acts 
opportunistically and is dismissed by an LBC, the same PC will be able to find 
work with another LBC in the market.  Therefore, the threat of job loss is not a 
major deterrent to PC opportunism, as can be seen from the extract below taken 
from an interview with an LBC manager,   
 
[R] ‘If a PC is found to have been cheating, how easy is it for him to move to 
another LBC?’ 
 
[LBC] ‘It is very easy, it is very easy, it is just a matter of going to the LBC and 
saying I want to buy for you, incidentally we as LBC’s haven’t resolved enough to 
have, we are making it easy for a person to move from one company to another.’ 
 
Ostrom [2000] observes that collective action between market participants can 
increase the threat of credible sanction for opportunistic acts.  Either by sharing 
information on opportunistic actors, or by resolving to collectively sanction 
those who act opportunistically, collective action can reduce the incentive for 
opportunism.  In the case of organisational risk, collective action would take the 
form of district managers sharing information on opportunistic PC’s, with the 
intention that any PC who is sacked for acting in this way will not be able to get a 
job with any other LBC.   Indeed, this suggestion is much more realistic in 
272 | P a g e  
 
272 
 
relation to the problem of PC opportunism, instead of farmer default, due to the 
relatively small number of PC’s in the system compared with farmers248.   
 
During research it emerged that the possibility of collective action in this area 
had been discussed amongst LBC’s for several years.  However, close to 80% of 
LBC respondents across both stages of research expressed the opinion that 
either it was not Licobags’ responsibility to take action in this area, or that 
Licobag did not have the capacity to achieve such a goal.  As such, it would 
appear that further development is required in both the level of LBC 
commitment towards Licobag, and the level of organisational infrastructure in 
Licobag, before collective action in relation to PC opportunism could be achieved.   
 
7.4.2.3 - Buyers Role  
 
The LBC’s natural tendency to reject the possibility of a more active role in the 
market for farmer inputs may also be related to their perception of their role in 
the market.  During round two interviews thirteen of the fifteen LBC respondents 
indicated that they only considered themselves to be agents of the Cocobod, 
contracted to purchase and deliver cocoa.  As such, it appears that the majority of 
LBC’s have a rather narrow perception of the opportunities that exist in the 
market, focusing only on their immediate responsibility of purchasing and 
delivering.  Indeed, as observed by one LBC manager, 
 
‘We particularly are traders, we are buying to sell to Cocobod, I don’t think it our 
duty to oversee the program [fertilisers] in the field, it will take of a lot of time 
from us.’ 
 
Given the potential for LBC’s to take on more responsibility in the Ghanaian 
market, it is important to question why LBC’s consider themselves in this light.  
As witnessed in section 7.3 on supply chain management, the cost and efficiency 
focus of LBC’s is primarily driven by the market conditions set for them by the 
                                                 
248
 It should be noted that there are potentially around 25,000 PC’s in the cocoa market.  As such, the 
number of PC’s is not small; however, in comparison with the estimated 3.2 million cocoa farmers in 
Ghana, the number of PC’s is significantly more manageable.    
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Cocobod.  Working on a tight fixed margin it may be argued that LBC’s are fully 
justified to focus single-mindedly on their roles in purchase and delivery.  Within 
this framework it is understandably difficult for LBC’s make the long term 
investments required to develop a private sector input market.  In support of this 
fourteen of the fifteen LBC participants in round two indicated that, rather than 
searching for opportunities to invest, in recent years LBC’s have been struggling 
for survival.  When discussing the possibility of investing more in farmers, one 
buyer noted,  
 
‘It would be ideal if we could do that, but you know most of us have been saddled 
with financial problems in the past four years...when you are working as a 
private company you must create before you can share’.  
 
In recent seasons, Ghana has experienced high rates of inflation249 and 
resultantly all buyers in round two complained that the margin they receive no 
longer reflects the cost of doing business.  Indeed, as discussed in chapter four, 
LBC’s have struggled to make a profit since their inception in 1992.  Resultantly, 
it is not surprising that the role of the LBC has not significantly evolved since the 
beginning of market reform.   
 
Within Kydd and Dorward’s [2004] model, private sector growth is contingent 
upon government encouragement and the creation of investment opportunities.   
However, in Ghana there are very few examples of the Cocobod taking action to 
lower the investment threshold faced by buyers250, or increasing the returns 
available from investment.  As such, it may not be the case that buyers have a 
narrow perception of their role, but rather that their role has been somewhat 
limited by the absence of profitable investment opportunities.    
 
In light of this, the following theme of ‘public private partnership’ will attempt to 
explore the LBC response to a recent investment opportunity created by the 
                                                 
249
 Kpodo [2009c] Ghana Inflation rises to 20.56 pct in April’. - http://af.reuters.com/article/ghana 
News/idAFLE36176820090515?sp=true  
250
 The one exception to this is the Cocobod’s provision of seed-fund financing at an interest rate 
lower than the standard bank rate in Ghana. 
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Cocobod in the area of farmer inputs.  Whilst this example was only beginning to 
emerge during round two research, the actions of both the Cocobod and the 
LBC’s in this area offer valuable insight into the potential for input services to be 
transferred to the private sector.      
 
7.4.3 - Public Private Partnership 
 
7.4.3.1 - LBC Interface  
 
As can be seen from the findings above, throughout round one all LBC’s 
respondents displayed a reluctance to become involved in the area of input 
delivery.  In light of this, it was surprising to observe that during the second 
round of research three Cocobod respondents indicated that in the coming 
seasons LBC’s are to become the main channel through which fertilisers are 
marketed to farmers.  The Cocobod’s motivations for this are twofold.  
 
Firstly, the Cocobod have been largely unsuccessful in their own efforts to 
market fertilisers to farmers.  The Cocobod’s most recent program of selling 
fertilisers farmers at a subsidised price on a cash upfront basis has proven 
ineffective at reaching a large amount of farmers.  Interviews with two Cocobod 
officials in round two suggest that this has been because of the farmers’ financial 
credit constraint.  In the past when Cocobod have attempted to overcome this 
constraint by giving farmers inputs on credit, high default rates have been 
recorded.  This can be seen in the following statement by a Cocobod official: 
 
‘When Cocobod goes in everybody says that Cocobod is government, so I know 
that we will never get our money back’.   
 
This is consistent with the earlier findings on strategic default where it was 
found that the farmer’s negative attitude towards repayment is a major 
constraint to farmer credit in Ghana.    
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Secondly, given the LBC’s are already situated at the farmer level, all Cocobod 
respondents indicated that LBC’s are appropriately placed to sell inputs to 
farmers.  As observed by one Cocobod official,  
 
‘Ideally the LBC’s are now the interface between the Cocobod and the farmers, so 
it is easier to work with them’.   
 
Logistically LBC’s are also well placed to; distribute the inputs to farmers, 
monitor the farmer’s activities, and collect repayments.  This is consistent with 
the findings of, Hoff et al [1993], Poulton et al [1998] and Coulter et al [1999], as 
reported in chapter two.  Building on the advantage that LBC’s have in this area, 
the deputy chief executive of the Cocobod, Mr Charles Ntim, was very 
enthusiastic about the possibility of using the LBC’s as a marketing channel to 
the farmers.  Mr Ntim noted that in the coming season’s he expected LBC’s to be 
used increasingly as the Cocobod attempts to transfer some its farmer services to 
the private sector.   
 
Beyond the logistical advantages of using LBC’s as input providers, there is 
another major advantage in this role.  As discussed at the beginning of this 
section, LBC’s have experimented in the past with providing farmer credit as a 
form of competitive strategy.  Indeed, nine of the fifteen LBC respondents in 
round two indicated that, although very risky, farmer credit is one of the 
strongest incentives that a buyer can offer a farmer251.  When asked about 
farmer credit one LBC manager noted that, 
 
‘A major benefit is to some extent it increases loyalty252 if we provide soft loans 
or a credit facility’.  
 
In light of this, it appears that LBC’s may be naturally motivated to explore any 
opportunity to incentivise farmers.  LBC’s are fierce competitors and therefore 
                                                 
251
 This finding is consistent with those reported by Laven [2005], Zeitlin [2006], and Vigneri and 
Santos [2007].   
252
 The buyer in appendix twenty seven also observed that ‘soft loans’ [credit] can help to build 
relationships with farmers.  
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should a viable opportunity to gain competitive advantage present itself, then 
there will be interest from LBC’s.  Indeed, as noted by Poulton et al [1998], where 
opportunities for profit making exist in sub-Saharan markets, local traders will 
find a way to make it work.   As such, given the close link between competitive 
strategy and the provision of farmer inputs, once again it appears that the role of 
the LBC’s has a natural fit with the market for farmer inputs.  
 
In response to the above conditions, the Cocobod have developed a new program 
for fertiliser marketing involving the LBC’s, due to begin in the 2008/09 season.  
With the new fertiliser program LBC’s purchase inputs from Cocobod on a part 
credit basis.  LBC’s repay the cost of the inputs in three separate instalments; 
30% on the initial receipt of the fertilisers, 50% more by the end of December, 
and the final 20% is paid off by the end of February.  Fertilisers are bought at the 
subsidised price of 13.28 Ghana cedis per bag of cocoa and LBC’s receive a 
commission of 2.45 Ghana cedis for every bag of fertiliser sold.  
 
This may be considered a logical approach by the Cocobod. Given the 
relationship that LBC’s already have with their farmers they are best placed to 
decide which farmers are most trustworthy and thus most likely to make 
repayments on any inputs received on credit.  This was observed by the 
following Cocobod official,  
 
‘Now we are going to ask PBC to give us a list of his large scale farmers, and PBC 
can vouch for them...because PBC identify the farmer and they say they know 
him, it is the PBC that make the down-payment’.   
 
The Cocobod have also attempted to make the new program more attractive for 
LBC’s.  By selling the inputs to LBC’s on a part credit basis, the Cocobod are 
helping to overcome the LBC’s finance constraint.  Rather than suffer the finance 
costs associated with cash payment for fertilisers upfront, LBC’s are able to make 
repayments for the fertilisers throughout the season, allowing them to balance 
borrowing against their income stream.  Finally the offer of commission on each 
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sale means that LBC’s will benefit not only from the productivity gain associated 
with increased fertiliser use, but there is also a direct financial incentive.    
 
In keeping with Kydd and Dorward’s [2004] model of developmental 
coordination, the Cocobod have helped to reduce the investment threshold faced 
by LBC’s in the market for farmer’s inputs.  The investment decision has been 
improved both with regards to the cost of credit, as well as the potential financial 
benefit.  Indeed, this builds on the suggestion of Poulton et al [1998] who find 
that the government have an important role to play in encouraging the 
development of input markets by lowering the financial constraints faced by 
traders.  However, despite these improvements, at the time of round two 
research only three out of the nine LBC’s that had been asked to participate in 
the program felt that they would want to be involved.   In order to understand 
why may be LBC’s reluctant to participate in this new program it is necessary to 
look at their past experiences of private-public partnerships with Cocobod.    
 
 
7.4.3.2 - Partnership  
 
During the 2004/05 and 2005/06 seasons the Cocobod attempted to use LBC’s in 
the marketing of farmer’s inputs.  In the first year of this program LBC’s were 
tasked with both the distribution of inputs to trustworthy farmers on a credit 
basis, and the corresponding collection of repayment for these inputs.  Based on 
interview findings it appears that LBC’s were willing to carry out this function 
based on the Cocobod’s promise that they would not be held liable for instances 
of farmer default.  During the second year of the program, however, the Cocobod 
unilaterally changed the conditions of the agreement so that LBC’s became 
financially liable in cases of farmer default.  Resulting from this, LBC’s suffered 
significant financial loss as high levels of default were experienced253.  As 
observed by one LBC manager, 
 
                                                 
253
 This is acknowledged by the respondent in appendix twenty eight.  
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‘We found it difficult collecting the money, the farmers, most of them were not 
honest...the Cocobod also did not manage it well, what they did was they tried to 
take money from our margins...so much harm has been done, they took about 
five billion from my money’. 
 
Interview responses from all LBC managers in round two show that at no point 
in time were LBC top management fully engaged by Cocobod in this project.  
Regional level managers were given the freedom to decide whether or not the 
LBC would distribute inputs. Cocobod officials themselves admit that this was a 
major failing of this program.  The Cocobod did not communicate with top 
management either before distributing inputs to LBC local level operatives, or 
before deciding to change the rules on liability.  Resultantly, the Cocobod’s 
credibility as a partner has been severely diminished.  In light of this experience 
all LBC’s managers in round one found that they would not consider the option of 
working with the Cocobod on farmers inputs in the future.  As noted by one LBC 
manager, 
 
‘We would not want to get into any particular fertiliser program...last time the 
program ran through the LBC’s we suffered losses’. 
 
Closely related to this, Kherallah et al [2000] find that unilateral policy changes 
and the threat of policy reversal have been a major hindrance to the 
development of private sector inputs markets across sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Interestingly, however, the Cocobod’s credibility as a partner is not the main 
justification given by the six LBC’s that indicated a reluctance to engage in the 
new program.  Closely related to the earlier findings on interlocking, the major 
stumbling block for these LBC’s is the risk of default.  Whilst the improved terms 
of credit and the potential of commission offered by Cocobod are clearly an 
incentive, past experiences with default have created a deep-seated negativity 
towards the provision of credit to farmers.  
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In many ways this attitude is justified not only by the buyers own experiences of 
default, but also the added risk of default that arises when farmers know the 
program is linked to the government.   As observed earlier in this section, the 
Ghanaian farmer’s negative attitude is closely linked to the history of 
government handouts.  Indeed, the close link between the Ghanaian government 
and the first attempt at a public-private partnership in fertilisers was highlighted 
as a key problem by eight of the thirteen LBC managers interviewed in round 
one254.   
 
As observed by one LBC manager,  
 
‘The way they [inputs] were sent out, because they were attached to government, 
they [farmers] refused to pay’.  
 
This attachment continues to play a significant role in the new program, where 
the government has publicly announced its support for farmers through the 
release of 65.5 million Ghana cedis for fertiliser subsidies255.  As such, despite the 
fact that LBC’s will be used as the main channel of delivery, the farmer will still 
be aware that the government is linked to the program.  Indeed, it may be argued 
that if the Cocobod were really committed to the success of a private sector input 
market they would attempt to distance themselves from the program, regardless 
of the whether or not they have offered financial support.  However, because of 
the political points that can be gained through such programs it is highly unlikely 
that the Cocobod would ever separate themselves from the program in this way.  
The impact of politics on the previous LBC program can be seen from the passage 
below taken from an interview with an LBC manager, 
 
                                                 
254
 The negative role that the government played in this area is acknowledged by the LBC manager in 
the passage in appendix twenty eight. 
255
 Ghana News Agency [2008] ‘Government Raises Cocoa Producer Price by 36 percent’, -  
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/ghana/government_raises_cocoa_producer_price_36_percent.jsp 
280 | P a g e  
 
280 
 
‘They did a lot of politics with it, the way that they packaged it, it looked like they 
were dashing256 the farmers and I believe their intention was to win political 
power’.   
 
This finding can be closed the problem of uncommitted liberalisation, as 
highlighted by Kherallah et al [2000], and Jayne et al [2002].  On this basis it is 
argued that the poor performance of market reform policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa has been caused by the unwillingness of African governments to correctly 
implement policies due to their desire to maintain power and control.  In relation 
to input subsidies Poulton et al [2007], Crawford et al [2007] and Gregory and 
Bumb [2006] find that the government’s refusal to divorce itself from the 
political gains associated with subsidies may constrain the level of private sector 
growth.   In this light, it appears that whilst efforts are currently being made 
towards a private sector fertiliser market, in many ways the positive messages of 
this development may be undermined by the Ghanaian government’s desire to 
be visibly associated with the program.  
 
The challenge that the Cocobod faces is this area is conceptually similar to 
problems that have been witnessed elsewhere in the partial model, most notably 
in section 7.1, on the credibility of reform.  Whilst the Ghanaian cocoa market 
continues to benefit from a significant level of government intervention, to some 
extent this same intervention restricts the potential for future private market 
development.  Within the function of farmer inputs it appears that, whilst in 
some ways government subsidies may act to reduce the invest threshold faced 
by LBC’s, equally there are aspects of having the government associated with the 
program that increase the investment threshold.  Indeed, it has been regularly 
observed throughout research findings that whilst the partial model in Ghana 
has many benefits, thus far its capacity to leverage the potential of private sector 
investment has not been seen. 
 
 
 
                                                 
256
 In Ghana dashing means to give somebody something for free. 
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7.4.4 - Conclusion  
 
This findings section has explored the opportunities and constraints surrounding 
the transition of input marketing from the Cocobod to the LBC’s.  In balance, the 
findings have indicated that whilst there is a clear opportunity to develop the 
LBC’s role in input delivery in the future, at the moment there are one or two 
strong constraints hindering the LBC’s engagement in this area.  In particular the 
Ghanaian farmer’s negative attitude towards loan repayment and the resultantly 
high risk of default has been highlighted by LBC respondents.   
 
As such, the experience of input market transition within the Ghanaian cocoa 
market has been broadly consistent with Kydd and Dorward [2004], where it is 
suggested that the movement from hard government coordination to private 
sector coordination is likely to be a very challenging process.  However, whilst 
the findings in this section suggest that LBC’s are not yet willing to embrace the 
role of input providers, positive advances have been made by the Cocobod.   Both 
the content and the implementation of the 2008/09 fertiliser program are a 
significant improvement on the previous attempt in 2004/05.  As such, having 
recognised the LBC’s potential as a channel of input delivery it is vital that the 
Cocobod continue to build on the opportunity that they have foreseen in this 
area.  Furthermore, as encouraged by Crawford et al [2006], the Cocobod must 
remain consistent in their approach, recognising that input market development 
is a long-term process.  Knee jerk policy changes, such as those seen in the past, 
will only take the Cocobod back to the beginning of the building process, where 
they currently find themselves.   
 
Consistency of policy will also be required to help change farmer attitudes 
towards repayment.  As noted by Poulton et al [1998], farmers have the greatest 
incentive to repay loans where they feel that repayment in the current year will 
lead to loan availability in the subsequent year.  To date this attitude has not 
been enforced in Ghana, as even where farmers have defaulted on loans, thus 
causing LBC’s to leave the credit market, the Cocobod have intervened in the 
subsequent season to once again make inputs available to farmers.  Now that the 
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Cocobod have put in place a credible private sector input program they must 
commit to supporting its development over the long term.   Reducing the 
availability of inputs to defaulting farmers will be a key part of this process.     
 
As recommended by two key informants with a specialisation in farmer inputs, 
the Cocobod would also be advised to invest in an education program teaching 
farmers both the benefit of input application, and the long term value of loan 
repayment.  This recommendation is consistent with the findings of Poulton et al 
[2007] and Crawford et al [2006] both of which find that farmer education is an 
important step in developing a sustainable private sector input market.  At the 
current time the Cocobod have no formal program of farmer education.   
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7.5 – Government Quality Control and the CMC 
 
 
7.5.1 – Introduction  
 
During chapters one and four it was observed that one of the most recognisable 
outcomes of market liberalisation with sub-Saharan commodity markets has 
been the removal of the government’s role in quality control.  As observed 
throughout chapter four, the resultant changes not only in the quality produced 
within African markets, but also the quality of product demanded by external 
buyers, have formed the basis of several GVC studies [Ponte, 2002; Losch, 2002; 
Fold, 2002].  Based on these studies it appears that global cocoa demand is now 
characterised by low quality, low price cocoa.   
 
Within Ghana, however, the traditional methods of quality control and 
monopolised exporting remain intact. Indeed, whilst the Cocobod’s system of 
cocoa marketing was once the norm across West Africa, within the current global 
market, the Ghanaian system is now unique.  Compared with a fully liberalised 
supply chain, the Cocobod’s system of supply chain governance differs in the 
areas of price, quality, and control of supply.  As observed by Humphrey and 
Schmitz [2001] these are the three primary areas of concern for lead buyers in 
global supply chains.  In light of these concerns, this section will assess the 
Cocobod’s ability to fulfil buyer’s needs and compete as an alternative mode of 
governance within the ever changing global cocoa chain257.   Alongside this, the 
potential for change within the current system of quality control will also be 
                                                 
257
 It must be noted that this section is focused on the Cocobod’s role in the cocoa export market.  
The Cocobod’s role in supplying local processing factories, which is slightly different, will be 
considered in section 7.6.  The respondents used for the current section on cocoa exports will mainly 
include multinational processors and key informants who have recent experience of the cocoa export 
market.   Within the sample of local processors three of the four respondents in round one and four 
of the five respondents in round two work for multinational processing companies.  These 
respondents have experience of working in several different countries around the world and also 
have close links with their parent company operations in Europe and North America.  As such, they 
can offer informed insight into the Cocobod’s role in the cocoa export market.  Further understanding 
of the Cocobod role in the export market is also gained through interviews with seven key informants. 
In appendix eighteen these particular key informants can be identified as those with the letters EB 
after their name.      
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discussed in order to further understand the optimal division of responsibility 
between the government and the private sector within the partial model.  
 
Based on the strength of GVC literature on the topics of quality control and 
commodity exports the following template contains several themes that were 
identified a priori in the literature review.  In particular the primary themes of 
reputation and private sector quality control, and the secondary themes of 
quality reputation and public goods were identified prior to round one research.   
 
Alongside these a priori themes, some new topics have also emerged.  The 
secondary theme on the role of the CMC emerged strongly as a factor affecting 
Ghana’s reputation.  Equally, the theme of collective action emerged as an 
interesting line of debate informing the argument on private sector quality 
control.   The primary theme of market demand and its secondary theme of 
global quality decline are also considered emergent themes.  These themes 
related to market demand are considered emergent, not because of their absence 
from past literature in this area, but because of the fresh perspective that 
emerged in relation to these themes.  
 
The structure of themes within the final template can be seen in a linear format 
in figure 7.5.1 and in a hierarchical format in figure 7.5.2.   
 
Figure 7.5.1 – Final Template: Government Quality Control and the CMC 
 
 Reputation  
o Quality Reputation  
o The Role of the CMC    
 Private Sector Quality 
o Public Goods 
o Collective Action  
 Market Demand  
o Global Quality Decline 
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Figure 7.5.2 – Hierarchical Template: Government Quality Control and the CMC 
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7.5.2 – Reputation  
 
7.5.2.1 - Quality Reputation 
 
During chapter three it was observed that, prior to market liberalisation in the 
1990’s, national reputations for quality played an important role in international 
commodity trading [Daviron, 2002; Fold, 2002; Losch, 2002].  National reputations 
came to convey information about the cocoa being traded, and on this basis different 
origins were traded at different price levels on the market. As such, the benefits 
accruable to a nation as a result of their reputation for quality have previously been 
used in support of government quality control [Ponte, 2002; Daviron and Gibbon, 
2002].  Government marketing agencies, such as the Caistab in the Ivory Coast, had 
an incentive to maintain their reputation for quality in order to reap the increased 
trading and price premiums associated with a good reputation.   
 
However, as observed in chapter four, post-market liberalisation the traditional 
process of trading cocoa based on reputation has been largely abolished [Losch, 
2002].  Quality decline across liberalised cocoa markets has meant that a nation’s 
former reputation for quality is no longer applicable, and cocoa is traded according 
to homogenous standards of product quality [Losch, 2002; Fold, 2002].   Indeed, the   
interview responses of all multinational processors258 and seven key informants 
involved in the cocoa export market259 confirm that the information formerly 
conveyed by an origins reputation is no longer considered sufficient in the 
assessment of quality.   
 
                                                 
258
 For the purpose of this section on the cocoa export market any respondent in the local processing 
segment that works for a multinational processor will be referred to as a ‘multinational processor’.  As 
noted earlier this includes three of the four local processor respondents in round one and four of the five 
local processor respondents in round two.   
259
 Throughout section 7.5 in all cases where the response of key informants is used to support a research 
finding, it can be assumed that the key informants are amongst the seven with direct experience of the 
cocoa export market. These respondents are identified in appendix eighteen with an EB after their name.  
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Therefore, within fully liberalised markets cocoa now undergoes an onsite quality 
assessment before contractual parameters are defined.   This has resulted in a move 
away from forward selling, in favour of spot market trading260 where quality 
parameters are defined after an assessment of the physical cocoa.  Forward trading, 
on the other the other hand, relies on the reputation of the seller, as contractual 
parameters are defined long in advance of the cocoa harvest.  As noted by the 
respondent in appendix twenty-nine,  
 
‘What happened with the Ivory Coast is that when it liberalised and became a 
melting pot, it became a spot market’. 
 
The one exception to this is the export market for Ghanaian cocoa, where cocoa is 
still traded on the basis of Ghana’s reputation for quality.  Interview findings show 
that due to Ghana’s reputation for quality, international buyers are prepared to 
operate through forward contracts where the contractual parameters of quality are 
defined well in advance of the cocoa being harvested.  Indeed, all multinational 
processor respondents and seven key informants found that the market’s 
willingness to operate through forward contracts represents a clear sign of the 
confidence buyers have in the Cocobod’s capacity to deliver quality cocoa.   As 
observed by the processor in appendix twenty-nine,  
 
‘The system is as such that you should get a quality bean out of a Cocobod contract, 
so dealing with the CMC you will have a quality aspect that is not certain out of a 
private a trader’. 
 
Throughout all seven Cocobod interviews discussing the sale of cocoa on the export 
market261 there is a strong emphasis on the importance of Ghana’s reputation for 
                                                 
260
 The spot market is also known as the cash or physical market.  Commodities traded on the spot market 
are sold for cash and delivered immediately.   
261
 Within appendix eighteen these seven Cocobod interviews are identified with the  symbol.  During 
these interviews respondents were asked a range of questions on the Cocobod’s role in the external 
market and therefore these interviews will be reference regularly throughout section 7.5 and 7.6.    
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quality cocoa.  Indeed, all seven external market respondents within the Cocobod 
sample are keen to emphasise that the Cocobod will always prioritise any action 
necessary to maintain Ghana’s reputation.  To a large extent this can be seen from 
the severity of the Cocobod’s actions during the purple bean problem observed 
earlier in section 7.3.  When discussing this problem with the deputy executive 
director of the QCD he found that whilst purple beans are not considered a defect on 
the international market, they can be seen as a signal of quality deterioration.  As 
such, the Cocobod considered it necessary to take firm action in order to enhance 
Ghana’s reputation with their export clients.  This was noted by the deputy 
executive director of the QCD,  
 
‘Our aim is one hundred percent...that is why we feel concerned even though the 
problems are minor’.   
 
The value of Ghana’s reputation for quality is also widely acknowledged by all 
multinational processors and seven key informants.  Indeed, all multinational 
processors noted that at least 50% of Ghana’s export market premium is based on 
the quality of cocoa produced in Ghana.  Due to years of adherence to quality 
standards export buyers are willing to pay a premium for Ghana cocoa, in the 
knowledge that based on the Cocobod’s reputation they will receive high quality of 
cocoa.  The significance of quality in the premium that Ghana receives for its cocoa 
can be seen in the quotation below,  
 
‘Quality control is the big one, they have got to be sure they stay on top of that, that 
really is the key, because if the market perceives that they lose that they will take a 
big hit’.    
 
7.5.2.2 – The Role of the CMC 
 
Throughout the quotations highlighted above it can be observed that, alongside the 
QCD, the role of the CMC is often very closely associated with the positive reputation 
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of Ghanaian cocoa262.  Indeed, during all multinational processor interviews and 
three key informant interviews, the role of the CMC emerged very strongly as a 
significant factor affecting the price premium obtained by Ghanaian cocoa.  
 
Based on the responses of all multinational processors and seven key informants it 
appears that the CMC play an important coordinative role for downstream cocoa 
buyers.  As observed in chapter three, vertical coordination263 is one of the main 
areas of concern in supply chain governance [Gereffi et al, 1994].  In light of this it 
appears that value is attributed to the CMC based on their ability to reduce the level 
of supply risk facing downstream users of cocoa.  Indeed, as observed by Humphrey 
and Schmitz [2000], within the unstable market environments of the developing 
world, control of supply risk has become a key issue facing supply chain governors.  
 
The responses of all multinational processors and seven key informants indicate 
that an essential aspect of CMC coordination is their level of contract security.  This 
is observed by the buyer in appendix twenty-nine, and can also be seen from the 
interview extract below, 
 
‘CMC has a very well established name and has a reputation for honouring their 
contracts...with the CMC you will get the quality you asked for at the correct price 
you agreed in the contract’.  
 
Respondents emphasise that the contract security of dealing with the CMC is a 
significant departure from the relative uncertainty of the cocoa trade.  Cocoa trading 
is fraught with uncertainty and contract default occurs both in terms of non-delivery 
of goods and also the failure of delivered goods to meet contract specifications.  By 
comparison, the CMC proudly boast of never having defaulted on a contract and 
                                                 
262
 This can be clearly seen from the response to the opening question in appendix twenty-nine.  
263
 It is important to differentiate between the use of coordination within the GVC and the type of 
coordination discussed in the developmental coordination framework in sections 7.1-7.4.  Throughout 
sections 7.5-7.6 the term coordination will be used in reference to the GVC definition of coordination 
discussed in chapters three and five.   
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claims against cocoa not meeting the specified standards are very rare264.  In 
support of this, all multinational processors and four key informants find that the 
CMC is a very willing partner and will always do its utmost to honour all contracts.  
As noted by a member of the CMC, 
 
‘If you are buying forward in a developing country, naturally you must weigh your 
risks in terms of performance, but CMC over the years has shown a high degree of 
performance in reliability of contracts so naturally buyers are prepared to pay more 
for the reliability’.     
 
Interestingly, all multinational processors interviewed highlighted that a major 
source of security when dealing with the CMC comes from their relationship with 
the government.  Within the predominantly liberalised global cocoa market no 
private sector seller can offer a contract counter party with the same level of 
security as the Ghanaian government.  This can be observed in the extract below, 
 
‘Their dependability on the fulfilment of a contract, this is basically dependent on 
the Cocobod, you couldn’t have the same dependability of contract if there wasn’t 
the well organised state, or another large contract counterparty in place’.  
 
Resulting from the CMC’s reputation as reliable trading partner, there are a number 
of supply chain coordination advantages for downstream buyers.  Firstly, buyers 
dealing with the CMC have a level of trust and familiarity that enables them to 
conduct their transactions with confidence and efficiency.  The significance of this 
was greatly emphasised by a CMC trader interviewed in round one.  Indeed, all 
multinational processors and two key informants noted that in recent years the CMC 
have become increasingly professional, in turn raising the level of efficiency 
experienced when conducting business with them. As noted by one processor, 
 
                                                 
264
 According to the CMC’s website over 98% of Ghana’s cocoa meets the contractual quality 
specifications -  http://www.cocoamarketing.com/what_we_production.php 
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‘We consider them as the top reliable trader that we can do business with’. 
 
The second advantage is the relative ease of procuring cocoa from the CMC. Buyers 
simply have to make one phone call to the CMC trading desk and provided cocoa is 
available, the buyer should be able to obtain the required quality and quantity of 
cocoa.  Unlike other origins, buyers of Ghanaian cocoa do not carry out any third 
party checks against quality before cocoa is shipped.  Indeed, as noted by a key 
informant ‘the covenant of the CMC’ offers buyers all the assurance they require in 
this area.   As such, for buyers without a presence at origin, this service greatly eases 
the process of procurement.  This was noted by a member of the CMC,  
 
‘It boils down to reliability, over the years people have been very comfortable calling 
in from around the world with a phone call to the CMC...that is the faith that people 
have shown in the CMC’. 
 
Thirdly, the level of confidence buyers place in CMC contracts enables the CMC to 
operate through forward sales.  As described in chapter four, forward contracting 
involves establishing a contract for the sale of cocoa typically around 6-12 months 
prior to the agreed delivery date.  The CMC is able to guarantee such contracts due 
to the quality assurance offered by the QCD265.  When questioned on this topic all 
multinational processors and members of the Cocobod found that without the 
assurance offered by the QCD, forward contracting would not be possible.  Buying 
forward will reduce the need for buyers to enter the much less reliable spot market 
for cocoa, thus reducing the level of supply risk faced.    
 
The size of the premium achieved by Ghanaian cocoa on the export market in recent 
years offers a further indication of how the roles of the CMC and QCD combine to 
                                                 
265
 As discussed in chapter four, operating through forward contracts has also led to significant benefits 
for the Cocobod, enabling them to borrow money offshore using forward contracts as security.  For the 
2009/10 season the Cocobod have borrowed a record $1.2 billion using this facility: Blowers and Wessels 
[2009] ‘Ghana Gets Biggest IMF Crisis Loan to African Nation’ - http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=20601116&sid=avqGFSywtr8s 
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achieve a large market premium for Ghana cocoa. The Cocoa Merchants 
Association266 spot cocoa bean and product price indicators, show that between 
March 19th 2008 and May 28th 2008, one ton of Ghana main grade cocoa was being 
traded at a premium of $110-140 above main grade Ivorian cocoa and $140-160 
above main grade Nigerian cocoa.  Indeed, whilst this alone is an impressive 
premium it was recently reported that one tonne of Ghanaian cocoa being sold in 
July 2008, for delivery in December 2008, was being traded at £207 over the LIFFE 
quoted London contract267 for December 2008268.  On the 16th of January 2009, one 
tonne of Ghanaian cocoa was quoted at £230-250 over the LIFFE quoted London 
contract269.   Whilst this premium is exceptionally large, and may therefore not be 
maintained in the long-term, it does show the additional value which the market is 
currently placing on Ghanaian quality. 
 
Based on the findings above it appears that having both the QCD and CMC operating 
under the government can lead to synergistic benefits in the export performance of 
Ghanaian cocoa.  Operating within an international commodity chain where a 
premium is placed on coordination, the role of the CMC appears to be of significant 
value to external buyers.  To some extent this challenges the GVC understanding of 
supply chain governance developed in chapter three, where it is assumed that 
modern systems of supply chain governance will be adopted based on the advanced 
organisational capabilities of lead firms [Gereffi et al, 1994].   
 
On this basis Fold [2002] and Losch [2002] find that lead buyers have driven change 
within the global cocoa chain, creating a new form of chain governance more 
suitable to their needs, as compared the former system of government control.   
                                                 
266
 Daily market prices for cocoa are found at - http://www.cocoamerchants.com/dailyspotprice/index.asp 
267
 Liffe stands for London International Financial Futures and Foreign Exchange Options.  Liffe will quote 
standard prices for cocoa futures being traded at different stages throughout the year.  The Liffe contract 
will quote prices for one tonne of cocoa of a standardised quality.  
268
 Reuters [2008] Ghana price surges in European cash cocoa market. http://africa.reuters.com/country/ 
GH/news/usnEUCOC1.html 
269
 Reuters [2009a] London fall generates European cash cocoa buying. http://africa.reuters.com/country 
/GH/ 
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However, in the case of Ghana, where the government’s monopoly over cocoa 
trading is still intact, research findings suggest market support for the role of the 
CMC.   As such, it appears that where the traditional mode of supply chain 
coordination remains effective at meeting the needs of buyers, change in line with 
the modern organisational capabilities of lead actors may not take place.   
 
7.5.3 - Private Sector Quality   
 
Whilst the above findings clearly highlight that there are advantages to the 
government’s role in quality control, it is also important to observe some of the 
negative aspects created by the government’s role in this area.  As observed in 
section 7.1, the lack of accountability amongst QCD staff, leading to institutionalised 
rent seeking and the potential for moral hazard, is a major concern for LBC’s in the 
market.  In light of this problem 43% of the LBC participants suggested that there is 
a need to introduce competition into upcountry quality grading in order to eradicate 
the problem of inconsistent grading270.  Indeed, as observed in chapter two, 
competition is often recommended as a solution to the organisational problems 
facing public sector agencies [Tirole, 1994; Dixit, 2002].  As such, whilst the Cocobod 
does not have any plans to transfer the function of quality control to the private 
sector, it is still necessary to consider how quality control would operate under a 
fully liberalised market situation in Ghana271.  In turn, this discussion will contribute 
to our understanding of the optimal division of responsibility between the private 
sector and the government within the partial model. 
 
 
                                                 
270 The buyer in appendix twenty-three suggests that the introduction of competition would help raise the 
accountability of the quality control system in Ghana.  
271
 Under this scenario both the QCD and CMC’s monopolies have been broken up and there are multiple 
private cocoa exporters and quality graders.  This scenario has been chosen as, based on research 
findings, it would appear that the only circumstances under which the QCD’s monopoly would be broken 
up is if the Cocobod was no longer the monopoly seller of cocoa.  As such, the fully liberalised situation 
was chosen over the alternative situation in which the Cocobod remained as the monopoly seller and 
there are multiple quality graders in the market for quality control.   
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7.5.3.1 – Public Goods 
 
Analysis of quality decline across several liberalised sub-Saharan commodity 
markets has generally found that private buyers and sellers do not have the same 
incentive to enforce quality as the government [Fold, 2001; Ponte, 2002, Poulton, 
2006].  Indeed, experience shows that in a liberalised market situation when there 
are multiple sellers it is much more difficult to maintain a nation’s reputation for 
quality.  To a large extent this argument is based on the public good characteristics 
of national reputations [Kindelberger, 1983; Daviron and Gibbon, 2002, Fold, 2001].  
The benefits resulting from a good reputation are both non-exhaustible and non-
excludable [Samuelson, 1954].  Reputations convey free and valuable information 
about the product being traded, and any one trading under this reputation has the 
capacity to reap the rewards associated with it. 
 
However, as a public good, the reputation will only be maintained if it is possible to 
internalise both the costs resulting from any deterioration in the reputation, and the 
benefits associated with the ability to trade under the good reputation.  Within a 
liberalised market, where there are multiple sellers, no single private actor can 
internalise the benefits or costs associated with national reputations, thus creating 
the incentive to free-ride.  Free-riding occurs when some sellers feel that they can 
reap the rewards associated with trading under a good reputation, without making 
the investments required to sustain the reputation [Tollens and Gilbert, 2003].    
 
In Ghana, however, where the costs and benefits of any change in reputation are 
internalised under the monopoly of the CMC, there is no risk of free riding behaviour 
[Fold, 2001].  Indeed, as observed by Olson [1965] the risk of free-riding in the case 
of public goods, offers a strong case for why such services should be provided by the 
public sector.  Furthermore, given the link between quality control and the CMC’s 
position as the monopoly seller there is a very strong incentive for the government 
to maintain quality.  The strength of this incentive is key because, as observed from 
the buying practices of LBC’s in section 7.3, the maintenance of quality within a 
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partially liberalised market requires strong enforcement272.  Without the potential 
to achieve large premiums, as gained by the CMC on the export market, it is possible 
that the Cocobod’s motivation towards quality control may not be the same.  As 
such, it would appear that the high level of Ghanaian quality is not solely based on 
the operation of the QCD as an institution under the Ghanaian government, but also 
the strength of the government’s motivation towards quality control based on their 
financial accountability for Ghana’s export performance.  
 
7.5.3.2 – Collective Action 
 
Within the section above, it was observed that the Cocobod’s motivation towards 
quality maintenance is based on their monopoly position in the sale of Ghanaian 
cocoa.  In theory this same incentive could be achieved through collective action 
from a group of private exporters.  Recognising the benefits of a good quality 
reputation a group of organised exporters could financially contribute to quality 
control, thus internalising the costs and benefits associated with a change in 
reputation.  However, all interviews carried with LBC’s, and six out of seven 
multinational processor interviews indicate that the prospect of the private sector 
working together in the area of quality control is highly unlikely.  There are two 
main reasons why this is the case.   
 
Firstly, collective action between private sector actors requires a high level of 
commitment and motivation towards a common goal from all group members 
[Olson, 1965].  In relation to this, all multinational processor interviews across both 
stages of research, along with six key informant interviews, indicate that in a 
liberalised market setting private sector actors will all have differing priorities in 
relation to quality.  In particular it was noted that many exporters may be prepared 
to sacrifice an element of quality for a volume-based strategy.  Indeed, all bar one 
                                                 
272
 This is also supported by the private sectors failed attempts to establish a system of quality control in 
the Ivory Coast cocoa market post market liberalisation [Losch, 2002].  As observed by Losch [2002] the 
dynamics of local market competition were simply too strong to sustain a system of quality control.  
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respondent from the multinational processor segment across both stages of 
research found that LBC’s and external buyer’s priorities in the area of market share 
would most likely distract them from the significant effort required for quality 
maintenance. As noted by one key informant,  
 
‘Buyers of cocoa whether they are from developed consuming countries or not 
always want to cut corners…as soon as you start to liberalise the race is for the bean, 
they will take volume and try to make good quality out of it’. 
 
This is consistent with the findings in section 7.3 showing how the dynamics of local 
competition lead to buying practices that favour volume over quality273.    In light of 
both this finding and the experience of other markets, it appears that in a liberalised 
setting market share becomes the dominant strategy for competing buyers.  As 
described by Poulton [2006], buyers with a preference for quality risk being 
undercut by volume buyers in liberalised markets.  Therefore, even if there was an 
attempt to enforce quality control through collective action in a fully liberalised 
Ghanaian market, recent experiences suggest that the risk of free-riding from buyers 
pursuing a market share maximisation strategy would be high.   
 
The second reason restricting buyers from working collectively to achieve quality 
control is the element of subjectivity that occurs in quality judgement.  All 
multinational processors interviewed indicate that it is highly unlikely that a group 
of external buyers would be able to agree upon a set of quality parameters to be 
enforced across the entirety of Ghana’s crop.  Major cocoa processors will have their 
own specific quality requirements depending on the products they are making and 
the clients they are serving.  In addition to this, each individual processor will have 
an individual perception of what is good and bad quality cocoa.  Therefore, whilst 
research findings show that buyers are quite happy to accept the standardised 
                                                 
273
 This is also supported by the examples of the Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Nigeria, where market 
liberalisation saw buyers rushing for the product at the expense of quality [Varangis and Schreiber, 2001; 
Losch, 2002]. 
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quality enforced by the Cocobod, in a liberalised market standardised quality is 
much more difficult to achieve. This can be seen in the following passage taken from 
an interview with a multinational processor, 
 
[R] ‘Why could quality control not be maintained in a private market setting?’  
 
[LBC] ‘It’s too subjective, there are too many grey areas, whether beans are for 
example 3% mouldy or 4% mouldy...with a network as numerous as one million 
farmers there are no end of, and there still are in the present system, grey areas’. 
 
To a large extent the above findings are supported by recent experiences in the 
liberalised markets of the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Cameroon.  Indeed, throughout 
both stages of research all multinational processors and five key informants often 
related their experiences in fully liberalised markets with their concerns about 
private sector quality control in Ghana.   Based on these experiences, external 
buyers have come to realise that quality control within an African environment 
requires government enforcement.  Indeed, when asked about the possibility of 
private sector quality control in a liberalised Ghanaian market one key informant 
stated, 
 
‘I have my doubts, the free marketers think it [quality decline] is just a period of 
adjustment, I don’t think these people have ever worked in Africa where there is 
very little trust involved in anything’.  
 
Divorced from the competitive pressures of local market buying and the global 
competition for supply, the government is able to dogmatically enforce quality 
based on its desire to uphold the nations’ reputation.  Concerned with the more 
pressing issues related to market competition, interview findings suggest that the 
private sector does not have the required commitment to achieve the strong 
enforcement required in this area.   Indeed, recognising the LBC’s tendency towards 
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a volume strategy at the expense of quality, the Cocobod’s efforts to preserve quality 
within the partial model must be commended. 
 
 7.5.4 – Market Demand  
 
7.5.4.1 – Global Quality Decline  
 
During chapter four, it was observed that post-market liberalisation the level of 
global demand for high quality cocoa had reduced, contributing to the quality 
decline observed in liberalised West African cocoa markets [Fold, 2002].  At the 
extreme end of this argument, Tollens and Gilbert [2003] suggest that the decline in 
quality has been brought about purely as a result of demand factors.  On this basis 
they argue that local level supply factors, such as those covered in section 7.3, have 
no significance in the level of high quality cocoa available on the market.  As such, 
there is no need for government led quality control, as local buyers can deliver 
whatever quality is demanded by exporters. 
 
In light of this it was interesting to observe that, during round two interviews all 
multinational processors and three key informants noted that in recent seasons the 
international cocoa market has become extremely concerned by the level of quality 
decline in the Ivory Coast.  As noted by one by one key informant, 
 
‘We have seen quality decline in the Ivory Coast to quite horrendously poor levels’.  
 
This finding is supported by a number of market reports expressing concern in this 
area274.  As such, it appears that, in disagreement with the argument put forward by 
Tollens and Gilbert [2003], the level of quality available on the market may not 
directly reflect that demanded from buyers.  Indeed, in recognition of both the level 
                                                 
274 Two examples of market reports in this area include: Aboa, A, [2008] ‘Exporters fret over falling 
Ivorian cocoa quality.’ - http://africa.reuters.com /country/CI/news/usnBAN245485.html; and: James, J, 
and, Attai, O [2009] ‘Ivory Coast cocoa buyers see rapid fall’s in quality.’ - http://www.djnewswires.com. 
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of quality decline in Ivory Coast and also the supply side factors observed in section 
7.3, it might be suggested that the level of quality available on the international 
cocoa market is dependent upon a complexity of demand and supply factors.  
 
Based on interview data it appears that, in recognition of the supply factors affecting 
the production of quality within liberalised cocoa markets, there is a strong degree 
of support for the Cocobod’s role in quality control.  Indeed, the positive aspects of 
the Cocobod’s system as compared the quality decline experienced in the Ivory 
Coast are acknowledged by the respondent in appendix twenty-nine.  Responding to 
their experience in the Ivory Coast, all multinational processors, along with the two 
internationally experienced LBC’s, indicate that the area of the Cocobod in which 
they would least like to see change is quality control.  As noted by one multinational 
processor, 
 
‘Everything to do with the quality assurance, they should keep that in place as much 
as possible’.    
 
As such, it would appear that the supply factors affecting cocoa decline are clearly 
recognised by external buyers.  However, as suggested above, demand factors have 
also had an effect on quality decline. This is supported by three key informants and 
one multinational processor who suggested that in recent years the cocoa industry 
has been largely uninterested in improving the quality of cocoa within liberalised 
markets.  Indeed, consistent with the findings of LMC [1996] and Fold [2002], one 
key informant noted that, 
 
‘We seem to be transferring the technology to the processing machines to deal with 
poor quality, rather than sending a message through the market to signal to the 
farmers that quality should be improved’.  
 
Based on the responses of all multinational processors and two key informants, it 
appears that the strength and pervasiveness of the supply factors that encourage 
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low quality have created a situation in which the level of intervention required to 
resolve West Africa’s quality problems is not considered cost effective.   As such, the 
support shown for Ghanaian quality may not be reflective of external buyer’s efforts 
to revive quality in other markets.   
 
Nevertheless, the level of support currently shown for Ghanaian quality does lead to 
a revision of the argument put forward by Fold [2001, 2002] suggesting that lead 
buyer’s broader preference for lower quality cocoa may lead to a decline in demand 
for Ghanaian quality.  Whilst research findings suggest that although Fold [2002] 
was correct in his analysis of the trend towards quality industrialisation, he did not 
predict that buyers would continue to staunchly differentiate between high quality 
Ghanaian beans and beans from other origins.  Indeed, the trend towards quality 
industrialisation appears to have increased the level of demand for Ghanaian cocoa, 
by solidifying Ghana’s place as the only viable supplier of high quality cocoa.   
 
All multinational processors interviewed indicate that whilst processing technology 
can help to alleviate some minor quality defects, good quality beans are still 
required to make chocolate.  As observed by one multinational processor,  
 
‘Some of the big pressers can knock out some of the poor quality, but you can’t turn 
bad cocoa into a good product’.  
 
As such, cocoa processors will use high quality Ghanaian cocoa beans to blend with 
low quality beans elsewhere in order to achieve a marketable product.  High quality 
cocoa beans have characteristics such as a rich flavour, a high fat content and a low 
FFA275 level, all of which are required in chocolate production.  Indeed, bean quality 
is increasingly an issue due to European chocolate regulations placing a restriction 
on the FFA levels present in cocoa products276.  High quality beans such as Ghanaian 
                                                 
275
 FFA stands for free fatty acids.  
276
 European regulations state that cocoa butter used in chocolate production can be composed of no 
more than 1.75% free fatty acids [FFA], also known as Oleic acid.  
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beans have a very low FFA level, whilst low quality beans such as those currently 
produced in the Ivory Coast have a high FFA level.   
 
Traditionally, processors have been able to rely on some amount of high quality 
cocoa beans from the Ivory Coast to carry out blending. However, as quality 
continues to decline, more and more buyers are being forced into the market for 
Ghanaian beans.  Financially this has resulted in a higher premium for Ghanaian 
cocoa, as demonstrated by the record premiums highlighted earlier.  The current 
demand for Ghanaian cocoa can also be observed from both the passage in appendix 
twenty-nine, and the following extract taken from an interview with a multinational 
processor, 
 
‘Due to lower quality standards in other countries a lot of companies in Europe buy 
Ghana to blend with other origins, to get the average quality they had before.’ 
 
The responses of all multinational processors and four key informants interviewed 
in round two suggest that the industry is increasingly dependent on Ghanaian beans.  
The level of decline in Ivorian quality during the 2007/08 season was more 
dramatic than expected.  Resolving the situation in the Ivory Coast appears to be 
increasingly challenging and as such the importance placed on Ghana as a supplier 
of quality continues to grow277.  Recognising the extent to which the industry is now 
reliant on the Ghanaian cocoa crop one multinational processor commented, 
 
‘The reason why 700,000 tonnes is sill fetching a premium is because the world 
needs it, often to blend down some of the poorer quality, it’s an insurance premium, 
it’s the insurance of the industry, the Ghana crop’. 
 
In light of the above findings, it appears that Ghana has managed to avoid the trend 
of quality industrialisation and in many ways Ghana cocoa now exists as a niche 
                                                 
277
 This point is clearly observed during the passage in appendix twenty-nine. 
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product on the mainstream cocoa market.   Building on the earlier findings on the 
unique the role of the CMC in the global cocoa chain, the role of Ghana as a reliable 
supplier of high quality control cocoa further contributes to the understanding of 
governance within global supply chains.  Despite the efficiency advantages and 
organisational capabilities of lead buyers that could be exercised in absence of the 
Cocobod [Fold, 2002], change is not supported based on the Cocobod’s ability to 
achieve a level of supply chain coordination that is absent in liberalised markets.  As 
such, contrary to the financially driven ‘industrial quality’ argument put forward by 
Fold [2002], the sourcing strategies of mainstream global cocoa buyers appear to be 
more strategic.   
 
In support of this Ponte [2002] notes that external buyers within the global coffee 
chain have strategically encouraged market liberalisation within nations with a poor 
quality reputation, whilst offering support for systems of government control in 
nations with a good reputation.  Recognising the level of supply risk created by 
quality decline in cocoa markets around the world, lead buyers in the global cocoa 
chain appear to be acting in a similar fashion, through continued support for the 
Cocobod.  In this light, it may be argued that, as long as lead buyers continue to 
exercise their sourcing preferences in such a manner, there will be limited risk of 
the Cocobod’s advantage in the market for high quality cocoa becoming diminished.   
 
7.5.5 – Conclusion  
 
Throughout this findings section it has been observed that as a result of the 
government’s monopoly over quality control and cocoa exports, Ghana has been 
able to maintain its reputation as a supplier of high quality cocoa.  Despite the 
restructuring that has taken place in other commodity markets, the Cocobod has 
been able to recognise the strength of its role in quality control and trading, leading 
to a number of benefits throughout the Ghanaian cocoa market.  Research findings 
indicate that Ghana’s strength in this area results from having both the QCD and the 
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CMC directly under the Cocobod, creating the incentive required to maintain quality 
in a partially liberalised market.  Findings have also suggested that the significant 
level of benefit generated through Ghana’s strong reputation for quality may not be 
available to the private sector.   As such, it was suggested that under a scenario of 
complete market liberalisation the private sector may fail to maintain the high 
quality of Ghanaian cocoa. 
 
To a large extent the risk that exists in this area is roundly acknowledged by 
external buyers involved in the Ghanaian cocoa chain.  Whilst the findings of past 
studies [Fold, 2002; Losch, 2002] suggest that lead buyers in the cocoa chain have 
little demand for high quality cocoa, findings in this study indicate a strong level of 
support for high quality Ghanaian cocoa.  The demand that exists for high quality 
cocoa can be clearly seen from both, the record high market premiums achieved by 
the CMC and the strong level of market support for the QCD/CMC axis.   
 
In light of the impressive financial performance of the CMC on the cocoa export 
market, it is recommended that the Cocobod continue with the production of high 
quality cocoa.  In order to maintain their position of strength, the Cocobod must 
recognise that their success as an alternative mode of governance has been based on 
their ability to meet the needs of buyers in a way unmatched by other suppliers.  
Indeed, research findings suggest that as long as the Cocobod continues to meet 
buyer’s supply needs there will be no pressure for change in the areas of quality 
control and cocoa exports.       
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7.6 - Governance and Power278 
 
7.6.1 - Introduction  
During chapters three and five it was observed that the themes of governance and 
power are widely observed within the literature on global value chain analysis.  
Governance can be defined as: the patterns of authority and power relations which 
structure the parameters under which supply chain actors operate [Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2001, p 4].  In relation to cocoa supply, where the role of the Cocobod is 
most clearly observed, lead buyers will attempt to excercise governance in the areas 
of quantity, quality and price.  Building on this, the following section will attempt to 
explore the emerging relationship between the supply needs of local processors and 
the Cocobod’s governance of supply in the Ghanaian cocoa market.  
As described in chapter four, control of supply is of major importance to lead buyers 
in the global cocoa chain [Losch, 2002, Fold, 2002].  Indeed, within the segment of 
origin processing, supply control is of even greater importance.  In light of this, the 
the following template will attempt to explore the supply requirements of local 
processors279 in the Ghanian cocoa market.  Given the link between governance and 
power, the template will also explore the how the power of lead buyers is 
manifesting itself in light of the supply issues facing local processng.  In recent 
seasons all of the world’s most powerful cocoa processors have investing in Ghana, 
suggesting the potential for lead buyers to influence governance within the 
Ghanaian market.  As such, it will be necessary to explore the challenge this presents 
                                                 
278
 It is important to note that this section deals with governance and power as they are understood 
within Global Value Chain Analysis.  Please refer back to chapter three for further information.  
279
 Within the following section the focus of analysis is the Cocobod’s role within the market for local 
processing.  As such, we are interested in information that is specific to processors experience in Ghana.  
The processing respondents used in this section will be all the local processors’ listed in appendix 
eighteen. This includes multinational processors with factories in Ghana, and processors whose 
operations are limited to Ghana.    
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to the the role of the Cocobod as the dominant power within the Ghanaian cocoa 
chain.   
Given the significance of governance, power and supply within the GVC literature, 
there are a number of a priori themes within this template.  In light of this, the 
secondary themes of the logic of vertical integration, bean specification, and 
processing incentives were identified a priori based on studies by Losch [2002] and 
Fold [2002].  The theme of supply shortage is also an a priori theme, given the 
importance of this topic within market reports, as indicated in chapter four.  The 
primary theme of supply priority is, however, considerd an emergent theme given 
the importance that processors place on this issue above all other issues facing them 
in the local market.  
The theme of government governance focuses on the implications of having an 
influential government institution controlling supply within the the local processing 
industry.  Whilst governance in this area has not been given much consideration 
within previous GVC studies, the primary theme of government governance was 
identified a priori based on the importance of the Cocobod’s role in Ghana.  The 
benefit of functional upgrading was also identified a priori from the GVC literature.  
The secondary themes of agreement credibility and Cocobod adaptability emerged 
throughout the course of research and offer an interesting insight into the challenge 
of government governance in the local processing industry. 
Gereffi’s [1994] analysis of buyer power within the early GVC literature is 
considered fundamantal to the understanding of modern global supply chains.  As 
such, the primary theme of buyer power, along with the secondary theme of 
Coocbod power were considered a priori in the development of interview guides for 
round one.  To some extent the secondary theme of Cocobod power may also be 
considered emergent, given the unexpectedly strong cross section of support 
highlighting the importance of the Cocobod’s role both within Ghana and the global 
cocoa market.  The theme of strategic investments is also considered emergent, 
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given that the information related to this theme has emerged in response to the 
recent market conditions facing processors.  
The structure of themes within the final template can be seen in a linear format in 
figure 7.6.1 and in a hierarchical format in figure 7.6.2. 
 
Figure 7.6.1 – Final Template: Governance and Power  
 Processors Supply Priority  
o The Logic of Vertical Integration 
 Bean Supply Agreements  
o Bean Specifications 
o Light Crop Shortage  
o Processing Incentives  
 Government Governance  
o The Benefits of Functional Upgrading 
o The Credibility of Bean Supply Agreements 
o Cocobod Adaptability 
 Buyer Power 
o Strategic Investments  
o Cocobod Power 
 
 
 
 
 
307 | P a g e  
 
307 
 
Figure 7.6.2 – Final Hierarchical Template: Governance and Power  
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7.6.2 – Processors’ Supply Priority  
7.6.2.1 - The Logic of Vertical Integration  
Losch [2002] finds that multinational processors had two main objectives when investing 
in origin processing facilities in the Ivory Coast throughout the late 1990’s.  Firstly, due to 
the breakdown of horizontal coordination systems, such as quality control, processors 
wanted to get closer to the source of cocoa.  By shortening the supply chain processors 
have been able to increase their level of control and reducing the risks associated with 
supply in the disorganised Ivorian market.  Secondly, processors invested in order to 
increase their level of market share in Ivorian cocoa.  Through establishing facilities at the 
domestic level, processors have been able to build alliances with local traders280, enabling 
them to increase their share of first hand cocoa281.  
The above justifications demonstrate a strong logic behind vertical integration in the Ivory 
Coast282.  However, due to the functions of the Cocobod, these justifications do not apply to 
the same extent in Ghana.  This is particularly true for the justification of improved supply 
chain coordination.  As demonstrated in section 7.5, both horizontal and vertical 
coordination are very strong in Ghana, enabling processors located in remote locations of 
the globe to access high quality cocoa with relative ease.  As noted by one processor,  
‘The big advantage of the state controlled system is that you do not have to set up a very big 
organisation to collect the beans of the farmers’. 
                                                 
280
 Reuters [2007] report that ADM and Cargill were offering traders a price premium of $150-200 per ton of cocoa, 
as compared the rate being offered by cocoa exporters.  Local processors in the Ivory Coast have therefore made it 
very difficult for their competitors on the international market to access better quality cocoa beans. 
281
 The first hand cocoa market is cocoa that is purchased directly from local cocoa traders/farmers.  The second 
hand cocoa market [the terminal and spot markets] is cocoa that is purchased from the cocoa trade i.e. specialised 
cocoa exporters selling on the terminal market, or cocoa traders selling on spot.  Cocoa on the second hand market 
will be more expensive as you will be paying for the services of the cocoa trader that procured this cocoa.  
Operating on the second hand [terminal] market also carries a greater degree of supply risk for cocoa processors 
due to the additional competition for beans that exists at this level.  Increased competition is caused by the greater 
ease of accessing cocoa on the second hand market.    
282
 Barry Callebaut [2007] reported that it doubled its local level purchasing operations in the Ivory Coast in a bid to 
gain access to the better quality beans and reduce the risk of having to rely on sales through the terminal market. 
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In relation to the incentive of market share and control, again this justification does not 
appear to be as powerful as it was in the Ivory Coast, due to the Cocobod’s monopoly in 
external sales283.  Processors in Ghana have to make all purchases through the CMC, thus 
ruling out access to first hand cocoa.  Indeed, based on the way in which the CMC 
distributes beans amongst competing buyers they are able to restrict the extent of control 
that the larger processors can gain over Ghana’s cocoa supply.  As noted by a CMC trader,  
‘Nobody would like to find his buyers aggregated to five buyers, you really like to have a 
fine spread, and deal with them’. 
Therefore, in terms of access to bean quantities284, the CMC would appear to present a 
greater level of supply risk compared with the option of vertical integration employed in 
the Ivory Coast.   
7.6.2.1.1 - Supply Agreements  
Though processors are not able to form linkages with suppliers at the local level, some 
additional degree of supply security is available to processors in Ghana through the bean 
supply agreements that they can establish with the Cocobod.  Whilst the exact terms of 
each bean supply agreement were not available285, it is understood that based on this 
agreement Cocobod will attempt to ensure that a certain quantity of beans is supplied to 
each factory on an annual basis.  In theory bean supply agreements should therefore 
remove the risk of having to compete for Ghanaian cocoa beans on the market, thus 
providing processors with an additional level of security.  This was acknowledged by all 
processors interviewed during both stages of research, and can be seen in the extract 
below, 
‘All of the processors get a bean supply agreement, which endeavours to satisfy them that 
they are going to get the sort of tonnages they need’. 
                                                 
283
 External sales include sales to local processors as well as overseas buyers. 
284
 As discussed in the previous section on quality control, due to the CMC’s relationship with the QCD, the CMC 
presents very little risk in terms of bean qualities.  
285
 Bean supply agreements contain confidential information that processors did not wish to revealed for 
competitive reasons.  
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Bean supply agreements also offer processors an additional privilege, again not accessible 
to processors operating outside of Ghana.  As discussed in chapter four, local processors 
can access light crop cocoa at a discount of 20% cheaper than main crop cocoa.  In theory 
light crop beans are to be set aside for use by local processors and not exported out of 
Ghana. Light crop beans, which traditionally make up around 25% of Ghana’s total 
production, are to be distributed to processors on a pro-rata basis dependent on the 
capacity of each processor’s factory.  Interviews with two members of the CMC indicate 
that they have operated this policy for a number of years, believing that selling light crop 
beans on the international market may jeopardise Ghana’s reputation for quality.   
However, all respondents in the local processor segment indicate that light crop cocoa 
beans are of a similar quality to main crop beans.  The only minor issue with light crop 
beans is that due to their smaller size they are slightly less efficient to process.  One local 
processor found that whilst main crop cocoa beans will offer a yield286 of 81-82%, the yield 
of light crop beans is slightly less at 78-79%.  As such, the discount of 20% offered by the 
Cocobod greatly outweighs the minor efficiency loss from using light crop beans.  In light of 
this, all of the processors interviewed in round two, claimed that the availability of light 
crop beans at a 20% discount was a major incentive to invest in Ghana.  This can be seen 
from the passage below, 
[R] ‘What are the main incentives for setting up a processing facility in Ghana?’ 
[P] ‘Access to light crop, the big processors can take light crop beans, which are slightly 
smaller, they are selling it at a significant discount as they don’t want to sell it on the 
outside market’.  
Aside from light crop, there are additional supply reasons behind the recent surge of 
investments into processing facilities in Ghana.  ICCO figures show that global demand for 
cocoa based products increased at over 4% during the 2006/07 and 2007/08 cocoa 
                                                 
286
 The yield of a cocoa bean is the percentage of the bean that is cocoa nib, which can be used in processing.  The 
remaining waste is mainly made up of the bean shell.  Because light crop beans are slightly smaller they have a 
higher shell to bean ratio.     
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seasons287.  During the same two seasons, the ICCO reported global cocoa supply deficits288 
of 301,000 tonnes in 2006/07289 and 88,000 tonnes in 2007/08290.  ICCO forecasts for the 
2008/09 season, again predict a deficit of 193,000291tonnes. In response to the supply 
squeeze taking place in global cocoa markets, cocoa prices hit a twenty three year high in 
December 2008292.    
In light of the above trends cocoa processors have needed to both increase their processing 
capacity in order to meet growing demand, and also expand their sourcing capabilities in 
order to guarantee supply in an increasingly competitive global cocoa trade.  Investments 
in factories at origin appear to offer processors both of these advantages and it is therefore 
understandable that origin processing has become an increasingly popular investment 
decision in the last ten years293.  Ghana in particular has received increased investment in 
recent years as a result of the relatively small amount of processing capacity that existed in 
Ghana before 2007/08294.   In this light, three of the processors interviewed in round two 
found that Ghana is the logical next step for processors wishing to expand their processing 
capacity at origin.  As noted by one local processor, 
‘There is clearly nowadays a move to get closer to the raw material and get your hands on 
the supply chain, but I think in Ghana’s case whilst that is true, I think the factors that drew 
the big processors to come here were, it is the second biggest cocoa producer, they had no 
interest here, and there were problems next door in Ivory Coast’. 
                                                 
287 
Brough, D [2008] ‘ICCO sees fall in cocoa demand growth’ http://africa.reuters.com/country/CI/news/usn 
BAN954866.html 
288 
A cocoa supply deficits means that the annual figure for grinding as driven by demand, is greater than the 
annual level of raw cocoa production 
289
 Brough, D, and Nicholson, M [2008] ‘Cocoa prices at over 20-year highhttp://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly .ph 
p?id=13804450 
290  
ICCO, March [2009] Latest Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics http://www.icco.org/about/press2.aspx?Id 
=nve11543 
291
 ICCO, March [2009] Latest Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics  
292 
Blas, J [2008] ‘Cocoa hits 23-year high on supply fears’ - http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1f48a1b8-d129-11dd-8cc3-
000077b07658.html 
293 
Please see Table 4.5 in chapter four showing the growth of African processing.  
294
 The growth of origin processing in Ghana is documented in chapter four. 
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As observed within the passage above another key reason for the recent expansion of 
processing in Ghana has been the instability of the political and economic environment in 
the Ivory Coast.  The Ivorian cocoa market has been destabilised not only though market 
liberalisation and defunct market institutions295, but also through the ongoing civil war and 
political unrest throughout the country296.  This instability has had a significant influence 
on the security of global cocoa supplies297.  In light of this all processors interviewed found 
that they were attracted to Ghana based on both the degree of political stability in Ghana, 
and also the sustainability of the cocoa sector itself.  As such, once again the Cocobod’s 
stabilising influence is being supported as one of the Ghanaian cocoa market’s major 
strengths. 
7.6.2.2 - Bean Specifications 
Whilst the findings above indicate that local processors receive a strong incentive through 
the supply of light crop beans at a discount of 20%, the same level of support from local 
processors is not shown for Ghanaian beans sold at the full market price.  In some respects 
the findings in this area build on the arguments of Fold [2001] who finds that processors at 
origin have a lower quality requirement than export buyers and are therefore reluctant to 
pay the premium for Ghana’s high quality beans.  This argument is based upon the fact 
certain processed products do not require a high quality cocoa bean.  During round two 
80% of the processors interviewed found that factories making cocoa butter and cake will 
have a preference for lower quality beans.  Cocoa butter and cocoa cake are relatively 
standardised commodities regardless of the quality of cocoa beans used to produce them. 
Resultantly, the majority of processors298 that have recently invested in Ghana have only 
                                                 
295
Dow Jones Newswire [2007] ‘Ivory Coast President Calls for Probe into Cocoa, Coffee Boards’ -http://www.flex-
news-food.com/pages/11546/Ivory-Coast/ivory-coast-president-calls-probe-cocoa-coffee-boards-dj.html 
296
Lewis, D [2008] Reuters, Sept 13
th
 2008 ‘ANALYSIS-Ivory Coast cocoa sector faces season in turmoil’ - 
http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Agflation/idUSLC25967020080912  
297
 Dow Jones Newswire [2009] ‘Ivory Coast cocoa arrivals to Aug 23 seen down 15% on year’.  http://www.analyst 
palmoil.com/ivory-coast-cocoa-arrivals-to-aug-23-seen-down-15-on-year/ 
298
 The one exception is Cargill who have invested $100 million in a state of the art processing factory with the 
capacity to go further downstream and make cocoa butter and cocoa cake.   
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put in place the equipment required for the first stage of processing299.  As observed by one 
local processor,  
‘I wouldn’t press300 the Ghana bean because for me the premium is way too high, if you 
press the Ghana bean you get two products out of it, cocoa cake and cocoa butter, on the 
cocoa butter you don’t get a premium, it is the same butter no matter which bean you use’. 
The justification for this decision, as indicated by three of the processors interviewed in 
round two is that, unlike cocoa butter and cake, cocoa liquor made using Ghanaian beans 
will carry some level of premium on the market.  Cocoa liquor is not a standardised product 
as different cocoa liquors will be used to flavour different qualities of chocolate.  Processors 
therefore prefer to use low quality beans in the production of cocoa butter and high quality 
beans in the production of cocoa liquor.  Within Ghana, however, processors do not have 
this option, as only high quality beans are available.    
Furthermore, it appears that the premium available for Ghanaian liquor does not fully 
compensate for the cost of using Ghana main crop beans.  One processor suggested that the 
market for Ghana liquor is only a ‘niche market’, and therefore the number of buyers 
willing to pay a significant premium may actually be quite small.  As such, the Ghanaian 
processing industry is concerned that the premium currently available for Ghanaian liquor 
will diminish in line with the increased level of processing in Ghana.  As noted by one 
processor, 
‘If you process everything into Ghana liquor then you will have more liquor to sell than 
buyers who are willing to pay a premium for Ghana liquor’.      
The difference in the level of market demand for Ghanaian liquor, as compared Ghanaian 
raw beans, results from the level of differentiation within the market for cocoa liquor.  
Whilst cocoa beans within the mainstream market are a relatively homogenous product, 
                                                 
299
 The first stages of processing includes the de-shelling of cocoa beans to get cocoa nibs, and then the processing 
of cocoa nibs to achieve cocoa liquor.  
300
 Pressing is the stage of processing after beans have been made into cocoa liquor.  Pressing cocoa liquor makes 
two products of equal proportion, cocoa butter and cocoa cake. 
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cocoa liquors can vary greatly depending on the specific requirements of the product being 
made.  Each chocolate manufacturer will use a specific blend of different types of cocoa 
bean in order to achieve a cocoa liquor with the flavour characteristics demanded by their 
customers.  As such, there is a greater premium placed on raw Ghanaian beans, as 
processors have a greater level of flexibility in using beans to make the end product they 
require.  
The Ghanaian bean is at its most proficient when it is used to blend with other types of 
lower quality cocoa beans, either to achieve a certain type of flavour, increase the fat 
content, or lower the level of FFA.  This finding is in keeping with several previous studies, 
all of which contend that Ghanaian beans are typically used for blending with lower quality 
beans [Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Fold, 2001; Gilbert, 1997]. Processors will typically want 
to use only a small quantity of expensive Ghana beans in their blend.   
However, factories located in Ghana do not have this option as they are unable to access 
beans from different origins with the same level of efficiency as factories in consumer 
markets.  As such, it appears that processors in Ghana are somewhat restricted in the level 
of value that they can extract from Ghanaian quality.  Some of blending issues that result 
from processing at origin are emphasised by the processors in the passage below, 
‘Processing at origin would tend to give you another complication, what you get at origin is 
100% Ghana and most of your top chocolate blends are maybe 80% Ghana, you don’t have 
that flexibility here’. 
Blending using different varieties of beans at origin is not cost effective due to the location 
of cocoa consumer markets.  Ghana is not a major consumer of cocoa, with almost 100%301 
of Ghana’s semi-processed cocoa products being exported to the major chocolate consumer 
markets of Europe, North America, and Asia. It is highly inefficient to import different 
                                                 
301
 The CPC is the only processor whose products remain in Ghana for consumption.  However, around 90% of the 
CPC’s output is exported to the major consumer markets of Europe, North America, and Asia.  
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varieties of cocoa bean into Ghana302, only for them to be processed and then exported. As 
such, it appears that the structure of the global cocoa chain creates a disadvantage for 
processors operating in the Ghanaian market, where only high quality cocoa beans can be 
sourced efficiently.  This argument builds upon that presented by Fold [2001] and Losch 
[2002] where it is suggested that origin processors are disadvantaged by their inability to 
market products that incorporate a blend of beans. 
7.6.2.3 – Light Crop Shortage  
As can be seen from both of the sections above, there are relatively strong arguments 
against processing investments in Ghana.  In terms of supply chain coordination and 
market dominance, the advantages created by investing in Ghana, as compared the Ivory 
Coast, appear to be relatively weak.  Furthermore, the high priced cocoa beans available in 
Ghana do not appear to meet the ideal supply requirements of local processors.   
There are, however, some clear advantages to investing in Ghana.  In particular all 
processors highlighted the 20% discount on light crop beans as the number one incentive 
for investment.  As can be seen from the coded interview passage in appendix thirty, this 
discount is in many ways the key to processing in Ghana.  Indeed, without this discount all 
three of the major global processors interviewed found that the decision to invest in Ghana 
could not be economically justified. Therefore, it appears that whilst Ghanaian quality is a 
positive aspect for processors, this advantage can only be realised when beans are sold at 
the discounted price. Outside of this discount the price position of Ghanaian cocoa on the 
market, as determined by quality, is considered a disadvantage.   
In light of the importance placed on light crop, research findings show that processors are 
greatly concerned by the rate of market entry into the local processing market.   Light crop 
cocoa traditionally makes up around 25% [170,000] of Ghana’s overall production 
                                                 
302
 Please note that imported beans have to be transported by sea, due to the Cocobod’s fear that trucks bringing 
beans across the border by land could increase the amount of low quality cocoa being smuggled into Ghana for 
purchase by LBC’s.  Sea transportation is more expensive and inefficient.  
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[680,000]303.  However, the amount of light crop cocoa appears to be decreasing with only 
27,030304 tonnes reported by Cocobod in 2006/07 and only 16,826305 tonnes in 2007/08.  
Even with a total estimated light crop of around 57,000 tonnes [see footnote 304], the 
amount of light crop available will be vastly short of that required to supply the 380,000 
tonnes of processing that will be operational by the end of 2008/09.   This has been a major 
concern of Ghanaian processors for the last two years, and as can be seen from the 
interview statement below, the Cocobod has apparently failed to appreciate the 
significance of this for local industry,     
‘You don’t process main crop Ghana at a profit, you can only process light crop Ghana at a 
profit, and there are some fundamental economics in there that I think the Cocobod has got 
to take on board as they are allowing too many people in’. 
Whilst interviews with processors in round one indicated that they were hopeful the 
Cocobod would find a solution to this problem, round two interviews suggest that during 
2007/08 the situation has only worsened.  As observed by the respondents in appendices 
thirty and thirty-one the Cocobod have not taken any action to appease processors 
concerns in this area.  Indeed, despite processors concerns, processing capacity in Ghana 
continues to increase306.  The newly elected NDC government, which came into power 
under a mandate of increased manufacturing, has vowed to increase processing in Ghana to 
                                                 
303 
In the last 5 years Ghana has averaged around 670,000-700,000 per annum. Therefore light crop is normally 
around 160,000-180,000 tonnes.  
304 
This figure is for light crop cocoa harvested during the mid-crop between May-August.  The mid-crop 
traditionally produces more light crop beans as compared the main crop during September-May.  Whilst the 
Cocobod do not publish the figures for the amount of light crop beans harvested during the main crop, local 
processors suggest it is normally around 40,000 tonnes.  Therefore to estimate the total light crop produced in a 
season I have added 40,000 to the figure published by Cocobod.  In theory all light crop beans, whether they are 
harvested during the main crop or the mid-crop should be set aside for local processors.  
305
 Kpodo, K [2009a] ‘Ghana Cocoa Purchases 14 pct down at Jan 1’ -http://af.reuters.com/article/idAFJOE50 
D0IW20090114?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true. 
302
 Kpodo [2009b] estimates that Ghana’s processing capacity will soon reach 494,000.  [Kpodo, K, 2009b, 
‘FACTBOX-Ghanaian cocoa grinding capacity’ - http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUKLS7848 
920080829?symbol=ADM.N] 
 
317 | P a g e  
 
317 
 
60% of the country’s total production307.  As such, the previous figure of 50%, about which 
processors have expressed concern, has now been revised upwards.      
During all seven of the Cocobod interviews308 discussing the light crop shortage facing local 
processors, it was stated that if local processors do not want to use Ghana main crop cocoa 
beans, then there is a clause in their supply agreements that enables them to import beans 
from other countries.  However, as discussed earlier the logistics of this are highly 
inefficient.  Furthermore, if the main objective of processing in Ghana is to increase your 
access to a Ghanaian beans, then it is counter intuitive to import beans.    
In light of this, all processors interviewed during round one disregarded the option of 
importing beans from other origins as a way to solve the local industry’s supply problem.   
Interestingly, however, during round two interviews it emerged that light crop shortages in 
the 2007/08 season had forced one local processor to bring in a shipment of beans from 
Nigeria.  When I interviewed the processor in question about this, he indicated that this had 
been done out of necessity and should not be considered a good supply alternative.  As 
such, this offers some indication of the relatively desperate supply situation facing local 
processors in Ghana.  This is exemplified by the level of discontent expressed by the 
respondent in appendix thirty-one.  
Offering some perspective on the level of light crop shortage that currently exists, two of 
the major processors interviewed suggested that a processing operation making cocoa 
liquor would need to use 65% discounted light crop beans in order to survive.  Indeed, the 
respondent in appendix thirty suggests that using a smaller volume of discounted beans 
would result in a financial loss for the processor.   Based on the current processing capacity 
within Ghana309 this would require a light crop of 247,000 tonnes, which is still much  
                                                 
307
 The Daily Guide [2009] ‘New Cocoa Processing Plant for Ghana’ - http://ghanareview.com/review/ 
nshownews1.php3?class=all&date=2009-01-27&id=32071','','scrollbars = yes,width=600 
308
 These seven Cocobod respondents are marked with an  in appendix eighteen and will be referred to regularly 
throughout this section.  
309
 This does not account for the proposed factories indicated earlier which could see the light crop requirement 
increase by close to 70,000 tonnes based on the estimation that each factory requires 65% light crop.   
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greater than the 150,000310 tonnes of light crop produced on average. 
7.6.2.4 - Processing Incentives 
Consistent with the contentions of Fold [2002], interview findings indicate that processors 
require a strong financial incentive to operate in Ghana.  Currently it appears that it is not 
possible to market Ghanaian processed products at a price that covers the cost of main 
crop beans and, as such, processors require an incentive to compensate for the value loss 
that results from using Ghana main crop beans at origin.  Furthermore, all processors 
interviewed found that operating in Ghana leads to additional costs over and above those 
faced in Europe or North America311.  Alongside inconsistent and expensive electricity and 
water, processors have to suffer additional costs in the transportation of their processed 
goods.  As noted by the respondent in appendix thirty, cocoa liquor produced in Ghana has 
to be solidified in order to enable shipment.  In turn the solidified liquor then has to be 
melted by the client upon arrival.  These two additional stages, not incurred by factories 
located in consumer markets, result in an efficiency loss.   
In light of the above findings it appears that in absence of government incentives, such as 
the 20% on light crop beans, it is more advantageous to locate cocoa processing plants 
close to consumer markets.  This is consistent with Fold [2002], who finds that all of the 
world’s largest cocoa processors have consolidated their operations around the Zaanstreek 
port in Amsterdam, due to the ease of access to consumer markets.  In this light, Gereffi et 
al [1994] find that global supply chains have been developed in a manner that takes 
advantage of each country’s functional specialization, whereby the geographical location of 
each stage of production will be selected to maximise supply chain performance.  The 
development of processing factories in origin countries does not appear to represent such 
functional specialization.   As such, incentives are often required to encourage processing at 
origin [Fold, 2002; Losch, 2002; Wilcox and Abbot, 2004].   
                                                 
310
 Earlier it was noted that an estimated 47,000 tonnes of light crop had been made available to processors in 
2007/08, making 150,000 tonnes a generous estimate.  Processors did, however, indicate that in the most recent 
years the light crop has been especially small and therefore an average of 150,000 is more likely to be a fair 
reflection of the future light crop output. 
311
 These problems are acknowledged by the respondents in appendices thirty and thirty-one. 
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Within the Ivory Coast, processors have received such incentives through a tax reduction 
available on processed goods.  Interviews with multinational processors indicate that the 
Ivorian authorities are able to finance such a tax reduction through the overly exorbitant 
export tax they charge on raw goods, such as cocoa beans312.  As such, there is a clear 
incentive to process cocoa in the Ivory Coast, rather than export heavily taxed cocoa beans.   
As noted by one local processor, 
‘In the Ivory Coast there is an incentive system to overcome the disadvantage of being so 
far away from the consumer’.  
Furthermore, lead buyers have an incentive to set up processing facilities in the Ivory Coast 
in order to enhance their competitive strength through control of the supply channel.  
Within Ghana, however, there is no possibility of market capture based on the role of the 
Cocobod.   Furthermore, the Cocobod is not able to differentiate between the export taxes 
for raw and processed cocoa products, due to affect this would have on the CMC’s 
competitiveness in the export market for raw beans.  As such, the only available incentives 
in Ghana are the supply security offered by bean supply agreements and the 20% discount 
on light crop cocoa.   
As the processing market in Ghana continues to expand, both of these incentives are being 
diminished.  In light of this, all processors interviewed expressed concerns about the depth 
of incentives offered in Ghana313.  Nevertheless, it must be remembered that all processors 
who have invested in the last two seasons would have been fully aware of this situation.  As 
such, it would appear that the extent of supply concerns in the international market, may 
be forcing processors to make investments that strongly defy GVC logic both in terms of 
their functional specialization and also the thinness of the supporting incentives.  
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 Raw cocoa beans in the Ivory Coast are taxed at 40% of the FOB price. 
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 The respondents in both appendices thirty and thirty-one express concerns over the current incentive situation. 
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7.6.3 – Government Governance 
Gibbon and Ponte [2005] find one of the major failings of GVC analysis is the apparent 
assumption that lead buyers operate in a regulatory vacuum unaffected by the government 
policies under which they operate.  In a similar vain, Neilson and Pritchard [2009] argue 
that the formal and informal institutions that operate within a national market have a 
profound impact on the nature of change within value chains.  Within this understanding 
the Cocobod in Ghana, and its subsidiary organisations, can be understood as nationally 
based institutions that impact on the nature of governance and change within the Ghanaian 
cocoa chain. In light of this, the following three themes will explore the role of the 
government in Ghana’s cocoa processing industry.   
7.6.3.1 The benefits of Functional Upgrading   
As observed in chapters three and four the process of functional upgrading, also known as 
agro-industrialisation in the case of agriculture, is widely researched within the GVC 
literature [Fold, 2000].  Gereffi [1995] finds that successful upgrading enables states to 
transform the traditional export base of the economy and move towards the more 
advanced stages of the chain.  Agro-industrialisation has been highlighted by the Ghanaian 
government as a key process in helping Ghana achieve their stated of goal of reaching 
middle income status314 by 2020 [The World Bank, 2003].   Resultantly the government 
have been strong advocates of the recent increase in Ghana’s processing capacity, as seen 
through the regular public announcements made by the Ghanaian president in this area 
during 2007 and 2008315.  The level of government support in this area was also 
acknowledged within all Cocobod interviews.  Acknowledging the government’s leadership 
in this area one Cocobod respondent noted that, 
‘It was a government policy and we act on government policy’.   
                                                 
314 
The World Bank states that that based on 2007 GNI figures, lower middle income countries have a GNI per 
capita of $936 – $3705, and upper middle income is $3706 - $11455.  In 2007, Ghana was classified as a low 
income country and had a GNI per capita of $590: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources 
/GNIPC.pdf 
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 Twum, N, S [2006] ‘Cocoa: We’ll Process 50% Here – President Kuffour’. http://www.copalcpa.org/ 
newsletters/Newsletter%20No%20181.pdf 
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Within the development literature, national governments are encouraged to facilitate the 
process of agro-industrialisation, as it ‘increases value added in the commodity chain, 
enhances technological and organisational know-how, stimulates capacity in supplier and 
buyer linked industries and diversifies exports’ [Fold 2000, p 264].   However, in the case of 
cocoa, many of the benefits commonly associated with agro-industrialisation may not be as 
widely available [Fold, 2001; Talbot, 2002; Wilcox and Abbot, 2004].  Indeed, as observed 
earlier, it is possible to challenge the argument of value addition in Ghana, based on the 
premium which the market places on Ghanaian beans in their raw format.  In relative terms 
cocoa processing appears to diminish the value of Ghanaian beans.  In light of this, there 
were eight interview respondents throughout both rounds of research that questioned the 
logic behind the government’s argument of value addition.  Commenting on the motivation 
for local processing one industry informant noted that, 
‘I think it comes from the belief that value addition would help earnings and there was an 
assumption that it would create greater employment, but we have realised it does not’.   
Fold [2000] suggests that if agro-industrialisation is to be successful then the government 
has a key role to play in making sure expert knowledge from foreign investors is 
transferred to domestic industry.  This can happen in two ways, either through the 
exchange of technology and skills, or the training and development of a large national 
workforce.  However, in the case of cocoa, past studies find little support for the argument 
that processing will lead to knowledge transfer [Fold, 2001; Wilcox, Abbot and Muir, 2005].  
Indeed, interviews carried out with Cocobod officials, key informants and local processors 
show that knowledge transfer is not taking place on a significant scale in Ghana.  As noted 
by one industry informant,  
‘I find that argument very hollow...some of the factories have come with the argument of 
knowledge transfer...most of the factories are so highly mechanised that you don’t need 
experts to run them’. 
Multinational processors have been given no government mandate to share or exchange 
information with Ghanaian factories and due to the highly automated nature of cocoa 
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processing internationally owned factories have a relatively small workforce.   As such, the 
opportunities for training and development appear limited, leading eight interview 
respondents to question the logic behind knowledge transfer as a justification for agro-
industrialisation in the cocoa sector.   
However, in defence of the government’s industrial policy towards processing, it must be 
acknowledged that further research into the spillover effects of processing investments is 
required in order to make a full assessment of the benefits associated with these 
investments.  Furthermore, research findings indicate that increasing the capacity of 
processing at origin may have a positive effect through insulating the Ghanaian cocoa 
market against demand fluctuations on the global market.  Origin processing creates 
structural demand for Ghanaian cocoa that is unlikely to change year upon year based on 
the demand and supply conditions on the global market.  In light of this all respondents in 
the Cocobod segment found that origin processing would help to protect the price of 
Ghanaian cocoa on the global market.   
This argument is particularly strong under the scenario where the Cocobod is able to 
achieve its target of one million tonnes of cocoa production.  If Ghana were to achieve this 
production level it would greatly increase the supply of high quality cocoa on the world 
market, thus placing significant downward pressure on Ghana’s price premium.  As such, 
the demand created by origin processing would help to reduce the impact of this 
production increase on export market prices.  Indeed, as noted by one Cocobod 
respondent, 
‘In order for us not to affect prices, if we do one million tonnes, it is better not to put it all 
on as beans’.   
The strength of the above argument is entirely dependent on the Cocobod’s ability to reach 
one million tonnes in the near future.  In recent years Ghanaian production appears to have 
plateaued at around 700,000 tonnes, despite the government’s efforts to increase pesticide 
and fertiliser application.  As such, there are concerns that Ghana may have encouraged a 
drastic increase in origin processing capacity, without sufficient evidence showing the 
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required growth in cocoa production.  Indeed, it may have been more appropriate for the 
Ghanaian government to pace market entry into the processing segment at the same speed 
as growth in cocoa production in order to avoid the disparity between supply and demand 
that will be experienced in the near future.    
In light of the above evidence indicating the current challenges associated with rapid 
growth in the origin processing market, it is necessary to question why the Ghanaian 
government have pursued this industrial policy.  It may be speculated that to some extent 
processing is being supported as a populist economic policy.  As observed earlier agro-
industrialisation as an ideal is widely supported within the academic literature [Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008; UNCTAD, 2008].  Indeed, UNCTAD’s 2008 Economic Development in 
Africa Report encourages growth in Africa’s manufacturing sector as a pathway to 
economic development across the continent [UNCTAD, 2008].  
However, such reports cannot cover the nuances of processing different commodities in 
different countries.  As noted by Cramer [1999] arguments for origin processing in 
developing countries are normally made at a high level of abstraction.  Indeed, interview 
findings suggest that decisions on this particular aspect of the cocoa sector in Ghana may 
not be driven by experts in the Cocobod.  It appears that Cocobod have not been widely 
consulted on the government’s policy drive to process 50-60% of Ghana’s cocoa.  The 
extent of concern in this area can be seen from the following quote from an industry 
informant, 
‘I have a little bit of trouble seeing where they get this 50%316, there is a conceptual point 
which I struggle with anyway, at times I think that it has not been thought through 
properly’.  
Fold [2000] and Cramer [1999] find that each nation’s industrial policy for agro-processing 
must be carefully designed based on a number of highly specific factors, including: the 
characteristics of the commodity, the nature of the processing industry, market conditions, 
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 At the time of research the government’s target for processing growth was 50%.  As noted earlier this has now 
been revised upwards to 60%.    
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and the political and economic conditions of the country.  In light of both the high quality 
nature of the Ghanaian crop and the strong performance of the CMC’s model for cocoa 
exporting, it would appear that the policy to rapidly increase processing is not matched 
with the Ghana’s competitive strengths in the cocoa market.  The Cocobod system has been 
developed for export market success and as a result of this there appears to be little 
flexibility in adapting to the conditions required for a large scale local processing industry.  
Nevertheless, as Ghana nears its projected target of 60% cocoa processing, thus making 
local processors the CMC’s main customer, the Cocobod’s system of marketing may have to 
be restructured in order to service the needs of local factories.   
7.6.3.2 - Credibility of Bean Supply Agreements  
During chapter two the credibility of government action was highlighted as a crucial factor 
affecting the level of private sector investment in developing countries [Jayne et al, 2002; 
Kherallah et al, 2000; Stone et al, 1996].  Whilst the earlier sections of this findings chapter 
have generally found the Cocobod to be a credible institution, the current supply situation 
facing local processors appears to have become an issue affecting the Cocobod’s credibility 
as a market regulator.  Although it has not been possible to establish the exact terms of any 
bean supply agreements between the Cocobod and local processors, throughout both 
stages of research doubts were raised about the level of supply security bean supply 
agreements offered local processors.   
Based on seven Cocobod interviews and all local processor interviews, it was found that 
supply agreements do not state that Cocobod will supply processors with as much light 
crop as they require, but that light crop will be distributed on a pro rata basis, as and when 
available.  Commenting on this, seven of the nine respondents in the processing segment 
expressed concerns about the impartiality of light crop distribution.  Indeed, the Cocobod’s 
continued link with CPC317 may act to fuel speculation in this area.  To overcome this issue 
the Cocobod need to increase the transparency of light crop distribution amongst local 
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 Despite the privatisation of the CPC in 2004/05, the Ghanaian government is the CPC’s major shareholder and 
the Cocobod chief executive sits on the CPC board. 
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processors, as at the current time figures surrounding this issue are not made available.  
This can be seen from the passage below, 
[R] ‘What assurances do the Cocobod give you that all processors are being treated the 
same?’ 
[P] ‘That is a clause in our contract so we just hope it is being respected.’ 
[R] ‘Is there any way they can assure you?’    
[P] ‘Yes, they could increase transparency a lot.’ 
Further doubts have been raised in relation to the bean supply agreements due to media 
reports that the Cocobod was planning to remove the discount on light crop currently 
afforded to local processors318.  Whilst this news story was quickly rebuked by a follow up 
article quoting the government’s special advisor on cocoa319, in many ways the original 
article represents the current level of uncertainty that exists in this area.    
As a result of the current light crop shortage, a situation has arisen whereby a significant 
portion of each processor’s supply agreement will have to be made up with main crop 
cocoa.  Traditionally, local processors used forward contracts in the rare instances that 
they needed to use main crop cocoa.  Indeed, Cocobod sources have indicated that, despite 
supply agreements, local processors will now have to compete for the large amount of main 
crop cocoa they require on the forward market.  Cocobod sources indicate that local 
processors will be given ‘priority’ when competing for forward contracts; however, they 
will still have to pay the same price as export buyers.   
For local processors this is not an acceptable situation, feeling that they should not have to 
resort to forward contracts in order to have their supply agreements fulfilled.  Operating 
through forward contracts creates many additional risks and problems over and above the 
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 Kpodo, K [2008b] ‘Ghana Ends Local Monopoly on Light Crop’ –  http://af.reuters.com/news/country?Type 
=ghanaNews 
319
 Kpodo, K [2008c], ‘Ghana Reassures Grinders Over Cocoa Crop Sale.’ http://af.reuters.com/news/country?type 
=ghanaNews 
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guaranteed supply local processors hoped they would attain through bean supply 
agreements.  In particular it is very difficult for a processor to know how much main crop 
cocoa to purchase on forward contracts, especially when it appears virtually impossible to 
accurately forecast how much light crop they will be granted in several months time320.  
Processors clearly have a preference for light crop cocoa; however, based on recent 
production figures it would be very risky to bank on a large quota of light crop.  As such, 
they will need to hedge against the risk of a small light crop through the purchase of 
expensive main crop on the forward market.  This would appear to create an additional 
supply risk for local producers, thus further reducing the level of incentive created through 
bean supply agreements.      
7.6.3.3 – Cocobod Adaptability 
During section 7.5, it was suggested that a key indicator of success for the Cocobod as a 
mode of governance is their capacity to meet the supply needs of cocoa buyers.  Given that 
local processing is set to reach 50-60% of Ghana’s total production capacity in the coming 
years, meeting the needs of local processors will most likely become a key determinant of 
the Cocobod’s competitiveness as a mode of governance.   
In light of the evidence presented above, it does not appear that the Cocobod are currently 
meeting the supply needs of local processors.  By encouraging a level of market entry, far 
beyond the expectations of all processors interviewed, the Cocobod have created a 
situation in which the previous incentives offered to local processors are now insufficient.  
This is new territory for the Cocobod, as for many years the light crop has easily satisfied 
the demands of the small local processing industry321.  However, now the Cocobod are 
challenged with developing a new incentive structure, more suited to the needs of a large 
scale processing.  To date this appears to be a problem, and to some extent this may be 
caused by the Cocobod’s level of experience and understanding in cocoa processing. 
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 As noted in chapter four, light crop cocoa is traditionally harvested at the end of the season, some 8-16 months 
after the CMC have sold the majority of their main crop cocoa through forward contracts.  
321
 This is acknowledged by the processor in appendix thirty.  
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Indeed, all of the cocoa processors interviewed expressed a concern that the Cocobod do 
not fully understand the dynamics of cocoa processing322.   
As noted by Fold [2002] cocoa processing is an industry built on scale and efficiency. 
Competitive cocoa processors operate their factories twenty four hours a day, seven days a 
week.  To make this possible, good stock control and supply chain management are vital.  
Having spent many years as an entirely independent government parastatal, such 
principles of efficiency do not appear to be an inherent feature of the Cocobod’s way of 
thinking.   This was also evident in section 7.2 on supply chain management.   
The Cocobod’s main experience of cocoa processing comes from the Cocoa Processing 
Company, which prior to 2004 was run as a fully owned subsidiary of the Cocobod. During 
seven interviews conducted with a range of participants from the cocoa processing and key 
informant segments it was noted that the CPC does not operate with the same efficiency 
mentality as most modern cocoa processors.  Whist it is unfair to blame the CPC for this 
situation, given their many years of government ownership, the apparent difference 
between the CPC and multinational processors helps understand the Cocobod’s perception 
of cocoa processing.  During round one interviews with two members of the Cocobod it was 
suggested that if cocoa beans are not available then local processors could simply shut 
down their factories.  However, throughout both rounds of research, 78% of processor 
respondents suggested that in order to obtain the efficiency required for profitable cocoa 
processing it is not possible to periodically close your factory.  Commenting on the 
Cocobod’s perception of cocoa processing one respondent noted that,    
‘For them to fully understand that in today’s competitive world your factory must run 
twenty four hours seven days a week, they find it hard’. 
Interviews with local processors also indicate that the Cocobod is currently 
underestimating the severity of the situation facing local processors323.  Again, this may be 
partly caused by the Cocobod’s lack of experience in the area of modern cocoa processing.  
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All local processors interviewed found that Cocobod do not fully appreciate the impact 
which the current supply situation is having and that within the next two years there could 
be a spate of bankruptcies within the local market324.  Indeed, during an interview with one 
of the smaller local processors great concern was expressed about their ability to survive 
within the current market325.  Such concerns appear to be well founded given the high 
profile closure of a WAMCO’s cocoa processing factories in April 2008326.  The stated 
reason for this closure was the unavailability of light crop beans for processing.       
Based on seven interviews with participants in the Cocobod sample it appears that the level 
of supply risk facing local processors is currently not an area of great concern for the 
Cocobod.  Within all seven interviews, Cocobod participants express the opinion that 
processors should be able to operate using main crop cocoa.  As noted by one Cocobod 
respondent, 
‘They will have to buy more main crop, we assume that they realised that before they 
came’. 
Furthermore, any suggestion that the Cocobod might offer processors a discount on main 
crop cocoa was firmly rejected in all seven Cocobod interviews discussing this topic.  As 
such, there is no evidence to suggest that the Cocobod is considering a compromise on the 
price of beans supplied to local factories.  This can be seen from the following extract taken 
from an interview from a respondent within the Cocobod segment, 
‘Our job is to make sure that we guarantee value for Ghana’s cocoa, so under no 
circumstances are we willing to compromise on value’.    
However, whilst the goal of value maximisation is highly credible, to some extent this may 
be indicative of the Cocobod’s inability to adapt their traditional mode of thinking and 
evaluate decisions in light of emerging market conditions.  Local processors are fast 
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 The risk of bankruptcies in the local market is acknowledged by the respondent in appendix thirty-one.  
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 This processor interviewed during rounds one and two of research wished to remain anonymous.  
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 Adams [2008] ‘Wamco to Be Closed Down’ - http://www.modernghana.com/news/162748/1/wamco-to-be-
closed-down-due-to-non-availability-of.html  
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becoming the CMC’s most important customer base; however, at the current time they do 
not feel that the Cocobod is treating them with the appropriate level of consideration.   
This can be seen from the following passage taken from an interview with a processor in 
round two,  
‘We are now a captive customer for Ghana, we would expect them to first deliver to the 
local industry and then what they have in excess they should then deliver to the trade for 
export’. 
As suggested in the early findings sections [7.1-7.4], the Cocobod is not accustomed to 
adapting to the needs of domestic private sector stakeholders due to their long history of 
complete market control.  Indeed, as observed by Talbot [2002], Ghana’s previous attempt 
to establish a large scale domestic processing industry during the 1960’s failed because of 
the government’s lack of support for private sector development.  However, in light of the 
amount of buyer power commanded by the multinational processors now located in Ghana, 
the Cocobod may now find themselves in a situation where a greater degree of compromise 
is required in order to avoid unnecessary conflict with important market stakeholders.  
7.6.4 - Buyer Power  
During chapters one, three and four reference was made to the significance of buyer power 
within the global cocoa market [Fold, 2002; Losch, 2002].  Through a series of mergers and 
acquisitions beginning in the 1980’s, Cargill, ADM and Barry Callebaut have grown to form 
an oligopoly of processors, completely dominating the intermediate stages of the cocoa 
chain.   All three of these companies are now invested in Ghana, and between them they 
have the capacity to process 155,000 tonnes of cocoa.  In light of this, it is necessary to 
investigate the market power implications of recent investments in Ghana.   
7.6.4.2 - Strategic Investments  
Earlier in section 7.6.2 it was observed that as a result of the current shortage of light crop 
cocoa, processors have begun to question their incentive to operate in Ghana.  However, 
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given that all recent investors would have had a clear understanding of the potential for a 
light crop deficit prior to investing, the light crop incentive should not be considered the 
only reason for recent investments.  This is particularly true for large multinationals such 
as ADM and Cargill, for whom the long term opportunities created by an investment in 
Ghana appear to offer some justification for their recent decisions to invest.   
It may be speculated that, given their financial muscle, ADM and Cargill have entered Ghana 
aware that should a supply squeeze occur in the market it is they that have financial 
strength to survive.  In a situation where companies are struggling for survival due to the 
price of beans made available by the Cocobod, then it will most likely be the smaller 
processors that collapse first.  As noted by an industry source,   
 ‘The big boys will survive in this world, because the big boys control their risk very 
carefully, the smaller grinders around don’t do that and I suspect they are not funded well 
enough to carry big stocks, so there will come a day when some of the smaller boys begin to 
hit the wall’. 
As such, there may be an opportunity for the larger processors to establish their 
dominance in Ghana in the coming years.  
Furthermore, for the multinational processors their decision to invest will not be based 
entirely on the profit potential of their Ghanaian factories, but also the role of their 
Ghanaian factories in helping them achieve their global supply requirements.  As noted 
earlier, the current supply deficit in the global cocoa market has led to a period of 
extraordinarily high cocoa prices and concern amongst cocoa processors.  In light of this, 
interview findings suggest that the recent investments of ADM and Cargill have been made 
in order to improve their strategic position in terms of future cocoa supplies.  When 
commenting on recent investments one industry informant commented that, 
‘It’s more a strategic decision in case there are problems with bean availabilities in the next 
three, four, five years...if you are in the biggest producing countries you probably stand a 
better chance of getting access to those beans’.  
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To a large extent this builds on the findings of Fold [2001, 2002], who suggests that 
strategic supply concerns have been a significant motivation behind the trend of 
multinational corporations establishing processing facilities in origin countries.  Indeed, 
commenting on recent investments in Ghana one industry informant observed that,  
‘I think that they have just got to be there, they are so dependent on continuous supplies’.  
In recognition of this all seven Cocobod interviews discussing processing investments 
indicate that the Cocobod feel processors have come to Ghana in order to secure supply.  
However, this does not mean that the Cocobod can remain ignorant to the finer aspects of 
local processor supply needs.  The extent of power and influence within the processing 
segment is very real and as noted by three industry informants, this segment may be able 
to influence change in the Cocobod.  Indeed, whilst no respondent expressed direct support 
towards total liberalization in Ghana, there were four respondents who suggested that, 
dependent on the Cocobod’s performance, future pressure towards liberalization should 
not be ruled out.   
Closely related to this, Fold [2002] finds that the ‘establishment of grinding facilities in 
countries of origin further strengthens the dominance of transnational companies because 
it gives them higher shares of global capacity and increased political clout’.  Therefore, now 
that the big processors are present in Ghana, it may be the case that the Cocobod’s extent of 
power and control over the Ghanaian supply chain has marginally diminished.  Before the 
expansion of the processing industry, lead buyers were forced to accept the role of the 
Cocobod, as they were dependent on the Cocobod’s supply of high quality cocoa on the 
export market.  However, now that processors are present in Ghana their capacity to 
influence change may have increased327.  Building on this, local processors have taken steps 
towards the formation of a processors association in order to strengthen their bargaining 
position in Ghana.  Indeed, whilst an association of processors’ has not been seen in any 
other origin countries, the relevant actors in Ghana have been motivated to take such 
action in light of their current supply problems. 
                                                 
327 The respondent in appendix thirty talks about the processors beginning to lobby the Cocobod.  
332 | P a g e  
 
332 
 
7.6.4.3 – Cocobod Power  
The vast majority of recent studies focusing on the role of powerful buyers within 
commodity chains share a common feature through their focus on fully liberalised markets 
[Gereffi, 1994; Losch, 2002; Gibbon, 2005].  Resultantly our understanding of government 
power within modern global supply chains is largely undeveloped.  As has been 
documented throughout this study the Cocobod is currently the dominant actor within the 
Ghanaian chain and to their credit they have been able to use their power to achieve a high 
level of performance in recent years.  Indeed, whilst lead buyers have been criticized for 
using their power to negative effect in liberalised cocoa markets [Losch, 2002], in Ghana 
the Cocobod have used their power to achieve a stable and sustainable market.           
As a result of the success that the Cocobod have achieved in recent years the power which 
they command in the cocoa market appears to have grown.  In recognition of this one key 
informant noted that, 
‘Because Ghana has been in control of the sale and quality parameters maintained, it seems 
that the country itself could be better off and the cocoa world better off for having an 
organisation structured like that’.  
Whilst processors may not be achieving their exact supply needs in the current Ghanaian 
system, to some extent Ghana’s overall level of market performance appears to supersede 
this issue.  As indicated earlier, the powerful processors now located in Ghana control their 
supply risk at a global level.  Therefore, whilst the high quality beans produced in Ghana 
may not be ideal for local processing, they are nonetheless fundamental to the global 
sourcing operations of multinational processors.  In support of this, four out of the five 
processors interviewed in round two found that despite the current problems Ghana would 
not be encouraged to fully liberalise due to the importance of Ghanaian quality in the global 
market.   
 
As noted by one processor, 
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‘At this point in time I wouldn’t like to see the board disappear at all, any diminution of the 
Cocobod’s tentacles I would not particularly wish just now, obviously the quality control, to 
an extent the research, I would like to see it stay as it is’.  
Furthermore, the same four processors emphasised support for the Cocobod, based on 
their belief that production in Ghana should increase over time and that the system in 
Ghana is sustainable.  In light of current instabilities and supply risks emanating from other 
markets, these factors clearly place the Cocobod in a position of strength.   
Ultimately this is good news for the Ghanaian cocoa market and Ghana as a whole.  The 
experiences of complete liberalisation in other cocoa markets suggest that major reform 
may not be in the interest of the Ghanaian market.  Indeed, research findings indicate that 
the global cocoa market has begun to recognise the important role played by the Cocobod, 
not only in terms of Ghanaian market development, but also the sustainability of global 
cocoa supplies.  As such, it is recommended that the Cocobod should attempt to leverage 
their current level of market support to maintain their position of dominance in the 
Ghanaian supply chain.  However, it is equally important that the Cocobod realise that they 
are no longer the only actor with influence in the Ghanaian cocoa market, and that they 
must use their position of power and leadership to achieve harmony amongst key 
stakeholders.  Indeed, this positive change in attitude would most likely help to reduce the 
threat of externally enforced reform in future years.   
7.6.5 – Conclusion  
During section 7.5 it was observed that the foundation of Cocobod’s success as an 
alternative mode of governance within the global cocoa chain has been their ability to meet 
the needs of buyers in the market.  Buyers operating on the cocoa export market have given 
strong support to Ghana, based on its strategic importance as a provider of quality.  The 
degree of supply control that lead buyers could achieve over the Ghanaian cocoa supply 
was considered secondary to the quality of cocoa they could achieve when buying through 
the CMC.  However, recent investments in processing factories in Ghana appear to have 
changed the landscape on this issue given the importance of supply control in origin 
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processing.  Whilst export buyers can strategically source different quantities and qualities 
of cocoa from various origins dependent on their needs, local processors are captive 
customers for Ghanaian cocoa.  As such, local processors require an incentive to process in 
Ghana. 
In light of this, it appears that the extent of cocoa processing pursued by the Ghanaian 
government may pose a threat to the Cocobod’s current model for cocoa exports.  Whilst it 
is too early to suggest that the Ghanaian government have over-expanded in this area, 
research findings indicate that as this industry continues to grow the Cocobod may have to 
adjust in order to create a viable incentive structure for local processors.  Creating an 
incentive through the system of cocoa supply would appear to be the most realistic option 
for the Cocobod, given the importance that local processors place on this issue.   
The power and influence of multinational cocoa processors now located in Ghana, further 
accentuates the need for the Cocobod to respond to local processors’ supply requirements.  
To date the Cocobod’s handling of this situation appears to be largely inadequate, and 
therefore in order for the Cocobod to maintain their credible status within the cocoa 
market change may be required.  Not only have there been doubts surrounding the 
credibility of bean supply agreements, but the Cocobod have also failed to communicate 
their plans over what has become a very sensitive issue328.  The Cocobod’s failure to 
respond to the private sector’s needs in this area is indicative of their broader attitude 
towards stakeholder integration and adjustment within the partial model.  
However, despite the challenge that exists in this area the Cocobod remains the dominant 
actor in the Ghanaian cocoa market.  In light of this it is imperative that the Cocobod use 
their position of power to create a market environment in which processors can operate.  
Indeed, based on interview responses from processors it appears that the Cocobod will 
maintain their position of authority, provided government actions remain transparent and 
that local processors’ supply needs are being met.  Should this situation prevail, then 
research findings suggest that there will be no further pressure towards liberalisation in 
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 The Cocobod’s failure to communicate with processors on this issue is noted by the respondent in appendix 
thirty-one.  
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Ghana. Indeed, despite the loss of export revenues that may result from adjustments in the 
marketing system, it is recommended that the Cocobod make any necessary sacrifices to 
remain in power, thus protecting the wider interests of the Ghanaian cocoa market.  
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Chapter Eight – Conclusions 
 
8.1 – Introduction  
Throughout the course of this study the main objective has been to fulfil the research aims 
outlined in chapter one:   
Primary Aim:  To carry out a detailed exploration of the partial model329 of liberalisation in 
the Ghanaian cocoa market, in an attempt to contribute towards the post-Washington 
consensus perspective on market development.  
Secondary Aim:  To assess the future reform options facing the Ghanaian cocoa market. 
Research aims not only present the researcher with a target on which to focus, but they 
also put forward a benchmark against which the success of the study may be measured.  In 
order to achieve the aims of this study a number of research questions were also developed 
in chapter one.  As indicated in the methodology chapter, the research questions have been 
central to every stage of analytic process throughout this study.  Indeed, it was felt that by 
keeping the research questions central within the analysis, the aims of the study would be 
fulfilled.  In light of this the following chapter will attempt to address each of the research 
questions separately, drawing reference to their contribution towards the research aims330.   
To a large extent the central role that the research questions have played in this study can 
be seen through the selection of key themes within the findings chapter.  As noted in the 
methodology chapter, the research questions were hugely influential in directing the 
selection and organisation of themes within the templates.  As such, there is a strong 
connection between the key themes and the research questions that will be displayed 
                                                 
329
 As noted in chapter one the term ‘partial model’ is not an established theoretical terminology.  Rather the term 
partial model has been used in this study to describe the style of market organisation used in Ghana.  Indeed, with 
reference to the external validity of the findings in this study the term ‘partial model’ will be used to describe the 
concept of a market where the government plays an influential role alongside that of the private sector.  
330
 The primary aim will be addressed within the main body of the answer to each of the research questions. The 
secondary will be addressed in a separate section at the end of the main answer where recommendations on 
future reform will be made.  
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throughout this chapter.  The later sections of this chapter will address the limitations of 
the research process, and also the potential for future research on the topics addressed in 
this study.   
8.2 – Question One:  How does the private sector perceive the credibility of the 
Cocobod’s role in the market, and what actions have the Cocobod taken to improve 
their credibility in this area?  
Key Theme – Credibility of Reform [7.1]  
Within the conclusion to section 7.1 it was emphasised that although the Cocobod’s 
credibility had been questioned in response to allegations of QCD rent seeking, in light of 
both their good overall performance, and their positive reputation amongst the majority of 
market stakeholders the Cocobod should be considered a largely credible organisation.  In 
comparison with the large-scale corruption witnessed in other African markets, such as the 
Ivory Coast’s cocoa market, the level of problems in Ghana are relatively small and appear 
to be confined to small-scale transactions amongst remote actors.  Indeed, given the 
number of opportunities for abuse of power that exist within the partial model, the relative 
scarcity of serious complaints in Ghana is a positive sign for the Cocobod’s credibility331.  
Nevertheless, the issue of moral hazard within the QCD does highlight the potential for rent 
seeking that arises in partial models of organisation due to the high level of interaction 
between government and the private sector.  Private sector actors depend on civil servants 
for favourable judgements, and where such judgements are made without the appropriate 
systems of monitoring, the potential for moral hazard is very high. In light of this, it would 
appear that rigorous monitoring and detailed performance measurement are required 
within partial models of organisation.  This recommendation is particularly true when 
government institutions operate in remote locations, where low monitoring increases the 
potential for moral hazard.   
                                                 
331
 Ghana was ranked in joint first place in the World Bank’s African governance indicators for 2009 [Kaufmann et 
al, 2009]. 
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The problems associated with the Cocobod’s links with certain institutions in the market 
could also be seen in section 7.2, further adding to our understanding of credibility within 
the partial model.  During section 7.2, the Cocobod’s roles in both the collection of interest 
payments and the determination of LBC turnover speeds was raised as an issue of discredit 
amongst LBC participants.  In analysis of this problem it was found that the Cocobod’s role 
in the takeover centres was non-essential and as such, there is an opportunity for the 
Cocobod to divorce themselves from this issue and send a positive signal to the private 
sector.  Indeed, the same could be said for the Cocobod’s links with the CPC, which act to 
fuel speculation over the impartiality of light crop distribution.  In light of these findings, it 
may be suggested that when determining the division of responsibility within partial 
models of organisation every effort should be made achieve a structure where the 
government’s role as a non-biased regulator is not conflicted by their roles in other aspects 
of the market.   
The issue of accountability was also addressed in section 7.1, where the LBC’s inability to 
hold the Cocobod accountable in cases of poor performance was highlighted as a 
governance problem within the partial model.  LBC’s in particular highlighted the need for 
a non-partisan arbitration body to oversee any disagreements between the Cocobod and 
themselves.  Based on the potential for government bias within partial models of 
organisation, it may be suggested that such an institution should be seen as a minimum 
requirement in order increase the perception of credibility amongst private sector actors.  
Indeed, as noted by Kydd and Dorward [2004], the private sectors perception of credibility 
within partial models can be highly important in determining the level of investment and 
development.   
Given the LBC’s standing as important stakeholders within the partial model, concerns 
were raised in response to their lack of integration into the Cocobod’s decision-making 
framework.   In many respects this problem also addresses the issue of governance within 
the partial model.  Greater voice for private sector participants is considered a key 
determinant of good governance by providing a source of external accountability for 
government actions.  However, as addressed in section 7.1, to date the Cocobod have been 
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largely resistant to such advances from the LBC’s due to their habitual preference for total 
control.  Whilst the Cocobod is comfortable with this position, it may be having a negative 
impact on the market, as seen through their failure to respond to private sector concerns.  
This is evident in section 7.2, where the Cocobod’s failure to respond to congestion 
problems has acted as a disincentive to several LBC’s, and also in section 7.6, where the 
Cocobod’s failure to communicate over the supply shortage facing processors has raised 
serious concerns.   Again it must be accepted that the process of adjustment towards the 
private sector’s mode of operation is likely to be a major challenge for the Cocobod.  
However, given both the amount of time the Cocobod have had to adjust and the significant 
power of private sector stakeholders in the Ghanaian market, change must be expected in 
this area.   
The introduction of private sector stakeholders into Cocobod decision-making forums 
would appear to have a number of positive benefits.  To date, liberalisation pressure in 
Ghana has achieved largely positive results, as indicated by Ghana’s improved performance 
post-1992.  As such, the infiltration of further private sector ideals may have the potential 
to encourage further efficiency improvements in the Cocobod.  Equally, the issue of 
transparency, which continues to be a major concern amongst private sector actors, could 
be overcome with a more open and representative decision-making process.   Indeed, given 
the problems that have been created as a result of the Cocobod’s failure to integrate 
stakeholder needs, it is suggested that representative and participative decision-making 
forums should be considered a key institution within all partial models of organisation.  
Recommendations 
1. That the Ghanaian government establish an independent council for arbitration over 
disagreements between the LBC’s and Cocobod. Such a council could be made up of elected 
representatives from the public sector, private sector, academic community and legal 
profession.  
2. That when considering future reforms the Cocobod strongly consider the possibility of 
divorcing themselves from any functions in the market that may jeopardise their position as a 
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non-biased regulator.  In cases where the Cocobod’s role in a certain function is considered 
essential, such as quality control, then the case for retraction is much less strong.  
3. That private sector332 stakeholders be involved in Cocobod decision-making forums. This 
does not mean that the private sector actors assume the same level decision-making power as 
the government, but rather that on issues that affect the private sector they should be able to 
participate.  The extent to which the private sector is given the power to object to decisions 
made against them, and also the course of action in such cases, must be clearly established 
prior to their involvement in order to avoid inefficient delays in the decision-making process. 
8.3 – Question Two: Based on a critical examination of the Cocobod’s various 
functions in the domestic supply chain, in which areas is the Cocobod’s role most 
important to market performance? 
Key Themes – Supply Chain Management [7.2], and Competition and Quality Enforcement 
[7.3].  
Throughout the course of research, it was possible to assess several of the Cocobod’s 
functions in the domestic supply chain, including quality control, price fixing, input 
subsidies, control of takeover and payment, and LBC seed-funding.  Whilst all of these 
functions influence the performance of the domestic supply chain, some appear to be more 
significant than others.  In particular quality control and control of takeover and payment 
featured heavily within the accounts of market participants.  As such, these functions will 
form the basis of the response to question two.  
As highlighted in several previous studies, the role of quality control is of great importance 
in the Ghanaian cocoa market [LMC, 1996; Fold, 2002; Laven, 2007].  Findings in this study 
have further emphasised the importance of quality control, where, in particular, the QCD is 
praised for guarding against the dangers of quality decline inherent within liberalised 
buying.  Further support for the government’s role in quality was also evident in section 
7.5, where it was found that given both the public good characteristics of national 
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 The LBC’s and local processors in particular.  
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reputation, and also the challenges related to collective action in quality control, the private 
sector is unlikely to face enough incentive to replicate the Cocobod’s performance in this 
area.  This is clearly reflected in interview responses, where local processors show strong 
support for the Cocobod’s role in quality due to their fears surrounding the performance of 
a private sector quality control organisation.  
The Cocobod’s incentive towards quality control is particularly strong due to the financial 
value Ghana is able to achieve for its cocoa on the export market.  Based on this incentive 
the Cocobod have a strong motivation to enforce quality control despite the pressure 
resulting from liberalised buying.  Indeed, the Cocobod’s success in overcoming the threat 
of liberalising buying perfectly exemplifies the type of hard coordination advocated in the 
model of developmental coordination [Kydd and Dorward, 2004].  The stability which this 
has created may be considered one of the key factors enabling the steady rate of 
development witnessed in the Ghanaian cocoa market in recent years.   As such, the 
example of quality control in Ghana can be used as evidence in support of the positive 
stabilising effect that targeted government intervention can have on market development.      
To some extent, the Cocobod’s dogmatic attitude towards quality control is reflective of the 
organisation’s broader cultural preference for control, as indicated in by the analysis of 
organisational culture in section 7.1.  However, whilst control is well suited to some aspects 
of the market, there may also be cases in which the Cocobod’s preference for control is 
having a stifling effect on the market.  This is exemplified through the Cocobod’s role in 
cocoa takeover and also their response to congestion along the Ghanaian supply chain.  
Within section 7.2, the Cocobod’s inability to reduce congestion was highlighted as the 
most significant issue facing LBC’s in the current market.  LBC’s have clearly highlighted 
speed of turnover, not only as a key area of competition, but also an issue which greatly 
affects their incentive to compete in other aspects of the market.  Whilst the Cocobod have 
attempted to respond to this problem with a controlling quota system, research findings 
suggest that this is a flawed system, used to mask the insufficiency of supply chain 
infrastructure.  In response to this, it was suggested that the responsibility for quality 
control should be transferred to the private sector.    
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The contrasting effect of the Cocobod’s control of cocoa quality, as compared cocoa 
takeover, can be used to offer insight into Poulton et al’s [2004333] theory that market 
development in sub-Saharan Africa is best achieved through a balance of competition and 
coordination [control].  Whilst the case of quality control clearly highlights the need for 
government intervention in an area where both market failures and a lack of supporting 
institutions represent a risk to national interests, in the case of cocoa takeover there is less 
support for control.  Though, some element of control is required to ensure that cocoa is 
offloaded and stored correctly, this can be easily achieved through the use of efficient 
modern takeover equipment.  Equally, the QCD’s effectiveness in the area of quality control 
should help to guard against any quality decline resulting from increased turnover speeds.  
As such, the takeover process represents an opportunity to encourage private sector 
dynamism, without significantly jeopardising the level of control in the system.   
Whilst the takeover centres may represent an opportunity to address the balance of 
competition and control in the local purchasing market, criticism of the Cocobod’s role in 
cocoa takeover should not detract significantly from the positive impact of control in the 
Ghanaian cocoa market.  Indeed, the results of this study may be considered consistent 
with the contentions of Poulton et al [2004], who find that coordination [control] can have 
a positive effect on market performance, even where it compromises competition.  Equally, 
Poulton et al [2004] suggest that where possible a balance between these two elements 
should be the regulators ultimate goal.  As such, despite the positive impact of control on 
several aspects of the Ghanaian market, it is recommended that when deciding upon the 
appropriate level of regulatory control in partial models of organisation careful 
consideration must be given to both the necessity of control in certain areas, and also the 
impact of control on private sector dynamism.  There is no universal prescription in this 
area, but rather each regulatory approach must be carefully tailored in response to market 
conditions and also the functional abilities of the government and private sector.     
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 It is interesting to note that Poulton et al’s [2004] findings that increased competition does not always improve 
development and that markets may benefit from a balance of competition and coordination were recently tested 
in Tschirley et al [2009].  The results of this recent paper fully support the findings of Poulton et al [2004].    
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Further insight into partial models of organisation can be gained from the different 
incentives that the Cocobod faces in the areas of quality control and cocoa takeover, and 
how these incentives may influence the Cocobod’s performance.  Earlier it was noted that 
through their role in the export market the Cocobod face a strong incentive towards quality 
maintenance.  Resulting from this incentive the Cocobod have been motivated to perform 
this function very effectively.  However, as noted in section 7.2, the Cocobod face no such 
incentive to improve their performance in the area of cocoa takeover.  To some extent this 
may explain why the Cocobod have been so slow to invest in the warehouse improvements 
needed to increase the speed of LBC turnover.  In light of this it is recommended that when 
deciding upon the optimal division of responsibility between the government and the 
private sector in partial models of organisation, careful consideration must be given to the 
opportunities and incentives that are present within the various functions in the market.  
Recommendations  
1. That the Cocobod continue to rigidly enforce their standards of quality control along the 
domestic supply chain and remain aware of the potential threat resulting from the buying 
practices of LBC’s.  
2. That, as recommended in section 7.3, the Cocobod increase the level of farmer training on 
the issue of cocoa quality.  This will help to lower the amount of low quality cocoa farmers 
present to buyers, thus reducing pressure on LBC’s trying to balance their need to compete at 
the local level against the Cocobod’s quality demands.  
3.  That the Cocobod continue to pursue their stated interest in the privatisation of cocoa 
takeover. Building on the findings in section 7.2, any reform in the area of cocoa takeover 
should incorporate a system where the performance of those in charge of takeover is assessed 
based on the efficiency of the takeover process.  The performance of those in charge of 
takeover must also be linked with reward.  
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4. Under the circumstances where an LBC does not receive payment for cocoa delivered within 
the ten days334 stipulated by the Cocobod, all interest charges on seed-fund must be frozen 
until such a time as the LBC receives payment for the cocoa.      
8.4 - Question 3: Based on both the transaction risks and incentives presented 
within the model of partial liberalisation, what level of engagement can be witnessed 
from the LBC’s in the development of the domestic supply chain? 
Key themes – Supply Chain Management [7.2], and Input Market Transition [7.4].  
Before answering the above question it is appropriate to address the issue of what level of 
engagement can be expected from LBC’s in supply chain development. 
Within past studies, discussed in chapter four, the focus of LBC engagement has been at the 
farmer level, where the provision of farmer rewards, and inputs on credit has been 
heralded as a positive aspect of market liberalisation [Teal et al, 2006].  To some extent, it 
is understandable to assess LBC engagement at this level given their close proximity to the 
farmer.  However, based on the understanding of LBC functional capabilities obtained 
during this study, it might be suggested the LBC’s potential in the Ghanaian market extends 
beyond the sort of ad hoc farmer incentive schemes identified in previous studies.  
Throughout research, LBC’s335 displayed impressive capabilities in the areas of financial 
management, organisational infrastructure, formal collective action, and human resource 
management.  Furthermore, LBC’s command a position of great importance in the supply 
chain, controlling the flow of all cocoa from the farmer level to the CMC.  As such, there 
appears to be the potential for positive LBC engagement in several aspects of the domestic 
supply chain including farmer inputs, supply chain infrastructure, and the policy arena.      
The above assessment of LBC capabilities does not, however, reflect their current level of 
engagement in the Ghanaian cocoa market.  LBC’s continue to limit themselves to the role 
                                                 
334
 As noted in section 7.2, the Cocobod has stated that LBC’s should receive payment for cocoa delivered no more 
than ten days after the cocoa has been taken over on schedule with the Cocobod’s quota.  If the Cocobod is not 
meeting its quota schedule then compensation must be made for this.    
335
 It must be remembered that ten of the eleven LBC’s interviewed make up the top ten LBC’s in Ghana, and as 
observed during chapter four, these top ten LBC’s have a very dominant position in the market. 
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of buying agents, commissioned to buy and deliver cocoa, with limited responsibility 
outside of this basic remit.  Indeed, throughout the research process it became apparent 
that the majority of LBC’s have now retracted from the ad hoc provision of farmer 
incentives identified in previous studies.  Based on the findings developed throughout this 
study there are a number of possible explanations behind the limited role of LBC’s.   
Firstly, LBC’s receive a low level of financial reward in the current market.  As discussed in 
chapter four LBC’s have traditionally suffered from very low profit margins and high rates 
of bankruptcy.  In recent years market conditions have not improved, as high levels of 
supply chain congestion and sanctions against purple beans have led to significant financial 
losses for LBC’s.   Supply chain congestion in particular has reduced the level of profit 
achievable by LBC’s.  Resultantly, all LBC’s state that they do not have sufficient finances to 
reinvest in the supply chain. 
Secondly, the level of transaction risk facing LBC’s in the current market appears to be 
quite high.  In section 7.4 the level of strategic default from farmers and organisational risk 
from purchasing clerks were both highlighted as constraints to LBC’s becoming more 
involved in the market for farmer inputs.   Within Kydd and Doward’s [2004] model of 
development coordination the private sector can overcome such risks through the use of 
soft coordination mechanisms such as interlocking transactions and collective action.  
However, as observed in section 7.4, neither of these soft coordination mechanisms have 
been used successfully in response to farmer default or organisational risk.  Furthermore, 
section 7.4 also highlighted the Cocobod’s inconsistent policy towards input market 
subsidies as a transaction risk facing LBC’s wishing to get involved in the market for 
farmers’ inputs.  
Thirdly, the Cocobod have not been active in encouraging a higher level of engagement 
from LBC’s.  As discussed in sections 7.1 and 7.3, the Cocobod appear to be sceptical of the 
LBC’s intentions in the market. Resultantly, the focus of the Cocobod has been on reducing 
the level of LBC malpractice, as opposed to encouraging and engaging with LBC’s.  Indeed, 
the Cocobod’s reluctance to support LBC engagement may be considered the most 
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significant factor affecting the level of LBC investment in the market336.  As noted by Kydd 
and Dorward [2004] the government has a key role to play as a catalyst for private sector 
engagement, both through reducing the level of transaction risk and increasing the returns 
to investment.  However, within Ghana there is no evidence of the Cocobod actively 
engaging in these areas.   
Whilst it is possible to be critical of the Cocobod’s reluctance towards LBC engagement, it is 
also important to note that as a regulator the Cocobod has generally performed to a high 
level.  Aware of the problems associated with fully liberalised markets, it is understandable 
that the Cocobod have treated LBC’s with caution.  Equally, having become accustomed to a 
system of total government control it will clearly take time for the Cocobod to adjust to a 
system that embraces the potential of private sector dynamism.  However, reform began in 
1992, and over the course of time the Cocobod’s attitude towards the private sector should 
have changed.  In this light, there were encouraging signs in round two of the research 
where the deputy chief executive of the Cocobod suggested that there will be an increased 
level of engagement with LBC’s in the coming seasons.  
This change of perspective could prove to be significant for the Ghanaian market, as there 
is clear potential within the functional capabilities of the LBC’s.  The significance of the 
Cocobod’s role in realising the potential of the LBC’s should not be underestimated.  Indeed, 
the dampening effect that the Cocobod have had on private sector dynamism in the past 
strongly suggests that the Cocobod will have an influential role in reversing this trend in 
the future.  In light of this it may be suggested that the role of the government is one of the 
main factors affecting the level of private sector engagement within partial models of 
organisation.  Equally, it must be noted that in cases where the government is not averse to 
private sector growth, then the government’s role must go beyond that of a passive 
observer.  Indeed, the government must play a facilitative role in helping to reduce the level 
of transaction risk faced by private sector investors.   
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 This is consistent with the findings of Laven [2005] who finds that the Cocobod may be constraining LBC’s from 
realising their potential in the Ghanaian market. 
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Recommendations  
1. Consistent with recommendation three in section 8.1, the Cocobod should attempt to 
engage with the LBC’s in order to build a working partnership. This partnership should be 
formalised through a bi-annual meeting involving representatives of the Cocobod and LBC’s, 
where issues concerning both the Cocobod and LBC’s could be discussed.  Amongst several 
other benefits, this partnership will help the Cocobod and LBC’s to reach an understanding on 
[a] the aspects of the market which need to change in order to incentivise LBC’s, and [b] the 
aspects of the market where there is the greatest potential for LBC’s to take on more 
responsibility in the coming seasons. Working within a partnership it is hoped that an 
affective plan could be put in place to maximise LBC potential in the coming seasons. 
2. LBC’s themselves need to target improvement in soft coordination mechanisms.  In 
particular improved collective action could prove to be highly beneficial.  During section 7.4 it 
was suggested that improved collective action could help to reduce the risk of strategic 
default and organisational risk, both of which are significant barriers to LBC engagement at 
the local level.          
3.  Increased policy consistency is required from the Cocobod in order to reduce transaction 
risk and increase private sector confidence in long-term investments.    
8.5 – Question Four:  In light of both the performance of the Cocobod and the 
opportunities that exist in the private sector, what functions of the Cocobod could be 
transferred to the private sector?        
Key themes: Input transition, Competition and Quality, and Supply Chain Management  
As discussed in chapter two, the authors of the development coordination approach 
suggest that as the market develops liberalisation reform should take place depending on 
the evolving strengths of both the government and private sector, and the depth of 
supporting institutions [Kydd and Dorward, 2004; Poulton et al, 2006].  In light of this, it is 
interesting to observe that although the Cocobod have been making gradual reforms since 
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1992337, interview findings clearly suggest that the Cocobod do not believe that as the 
market develops the private sector will automatically begin to control a greater number of 
Cocobod functions.  To some extent this is understandable in light of the Cocobod’s success 
using their current system of market organisation.  Indeed, given the risks associated with 
liberalisation it is suggested that any decision to reform the current system should be 
based on a careful analysis of market conditions, rather than on the assumption that 
liberalisation should occur in line with market development.  
Nevertheless, the option of gradual reform is something that the Cocobod must remain 
open to.  Given the level of established support for Cocobod amongst market actors, they 
are now in a position where any reforms will be implemented on their terms.  In light of 
this it is appropriate to question in what aspects of the market the Cocobod would consider 
reducing their level of functional responsibility.   
Based on research findings the provision of farmers’ inputs emerges strongly as the 
function in which the Cocobod is most strongly considering transferring their 
responsibility to the private sector.  The motivation for this change appears to be primarily 
based on concerns surrounding the sustainability of the Cocobod’s involvement in this 
area.  As noted in chapter four, the Cocobod is reported to have spent over $100 million on 
input subsidies in 2007/08.  To some extent the Cocobod’s ability to fund such 
programmes is based on the profitability of cocoa exports due to the high cocoa prices 
experienced in recent years.  Historically, however, cocoa prices have followed a boom-to-
recession cycle [Ruf, 1995] and, as such, the Cocobod will be aware that the current 
surpluses may not be available in the long term.  Indeed, the recent global financial crisis 
appears to have triggered a period of more difficult conditions for the Cocobod with global 
cocoa demand dropping by a record level338, and the Ghanaian government announcing the 
need to reduce public spending339.   
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 Please see chapter one section 1.5 for a detailed discussion of the reforms in Ghana post 1992.  
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 Reuters [2009] ‘ICCO see’s biggest fall in cocoa grindings in 50 years.’ http://www.flex-news-food.com/pages 
/23631/Cocoa/icco-biggest-fall-cocoa-grindings-50-years.html 
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 Kpodo [2009d] ’Ghana budget aims to slash spending, create jobs.’ http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews 
/idAFJO E5240IV20090305?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&sp=true 
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In light of this, there may now be increased motivation for the Cocobod to transfer this 
function to the private sector.  As suggested in section 7.4 the use of LBC’s in this function 
would appear to be logical based on their close proximity to farmers and the organisational 
infrastructure that they have developed at this level.  To some extent it appears that the 
Cocobod are beginning to act on this, as demonstrated in section 7.4 through the increased 
incentives they have offered to LBC’s in the new fertiliser programme.   Indeed, through 
this public-private partnership it is possible that the Cocobod could help overcome some of 
the constraints that LBC’s face in the provision of farmers’ inputs.  The role of the Cocobod 
in this area is a positive indication of the facilitative role that the government can play in 
encouraging increased private sector development.  Building on this, it may be suggested 
that the potential for public-private partnerships should be considered as an advantage of 
partial models of organisation, given the constraints that private sector actors have 
traditionally faced when attempting to invest in developing country markets.  Indeed, long 
term private-public partnerships may help to avoid the problem of missing markets, as 
observed in previous examples of market liberalisation.     
Consistent with recommendation three in section 8.3, the Cocobod should also consider the 
privatisation of cocoa takeover.  For several years the inefficiencies in this area have been a 
major constraint to LBC development, with the Cocobod demonstrating little motivation for 
the major investment required in the modernisation of the takeover centres.   However, in 
light of the Cocobod’s past attitude towards the process of cocoa takeover there should be 
concerns surrounding the incentive structure that may be offered to private sector 
developers.  In particular there is doubt whether the Cocobod will offer the required 
incentives to engender the type of investment and efficiency improvements required in the 
takeover process.  The Cocobod’s past treatment of LBC’s serves as a warning in this area.  
As such, it is suggested that the Cocobod should only commit to the privatisation of cocoa 
takeover if they are fully prepared offer private sector developers the freedom and 
incentives required to achieve modern and efficient takeover centres.  
In closing, the findings from this study strongly suggest that the transfer of functions from 
the government to private sector should not be considered a process that occurs 
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automatically in response to market development.  In particular the Cocobod’s high level of 
performance in the functions of quality control and cocoa exports suggests that in terms of 
national benefit, Ghana appears to be better served by having these functions controlled by 
the government rather than by the private sector.  In light of this it is necessary for each 
nation’s reform strategy to be assessed at an individual level, where decisions are based 
not on economic ideology, but rather the associated strengths and weaknesses of the 
government and private sector in different aspects of the market.  The one possible caveat 
to this suggestion surrounds the potential reluctance of the government to relinquish its 
control over certain aspects of the market, even where there is strong evidence in support 
of reform.  As such, once again the system of governance in the market will be important, 
where external accountability, achieved through greater stakeholder voice, may provide 
the necessary safeguard against government entrenchment.  
Recommendations,  
1.  In light of the financial costs of input subsidies the Cocobod should continue to encourage 
and support the development of LBC’s as providers of farmers’ input’s . Policy consistency and 
an incentive structure that rewards the LBC’s appropriately for the risk they are taking will be 
required to help ease the LBC’s into this challenging market.    
2.  Consistent with the findings in section 7.4 the Cocobod should increase the level of farmer 
education on the benefits of input application.  By diverting some of the financial resources 
allocated for input subsidies towards increased farmer education the Cocobod would be 
making a sustainable investment in the long-term development of a private sector input 
market. 
3.  Any future reform in Ghana must not be externally enforced.  Decisions should be based on 
joint discussions between all major stakeholders actively involved in the market, and changes 
should be made only where it is considered to be in the long-term interests of the Ghanaian 
economy. 
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8.6 – Question 5: To what extent is the Cocobod able to compete on the global 
cocoa market using the traditional model of monopolised cocoa exporting? 
 Key Theme – Quality Control and the Role of the CMC.  
To a large extent question five was directly addressed in the findings section 7.5, where 
both the strong level of support from external buyers and the premiums obtained by the 
CMC, were presented in support of the Cocobod’s monopoly over cocoa exports.  Indeed, 
based on this evidence it was possible to conclude that the Cocobod system of monopoly 
exports appears to be very competitive in the global cocoa market at the current time.  
However, the global cocoa market is in a constant state of flux as a result of changes in both 
the demand340 of cocoa buyers and the supply341 produced by competing cocoa-producing 
nations.  As such, the Cocobod’s current level of support may not be reflective of their 
capacity to remain competitive in the longer term.  Taking this into account, this section 
will attempt to address the Cocobod’s capacity to sustain their competitiveness in the 
global cocoa market. 
During chapters one and four, and section 7.5, it was observed that to a large extent the 
Cocobod’s competitiveness in the market for cocoa exports has been bolstered by declines 
in production and quality in competing cocoa producing nations.  In particular the plight of 
the Ivory Coast appears to have elevated the level of market support for the Cocobod.  
Indeed, given that the Ivory Coast is Ghana’s main competitor on the cocoa market, any 
reduction in the Ivorian’s level of competitiveness will undoubtedly be to Ghana’s 
advantage.   
In light of this it is interesting to observe that, even though they began in September 2007, 
recent attempts towards reform in the Ivory Coast have made very little progress342.  As 
                                                 
340
 Demand can include both the volume and quality requirements of buyers. 
341
 Supply can include both the volume and quality of supply produced by rival producers.  
342
 As observed in section 7.5, in recent seasons the quality of Ivorian cocoa has worsened.  This is supported by 
interviews with multinational processors and key informants that also suggest the Ivorian cocoa sector remains in 
a state of disarray. Market reports are also consistent with interview findings in this area:  Reuters [2009c] ‘Ivorian 
Cocoa Reform Seen Urgent, Delayed by Polls.’ http://www.flex-news-food.com/pages/ 25129/Cocoa/Ivory-
Coast/ivorian-cocoa-reform-seen-urgent-delayed-polls.html 
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such, despite the Ivory Coast’s attempts towards reform, the Cocobod remain in a strong 
position.  Indeed, the challenge the Ivorian’s are facing in reversing the damage of failed 
liberalisation policies and government corruption suggests that it will be difficult for any 
market experiencing similar problems to simply replicate the model for success employed 
in Ghana.   
However, in the hypothetical situation where the Ivorian market returned to its former 
position as a provider of quality, the Cocobod’s competitive advantage would undoubtedly 
be diminished.  Although external buyers appear to value the CMC’s role in vertical 
coordination, the majority of market support for the CMC may be based on their unique 
position in providing high quality cocoa.  As such, if there was an alternative source of high 
quality cocoa on the global market then the value of the CMC may begin to be questioned.  
Indeed, it is quite plausible that if it became possible to access quality from other markets, 
then lead buyers may prefer to see the CMC’s monopoly removed so that they could then 
establish a greater level of supply control within Ghana. 
Therefore, the onus is now on the Cocobod to extend their competitive advantage in the 
market by using their highly structured quality control system to enhance their offering to 
external buyers.  As observed in chapter three, alternative grades and standards, and 
product certification have become increasingly important at the producer end of the value 
chain in response to the demand for product differentiation from upstream consumers 
[Henson and Reardon, 2005].  In light of this, Fold [2008] suggests that ‘certified spaces’ 
are likely to gain increased importance in the Ghanaian cocoa market in the coming 
seasons.    
Whilst product differentiation has traditionally been of relatively little importance with the 
market for raw cocoa beans, in recent years a number of major developments may have led 
to a change of perspective in this area.  In particular, the growing importance of cocoa 
products being certified against the use of child labour and also Cadbury’s decision to use 
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fair-trade certification as a competitive strategy on the mainstream market343, are likely to 
have a profound effect in reshaping lead buyers’ perspective on the importance of product 
differentiation within the market for raw cocoa beans.  Ghana clearly has the potential to 
meet buyer’s needs in these areas.  Indeed, as a result of the structure and stability of the 
Ghanaian market, it would appear that Ghana has been able to respond positively to the 
demand for fair-trade344 and child labour345 certification.  Therefore, given the relative lack 
of structure and control within other producing countries around the world there may be 
an opportunity for Ghana to enhance its reputation within the external buying market by 
establishing itself as the market leader in certified cocoa.  
In reference to the main aim of this study, the Cocobod’s role in the global cocoa market 
offers several insights into partial models of organisation.  Firstly, the Cocobod’s capacity to 
compete on the global market and achieve premiums for Ghanaian cocoa strongly suggests 
that export market liberalisation should not be considered a prerequisite for market 
development.  Secondly, the incentive created through a monopoly over cocoa exports 
appears to have a positive influence over the government’s performance in internal market 
regulation.  Thirdly, global commodity chains have the potential to be highly dynamic 
environments, where regular adjustments may be required at the producer end, both in 
response to the organisational capabilities of lead buyers and the demand requirements of 
upstream consumers.  As such, any government institution operating in the role of a 
commodity exporter will need to be alive to such changes and attempt to adapt in the 
manner expected of a private sector organisation.       
The first two findings, reported in the paragraph above, highlight the strong micro-macro 
link that has been observed throughout this study.  During Cocobod interviews it was clear 
that as an organisation their motivation in the internal and external markets is inextricably 
linked.  As such, it would appear that in order to achieve the level of performance that the 
                                                 
343 Bowers [2009] ‘Sweet Deal: Dairy milk to carry fair-trade badge.’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment 
/2009/mar/04/cadbury-fair-trade-dairy-milk 
344 Cadbury’s will source their fair-trade cocoa from Ghana: All Africa [2009] ‘Ghana: Cadbury's Fair-trade 
Certification to Boost Cocoa Farming’ [24/07/09] http://allafrica.com/stories/200907240740.html.  
345
 Daily Graphic [2009] ‘Government Takes Action to Eliminate Child Labour in Cocoa Growing Areas’ 
http://www.modernghana.com/news/231752/1/government-takes-action-to-eliminate-child-labour-.html 
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Cocobod has achieved, it may be necessary for the government to have some level of 
incentive attached to the export market.  This may not require the government to have 
monopoly control over exports, however, based on the findings in this study it is not 
possible to recommend an alternative incentive structure other than the system of 
complete export market control.  As such, further investigation into alternative systems 
such as the Caisse system formerly used in the Ivorian cocoa market, or the auction system 
currently used in Kenyan coffee, is recommended in order to enhance understanding in this 
area.  
Recommendations  
1.  That the Cocobod remain in monopoly control over cocoa exports through the CMC.  
2.  That the CMC continue to communicate with external buyers in relation to the growing 
importance of alternative grades and standards.  Equally, the Cocobod must remain open to 
making any changes required to adjust to new quality requirements, such as child labour 
certification.  
8.7 – Question Six – How are increased investments from large multinational 
corporations and the subsequent increase in origin processing capacity in Ghana 
likely to impact upon the Cocobod’s governance of the Ghanaian supply chain? 
Key Theme – Governance and Power 
During section 7.6 it was observed that, running somewhat the contrary to the benefits 
commonly associated with agro-industrialisation, the growth of origin processing in Ghana 
has emerged as one of the most significant problems facing the Cocobod in the current 
market.  The problem that has arisen in this area is based on the difference that exists 
between the Cocobod’s model for external cocoa supply, and the incentive requirements of 
local processors.  Local processors require an incentive to process in Ghana, due to the 
challenges of operating in the developing country environment, the logistical challenge of 
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being located a long distance from consumer markets, and also the value loss that results 
from using Ghana main crop cocoa at origin.   
In previous years this incentive has been provided through a discount on light crop beans.  
However, as processing capacity has expanded, thus reducing each processors allocation of 
light crop, this incentive has rapidly diminished, leading to unrest in the processing market.  
Furthermore, in light of the Ghanaian government’s recent objective to locally process 60% 
of Ghana’s annual cocoa production, it would appear that unless changes are made in the 
incentive system for local processing, this issue will only continue to grow in significance 
throughout the coming seasons. 
In light of this, concerns were raised about the process of policy formulation in Ghana.  
Findings suggest that some of the most prominent stakeholders in the Ghanaian cocoa 
community were not actively involved in the decision to increase cocoa processing.  Indeed, 
given the government’s failure to respond to the recent concerns of local processors, it 
appears that a specific incentive system suitable to the needs of large scale origin 
processing was not established prior to the decision to increase processing capacity.   
Whilst the government may have thought that the 20% discount on light crop beans would 
provide sufficient incentive, interviews with local processors and key informants, suggest 
that this position is not supported within the processing industry.  Resultantly, it appears 
that change is required in the system of cocoa supply used for local processors, thus placing 
pressure on the Cocobod’s highly successful model of cocoa exports.  As such, it is 
suggested that when devising industrial policy for highly specific industries, such as cocoa 
processing, it hugely important for government ministers to involve a range of industry 
experts in the decision-making process.   
To some extent, the Cocobod appear to have compounded the above problems in relation 
to industrial policy, through their failure to offer a credible response to concerns over the 
future of bean supply in the local processing industry.   Throughout section 7.6 it was 
observed that the Cocobod’s handling of this issue has been poor.  When related to the 
findings from domestic supply chain, it may be suggested that the Cocobod’s failure to 
effectively respond to the concerns of the private sector is a weakness of their regulation 
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within the partial model.  Indeed, the Cocobod’s failure to work with transparency in order 
to allay the credibility issues surrounding bean supply agreements may be related to the 
issue of good governance highlighted in sections 7.1 and 8.2.  As such, the findings in this 
area offer further support to the argument that in order to increase the credibility within 
partial models of organisation the regulator must strictly enforce a code of good 
governance across all departments.  
The issue of buyer power was also investigated in section 7.6.   Research findings suggest 
that Cargill and ADM, two of the most recent additions to the local processing market, 
would not have invested if they were not confident of change within the incentive structure 
used for local processors.   Indeed, as Ghana nears its target of processing 60% of their 
cocoa, the level of influence and power commanded by the local processing industry is 
likely to increase.  Based on the responses of local processors it appears that the most likely 
area for change will involve the way in which cocoa is supplied to local processors.   
In particular, local processors will be very keen to address the issues of cocoa price.  As 
noted in section 7.6, main crop cocoa is considered too expensive for use in origin 
processing.  In response to this, processors have requested a discount.   However, change in 
this area is rejected by the Cocobod based on the current demand for main crop cocoa on 
the export market and their objective of value maximisation.  As such, the Cocobod will 
have to find a way to maintain the value they gain for Ghana’s cocoa on the export market, 
whilst fulfilling the supply requirements of local processors.  
This may be possible if Ghana is able to reach its target of producing one million tonnes of 
cocoa.  Under this scenario, not only would the level of light crop increase, but the Cocobod 
could offer a discounted price on main crop cocoa to local processors whilst maintaining a 
sufficient volume of main crop cocoa to sell on the export market at a premium price.  With 
a production volume of one million tonnes, the level of cocoa supply in Ghana would begin 
to match the level of demand from export buyers and local processors.  As such, after 
fulfilling their premium export contracts, the CMC would have enough surplus cocoa to 
supply processors at a discounted price.  Indeed, as suggested in section 7.6, with one 
million tonnes to sell the CMC would have to rely on strong demand within the local 
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processing industry in order to maintain their premium on the export market.  Whilst it is 
not possible to predict the volume of cocoa the CMC could sell on the export market at a 
premium price, within three key informant interviews it is suggested that if the CMC was to 
flood the export market with one million tonnes of cocoa, Ghana’s premium would decline.   
This scenario is entirely dependent on the Cocobod’s ability to increase production, with 
the goal of reaching one million tonnes.  Progress in this area is not promising, as the 
previous target of one million by 2010 has been put back to 2011 in light of disappointing 
production figures.  Reaching this target will be a significant challenge for the Cocobod 
within a budget constrained economy346.  However, in light of the significant contribution 
that cocoa revenues make towards Ghanaian GDP, production increases in cocoa should be 
targeted as the sort of sustainable and cost effective investments that are required to help 
Ghana achieve a greater degree of economic stability.    
In closing, it is necessary to observe that based on the level of market support for the 
Cocobod within the global cocoa market, it would appear that there is relatively little threat 
of lead buyers forcing major change in the Cocobod model, regardless of processors’ supply 
concerns.  Indeed, the same lead buyers that express concerns about their Ghanaian 
factories also depend on the Cocobod for their global quality requirements.  However, lead 
buyers may have the power to enforce some degree of change in the Cocobod marketing 
model.  As such, rather than contest the power of lead buyers by refusing to communicate 
or compromise over buyers’ specific supply requirements, the Cocobod would be advised 
to treat this as an opportunity to enhance their reputation as a regulator by taking the lead 
in constructive talks with local processors.  
Recommendations  
1. Regardless of the level of production increase achieved within Ghana, the Cocobod must 
begin to communicate more regularly with the processors on their supply requirements.  
                                                 
346
 As noted earlier Ghanaian public spending has declined in response to budget deficits.  In recent weeks the 
situation in this area has worsened with the Ghanaian government announcing higher deficits than previously 
thought: Kpodo [2009e] ‘Ghana says budget deficit higher than thought.’ http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009 
/08/25/afx6811944.html.     
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Some degree of compromise will be required to appease local processors and signal the 
Cocobod’s intention to support the local processing industry.  
2. The Cocobod would be advised to continue with their programmes to increase the level of 
cocoa production in Ghana.  This will require a mix of both farmer education and the focused 
application of pesticides and fertilisers.  Given the budgetary restrictions currently facing the 
Ghanaian economy, the efficiency of these programmes is hugely important, and therefore 
where possible public private partnerships are encouraged to avoid any further periods of 
wasteful government subsidies.  
3.  The Ghanaian government must freeze any plans to further increase the capacity of cocoa 
processing in Ghana.  In future capacity increases must only be undertaken when there is a 
clear and viable incentive structure in place for processors and where the level of supply in 
Ghana is sufficient to meet processors needs.  
8.8 – Response to the Primary Research Question  
The above sections, responding to the study’s six secondary research questions, have 
focused on how the findings of this study have helped to enhance our understanding of the 
various features of the partial model in Ghana and how this impacts upon market 
development.  Building on this, the goal of the following section, responding to the study’s 
primary research question, is to focus more specifically on how the findings can help to 
illuminate the theoretical perspectives on market organisation within NIE and GVC.  This 
will be done in two ways; firstly, by revisiting and discussing the theoretical framework 
outlined in chapter five, and secondly, by specifically stating the areas in which this study 
has contributed towards the understanding of market organisation and development 
within NIE and GVC.      
8.8.1 - Revisiting the theoretical framework  
During chapter five, outlining the conceptual framework for this study, specific aspects of 
NIE and GVC theory where highlighted as the core foundations upon which the theoretical 
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analysis was to be based.  This was most clearly done in the visual conceptual framework 
[section 5.6], where five key aspects of the developmental coordination framework within 
NIE were highlighted and three key aspects of GVC were highlighted.  Based on the 
exploration of these topics, throughout both the findings chapter and the above responses 
to the research questions, the following section will specifically highlight how this study 
has built upon the theoretical framework for this study.   The theoretical framework for the 
micro analysis will be discussed before moving on to the conceptual framework used in the 
macro analysis.  
8.8.1.1 – Micro analysis theoretical framework 
The conceptual framework for the micro analysis was guided by the approach of 
developmental coordination, as developed by Dorward, Kydd and Poulton [1998a, 2005a, 
2006].  Within this approach the key aspects that were highlighted included; hard 
coordination from the government, threshold shifting from the government, soft 
coordination from the private sector, the balance of competition and coordination in the 
market, the process of transition within services from the public to the private sector and 
the process of institutional change.  In addition to this, the role of supporting institutions in 
providing governance over government actions was also considered; however, this has not 
received as much attention in past developmental coordination literature.      
In reference to hard coordination, section 7.3 of the findings chapter demonstrated the 
positive impact of strategically targeted and well enforced coordination from the 
Cocobod/QCD.  The introduction of private sector buyers into the Ghanaian cocoa market 
has created a greater level of transaction cost for the Cocobod, in terms of the risk of 
quality failure [coordination failure] and the actions that have to be taken to achieve 
coordination with LBC’s.  In response to this, decisive action from the Cocobod/QCD by 
increasing the vigilance of their quality control operation and raising the threat of 
sanctioning in the case of quality failure appears to have reduced the coordination failure 
that was taking place in this area, thus solidifying Ghana’s reputation as a supplier of high 
quality cocoa.  
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However, although the role of the QCD appears to be having a transaction cost reducing 
affect for the Cocobod, section 7.1 of the findings section highlighted the impact that moral 
hazard from QCD officers is having on the transaction costs faced by LBC’s.  Based on the 
huge monitoring challenge within the Ghanaian rural environment and the massive 
informational asymmetries that result from this, moral hazard and other forms of 
opportunistic behaviour are highly possible.  This is particularly true in the case of the 
partial model where there is a high level of interaction between public and private sector 
actors.  Indeed, the negative impact of public sector workers and organisations on the level 
of transaction costs faced by LBC’s was a common theme throughout the analysis.  This was 
not, however, a key theme within the developmental coordination literature observed in 
chapter two, and therefore, this is an area where the study of the partial model in Ghana 
can help to advance the theory of developmental coordination.      
Findings section 7.1 also highlighted the important role of supporting institutions that 
provide governance over government actions within the partial model.  Having 
traditionally had a complete monopoly over all aspects of the Ghanaian cocoa chain the 
Cocobod are not accustomed to being made fully accountable for their actions.  To some 
extent, accountability was enhanced during the World Bank structural adjustment 
program; however, research findings suggest that there is now a need to develop 
institutions with the capacity to provide governance over Cocobod actions.  Indeed, it might 
be suggested that this option should be considered within all partially liberalised systems 
where the governments countervailing power over the private sector creates the potential 
for bias in regulation.  The lack of discussion in this area within past developmental 
coordination literature needs to be addressed in future research given the fundamental 
importance of such institutions in cases where the government interacts closely with the 
private sector.     
Within chapter seven, section 7.4 explored the potential for the private sector to engage in 
soft coordination and encourage the process of transition from public to private sector 
service provision.  This is considered a key process within the developmental coordination 
framework.  Nevertheless, Kydd and Dorward [2004] warn that the movement from hard 
361 | P a g e  
 
361 
 
to soft coordination is likely to be a very challenging process and, to a large extent, the 
results reported in section 7.4 support this argument.  LBC’s in Ghana face a number of 
transaction costs from their purchasing clerks, farmers and the Cocobod, all of which 
restrict their ability to take on more responsibility within the provision of services to 
farmers.  Under the developmental coordination framework it would be recommended that 
the Cocobod should engage in threshold shifting to reduce the investment threshold facing 
the LBC’s.  In light of this, it must be noted that although the developmental coordination 
framework highlights several ways in which the government can undertake threshold 
shifting, there is little discussion of the ways in which the government may be encouraged 
to engage in threshold shifting.  Indeed, based on results from Ghana it appears that this is 
a fundamental process, given both the government’s reluctance to support the private 
sector and the private sectors current unwillingness to engage in what are high risk 
markets. 
The Cocobod’s reluctance to change and create an environment that supports private 
sector dynamism and investment was another common theme throughout the findings.  
This was highlighted in findings sections 7.1 and 7.2, where it was observed that the 
Cocobod’s embedded organisational culture and traditional mode of operation may have 
slowed the process of adjustment towards regulating the market in a way that encourages 
private sector engagement.  In light of this, it was observed that there is an imbalance of 
competition and coordination in the domestic market, with the Cocobod’s traditional 
preference for control somewhat stifling the LBC’s competition and dynamism.   As such, 
the Cocobod have not been able to achieve a balance between competition and 
coordination recommended by Poulton et al [2004].   
Though the Cocobod must take some of the blame for this, it appears that it is hugely 
challenging to achieve a balance between competition and coordination in a market that 
has traditionally been ruled through government monopoly.  Research findings suggest 
that the Cocobod have a natural preference for control, and as such, they are very reluctant 
to make any decisions which will remove aspects of their power and place important 
decisions in the hands of private sector actors.  To some extent, this may be compared to 
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the concept of path dependent institutional change, where a combination of the Cocobod’s 
historical position of power, their desire to maintain power and their ingrained belief in the 
traditional mode of operation, appears to have created a natural reluctance towards 
change.          
In light of this, it may be noted that, although the developmental coordination framework 
does not assume that change will be an automatic or easy process, future research should 
address the topic in greater detail.  This is especially the case given that the process of 
transition and role of private sector competition are fundamental to the growth and 
development of partially liberalised systems within the development coordination 
approach.  In particular, it is necessary to address the constraints to change, where insight 
into institutional literature that draws on the topic of path dependency [North, 1990] has 
the potential to create a more informed understanding of the process of change within old 
and embedded institutions.   
8.8.1.2 - Macro analysis theoretical framework  
As discussed in chapter five, the conceptual framework for the macro analysis was guided 
by the theoretical arguments of global value chain analysis.  The theoretical framework 
highlighted three separate aspects of GVC to be explored in the analysis; namely, the link 
between governance and quality, the link between governance and power and the process 
of change in governance.   
The link between governance and quality was explored predominantly in findings section 
7.5, where it was found that international cocoa buyers strongly support the production of 
high quality cocoa in Ghana.  In comparison with other cocoa producing nations, where it 
now appears that quality is a secondary consideration behind economies of scale [Fold, 
2002], quality is still the primary consideration within the Ghanaian supply chain, which 
largely defines the system of governance used by the Cocobod.  The differentiation between 
governance in the Ghanaian cocoa supply chain, as compared the cocoa supply chains 
elsewhere in West Africa, can be seen as a departure from the original GVC understanding 
of governance where it appeared that one of two dominant typologies could be used to 
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describe governance across commodity supply chains.  Indeed, early GVC theory would 
have predicted that for a commodity such as cocoa, where there is a relatively small 
amount of product differentiation, the governance structures seen across producing 
nations would be broadly homogenous.  This was seen in Gibbon [2001] where it was 
noted that based on the low level of quality differentiation within the cocoa market, cocoa 
could be considered a buyer driven commodity.  It should, however, be noted that the two 
dominant typologies of governance within GVC was only a foundational understanding and, 
as discussed in chapter three, GVC authors have now developed a more nuanced 
understanding of governance [Gereffi et al, 2005; Neilson and Pritchard, 2009].   
The level of support for the Cocobod’s role in quality control has been amplified by the 
deterioration of both quality and production levels in other cocoa producing nations in 
recent years.  In this environment the CMC’s capacity to provide reliable vertical 
coordination and improved supply security, appears to have increased the Cocobod’s 
legitimacy as a governance structure on the external market.  This legitimacy gives the 
Cocobod significant power and within the Ghanaian cocoa chain they are the lead actors, 
despite the immense and highly concentrated power that is held within the processing 
segment of the chain.  This expands upon the GVC understanding of governance by building 
on the idea that powerful buyers do not operate in a vacuum and that, dependent on the 
supply chain, there may be other stakeholders with significant power to shape the various 
elements of governance along the supply chain.  Indeed, based on the prevailing situation in 
other cocoa markets, international buyers have been willing to accept the Cocobod’s 
imposed governance system, largely because it enables them to meet their supply needs.    
As such, it appears that somewhat contrary to the GVC argument that governance 
structures will change in line with the advanced organisational capabilities of the chains 
lead actors [Gereffi et al, 1994], within the Ghanaian cocoa market the Cocobod’s 
traditional system of governance has remained dominant.  This dominance is not enforced 
through governmental power or patronage, but rather through the CMC and QCD’s capacity 
to provide vertical coordination in an increasingly risky and fragmented global supply 
chain.  The Cocobod system is, however, reliant on the production of homogenous cocoa, 
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and to some extent, it may be argued that their legitimacy in global market has been 
strengthened by the relatively slow uptake of product differentiation within the market for 
raw cocoa beans.  Therefore, as differentiation increases in-line with the trend of product 
certification, the Cocobod’s traditional and homogenous system of quality control and 
trading may become increasingly under threat.  Indeed, the Cocobod’s ability to adapt and 
meet the differentiated needs of buyers in the coming seasons has the potential to offer 
further insight into the capacity of traditional systems of governance to compete in modern 
supply chains.  
Based on the above discussion of governance and quality it appears that within the 
Ghanaian cocoa chain, the power of international cocoa buyers has not manifested itself as 
a force for change due to the Cocobod’s capacity to meet buyer’s needs.  However, within 
findings section 7.6, where the relationship between governance and power was explored 
more closely, it was possible to observe a different manifestation of buyer power, driven 
largely by the supply risk local processors are facing in Ghana.  In light of this, it would 
appear that the discussion of buyer power within the GVC could be advanced by further 
consideration of the conditions under which lead buyers are inclined to enforce their 
power.  Indeed, within the early GVC literature it was almost assumed that lead buyers 
would enforce change in-line with their advanced organisational capabilities, again failing 
to recognise the implications of having other influential actors in the supply chain.   
In light of this, the discussion of governance and power in the GVC is advanced by exploring 
the relationship between the Cocobod and local processors in Ghana.  As indicated in 
section 7.6, market entry into the local processing market in recent seasons has created a 
supply deficit, leading to concern within the local processing market surrounding the 
Cocobod’s system of cocoa supply.   However, even though the world’s three largest cocoa 
processors are located in Ghana, the Cocobod do not seem to be under any great pressure 
to make significant changes in this area.  The Cocobod’s legitimacy and power has been 
augmented by their performance in fulfilling the supply needs of international cocoa 
buyers, and as such, there appears to be relatively little potential for major change.  Indeed, 
before investing in Ghana lead buyers were aware of the trade-offs they would have to 
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accept in order to operate in Ghana, thus giving us some insight into the limited capacity for 
lead buyers to enforce change in certain circumstances.   
The decision to invest in local processing facilities is traditionally motivated by the desire 
to gain increased control over the local supply chain, specifically in terms of the greater 
volumes that can be procured when processing locally. However, even though this 
incentive was lacking lead buyers have invested in Ghana, predominantly due to the level of 
supply risk and uncertainty that was being created by the disorganisation in other cocoa 
producing nations.  As such, the governance structure currently observed within the 
Ghanaian local processing market is not the result of the traditional GVC logic, where lead 
buyers use power to orchestrate the supply chain [Daviron and Gibbon, 2002], but rather it 
has resulted from the concerning supply and demand conditions in global cocoa markets.  
Indeed, the recent investments by lead buyers in local processing facilities in Ghana are 
considered strategic investments to protect their supply security at a global level, as 
opposed to the short term profit opportunities of being located in Ghana.   
In light of the above discussion of governance and power, again it appears that governance 
within the Ghanaian cocoa market does not follow the traditional GVC understanding 
where lead buyers influence change in line with their organisational capabilities [Gereffi et 
al, 1994].  In practice, supply chain governance is multifaceted and in order to appreciate 
its complexity several factors need to be considered outside the traditional GVC 
understanding of power and coordination.  Though the power of dominant actors and the 
objective of improved coordination should still be considered the foundation for 
understanding governance in GVC, the situation in the Ghanaian cocoa market suggests that 
other factors such as a nations institutional environment and the prevailing market 
conditions both at a national and global level can have a profound effect in shaping the 
process of change within governance.  To a large extent this is consistent with emerging 
literature in GVC, such as Neilson and Pritchard [2009], where an attempt is made to 
broaden the GVC understanding of governance by examining the importance of local 
institutions in shaping the governance and change within value chains.           
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8.8.2 – Contribution to Knowledge  
8.8.2.1 – Developmental Coordination within NIE  
1.  Hard coordination from the government can be effective at reducing the level of 
coordination failure in the market when it is strategically targeted at the areas in which it is 
most needed.  Based on the assessment of quality control in the Ghanaian cocoa market, it 
is suggested that hard coordination should not be seen as a short term process required 
only at the early stages of development.  Instead, it was found that there may be certain 
situations where hard coordination can be prescribed for the long term based on an 
assessment of the government’s coordinative strengths in certain functions of the market. 
2.  Though effective in certain situations, government intervention can lead to increased 
transaction costs for the private sector, especially within partially liberalised markets 
where there is a high level of interaction between private sector actors and civil servants.  
In light of this, research on development coordination should focus in greater detail on the 
role of supporting institutions which have the capacity to provide governance over 
government actions and arbitrate in cases of dispute between the private sector and 
government institutions.  
3.  The process of institutional change appears to be highly important to the successful 
integration of private sector actors within partial models of organisation.  In light of this, 
research on development coordination should investigate the constraints to change faced 
by government institutions and the specific ways in which institutional change can be used 
to enhance the level of private sector engagement.   
The above contributions have attempted to build on the developmental coordination 
framework and where possible advance the understanding of market organisation within 
this approach.  Based on the analysis within this study, it was found that the development 
coordination framework, as developed by Dorward, Kydd and Poulton [1998a, 2005a, 
2006], is a highly applicable framework for the analysis of market organisation and 
development, particularly in cases where both the government and the private sector are 
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deeply involved in the market.  In order to advance the development coordination 
framework it has been suggested that greater attention should be given to the wider 
implications of having the government involved in the market.  Indeed, findings from the 
Ghanaian study suggest that beyond the government’s role in coordination, there are 
several aspects of its operation which impact upon the development trajectory of the 
market.   
8.8.3 – GVC 
1.  Effective vertical coordination is highly valued by international buyers operating in 
fragmented global supply chains.  Where reliable and effective vertical coordination is 
being achieved this gives a governance structure power and legitimacy, even if it is not 
controlled by lead buyers.  Furthermore, it should not be assumed that the power of lead 
buyers will always manifest itself towards change in governance, especially in cases where 
the current system of governance has the capacity to meet buyers supply needs.  
2.  It should not be assumed that lead buyers operate in supply chains where they are the 
only actor with power and that global market conditions may force even the most powerful 
buyers to accept trade-offs in their investment decisions.   Though lead buyers undoubtedly 
exude power and influence in the supply chain, a deeper understanding of governance can 
be achieved by considering power as one of several factors affecting governance along the 
supply chain.  
The above contributions have attempted to build on the two understandings of governance 
as power and coordination outlined in chapters three and five.  Though GVC presents a 
unique and applicable framework from which to examine the actions of powerful actors in 
global supply chains, it would undoubtedly benefit from a broader examination of the 
factors effecting governance in practice.  As observed in chapter five, GVC scholars have 
worked within both macro and micro approaches to analyse governance; however, as 
noted by Neilson and Pritchard [2009], a singular analytical approach would be more 
effective at presenting a compelling and complete understanding of governance in GVC.  
Based on the understanding developed throughout this study, it is suggested that GVC can 
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make the greatest impact on academic and policy discussions by focusing on macro level 
analysis where factors such as buyer power, quality conventions, national institutional 
environments and global market conditions can be explored to help understand the 
governance structures that exist across supply chains.          
8.8.4 – Contribution towards post Washington consensus understanding of market 
organisation and development  
The above sections have explicitly addressed how the examination of the Ghanaian cocoa 
market as a model of partial liberalisation has contributed to the to the understanding 
market organisation in NIE and GVC.  In terms of the studies overall contribution to the 
post Washington consensus understanding of market organisation this has been implicit 
throughout the entirety of chapter eight, based on the examination of the Ghanaian cocoa 
market.  As discussed in chapter one, the Ghanaian cocoa market was chosen for this study 
based on its proximity to several of the organisational principles espoused within the post 
Washington consensus perspective on development.  For example, exploring the role of the 
Cocobod in the domestic market has helped advance understanding of having the 
government so actively involved in the market and how this affects the level of private 
sector engagement.  Equally, by examining the interaction between the Cocobod and 
powerful international buyers it has been possible to understand the legitimacy of the 
Cocobod’s governance in this arena and how powerful buyers interact with the unique 
system of governance in Ghana.   As such, by exploring the role of the Cocobod both at the 
domestic and international levels of the market and by linking the findings of the study 
back to the theoretical perspectives of NIE and GVC it has been possible to make a sound 
contribution to the post Washington consensus on market organisation and development.  
8.9 – Research Limitations and Future Lines of Enquiry 
8.9.1 – Limitations  
Whilst every effort has been made to fully address the research aims set out in chapter one, 
the ambitious nature of this project has inevitably led to challenges.  Partially liberalised 
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models of market organisation represent a relatively new research phenomenon and as 
such the level of understanding achieved in this study has been somewhat limited by the 
lack of previous research directly focused on this area.  Though this is not the first study 
investigating a partially liberalised market, at the current time there are relatively few 
theoretical foundations directly related to partial models on which to build.  As such, it has 
been necessary to focus on the Ghanaian cocoa market as a single case, with the objective of 
carrying out in-depth exploratory research into partial models of organisation.  
Though the single case approach has undoubtedly yielded benefits in terms of the level of 
understanding achieved, it has also led to certain limitations in terms of the external 
validity of the research findings.  For example, if presented with sufficient time and 
resources to carry out the same research methodology on another example of a partially 
liberalised market, the process of comparison across case studies may have enhanced the 
external validity of findings.   In particular, the central importance of the Cocobod’s 
monopoly over cocoa exports in Ghana raises important questions surrounding the 
benefits of partial liberalisation without an export monopoly in place.  Equally, the 
opportunity to research a fully liberalised cocoa market would have led to an interesting 
comparison between the two systems.   
However, it must be noted that given the wide scope of this research project, the two-case 
approach described above could only be achieved with double the human and financial 
resources expended on this project.  Resource limitations have also placed restrictions on 
the amount of data that could be gathered.  Whilst it would have been ideal to extend my 
stay on both Ghanaian trips, in order to increase the number of interview participants, this 
was not possible.  Research within foreign countries is hugely expensive owing to the costs 
of travel and accommodation.  Although this challenge has been somewhat overcome 
through the use of key informant interviews carried out in the UK, given the network of 
contacts I was able to establish in Ghana, there would have been the opportunity to expand 
the research sample further.    
Finally, the expansive scope of this research project has possibly led to limitations in the 
depth of knowledge achieved within the specific functions of the Ghanaian market itself.  As 
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can be seen from the detailed description of the partial model in chapter four, the Ghanaian 
cocoa market is a fascinating case, presenting many interesting lines of enquiry and many 
complicated processes to examine.  Resultantly it has been necessary to try and balance my 
desire to achieve a full understanding of the Ghanaian market, against the need to achieve a 
detailed and informed perspective surrounding the most important features of the market.  
Resulting from this process, trade-offs have been made both in terms of the breadth of 
scope and the extent of detail.  Again, with a greater amount of time and resources it would 
be possible to focus in greater detail on each specific aspect of the Cocobod, the LBC’s, and 
the origin processer’s various roles in the market.  Though this has not been possible, it is 
hoped that, given the emergent nature of research on partial models, this study will 
provide a firm foundation from which future research efforts can draw more specific lines 
of enquiry.    
8.9.2 – Future Lines of Enquiry  
Building on the limitations highlighted above, the main recommendation for future 
research involves using the same research methodology developed in this study to 
investigate different examples of partially liberalised models of market organisation.  In 
order to keep the findings of direct relevance to this study, research should focus on 
agricultural export markets within the developing world.  In particular it would be highly 
beneficial to examine a market in which the government does not have complete monopoly 
control over exports in order to ascertain whether a performance similar to that of the 
Cocobod’s could be achieved in this setting.  
The coffee market in Kenya could be examined as one such example of a partially 
liberalised system [Akiyama, 2001; Ponte, 2002; Kondliffe et al, 2008].  Within this market 
the Coffee Board of Kenya continues to play an important role in several aspects of the 
market, including coffee milling, enforcing a co-operative buying model, issuing export 
licenses, and controlling the process of coffee auction.  Indeed, the system of coffee auction 
offers an interesting example of an alternative method of export market control that has 
enabled the Kenyan market to maintain its reputation for coffee quality [Ponte, 2002].  
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Further insight into the partial model of organisation used in Ghana could be gained by 
applying the research methodology from this study to the case of a fully liberalised cocoa 
market.  In this case it is necessary to focus specifically on a cocoa market, as the fully 
liberalised example will achieve the greatest level of insight when it can be directly 
compared with the market processes and buyers’ experiences from the partially liberalised 
Ghanaian case.  Based on interviews with a variety of cocoa stakeholders, the Cameroonian 
cocoa market has been recommended as the best example of a well functioning liberalised 
cocoa market in West Africa.   
Through examination of the Cameroonian case it would be possible to further establish the 
strengths and weaknesses of the partially liberalised as compared the fully liberalised 
model.  Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore whether participants in the 
Cameroonian and Ghanaian market share the same views on the need for government 
controls.  For example, the Cameroonian perspective would help to establish whether the 
support for the Cocobod evident in this study is reflective of an industry wide movement 
towards increased organisation within producer countries, or if instead, the Cocobod is 
only supported based on buyers’ strategic need for a source of quality.  Indeed, this is a 
poignant question given that the Ghanaian example appears to reflect market support for 
post-Washington consensus thinking on the role of the government.  As such, further case 
studies are required to establish the extent to which this thinking is reflected in the actions 
of industry stakeholders across different developing country markets.   
Focusing specifically on further research within the Ghanaian cocoa market, there are 
several examples of issues that will evolve over time, thus requiring further investigation to 
explore how the outcomes relate to analysis made in this study.  The Ghanaian cocoa 
market is an evolving system, and therefore at a basic level further understanding of partial 
models can be gained by exploring how the role of the Cocobod in Ghana changes over 
time.  However, within this study three particular issues stood out as aspects of the market 
in which change may be experienced in the near future.  As such, these issues should be the 
focus of research within the next three or four years.    
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Building on the concept of transition, as highlighted by Kydd and Dorward [2004], the 
Cocobod appeared to be considering the transition of responsibility to the private sector in 
both the provision of fertilisers to farmers, and also the control of the takeover centres.  As 
such, it would be particularly interesting to explore how these two functions have evolved.   
If change has taken place it will be necessary to explore the role of Cocobod in the process 
of change, and also how well the private sector has adapted to their roles in these areas.  
Whilst it is possible to speculate how such transitions may evolve, past experience of 
market liberalisation has shown that the outcomes may be significantly different to any 
predicted outcome.  Equally, it remains possible that significant change will not take place 
in these functions.  As such, should the process of transition stagnate, further evaluation 
will be required to ascertain why this has happened, and whether the Cocobod’s 
performance in these areas has justified their maintenance of control.   
Further change was also predicted within the market for local processing where the supply 
shortages facing processors appeared to be creating tension between the Cocobod and 
local processors.  Based on analysis it appeared that this confrontation may result in some 
degree of change in the Cocobod’s system of supply for local processors.  However, unlike 
the above examples where change was recommended based on an assessment of the 
Cocobod’s and private sector’s capabilities, any change in the Cocobod’s system of cocoa 
supply may be considered externally enforced.  This raises interesting questions 
surrounding how the Cocobod system will adapt to such changes given that they have been 
reliant on the traditional model of exports for a long period of time.  Equally, if the Cocobod 
refuse to adjust to the requirements of local processors then the emerging supply crisis in 
Ghana has the potential to teach us more about how buyer power manifests itself in a 
market with a dominant government actor.  Despite the dominance of the Cocobod as an 
institution, the Ghanaian cocoa market cannot be considered in isolation from the 
dynamics of governance within the broader cocoa industry.  Indeed, this is especially true 
now that lead buyers within the powerful processing segment are now firmly embedded in 
the Ghanaian market.    
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8.10 – Conclusion  
Throughout this chapter the primary objective has been to address the research aims set 
out at the beginning of this study.  Using a structured approach, this has been achieved 
through individual responses to each of the study’s research questions.  By addressing each 
of the research questions at this individual level the arguments presented in this chapter 
have tended to focus more specifically on the mechanisms at work within the partial model 
in Ghana, instead of how partial models of organisation may function in general.  Whilst 
this may appear to reduce the external validity of the research findings, it is felt that by 
focusing specifically on the Ghanaian model in the immediate term, it may be possible for 
future studies to build a richer understanding of partial models in the long term.  Indeed, 
based on the ontological perspective of critical realism outlined in the methodological 
chapter, it was felt that an in-depth case study analysis of the mechanisms at work within 
Ghana would best serve the objectives of this study.  
However, whilst generalisation has not been the primary goal of research, the study has 
been carried out with the aim of contributing towards post-Washington consensus thinking 
on market organisation.  In order to achieve this goal the theoretical perspectives of new 
institutional economics and global value chain analysis have been central throughout every 
stage of the study.  Indeed, based on the theoretical references made throughout chapters 
seven and eight it is hoped that the findings of this study may contribute to the 
understanding of market development within the fields of NIE and GVC.  Furthermore, in 
light of the Cocobod’s influence within both the domestic and international dimensions of 
the market, it has proven to be a highly suitable case in which to apply the cross-
disciplinary theoretical approach adopted in this study.   
In closing, it is appropriate to acknowledge that based on my understanding of the 
Ghanaian cocoa market developed throughout this study, I have come to believe that the 
Cocobod system is a highly suitable mode of market organisation within the Ghanaian 
cocoa market.  Whilst research has shown that the Cocobod model has flaws, the overall 
performance of the Ghanaian cocoa market and the credibility of the Cocobod as an 
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organisation surpass any of the criticisms levelled at the Cocobod throughout this study.  
Based on the evidence from this study it is not possible to determine whether the Cocobod 
model could be applied with the same success in other export agricultural markets 
throughout the developing world.  However, based on the strengths identified, there is the 
potential to further explore partially liberalised models of market organisation with the 
objective of building further understanding within this promising field of research.     
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Appendix One – Detailed Cocoa Revenue Breakdown 
 
Table A - 1 
 
 
Source: figures derived from documents obtained during field-work [2008] 
 
 
                                                 
347
 Revenue has been calculated as the export sales plus local sales [local processors]. In the figures provided by 
the Cocobod there is also a ‘miscellaneous’ income stream, however given that this is not associated with cocoa 
bean sales it has not been included.  Therefore, the total revenue reported in this table is from sales of cocoa at 
the F.O.B price.  As such, the breakdown of costs presented in the table may also be understood as a breakdown of 
the revenue derived from F.O.B sales i.e. the Cocobod’s system of F.O.B sharing. The ‘miscellaneous’ income that is 
not included in this table may be derived from the Cocobod’s investment activities or from financial sanctions 
against LBC’s.  
348
 The buyer’s margin presented in this table is money paid to buyers for cocoa delivered. In previous tables such 
as Table 2 [Laven, 2005], where the buyer’s margin for 2001/02 is reported at 11%, this figure may have taken 
account of both payment for cocoa delivered and the cost of quality control. Buyers previously paid for quality 
control separately and were therefore compensated for it through their margin. In recent years this cost has been 
absorbed by the Cocobod thus partly explaining why the buyer’s margin has reduced. It must however be 
acknowledged that regardless of the change in payment for quality control, the buyers margin has come down in 
response to increasing producers share of the F.O.B since 2002/03. 
349
 This figure is mainly discount charges on loans used to finance cocoa purchases [seed-fund], export duty and 
the operations of the Cocobod. 
350
 All other Cocobod costs. 
351
 In this category the Cocobod include the costs of quality inspection, research, the construction of feeder roads, 
and subsidies for fertilisers, pesticides and fungicides. 
Cocoa Season 1994/95 
 
1999/00 2002/03 2004/05 2006/07 
 Figures in Million Cedis: Brackets show percentage of FOB derived revenue. 
Revenue347 45.343 
[100%] 
164.619 
[100%] 
728.562 
[100%] 
888.503 
[100%] 
1076.000 
[100%] 
Producer 
Payments 
20.550 
[45.3%] 
98.566 
[59.9%] 
427.265 
[58.6%] 
623.901 
[70.2%] 
706.858 
[65.7%] 
Buyers Margin348 3.258 
[7.2%] 
15.830 
[9.6%] 
58.068 
[8.0%] 
57.875 
[6.5%] 
71.833 
[6.7%] 
Freight 3.123 
[6.9%] 
4.629 
[2.8%] 
36.457 
[5.0%] 
54.691 
[6.2%] 
66.574 
[6.2%] 
Finance Costs349 0.740 
[1.6%] 
7.071 
[4.3%] 
10.856 
[1.5%] 
21.327 
[2.4%] 
39.513 
[3.7%] 
Administration350 0.352 
[0.7%] 
3.049 
[1.6%] 
35.459 
[4.9%] 
65.202 
[7.3%] 
92.434 
[8.6%] 
Other351 2.616 
[5.8%] 
12.286 
[7.5%] 
7.719 
[1.1%] 
24.342 
[2.7%] 
36.173 
[3.4%] 
Export Handling - 3.685 
[2.2%] 
13.602 
[1.9%] 
5.294 
[0.6%] 
3.232 
[0.3%] 
Government Tax 15.402 
[34.0%] 
19.502 
[11.8%] 
78.390 
[10.8%] 
64.119 
[7.2%] 
92.055 
[8.6%] 
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Appendix Two - The Cocobod System of Quality Control 
 
STAGE ONE – Farmer Practice  
 
 Ghanaian farmers are trained to undertake specific procedures for the pre-harvest 
and post-harvest handling of their cocoa.   
 Once cocoa is harvested farmers go through a set procedure of fermenting and 
drying their cocoa in order to produce high quality cocoa beans, rich in flavour and 
low in defects.   
 Fermentation involves amassing cocoa beans in a 90-250 kg pile on top of plantain 
leaves.  The pile must be covered with plantain leaves and avoid direct sunlight.  
After three days the beans within the pile should be turned and allowed to ferment 
for another three days. 
 Drying takes place on large bamboo mats, where beans are laid out flat and left to 
dry for between seven to ten days352. 
 
STAGE TWO – LBC Responsibility  
 
 LBC’s have a responsibility to check the quality of cocoa purchased of farmers, 
making sure to remove all defect cocoa beans and check the beans are thoroughly 
dried.  The buyer is also required to categorise beans according to size.  LBC’s are 
required to do this because on the international market cocoa beans are priced and 
graded according not only according to the level of bean defects, but also the size of 
the beans. Bean sizes are arranged according to bean count whereby a sack 
containing 100-120 beans per 100g of cocoa is considered light crop beans, while 
80-100 beans per 100g are considered main crop beans.  Main crop beans are of a 
higher value to light crop beans due to their superior efficiency in the grading 
process [Fold, 2001]. All cocoa beans shipped from Ghana are graded according to 
the contractual conditions set out by the Federation of Cocoa Commerce [FCC]. 
                                                 
352
 Further information on fermentation and drying of cocoa can be found at the CMC’s website; 
http://www.cocoamarketing.com/what_we_production.php. 
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STAGE THREE – Upcountry Checking  
 
 The first of the Cocobod’s official checks is carried out at the district warehouse of 
the LBC that has purchased the cocoa from the farmer.  QCD officers inspect the 
cocoa based on dryness, smell, colour, infestation and size consistency.   Fold [2002] 
notes that the QCD takes samples from each pile of thirty bags of cocoa.  Laven 
[2007] reports that the QCD officer will sample one hundred beans from each sack 
of cocoa.     
 
 Beans are graded according to fixed parameters and bags of cocoa lower than grade 
two should not leave the district level.  The four grades include;  
o Grade 1 - thoroughly dried, free of foreign matter, smokey beans and not 
more than 3% slate, 3% mould, 3% all other defects. 
o Grade 2 – thoroughly dried, free of foreign matter, smoky beans and with not 
more than 4% mould, 8% slate and 6 % all other defects. 
o  Grade 3 -Sub-Standard Cocoa [double sealed and labelled ‘XS’- sub-standard 
beans may be re-sorted and re-conditioned to bring them up to Grade 2], and 
finally.  
o Grade 4 - Waste Cocoa.  Beans not reaching grade 1 or 2 will not be exported 
and are generally used in the domestic processing industry.  
 
Sources for grading standards - Fold [2002], M.O.F.A [2003], Laven [2007]. 
 
 Once the QCD officer is satisfied that beans are off the required standard, each bag of 
cocoa is individually graded and sealed, whereby the grader places his/her own 
individual tag on the cocoa, so that it is traceable to that grader.  Equally each sack of 
cocoa is marked with a number, which indicates the particular buyer who has 
purchased the cocoa, so that again if there are any problems the cocoa is traceable to 
that person.   
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STAGE FOUR – Takeover Centre Grading  
 
 After checking at the district level beans are transported to one of the Cocobod’s 
three takeover points at Kaase, Takoradi and Tema, where the QCD, separate beans 
into four grades, and carry out a second quality check.  This second quality check is 
known as ‘check sampling’.  Once accepted at this level, LBC’s receive a purity 
certificate and no longer have responsibility for the cocoa.  LBC’s can use the purity 
certificate as a receipt to gain payment from the Cocobod.  
 
STAGE FIVE – Final Checking  
 
 The cocoa is then checked a third time by the CMC prior to shipment. Cocoa shipped 
must meet the contractual terms set for each grade of cocoa and where this does not 
happen buyers may seek compensation through the process of arbitration. Varangis 
and Schreiber [2001], however, observe that unlike many other cocoa exporters the 
CMC rarely fail to meet contractual conditions. Indeed, given that Ghana grade 1 
cocoa is checked to a standard of no more than 3% of defects, whilst FCC contractual 
requirements for main cocoa is no more than 5%353 defects, it would be assumed 
that quality problems are rare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
353
 This is the standard against which all West African cocoa is traded.  The Federation of Cocoa Commerce [FCC] 
has two main grades for beans from West Africa – Good Fermented Beans – no more than 5% mould, 5% slate, 
1.5% foreign matter, and Fair Fermented – no more than 10% mould, 10% slate, 1.5% foreign matter. 
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Appendix Three – LBC Market Share 1993-2008 
Table A-2 
 
 
Source – figures compiled from various sources including Rottger [2000], The Bank of Ghana [2003], Cocobod [2006] and documents gained during fieldwork [2008]. 
                                                 
354
 P stands for tonnes of cocoa purchased. 
355
 MS stands for market share 
SEASON 
LBC’s 1993/94 1996/97 1999/00 2002/03 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
P
354
 MS%
355
 
P MS% P MS% P MS% P MS% P MS% P MS% P MS% 
PBC 203,408 80.0 219,790 67.0 190,451 44.4 N/a 34.0 225,358 37.6 242,472 32.8 186,046 30.3 208,482 30.6 
Olam - - - - 20,423 4.8 N/a 11.3 79,004 13.8 102,669 13.9 70,483 11.5 54,071 7.9 
Aduwamapa 1,160 0.4 10,061 3.1 31,294 7.3 N/a 10.8 43,401 7.24 66,265 8.9 59,909 5.7 61,411 9.0 
Akuafo 
Adamfo 
- - - - - -  
N/a 
 
7.0 
 
78,553 
 
13.1 
 
84,150 
 
11.4 
 
57,107 
 
9.3 
 
85,977 
 
12.6 
Federated - - - - 41,518 9.7 N/a 8.5 40,601 6.8 50,451 6.8 46,509 7.6 46,989 6.9 
Transroyal - - - - 20,446 4.8 N/a 6.1 30,332 5.1 42,181 5.7 41,089 6.7 37,918 5.6 
Kuapa 
Kokoo 
 
1,770 
 
0.5 
 
7,336 
 
2.3 
 
29,114 
 
6.8 
 
N/a 
 
10.8 
 
40,734 
 
6.8 
 
48,956 
 
6.6 
 
34,264 
 
5.6 
 
36,024 
 
5.3 
Armajaro - - - - - - N/a 7.6 32,137 5.4 36,765 5.0 31,466 5.1 46,712 6.9 
Diaby - - - - - - - - 525 - 6,068 1.2 24,774 4.0 28,888 4.2 
Cocoa 
Merchants 
- - - -  
20,666 
 
4.8 
 
N/a 
 
3.8 
 
13,219 
 
2.2 
 
17,504 
 
2.3 
 
22,075 
 
3.6 
 
22,683 
 
3.3 
Evadox - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6,359 0.93 
Dio Jean - - - - - - - - 2,281 0.4 9,325 1.2 10,614 1.7 8,820 1.3 
Royal - - - - 478 - -  2,722 0.5 5,825 0.8 6,702 1.1 8,188 1.2 
Cashpro 27,708 11.0 58,843 18.0 60,520 14.1 - - - - - - - - - - 
Unicrop 19,810 7.8 18,615 5.7 1,947 0.5 - - - - - - - - - - 
Premus - - - - 9,227 2.2 - - - - - - - - - - 
Goldcrest - - 5,543 1.7 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Others 281 - 5,651 1.7 2,559 0.6 N/a 2.3 10,451 1.7 24,826 0.34 23,490 3.8 28,326 4.0 
Total 254,637 100.0 325,945 100.0 428,673 100.0 N/a 100.0 599,318 100.0 740,457 100.0 614,532 100.0 680,779 100.0 
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Appendix Four – The Process of Template Analysis 
Figure A - 1 
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Appendix Five - Key generative mechanisms 
 
 
Round one interview guide for the Cocobod 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Understanding the process of change within the Cocobod 
 Attempt to understand the credibility of change by understanding the motivation 
towards change within the Cocobod. 
 The challenge of change towards the partial model within a large public sector 
organisation.   
 The Cocobod’s perception of how change has affected market performance. 
2. Functions of the Cocobod within the internal buying market. 
 Quality Control  
o The way in which the Cocobod enforces quality.  
o The integration of private buyers into the quality control system. 
o Quality performance in recent years. 
 Input Delivery 
o The Cocobod’s justification for the delivery of farmer inputs on subsidy. 
o The level of success and coordination challenges encountered i.e. repayments 
or default.  
 Farmer security – the Cocobod’s justification for a fixed producer price.  
 
Key  
 
Bold writing - Denotes the section of the interview guide  
 Bullet point denotes the key generative mechanisms explored in each section 
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3. The Cocobod’s links with LBC’s. 
 The Cocobod’s perception of the competition between LBC’s. 
 How the Cocobod has adjusted to the introduction of competition into the market. 
 The nature of the relationship between Cocobod and the LBC’s. 
 The Cocobod’s methods for enforcing regulations within the internal buying market.  
 
4. The Cocobod’s links with External Buyers.  
 The nature of vertical coordination between the CMC and external buyers. 
 The reputation and performance of Ghanaian cocoa on the external market. 
 How the CMC has adjusted to changes within the external market in recent years. 
 
5. The Growth of Origin Processing in Ghana 
 The Cocobod’s explanation for why origin processing has increased so significantly 
in Ghana in recent years. 
 Whether the Cocobod will be able to fulfil the supply requirements of origin 
processors under the current supply model. 
 The threat posed by the power of the big processors. 
 
6. The Future of the Partial Liberalisation Model 
 The current level of support for the partial model within the donor community 
 The long term objectives of the Cocobod. 
 The potential for future change and the transition of responsibility to the private 
sector.  
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Appendix Six – Cocobod Round One Interview Guide 
 
 
Section 1 – The process of change towards ‘Partial Liberalisation’. 
 
 What have been the main changes in the Cocobod’s operations in the move to 
partial liberalisation?  
 What challenges have been encountered? 
 What are the current [short-term] goals of the Cocobod? 
 
Section 2 – The Functions of the Cocobod in the Internal Buying Market.  
 
 The functions of the Cocobod in quality control, input and extension provision and 
farmer security [fixed pricing]? 
 How has the way in which the Cocobod delivers these services changed over the 
years? 
 
Section 3 – The linkages between Cocobod and the LBC’s. 
 
 The function of the LBC’s? 
 Regulation and sanction in the LBC market? 
 The function of the Cocobod in the LBC market? 
 The Cocobod’s relationship with the LBC market? 
 
Section 4 – The linkages between the Cocobod and the external market. 
 
 The Cocobod’s relationship with the external market? 
 The response of the external market to Ghana’s quality performance?  
 How changes in the external market have affected the Cocobod? 
 
Section 5 – The growth of origin processing and the role of the Cocobod. 
 
 The objective of increased origin processing? 
 The Cocobod’s functions within the origin processing market? 
 The changes in the Ghanaian market from increased origin processing? 
 
Section 6 – The future of the partial liberalisation model. 
 
 Donor response the partial liberalisation model and Ghana’s good performance? 
 The stability of the current model? 
 The long-term goals of the Cocobod? 
 The challenges ahead?  
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Section 1 – The process of change towards the ‘Partial Liberalisation’ model. 
 
1. In your opinion what are the fundamental aspects of the Cocobod model, which 
make the Ghanaian cocoa market operate as it does? 
 
2. What have been the main effects of the move towards partial liberalisation?  
 
3. In what areas has the Cocobod model changed the most? 
 
4. Where has the rationalisation involved in this change been felt the most?  
 
5. Are the Cocobod happy with the current balance of private sector and public sector 
in the partial liberalisation model?   
 
6. What have been the main positives resulting from a move to this model of market 
organisation? 
 
7. Has the model of partial liberalisation specifically created new challenges for the 
Cocobod?   
 
8. Have unforeseen challenges emerged as a result of this model? 
 
9. In your opinion how has the change to partial liberalisation affected the Cocobod’s 
reputation in the cocoa market?  
 
10. In your opinion has the model of partial liberalisation affected the culture of the 
cocoa market in Ghana? 
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Section 2 – The Functions of the Cocobod in the Internal Buying Market.  
 
1.  Quality Control. 
 
 What are the key factors behind Ghana’s consistent quality production? 
 Have the Cocobod been able to further develop the use of quality incentives over 
the years?   
 How responsive are farmers to changes in quality incentives? 
 How do the Cocobod ensure that quality standards are maintained?    
 What methods of sanction are used in the case of poor performance? 
 Who has the responsibility for quality performance? – How has this changed over 
the years? 
 How has the role of buyers in quality control changed since partial liberalisation? 
 How has the Cocobod been able to adjust to changes in quality grades and 
standards on the external market? 
 In your opinion what are the key aspects of the Cocobod’s quality control system 
that differentiates them from a private sector system?   
 
2.   Provision of inputs and extension services. 
 
 How has partial liberalisation changed the Cocobod’s role in this area? 
[rationalisation, private input providers] 
 What is the current policy on fertiliser subsidy?  
o What are the main justifications for this policy?  
 In your opinion how has the importance of inputs and extension at the farmer level 
changed in recent years?  
 What are the main challenges Cocobod faces in the operation of such a subsidy?  
 What mechanisms are being used to ensure success of this policy?  
o How do they differ from those used in the past? 
 What mechanisms are used to ensure the recovery of loans for fertiliser? 
 Is there active coordination between the department responsible for input delivery 
and the department responsible for extension?  
 How have conditions in the rural environment improved in recent years? [access to 
credit and inputs] –  
o What has been the role of the Cocobod in this area?  
 Have the Cocobod been able to use the LBC function to distribute inputs/credit at 
the farmer level?  
o Is this something that could possibly be used more in the future? 
 What is the Cocobod’s preferred method of farmer organisation?  
 
3.   Farmer Security. 
 
 What is the main objective of the fixed price mechanism in Ghanaian cocoa? 
 What actions have been taken to ensure that farmers can maintain access to 
markets despite increased certification requirements?  
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 Farmer Training – do farmers have the capacity at the local level to continue this 
process in absence of external assistance or are they dependent on the Cocobod in 
this area? 
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Section 3 – The linkage between Cocobod and the LBC’s.  
 
1.  The LBC function and the development of the internal buying market. 
 
 In your opinion how important are the LBC’s to the Ghanaian market? 
 Have you seen improved competition in the LBC market in recent years?   
 In what way has this impacted upon the market/farmers? 
 Have Cocobod adjusted the buying model in response to the way LBC’s operate in 
the market? 
 Have the Cocobod been able to learn from the operations of the private sector? 
 What are the main reasons behind high rate of market exit with the LBC market?   
 Has this steadied as the market has developed? 
 What are the main incentives for buyers to become involved in the internal buying 
market?  
 Do the Cocobod actively encourage entry? 
 Have the Cocobod tried to encourage the development of Ghanaian buyers?  
 Would the Cocobod like to see more foreign buyers? 
 Which buyers offer the best services to farmers? 
 The prospect of farmers becoming buyers?  
o Is this encouraged?  
 Is there an ideal number of buyers Cocobod would like to see it the market? 
 Are there restrictions on the market share any one company can hold in this 
market? 
 
2.   The Cocobod’s relationship with the PBC. 
 
 Is there still a strong relationship with the PBC? 
 Has the reduction in market share of the PBC been a planned exercise by the 
Cocobod?  
 How has the change in this relationship affected the Cocobod’s role in the internal 
buying market? 
 Is the Cocobod able to use the PBC in anyway to improve market performance and 
development, i.e. buying from more remote area’s, or distribution of inputs or, 
credit? 
 What is the future of the PBC?  
o Is its operation an important aspect of the PL model in the future? 
 
3.   Cocobod regulation of the internal buying market. 
 
 Have licensing regulations changed over the years in response to aspects of market 
development? 
 The reasons behind mandated physical presence at the village level. 
 The importance of regulatory control over the LBC’s? 
 What are the main threats of looser regulation?  
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  4.   Seed Funding.  
 
 The need – capacity of other credit sources? 
 The benefit of this to both Cocobod and the buyers. 
 The problems – [default?] 
 Future options? 
 
5.   Cocobod sanction within the LBC market. 
 
 Do the Cocobod face many problems with LBC’s cheating farmers in the market? 
 Are there still problems with LBC’s buying under prepared cocoa?  
 What are the main mechanisms of sanction used by the Cocobod for offending 
LBC’s? 
 Would the Cocobod worry about the possibility off increased cheating and the 
capacity of buyers to exploit farmers in absence of the Cocobod? 
 Do Cocobod have many clashes with LBC’s at a policy level? 
 How do the Cocobod respond to complaints from the LBC’s? 
 
6.   Communication between the LBC market and the Cocobod. 
 
 Is there frequent communication between LBC’s and the Cocobod? 
 On what level does this communication commonly take place. [individual buyers, or 
buyer association] – Does this affect the nature of the communication? 
 Has the nature of communication between Cocobod and the LBC’s changed at all in 
recent years? 
 
7.    Distribution of responsibility based on the partial liberalisation model? 
 
 Is there an understanding of who has responsibility for each aspect of market 
development?  
 Has this changed at all in recent years? 
 Are there problems with the balance of responsibility within the ‘partial 
liberalisation’ model?  
o If so, how could this be improved? 
 Are there any aspects of the model in which the Cocobod would like to see the LBC’s 
take on more responsibility in the coming seasons? 
 How have the Cocobod been able to encourage the LBC’s in these areas? 
 Are there any examples where communication on these matters has led to 
improvement? 
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Section 4 – The Linkages between Cocobod and the external market [CMC].  
 
 
1. The CMC and the partial liberalisation model 
 
 In your opinion what are the main sources of Ghana’s competitive advantage in 
the external market for Cocoa? 
 
 How has the Cocobod’s relationship with the external market changed since the 
move to partial liberalisation? 
 
 Has there been any response in the external market from Ghana’s move towards 
the partial liberalisation model?  
 
 In the late 90’s, early 2000’s, there idea was raised that Ghana may liberalise 
30% of cocoa exports. 
 
o What were the main reasons/incentives for this? 
o What were the main risks? 
o What has changed since then, such that the policy has not been 
implemented? 
 
2. The CMC and global cocoa market performance.  
 
 Can you think of any examples of the way in which the external market has 
responded to Ghana’s increased production and consistent quality performance 
in recent years?  
o Is this a reflection of the increased level of supply risk coming from other 
producers? 
 
 In your opinion does the market adequately value the quality of Ghanaian 
cocoa?  
o How has this premium changed in response to improved technology, but 
also declining cocoa quality in other markets?  
 
 Is there an increased risk in pan seasonal pricing in relation to current and 
future supply side risks in global cocoa?      
 
 Are buyers beginning to extend cover further in response to supply side risks? 
 
3. The CMC and changes in cocoa market structure. 
 
 How have the changes in the structure in the external market impacted upon 
the functions of the Cocobod? [Methods of transporting, bulking, purchasing, 
links with trade houses, contracting] 
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 How has the concentration that has taken place in the external market the 
Cocobod’s relationship with the key players in the supply chain? 
 
4. The CMC and changing cocoa standards and supply requirements.  
 
 Does the Cocobod/CMC actively engage with the cocoa industry on aspects of 
the industries supply requirements? [quality grades, crop balance, 
sustainability, health and safety]. 
 
 How flexible is the Cocobod quality control system in response to industry 
needs in these areas? 
 
 In relation to the proliferation of alternative grades and standards systems, such 
as organic cocoa and fair-trade etc; does the CMC consider alternative supply 
channels as an aspect of the Cocobod’s future model? 
 
 In relation to the Cocobod’s market leadership on meeting certification 
requirements;  
 
o What are the main factors that have enabled Ghana to take leadership in 
this area? 
o Has the external market actively responded to the Cocobod’s 
achievements in this area?      
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Section 5 – The growth of origin processing and the role of the Cocobod. 
 
1. The main reasons behind the current surge in origin processing activities? i.e. why 
now? 
 
2. The main benefits to Ghana of the growth in origin processing? 
 
3. How has the relationship between the processing firms and the Cocobod changed 
since the recent surge of investments? 
o Are there any advantages to the Cocobod in this area? 
 
4. The linkages between the Cocobod and origin processors? [communication, policy 
adjustments] 
 
5. Will these investments have an impact at the farmer level? 
 
6. The main benefits for the processing firms in Cocobod’s opinion? 
 
7. Do the Cocobod actively attract entrants into this market?  
 
8. The capacity to learn from industrial/technological capabilities of origin 
processors?  
 
9. Have any specific mechanisms been put in place to achieve industrial learning? 
 
10. How have the Cocobod attempted to encourage the development of Ghanaian 
processing firms?  
 
11. Has there been an attempt to encourage strategic alliances between Ghanaian firms 
and foreign firms? 
 
12. How have the Cocobod been able to learn from the policies of the past to facilitate 
development in this area?  
 
13. Increased competition for supply - have the Cocobod had to make any adjustments 
in their model in response to this? 
 
14. Supply requirements – will the origin grinding firms fulfil their entire supply 
requirements with the Ghanaian crop? 
 
15. Do the Cocobod have any concerns over the size and power of the companies 
investing in origin processing?  
o Is this something that has to be considered when screening potential 
investments? 
 
16. Are there restrictions on the market share any one company can hold? 
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17. Do you expect origin processing to continue to grow in Ghana?  
 
18. Is there an ideal balance between origin processing and exporting?  
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Section 6 – The Future of the Partial Liberalisation Model. 
 
1. In reference to the IMF/WB pressure that the Cocobod faced in the 1990’s and early 
20th Century - has this period of pressure now passed?  
 
2. As such, in its current state do you think the model of partial liberalisation is stable? 
 
3. Is support for the current model reflected in donor level policy? 
 
4. Is further reform a possibility?  
 
5. Is the 70/30 export market liberalisation still a possibility? 
 
6. What are the main goals of the Cocobod? 
o In the Short-term [1-4 years] 
o In the long term [5-10 years] 
 
7. What challenges are expected in meeting these goals?   
 
8. What actions are the Cocobod taking to overcome these challenges?  
 
9.  Will the current model have to be adjusted to meet these goals? 
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Appendix Seven – LBC Round One Interview Guide 
 
 
Section 1 – The functions of the Cocobod. 
 
Objective – ascertain how the role of the Cocobod impacts upon the operation of LBC’s in 
the market and more specifically how the functions of the Cocobod impact upon the level 
of coordination and risk faced by LBC’s in the market. 
 
Section 2 – Linkages between buyers and farmers. 
 
Objective – To establish the nature of linkages between buyers and farmers, and the 
incentive for buyers to invest in farmer upgrading.  I am also interested in the risks buyers 
face when investing in farmers and the impact of the Cocobod model in shaping the 
relationship between buyers and farmers. 
 
Section 3 – Linkages between buyers.  
 
Objective – To establish the nature of competition between buyers in the market and the 
impact of the PBC in this area. I am also interested in the existence of buyer networks and 
the role of such networks at an operational and policy level.  
 
Section 4 – The Partial Liberalisation Model.  
 
Objective – To establish the benefits of the partial liberalisation model and the 
adjustments that have been made to this model in recent years.  We also want to establish 
the major challenges, and the balance of responsibility for market development, that exist 
within the partial liberalisation model. 
 
Section 5 – Linkages between buyers and the Cocobod. 
 
Objective – To establish the level of communication between buyers and the Cocobod, both 
individually and collectively. I also want to explore the potential for change as a result of 
communication between buyers and the Cocobod, and the credibility of the Cocobod as a 
market regulator.    
 
Section 6 - The future of the partial liberalisation model. 
 
Objective – To establish the likelihood and possible direction of future change in the 
Cocobod model, as well as the changes necessary to meet the Cocobod’s future objectives.  
I also want to establish the risks and opportunities that future change would present, and 
the likely impact of Ghana’s current surge in processing investments.    
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Section 7 – Comparative Questions. 
 
Objective – To establish how the model of the Cocobod impacts upon risks faced by buyers 
in Ghana, as opposed to buyers in other producing countries. 
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 Section 1 – The Functions of the Cocobod. 
 
1. Quality control and the QCD: 
 
 What are the main advantages of quality control in the internal market? 
 What is the main reason for Ghana’s quality performance? 
 Does the function of quality control reduce the level of risk faced by buyers? 
 What is the buyer’s role in the quality control function? 
 Who has responsibility in the case of quality failure? 
 Are there any mechanisms through which a farmer can cheat a buyer with 
quality? 
 Is the QCD system of grading accurate? 
 Are farmers appropriately rewarded for the quality they produce? 
 How do changing quality requirements in the external market impact on the 
local buyers market? 
 Would the Cocobod system [or something similar] remain intact in a private 
market setting?  
o What changes would be made?   
o Would the same standard of quality still be enforced? 
 Do buyers recognise the link between quality control internally and the 
Cocobod’s role within the external market? 
 Declining quality? 
o If so, who is responsible?  
 
 
2. Fixed Pricing: 
 What are the main benefits of this for the farmer? 
 Does the mechanism of fixed pricing have any advantages at the buyer level?  
 In your opinion is fixed pricing justified through its impact on the farmer’s 
quality performance?  
 
3. Buyer licensing requirements:  
 
 Do you recognise the reasoning behind the mandated aspects of the Cocobod 
buyer’s model? 
 Do you think that any aspects of this model are more valid than others?  
 
4. Inputs and extension: 
 
 By providing these functions to farmers does this increase buyers confidence in 
the farmer performance? 
 Do they reduce the level of perceived risk in the market –  
o I.e do they reduce the services buyers need to provide to farmers, or, 
limit the risk of crop failure? 
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 Can you think of any examples where the Cocobod’s provision of inputs and 
extension has improved the performance of the market? 
 Do you feel the training of farmers by the Cocobod greatly affects the 
capabilities and performance of farmers? 
 Do you think the Cocobod have an advantage in this area?  
 
5. Seed –funding: 
 Is this a necessity, or are there viable alternatives? 
 Does this affect your attitude towards the other functions of the Cocobod? 
 Sources of credit for working capital? 
 
6. Sanction:  
 Are the rules of the Cocobod actively enforced? 
 Does this increase your confidence in the market? 
 Is the threat of sanction/licence revoke ever used in an unfair manner? 
 
7. Operating margins – how have these changed in recent years?  
 
8. Based on the Cocobod’s buying rules, what degree of freedom do buying companies 
have to employ their own business models and differentiate themselves from 
competitors in the market?  
 
9. Can you think of any way in which the functions of the Cocobod improves the level 
of cohesion between the different actors in the market? 
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Section 2 – Linkages between buyers and farmers. 
 
1. The relationship between buyers and farmers. 
 
 What is the structure of a typical trading relationship? 
 Mechanisms of communication between buyers and farmers? 
 The regularity of communication. 
 The goal of communication.  
 Do long-term trading relationships develop? 
 What are the advantages to the buyer of such relationships? 
 What mechanisms do buyers use to establish such relationships? 
 
2. Investments at the farmer level. 
 
 The type of investments made at the farmer level. 
 The incentive to invest at the farmer level. 
 Do buyers use this as a mechanism to compete, or, simply make the market 
function? 
 How does the model of the Cocobod affect the incentive to invest at the 
farmer level? 
 Has this changed at all in recent years? 
 How do you choose which farmers to invest in? 
 Can LBC’s easily differentiate between farmers based on performance? 
 The risk of investing in farmers – examples of opportunism?  
 Mechanisms buyers use to reduce risk, i.e. limit the risk of default? 
 Do buyers recognise a link between farmer inputs and cocoa quality? 
 
3. Farmer organisation. 
 
 Preferred mode of farmer organisation?  
 Buyers capacity to effect farmer organisation?  
 Is the small-holder model suitable to the model of partial liberalisation? 
 
4. Has there been much development of the rural environment in recent years?  
 
 Farmers access to credit and inputs. 
 Transport infrastructure. 
 Information systems. 
 
 
5. Can you think of any way in which the Cocobod has encouraged improved linkages 
between buyers and farmers? 
 For example have the Cocobod ever encouraged LBC’s to take on more 
responsibility for farmer inputs and credit? 
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Section 3 – Linkages between buyers.  
 
1. Competition in the LBC market: 
 
 The extent of LBC competition in the market. 
 The main areas of competition. 
 The incentive to compete. 
 Market share restrictions. 
 
2. The role of the PBC.  
 
 How does this impact upon the level of competition in the market? 
 How has the level of competition changed as the PBC’s share of the market 
decreases? 
 Has the role of the Cocobod in the internal market changed since the reduction 
of the PBC’s share of the market? 
 As a buyer of last resort does the PBC purchase cocoa in more remote areas 
where other buyers would not? 
 Does the PBC have preferential access to any services of the Cocobod that other 
buyers do not? 
 
3. The extent of buyer networks: 
 
 The existence of a network between buyers. 
 The strength of linkages between buyers in the network. 
 The purpose of buyer networks. 
 The form of these linkages [formal or informal]. 
 Do other networks exist outside of the main buyer’s network? 
 The importance of cross networks with other companies? [parent companies, or 
haulage companies] 
 The role of the PBC: Is the PBC involved in LBC networks? Does the PBC affect 
the influence of buyer’s networks?  
 
 
4. The operation and function of linkages between buyers? 
o Any examples of where buyers have coordinated with impact at the 
farmer/operational level? [i.e. information exchange leading to sanction].  
 
5. Any examples where buyers have coordinated with impact the Cocobod/policy 
level? 
 
6. Any examples of where buyers have coordinated to establish competition 
policy/agreements? 
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7. Risk of free riding – any examples where another buyer has been able to capture 
the benefit of an investment made by other buyer or a group of other buyers? 
 
8. As a buyers association would it be possible for the LBC’s to provide inputs as a 
public good? 
 
9. Are there better lines of communication established between the buyers who have 
been in the market for longer? 
 
10. Have fluctuations in the market personnel impacted upon the ability of buyers to 
establish a stronger buyers association? 
 
11. The capacity of current buyers to self regulate the market?  
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Section 4 – The Partial Liberalisation Model.  
 
 
1. What is your opinion of the partial liberalisation model as a mode of market 
organisation? 
 
2. To what extent is Ghana’s improved performance in recent years attributed to the 
changes since partial liberalisation?   
 
3. What improvements have been made to the partial model model in recent years? 
 
4. Have there been any improvements in the operational efficiency of the Cocobod in 
recent years?   
 
5. Have there been any recognisable changes in the market environment as the model 
has developed? 
 
6. What are the major challenges that still exist within this model? 
 
7. In what areas are buyers responsible for internal investment and upgrading of the 
market?  
 
8. Are there problems defining the boundaries of responsibility based on the 
interaction between the private sector and the state in this model? 
 
9. Do you feel the LBC’s could take any of the Cocobod’s responsibilities in the 
market? 
o If so, in what areas in particular and why?  
 
10. Is the credibility of this model compromised by the role of Cocobod subsidiaries in 
the liberalised local buying market?   
 
11. Is the success of the Ghanaian cocoa market dependent on the role of the Cocobod? 
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Section 5 – Linkages between buyers and the Cocobod 
 
 
1. How would you describe your own company’s relationship with the Cocobod? 
 
2. Do you have regular communication with the Cocobod?  
 
3. Example outcome of communication at the individual level? 
 
4. Do some LBC’s have stronger links with the Cocobod than others? 
 
5. How are the LBC’s represented at a policy level? 
 
o Is this effective? 
o Is it representative of the LBC’s? 
o Is communication regular? 
 
6. Change of leadership in the Cocobod – how has this changed the relationship 
between the Cocobod and the LBC’s? 
 
7. Earlier we were talking about the investments made by buyers in the market; does 
the Cocobod in anyway recognise the contribution of buyers in this area? 
 
8. Do the Cocobod recognise the increased importance of the LBC function in the 
market since the increase in output? 
o  Does this give the LBC’s greater force to effect change? 
 
9. In your opinion are there any areas of the Cocobod model where LBC’s have a 
greater capacity to effect change than others? 
 
10. Can you think of any examples where the Cocobod has taken action to encourage 
investment from the LBC’s? 
 
11. Have the Cocobod encouraged LBC’s to invest in other aspects of the model beyond 
your traditional role as buyers? 
 
12. Credibility of the Cocobod’s regulation; in investments [examples] 
  
o Risk of policy reversal. 
o Credibility in complementary investments. 
o Risk of free riding – ability to capture the benefit of an investment made by 
other buyer or a group of other buyers. 
o Examples of Cocobod taking action to increase credibility. 
 
13. In your opinion what has caused the current infrastructure deficit in the Ghanaian 
supply chain? 
427 | P a g e  
 
427 
 
Section 6 - The Future of the Partial Liberalisation Model. 
 
 
1. What would buyers prefer to see – for the state to upgrade the infrastructure of the 
current model? Or, for the model to change such the there is more room for the 
private sector to invest in upgrading? 
 
2. What aspects of the Cocobod model would you choose to keep in the situation of 
further reform?  
 
3. How do you think farmers would respond to further changes in the model?  
o Do farmers express an opinion on the role of the Cocobod in the market?  
 
4. Do you perceive further liberalisation as a risk or an opportunity?  
o Do you think this attitude would be shared by the other LBC’s? 
 
5. What major changes are needed for the Cocobod to reach its 1,000,000 tonne 
objective?  
o Is this realistic in the current model? 
 
6. In your opinion what is the most likely outcome to problems in the LBC market? 
 
o Increased investment by the Cocobod. 
o Private sector investment. 
o Greater incentive in for the private sector, including change in the PL model. 
o No change – what are the consequences of this? 
 
7. Processing investments: 
o How is this likely to impact upon the internal buying market? 
o In your opinion will the requirements of origin processing lead to changes in 
the current Cocobod model? 
o Have you observed a different relationship between the Cocobod and 
processing companies, compared to the one that exists between Cocobod 
and the LBC’s?   
 
10.  Do you think LBC’s will be able to export cocoa in the future? [30/70] 
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Section 7 – Comparative Questions [only for Olam and Armajaro] 
 
1. How does the partial liberalisation model compare against the alternative models 
used in other countries? 
 Levels of risk faced by buyers. 
 Incentives for investment. 
 Rewards available. 
 Infrastructure development. 
 
2. How does the nature of competition in the Ghanaian internal buying market differ 
from the competition in other producing countries? 
 
3. Do you consider the internal buying market in Ghana to be a liberal buying market? 
 
4. Are the mandated requirements of the Cocobod similar to the set-up used by 
buyers in other countries?   
 
5. Have you been able to learn anything from the role of the Cocobod? 
 
6. Is the Ghanaian model dependent on the specific role of the Cocobod, or do you 
think the same model could be used in other countries? 
 
7. Do farmers in Ghana demonstrate a more advanced level of skills and capacity than 
farmers in other countries?  
 
8. As a global buyer as well as a local buyer do you have a greater 
respect/understanding of the Cocobod model, based on: 
o The Cocobod’s role within the external market. 
o Experiences of buying in other countries. 
 
9. Is there greater justification for the role of the Cocobod due to the instabilities 
witnessed in other cocoa producing nations in recent years? 
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Appendix Eight – External Buyers Round One Interview Guide 
 
 
Objective 1 – Understanding the role of the Cocobod as the link between the national 
market and global actors in the cocoa supply chain.  
 
1.      The role of the Cocobod as the sole institution linking the 
national market with the external market for cocoa, based on three main 
areas: 
  
o The Cocobod's ability to meet the current and future supply requirements of the 
industry. 
o The Cocobod's role in engaging with, and creating a credible platform for, private 
sector investment. 
o The ability for the external market to link 'sustainability' orientated investments 
into the Cocobod model at the 
producer level.  
 
2.      How changes in the market structure at the global level of the 
cocoa chain are likely to impact on the Cocobod model of market organisation. 
 
Objective 2 – Understanding how the model of market organisation in Ghana affects the 
operations of external buyers. 
 
1. The advantages of operating under the Ghanaian system, based on experiences in 
Ghana and by comparison with other cocoa producing countries. 
2. The challenges posed by operating under the Ghanaian system, based on 
experiences in Ghana and by comparison with other producing countries. 
 
Objective 3 – Understanding the linkages between external buyers and other segments of 
the cocoa supply chain.  This segment is focused on how such linkages are affected by the 
role of the Cocobod in the Ghanaian market. 
 
1. The linkages between external buyer operations in Ghana and operations in 
Northern segments of the cocoa supply chain. 
2. The linkages between external buyers and the producer segments of the cocoa 
supply chain in Ghana. 
3. The linkages between external buyers and the Cocobod [i.e. the level of positive 
dialogue and the specific mechanisms through which communication takes place]. 
4.  The linkages between external buyers and other cocoa buyers/processors [by this 
I do not mean aspects of collusion, but rather the levels of competition, or, 
coordination affecting operational aspects i.e. buyers associations]  
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Section 1 - Export Buyers Supply Requirements   
 
1. What is Ghanaian cocoa’s greatest source of competitive advantage?  
 
2. Which of these factors gives the Cocobod greatest legitimacy in the market? [i.e. 
which would not take place in absence of the Cocobod]  
 
3. In your opinion what is the main source of Ghana’s premium?  
 
4. Given the current quality produced in other origins is Ghana’s premium a fair 
reflection of the quality they produce?  
o Why might this not be the case? 
 
5. Can Ghana’s quality performance be directly attributed to the role of the Cocobod? 
 
6. Do you think that quality would remain in absence of the Cocobod?   
 
7. How has the premium for Ghana cocoa changed in response to improved 
technology, but also declining cocoa quality in other markets? 
 
8. Does the industry have any incentive to establish a quality control system, similar 
to that of the Cocobod, throughout the mainstream market? 
 
9. Is quality likely to remain a viable source of competitive advantage in the future 
with improved technology in cocoa processing? 
 
10. How has the reputation of the Cocobod changed in recent years? 
 
11. Any examples of how the industry has responded to Ghana’s improved 
performance in recent years? 
 
12. How have the supply requirements of the cocoa industry changed in recent years? 
o Supply Risk 
o Changing demand patterns. 
o Alternative grades and standards – Changing quality convention? 
o Improved technology. 
 
13. Does the Cocobod/CMC actively engage with the cocoa industry on aspects of the 
industries supply requirements? 
 
14. Any examples where the Cocobod has responded to the industries requirements in 
this area? 
 
15. Are private grades and standards of importance to future supply arrangements in 
the mainstream cocoa market?   
o Do you think this will have any impact on the model of the Cocobod. 
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Section 2 - Investment in Origin Processing: 
 
o What are the main incentives to setting up origin processing facilities in Ghana? 
 
o What has been the main motivation behind the recent surge in investment activity? 
[state policy, supply security, technology] 
 
o Are beans purchased at origin priced differently to beans purchased for export? 
 
o Are processed cocoa products taxed differently than raw beans?  
 
o What are the implications of processing premium quality beans? 
 
o Is bean flavour an important as aspect of processing at origin? 
 
o Will processing firms fulfil their entire supply requirement from the Ghanaian 
crop? 
 
o Do processing firms have the option to purchase beans from other origins to use in 
their Ghanaian factories? 
 
o Do you think the growth of origin processing in Ghana will require adjustments in 
the Cocobod model? 
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Section 3 - Coordination between Cocobod and Local Processors  
 
 
1. Do you have regular communication with the Cocobod?  
 
2. Example outcome of communication at the individual level? 
 
3. Do some processors have stronger links with the Cocobod than others? 
 
4. How are the processors represented at a policy level? 
 
o Is this effective? 
o Is it representative of the processors? 
o Is communication regular? 
o Examples in this area? 
 
5. How have the changes in the structure in the cocoa supply chain impacted upon the 
model of the Cocobod? [Methods of transporting, bulking, purchasing, links with 
trade houses, contracting] 
 
6. Have origin processors been working with the Cocobod to facilitate learning and 
industrialisation in Ghanaian cocoa?  
 
7. Do you think the environment in Ghana and the role of the Cocobod helps to 
facilitate this process?  
 
8. How does the policy environment and degree of positive communication with the 
market regulator in Ghana, compare with that experienced in other producer 
countries?  
 
9. Key differences of operating under the partial liberalisation model, compared with 
other producer country markets? [Comparative] 
 
10. Do you recognise a link between the Cocobod’s role as the monopoly exporter and 
their control of supply within the Ghanaian internal market? 
 
11. Do you recognise the importance of the link between the role of the Cocobod and 
the country perspective of Ghana?   
 
12. Changes in the Cocobod environment in recent years?  
 
13. How has the Cocobod’s regulation of the industry changed since the growth in 
market entry into local processing?  
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14. What aspects of the Cocobod model would you choose to keep in the situation of 
further reform?  
 
15. What aspects of the model do you think other cocoa markets would learn from? 
 
16. Credibility of Cocobod as a market regulator? 
 
Possible topics -   
o Risk of policy reversal/unilateral policy decisions  
o Credibility in complementary investments. 
o Risk of free riding – i.e. rent capture. 
o Examples of Cocobod taking action to increase credibility. 
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Section 4 - Links between Origin Processors  
 
1. Competition in the origin processing market in Ghana. 
 
2. The extent of buyer networks: 
o The existence of linkages between external buyers. 
o The strength of these linkages. 
o The form of these linkages. 
o Multiple networks within the processors market.  
o The importance of cross networks with other companies? [parent 
companies, or haulage companies] 
 
3. Has network activity increased since the recent surge in market entry?  
 
4. Do buyer networks in other cocoa producing countries reflect the industries 
capacity to self regulate? 
 
5. Could buyer networks work to a similar extent in Ghana in future years? 
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Section 5 - Links between Ghana based processors and other segments of the cocoa 
chain. 
 
1. Intra-firm networks – the extent of these and how they operate? 
 
2. How has the development of origin processing facilities benefiting from your 
experience of operating in the Western countries? 
 
3. How has the development of origin processing facilities been able to benefit from 
your experience of operating in other developing countries? 
 
4. Have improved transport infrastructure and information systems throughout the 
supply chain encouraged a growth in origin processing?  
 
5. Has the expansion of origin processing been motivated by the increased 
outsourcing/supply contracts focused on the grinding segment?  
 
6. Does this give processing firms greater security in fulfilling contracts for 
downstream manufacturers? 
 
7. What is the operational capacity of grinding at origin, i.e. can they fulfil complex 
supply requirements?  
 
8. What are the logistical advantages to processing at origin – does it allow you to by-
pass a stage in the downstream end of the chain?  
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Section 6 - Sustainable investments and linkages at the producer level. 
 
 
1. What are the main objectives behind the growth of investment in sustainable 
supply chains? 
 
2. Do the Cocobod actively engage with the industry on the best way to achieve these 
goals? 
 
3. Does the example set by the Cocobod on sustainable development issues, such as 
child labour  
 
o Enhance the Cocobod’s reputation in the external market?  
o Encourage increased investment in sustainability? 
o Act as a source of competitive advantage for Ghana? 
o Have contracts responded to this? 
 
4. In your opinion what has enabled the Ghana to be more effective in this area? 
 
5. Is the industry able to coordinate its sustainability related investments with the 
Cocobod program? 
 
6. Does the role of the Cocobod in any way affect the industries level of engagement in 
sustainability in Ghana?    
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Section 7 - The Future of the Cocobod model. 
 
1. What would you perceive as the main risks of further reform in the Ghanaian 
model? 
 
2. In what areas would you like to see change?  
 
3. Based on the current level of support for the Cocobod in the external market, do 
you feel the Cocobod is under any pressure to change?  
 
4. What changes may be needed in the current model in response to: 
 
o Increased competition in origin grinding. 
 
o Supply Requirements of industry and changing quality standards. 
 
o Cocobod’s 1,000,000 tonnes goal. 
 
o Challenges in the current operating environment 
 
 
438 | P a g e  
 
438 
 
Appendix Nine – Cocobod Round Two Interview Guide 
 
 
Section 1 – The Cocobod’s reasoning behind liberalisation 
 
This section will attempt to understand the Cocobod’s justification for the initial 
liberalisation reforms in 1992. It is also important to understand the Cocobod’s concerns 
in relation to liberal change, and how the liberal model has performed as compared the 
former monopsony model. 
 
Section 2 – The Functions of the Cocobod in the Internal Buying Market.  
 
 The functions of the Cocobod in quality control, input and extension provision and 
farmer security. 
 The Cocobod’s management of its subsidiary bodies. 
 How has the way in which the Cocobod delivers these services changed over the 
years? 
 
Section 3 – The linkages between Cocobod and the LBC’s. 
 
 The extent and impact of LBC competition in the market? 
 The distribution of seed-funding, and delivery quota?   
 Regulation and sanction in the LBC market? 
 The Cocobod’s relationship with Licobag? 
 
Section 4 – The linkages between the Cocobod and Export buyers. 
 
 The competitive advantage of Ghana cocoa and Ghana’s quality reputation? 
 The CMC and the changing structure of the global cocoa chain?  
 The CMC and export buyers supply requirements. 
 
Section 5 – The growth of origin processing and the role of the Cocobod. 
 
 The motivation behind the current surge in origin processing? 
 The benefits Ghana can expect from the growth of origin processing? 
 The relationship between Cocobod and origin processors? 
 Competition in the origin processing market? 
 
Section 6 – The future of the current Cocobod model. 
 
The objective of this section is to understand if liberalisation has achieved the results that 
were expected at the beginning of reform, and how the objectives of reform have changed 
during the years since the initial liberalisation. It is also important to assess the Cocobod 
attitude towards change in the future, and the possible areas in which change might be of 
benefit. 
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Section 1 – The Cocobod’s motivation towards liberalisation. 
 
1. When Ghana began the process of liberalisation in 1992, what were the main 
reasons for this?  
 
2. Do you think liberalisation is something the Cocobod would have undertaken 
without the encouragement of the World Bank/IMF? 
 
3. In the initial stages, how was the process of liberalisation received within the 
Cocobod? 
 
4. What were the main concerns?  
 
5. What was the Cocobod’s experience of multi-buying system prior to the 1992 
reforms?  
 
6. How did this past experience affect the Cocobod’s attitude towards 1992 reforms?  
o Does this attitude still exist? 
 
7. What were perceived as the main benefits that would result from the 1992 
reforms? 
 
8. At this current time how does the Cocobod perceive the performance of the partial 
liberalisation model? 
 
9. How does this compare with the former monopsony model? 
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Section 2 – The Functions of the Cocobod in the Internal Buying Market.  
 
1.  Quality Control. 
 
 What are the key factors behind Ghana’s consistent quality production? 
 How do the Cocobod ensure that quality standards are maintained?    
 Where quality standards have declined, what has been the cause of this? 
 Is there any particular stage of the season where quality problems occur with 
greater frequency?  
 What methods of sanction are used in the case of poor performance? [exact] 
 In your opinion who has the greatest responsibility for quality at the up country 
level?  
o How has this changed over the years? 
 What is the buyer’s role in quality?  
o How has this changed over the years since liberalisation?  
 In your opinion what are the key aspects of the Cocobod’s quality control system 
that differentiates it from a private sector system?   
 
1a. QCD Credibility  
 
 Where Cocoa is passed at the up country level and then failed at the port, why 
might this occur?  
 What actions have been taken to ensure that cocoa grading up country is not open 
to manipulation? 
 What actions have been taken to ensure that cocoa cannot be changed during 
transit by an LBC?  
o How can you detect when this has taken place? 
 Would the Cocobod consider taking over cocoa up country to avoid this problem? 
 Where cocoa is failed at the port, what is the process of investigation to find out 
why this change in quality has occurred?  
o How can you accurately determine who is at fault?  
o What sources of information are used? 
 What mechanism of appeal can be used by the LBC’s?  
o How often is this used?  
o Would you consider independent arbitration? 
 Where it is found that a bribe has been taken, who do you hold accountable? 
o Why do you think that greater responsibility should be borne by this party? 
 Why in cases of QCD mal-practice do you only hold the individual accountable, 
whereas for the LBC’s management is also accountable?  
 Has the problem of QCD rent seeking only occurred since the introduction of 
private buyers?  
o Has it been getting worse?  
o Why? 
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 To what extent does the Cocobod get involved in the management of subsidiaries? 
 To what extent does the QCD act independently of the Cocobod? 
 How does the Cocobod’s management of subsidiaries differ from the way in which 
they manage LBC’s?  
 Is there variation in subsidiary management? 
 Do you think that the Cocobod is justified in treating subsidiaries in a different way 
to LBC’s? Why?  
 How would you assess the current performance of the QCD? 
 During the purple bean problem, how much responsibility did the QCD take for 
accepting beans that were then rejected on the market?  
o What was the Cocobod’s response to QCD hold-up? 
 Given that the accountability of QCD officers is a major concern for LBC’s, what 
actions have been taken to eradicate the problem of bribes? 
 Have you experienced many problems controlling the actions of your employees in 
the field? 
 Have the Cocobod taken any steps to ensure that the QCD and CMC operate in the 
manner of a private sector organisation? 
 
1b. Export Quality Requirements:  
 
 How has the Cocobod been able to adjust to changes in quality grades and 
standards? 
 The mechanisms used by the Cocobod to communicate changes in quality grades 
and standards – what are the main challenges faced in this area?  
 
2.   Provision of fertilisers. 
 
 What has been the Cocobod’s experience of providing fertilisers to farmers?   
 Why have Cocobod changed from providing fertilisers on credit, to a subsidy 
program?  
 What mechanisms are being used to ensure success of this policy?  
o How do they differ from those used in the past? 
 What mechanisms are used to ensure the recovery of loans for fertiliser? 
 In the past have the Cocobod been able to use the LBC function to distribute inputs 
at the farmer level?  
o What was the Cocobod’s motivation for this?  
o Describe your experience with this program? 
 How has this experience affected your attitude towards working with LBC’s in this 
area in the future? 
 What would have to change before you would consider working with LBC’s in this 
area in the future? 
 What has been the Cocobod’s experience of working with Weinco? 
 Do you consider Weinco as a possible replacement for the Cocobod’s role in 
fertiliser provision to farmers? 
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2a. Mass Spraying  
 
 What are the Cocobod’s long-term plans for the mass-spraying exercise? 
 Are the Cocobod happy with their current performance in this area? 
 What are the main constraints to change in this area? 
 Would the Cocobod ever consider private sector alternatives for this function? 
 Again, would Cocobod ever consider the possibility of a greater partnership with 
LBC’s in this area?  
 
2b. Transition of input responsibility  
 
 What do you think are the main constraints to LBC’s becoming more involved in the 
provision of inputs to farmers? 
 How do Cocobod plan to change the farmer attitude that all inputs should be 
provided by the government for free? [reward based]  
 How do you think LBC’s would respond if Cocobod decided to stop providing inputs 
for farmers? 
 
2c.  Farmer Extension  
 
 Is there active coordination between the department responsible for input delivery 
and the department responsible for extension? Examples of success in this area?  
 How has the change in extension services impacted upon the distribution of 
information developed by CRIG? 
 How has the buyer’s role in farmer training changed in recent years? 
 How have you encouraged buyers to take on more responsibility in this area? 
 Do you see buyers as a viable solution to farmer training in the long run?  
 
 
3.   Farmer Security. 
 
 What is the main objective of the fixed price mechanism in Ghanaian cocoa? 
 Has the smuggling problem this season caused any change of attitude on the fixed 
pricing mechanism? 
 Who is to blame for the smuggling problems witnessed this season? 
 
 Do the Cocobod consider the development of farmer cooperatives as a beneficial 
option in the future? 
 In your opinion what would be the advantages of this system? 
 Why have the Cocobod not encouraged cooperative development in the past? 
 Who has the responsibility to lead development in this area?  
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Section 3 – The linkage between Cocobod and the LBC’s.  
 
1. In your opinion how important is the role of the LBC to the functioning of the internal 
market? 
 
2. To what extent is the Cocobod now dependent on the role of the LBC’s? 
 
3. LBC Competition? 
 
 In your opinion what are the main incentives for buyers to become involved in the 
internal buying market?  
 Do the Cocobod actively encourage entry? 
 On what basis do you evaluate applications for entry? 
 How do you ensure that the market does not contain inefficient LBC’s?  
 Do the Cocobod attempt to regulate the level of competition in the market? 
 Are there an ideal number of buyers Cocobod would like to see it the market?  
 Has the Cocobod attempted to adjust licensing requirements to achieve this? 
 What do you think would be the impact of a smaller number of buyers? 
 What do you think would be the impact of a larger number of buyers? 
 Do you think there is a danger of making the market overly competitive? 
 As the number of buyers has increased, how has this impacted upon the Cocobod’s 
management of the market? 
 
 How has competition changed between LBC’s since the beginning of liberalisation? 
 What have been the main positives resulting from competition?  
 Are the Cocobod aware that many buyers are now retracting from the provision of 
services to farmers?   
 How can Cocobod improve the link between farmers and buyers? 
 What have been the main negatives resulting from competition? 
 Was quality decline a problem during the early years of liberalisation?  
o Why has this only become a problem in recent years? 
 In your opinion what is the dominant strategy pursued by most LBC’s? 
 Have Cocobod had to make adjustments to their own operations based on the way 
in which buyers compete in the market? [I.e. speed of turnover, quality] 
 
 Would the Cocobod like to see more foreign buyers? 
 
 Why have Cocobod improved conditions for buyers this season?  
o How did you expect this to affect the market? 
 
  3a. The role of the PBC. 
 
 How would you assess the current performance of the PBC? 
 Do the Cocobod still have links with the PBC? 
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 How has this relationship changed since the PBC was privatised?  
 Does the Cocobod recognise the credibility issues surrounding their relationship 
with the PBC?  
o How does the Cocobod plan to distance itself from the PBC in the long run? 
 Do you think the PBC’s reduction in market share has had a positive affect on the 
market? 
 Why do you think it has taken the PBC so long to respond to market conditions and 
operate like a private sector organisation?  
 Do you think the PBC could compete in the market without any additional support 
from the state? 
 Do you think firms like the PBC & CPC should receive state support because they 
are not accustomed with a competitive market culture? 
 Do you think the PBC performs a necessary role in the market? [buyer of last 
resort/hold-up]  
 
4.  Cocobod Supply Chain Management: Seed Funding, Quota and the Buyers Margin.  
 
 To what extent do you feel that buyers are dependent on the seed-fund? 
 Does seed-funding offer any benefit to the Cocobod? 
 Is this a service that you will attempt to maintain in the long run? Or is it the 
ultimate goal to have buyers independently financed? 
 On what basis do you distribute seed-funding? 
 How can buyers apply for additional seed-funding? Is there a lot of competition in 
this area? 
 
 On what basis do the Cocobod distribute delivery quota to LBC’s? 
 How can an LBC acquire additional quota?    
 In the past have the Cocobod rented warehouses during periods of congestion? 
 Given that congestion has been a problem for several seasons, why did it take the 
Cocobod until recently to update takeover centres?  
 What was your main incentive to improve the takeover centres?  
 Is there any incentive for Cocobod to increase the speed of cocoa turnover? 
 Do the Cocobod have any plans to move away from the quota system?  
o If not, how can the Cocobod meet buyer needs in this area?  
 Have the Cocobod ever considered transferring responsibility for takeover and 
warehousing to the private sector? 
 Did the Cocobod expect LBC’s to increase their speed of turnover in response to 
market competition? 
 Do the Cocobod offer any concessions to LBC’s when they have been delayed during 
the takeover of cocoa?  
 How do you decide the buyer’s margin? 
 Does the margin fluctuate in response to international price changes? 
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5.  Cocobod sanction within the LBC market. 
 
 How has the extent of mal-practice changed since the beginning of partial 
liberalisation?  
o How has it changed in recent years?  
o Why have Cocobod increased the number of sanctions in recent years? 
 How has this affected the relationship between Cocobod and the LBC’s? 
 How do the Cocobod monitor the actions of LBC’s in the field?  
o Has this been affected by the change if extension services? 
 How do the Cocobod investigate claims made against an LBC? 
 What mechanism of appeal can be used by an LBC when they have been 
sanctioned? 
 Do LBC’s regularly employ their right to appeal? 
 Buyers suggest the need for an independent arbitrator for cases of appeal, is this 
something that the Cocobod have ever considered? 
 Where the ‘agent’ or PC of an LBC is found to have committed an offence, who is 
held accountable? 
 Do you feel there is a possibility that by sanctioning LBC’s so strictly, this will affect 
their incentive to invest in other aspects of the system e.g. farmers? 
 
6.  Operational Risk  
 
 Why do the Cocobod enforce the model that buying agents must be registered with 
an LBC?  
 Why can an LBC not use a third party to buy cocoa at the local level? 
 Where LBC’s suffer the problem of cheating from their PC’s what can the Cocobod 
do to help eradicate this problem? 
 Do you think that Akuafo Cheque is a viable long-term solution? 
 Where LBC’s suffer from the ant-competitive practices of other buyer, what can the 
Cocobod do to help eradicate this problem?  
 
7.  Cocobod and Licobag  
 
 How would you describe the Cocobod’s relationship with Licobag? 
 How has the Licobag affected communication between Cocobod and the LBC’s?  
 How has Licobag affected the nature of the relationship between Cocobod and the 
LBC’s? 
 How regularly do the Cocobod communicate with Licobag? 
 Do Cocobod communicate more regularly with LBC’s on either an individual or the 
Licobag level? 
 Can you think of any examples were communication between Cocobod and Licobag 
has led to positive change? 
 Would the Cocobod ever consider working with Licobag to help eradicate problems 
of mal-practice in the field?  
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Section 4 – The Linkages between Cocobod and the external market.  
 
1. In your opinion what are the main sources of Ghana’s competitive advantage in the 
export market for cocoa? 
 
2. What are the main factors affecting the premium paid for Ghanaian cocoa? 
 
3. How has the premium paid for Ghanaian cocoa fluctuated in recent seasons? 
 
4. On average what is the $ premium paid for Ghana, as compared other West African 
origins?  
 
5. Do you feel that Ghana receives a fair premium for its cocoa, based on the low 
quality that is being produced in other countries? 
 
6. How do you think the premium for Ghanaian cocoa will respond to Ghana putting 
1,000,000 tonnes of cocoa on the market? 
 
7. Are you expecting an increase in global production in response to the recent high 
prices in global cocoa markets? 
 
8. In your opinion how does the ‘reputation’ of the Cocobod impact upon the way in 
which Ghanaian cocoa is traded on the external market? 
 
9. In your opinion what benefits does the Cocobod gain from this reputation? 
 
10. Do you think that Ghana cocoa would sell for a higher price than cocoa of the same 
quality being sold in another origin? 
 
11. On what basis do export buyers assess the quality of a particular batch of cocoa? 
 
12. Do export buyer’s carry out a third party check of Ghanaian cocoa before it is 
shipped? 
 
13. In absence of quality control would the CMC be able to sell Ghana’s cocoa through 
forward contracting? 
 
14. Have the recent fluctuations in global cocoa prices raised concerns over the value of 
selling through forward contracts?  
 
15. How many months in advance will the CMC sell forward? 
 
16. Is there a risk that you cannot accurately fix prices for farmers throughout the 
season when prices are fluctuating by such large margins? 
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17. How has the concentration that has occurred in world cocoa markets affected the 
operations of the CMC?  
 
18. Do the CMC have rules on the amount of cocoa that you are allowed to sell to any 
one buyer? 
19. Why do the CMC try and spread their supply across several buyers instead of 
concentrating on a few large buyers? 
 
20. Are the CMC still actively pursuing their program of market expansion? 
 
 
4a - The CMC and Changing Supply Requirements. [Also for QCD and Cocobod] 
 
1. Does the Cocobod actively engage with the cocoa industry on aspects of the 
industries supply requirements?  
 
2. How flexible is the Cocobod quality control system in response to industries quality 
needs? 
 
3. In relation to the proliferation of alternative grades and standards systems, such as 
organic cocoa and fair-trade etc; do you consider the production of alternate grades 
and standards as an aspect of the Cocobod’s future model? 
 
4. What are the main constraints to Cocobod pursuing these opportunities? 
 
5. In your opinion, what are the advantages of a homogenous quality system? 
 
6. Have the Cocobod ever considered the possibility of a greater differentiation in 
grades and prices of cocoa sold from Ghana?  
o What would be the advantages/disadvantages of such a system?  
 
7. How do you think the market would respond to such changes in the Ghanaian 
quality control system? 
  
4b - The CMC and the growth of origin processing in Ghana 
 
1. How do CMC operations differ when selling cocoa at origin compared with selling 
cocoa on the export market?  
 
2. What are the advantages of having buyers operating in Ghana? 
 
3. Are you able to establish stronger relationships with buyers when they are located 
in Ghana?  
o How does this affect the process of buying cocoa? 
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4. In your opinion what are the main advantages of operating through the CMC for 
local processors?  
 
5.  The CMC and operational risk – problems controlling staff – see QCD questions. 
[only for CMC – return to this after origin grinding: section 5] 
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Section 5 – The growth of origin processing and the role of the Cocobod. 
 
1. In your opinion, what is the main reason for the current surge in origin processing 
factories in Ghana? 
 
2. From where did the initial motivation to increase origin grinding in Ghana come 
from?  
 
3. Have the Cocobod and government taken different roles in this process? 
 
4. To what extent were the Cocobod involved in the decision to increase origin 
grinding? 
 
5. In your opinion should Ghana be processing as much 50% of their cocoa?  
o Is this position widely supported within the Cocobod? 
 
6. Do the Cocobod currently prioritise either export market sales or sales to local 
processors?   
o Once origin grinding has reached the proposed stage of 50%, do you think 
this will change?  
 
7. In your opinion what are the main benefits to Ghana of the current growth in origin 
processing? 
 
8. In what way do you think that selling beans at origin will help support Cocobod’s 
objectives in the export market? [keeping beans of the market] 
 
9. Is it only the light crop beans that the Cocobod wants to keep of the market? 
 
10. Do you not think that selling main crop beans to origin processors will put pressure 
on your export market premium? 
 
11. The capacity to learn from industrial/technological capabilities of origin 
processors? –  
o Have any specific mechanisms been put in place to achieve this? 
 
12. How have the Cocobod attempted to encourage the development of Ghanaian 
processing firms? 
 
13. In your opinion what are the main incentives for processors to set up a processing 
facilities in Ghana? 
 
14. What are the factors affecting the size of the light crop produced in Ghana? 
 
15. What are the factors affecting the proportion of the light crop that is distributed to 
processors? 
450 | P a g e  
 
450 
 
 
16.  Do bean supply agreements go beyond access to light crop beans? 
 
17. In a situation where the light crop cannot meet the processors supply allocated in 
the bean supply agreement, what arrangements have been put in place? 
 
18. Will bean supply agreements have to be adjusted in response to the decreasing size 
of the light crop in Ghana? 
 
19. Do processors operating at origin gain preferential access to main crop beans?  
 
20. Do you feel any obligation to meet the supply requirements of processors once they 
have invested in Ghana?  
 
21. Did the Cocobod actively try and attract investments from processors, or did 
processors apply to make investments?  
 
22. What is the process of screening potential investors? 
 
23. How would you describe the relationship between processors and the Cocobod?  
 
24. Do you communicate regularly with processors? 
 
25. Do all processors have the same bean supply agreements? 
o How can you reassure processors that this is the case? 
 
26. What has the Cocobod’s relationship with the CPC changed since it was privatized? 
 
27. How would you assess the current performance of the CPC? 
 
28. Why do you think it has taken the CPC a relatively long time to improve their 
performance in the market?  
 
29. Do you think that the CPC can compete in this market without additional support 
from the state? 
 
30. Do the Cocobod have any concerns over the size and power of the companies 
investing in origin processing?  
o Is this something that has to be considered when screening potential 
investments? 
 
31. Are there restrictions on the market share any one company can hold? 
 
32. Do you have concerns that by processing 50% of Ghana’s crop at origin this could 
place a lot of control in the hands of a small number of companies? 
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33. How do you attempt to control the amount of power afforded to any one particular 
processor?  
 
34. Do you expect origin processing to continue to grow in Ghana?  
o Is there an ideal balance between origin processing and exporting?  
 
35.  The option of LBC’s delivering directly to processors? [debate] 
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Section 6 – Transition and Change  
 
 
1. In your opinion has liberalisation achieved the objectives set out at the beginning of the 
liberalisation process? 
 
2. How have these objectives changed during the process of liberalisation?   
 
3. In the Cocoa sector strategy document 1999, it is stated that further liberalisation of 
the cocoa supply chain is required to improve efficiency and lower cost. Does the 
Cocobod still support this position? 
 
4. In the late 90’s, early 2000’s, there idea was raised that Ghana may liberalise 30% of 
cocoa exports. What has changed since then, such that the policy has not been 
implemented? 
 
5. In your opinion why have the reforms envisaged at the beginning of the liberalisation 
process not taken place?  
 
6. How has the Cocobod’s attitude towards reform changed?  
 
7. Do you think that the Cocobod is reluctant to change the current system? 
 
8. In your opinion what would be the benefits of further reform? 
 
9. In your opinion what would be the risks of further reform?  
o In which areas do you think that change presents the greatest risk? 
 
10. Where is pressure for reform most likely to come from? 
 
11. Are there any functions in which the Cocobod would consider transferring some 
responsibility to the private sector?  
o Have the Cocobod considered the option of working more closely with the 
private sector in the areas of input provision?  
 
12. What would have to change in order for the Cocobod to consider working more closely 
with LBC’s in this area?  
o How could LBC’s encourage this?  
 
13. Do you think that change will be necessary for the Cocobod to meet its goals?  
o If so, in what areas do you think change is required?  
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Appendix Ten – LBC Round Two Interview Guide 
 
Section 1 – The functions of the Cocobod. 
 
The objective of this section is to understand how the Cocobod’s functions in the market 
impact upon market performance and the operations of LBC’s. In particular I will be 
looking at the areas of quality control, fixed pricing and margins, seed funding, control of 
ports and warehouses, and sanctions for malpractice.   
 
Section 2 – Linkages between buyers and farmers. 
 
The objective of this section is to establish both the incentive and capacity for buyers to 
invest in farmers.  I am also interested in the role of the Cocobod in providing inputs to 
farmers and how this affects the incentive for buyer to become involved in this area. 
Farmer cooperatives are also raised as a possible solution to the problems buyers face 
when coordinating with farmers.  
 
Section 3 – Competition between buyers and the role of Licobag .  
 
The objective of this section is to establish both the level and nature of competition 
between LBC’s in the market.  The impact of competition on the operations of LBC’s will 
also be explored.  I am also interested in the current impact of Licobag in the market and 
the potential for Licobag to become stronger in the future.  
 
Section 4 – Linkages between buyers and the Cocobod. 
 
The objective of this section is to understand the extent and nature of the relationship that 
exists between buyers and the Cocobod. It is also important to explore the extent of LBC 
participation in Cocobod decision-making.  Recent changes by the Cocobod affecting 
market conditions will also be explored. 
 
Section 5 – Change and LBC development  
 
The objective of this section is to understand how LBC’s would respond to further 
liberalisation in the market. In particular I am interested in how LBC’s would operate in 
absence of the Cocobod, and the areas in which LBC’s aim to develop their capabilities in 
the future.  
 
Section 6 – The potential for change and reform 
 
The objective of this section is to understand the potential for change and reform in the 
market. In particular it is important to understand the attitude of LBC’s towards further 
reform, and the areas in which change would be considered either a risk or an 
opportunity. 
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Section 1 – The functions of the Cocobod. 
 
1. As a buyer coming in to the market, what was your expectation of the role that the 
Cocobod would play in the internal buying market?  
o Has the Cocobod fulfilled this role as expected? 
 
2. Do you think that the Cocobod was committed to the process of liberal reform, or 
do you think it was something that they had forced on them externally? 
 
3. Based on your expectations when entering the market, did you expect the market to 
have reached a more advanced stage of liberal reform? 
 
4. Quality control and the credibility of the QCD: 
 
 In your opinion, what is the main reason for Ghana’s quality performance? 
 What is the role of the QCD? 
 How would you assess the performance of the QCD both in terms of efficiency 
and the accuracy of grading and sealing? 
 What is the buyer’s role in the quality control function? 
 Who has responsibility in the case of quality failure? [purple bean] 
 In your opinion what has been the cause of recent quality problems?  
 Is there any particular stage of the season where quality problems occur with 
greater frequency? 
 Where quality is passed upcountry and then failed at the ports, what is the main 
cause of this? 
 Is this a major problem? [% Of cocoa, frequency of rent seeking].  
o If this is getting worse, why do you think this is? 
 Do the Cocobod hold the QCD officer’s accountable? 
 Are district managers reluctant to report rent seeking QCD officer? 
 What changes would you recommend in the quality control system in Ghana? [If 
removal of up country quality control, probe further about the implications of 
such a system and how it would work?] 
 Further recommendations related to inconsistent grading? 
o Independent arbitrator? Who could do this? 
o Monitoring of secondary evacuation?  
o Would buyers wish to hand over cocoa at the upcountry stage?  
 Do you think that the problems you have with rent seeking from QCD officers 
are specific to the QCD, or are they reflective of the public sector workers in 
general?   
o Do the problems you have with the QCD affect your attitude towards the 
Cocobod?  
 
 Where quality standards change on the external market, how does this affect 
the operations of local buyers? 
 What would happen to quality in absence of the QCD? 
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10. Fixed Pricing: 
 
 Without fixed prices what do you think would happen to quality in Ghana? 
 What are the disadvantages of the fixed pricing system?  
 How did it affect LBC’s when prices were revised upwards?  
 
11. Supply Chain Management: Cost of finance and Quota allocation. 
 
 Is seed-funding a necessity, or are there viable alternatives? 
 Necessity in the long-term? 
 The process of applying for additional seed-funding? 
 In what way does the Cocobod affect your cost of finance?  
 Are you charged interest during periods of high congestion at the ports? 
 How has the lower rate of interest affected your operations this season? 
 
 How does the Cocobod distribute the quota at the ports? 
 How has the quota affected your operations as an LBC?  
 The process of applying for additional quota allocation?  
o Is this effective?  
o What are the factors affecting the Cocobod’s decision?  
o Is this a credible process?  
 What alternative options have been put forward by buyers? 
 In your opinion what incentive does the Cocobod have to improve the efficiency of 
supply chain operations?  
 Have there been any improvements in the operational efficiency of the Cocobod in 
recent years?   
 How has efficiency been affected by supply chain improvements this season? 
 Are 2.2 turnovers now achievable? 
 
 What do you think would be the main differences in the functions of quality control 
and the takeover centres if they were controlled by the private sector? 
 Do you think that congestion problems would exist if the private sector controlled 
the ports and warehouses? 
 
 On what basis does the Cocobod set the buyers margin? 
 
12. Sanction:  
 
 How would you describe the Cocobod’s enforcement of sanctions in the market? 
 Is there a clear understanding of what actions are prohibited in the market? 
 In your opinion, are the Cocobod’s sanctions effective in reducing mal-practice in 
the field?  
o Why is this? 
 How do the Cocobod gather information regarding a sanction? 
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 Under what circumstances can you appeal a sanction of the Cocobod? 
 Is the process of investigating an appeal credible?  
o How does this your motivation to use the appeal process?  
 Under what circumstances might an LBC have their licence revoked?  
o Do you feel that this restricts LBC’s when confronting the Cocobod? 
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Section 2 – Linkages between buyers and farmers. 
 
1.  Investments at the farmer level: 
 
 What is your experience of providing services, such as input on credit, or an end 
of season reward to farmers? 
 What type of services have you provided in the past?  
 How did u structure these arrangements? 
 Do you find that in recent seasons you have been more reluctant to provide 
services for farmers?  
o To what extent have you retracted?  
o Why is this? 
 Is this trend common across the LBC market? 
 
 What are the main incentives to invest at the farmer level? 
 What are the different factors affecting which incentives to use in order to 
attract farmers? 
 Do buyers use this as a mechanism to compete, or, simply make the market 
function? 
 How do you choose which farmers to invest in?  
 What are the factors affecting the level of risk presented by a particular farmer? 
 How has the relationship between the buyer and farmer changed in recent 
years?  
 Do farmers have a negative attitude towards private buyers? 
 What % of your farmers do you consider to be loyal? 
 How can you attempt to develop loyal relationships? 
 What mechanisms can buyers use to reduce risk, i.e. limit the risk of default?  
o Is this something that LBC’s will actively pursue at the farmer level, 
or does this always take place through the PC? 
 What can you do in response to a farmer defaulting? 
 Is it a common for a farmer to give a PC cocoa on trust? 
 How often do farmers switch between buyers? 
 
 How does the model of the Cocobod affect the incentive to invest at the farmer 
level? 
 Do you think that the practice of buyers investing in farmers will return again in 
the future? 
 What are the factors affecting this?  
 How do you think price-competition would affect the relationship between 
buyers and farmers? 
 Why do you think that Weinco have been relatively more successful in 
providing inputs on credit as compared buyers? 
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2.  Inputs and extension: 
 
 How does Cocobod providing these functions to farmers affect your confidence 
to invest in the internal market? 
 How would assess the Cocobod’s performance in the provision of fertilisers?  
 How would you assess the Cocobod’s performance in the provision of mass 
spraying? 
 How does the Cocobod’s role in this area affect your motivation to provide 
inputs to farmers? 
 How would the LBC’s respond if the Cocobod were to completely withdraw 
from providing inputs to farmers? 
 How have the Cocobod attempted to involve LBC’s in the provision of fertilisers 
[or pesticides] in the past?  
o What were the problems with this? 
 How could the Cocobod encourage the private sector to become more involved 
in future?  
 Would you consider the Cocobod a credible partner in this area?  
 Do you think that if the state fully retracted from this area, this would lead to a 
change in the farmer’s attitude towards repayment? 
 What alternative options could the Cocobod consider in the delivery of inputs to 
farmers? 
 
 Who has the responsibility for farmer training? 
 Under what circumstances do you provide training for farmers? How does the 
risk of farmers changing buyer affect your decision in this area? 
 Do you think the Cocobod have an advantage in this area?  
 What would happen to farmer training in absence of the Cocobod? 
 
3.  Farmer organisation? 
 
 How do you think that the development of farmer Cooperatives would affect the 
operations of LBC’s?   
 In your opinion what are the advantages of this system? 
 Do you feel that this would reduce the risk of investment at the farmer level? 
 Do you have the necessary incentive to develop farmer co-ops? - Who’s 
responsibility should this be? 
 Do you think that cooperatives will develop in the future? 
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Section 3 – LBC competition and Licobag 
 
1.  Competition  
 
 How has the ‘level’ of competition between buyers changed since you entered the 
market? [market share figure] 
 How has this change in competition impacted upon the operations of LBC’s? 
 How has the ‘nature’ of competition between buyers changed since you entered the 
buyer’s market? 
 How have your profit margins changed in recent season? [figure] 
 Why do you think that so many LBC’s want to enter the market if the margins are so 
small? The Cocobod argue that this is reflective of profitability… 
 In your opinion what is the dominant strategy for an LBC to pursue in the market? 
 Do you think that each LBC is able to strategically differentiate itself from the 
competition? 
 What changes could the Cocobod make to enable LBC’s greater freedom in this area?  
 Earlier we spoke about the congestion and inefficiencies along the supply chain. Does 
this affect your own incentive to improve your speed of turnover? 
 
2.  Competition and Quality  
 
 In your opinion, how has competition in the internal buying market in Ghana impacted 
upon quality?  
 Do you suffer less quality problems in areas where there is less competition? 
 Does the farmer have a responsibility to produce quality?  
o If so how can the buyer enforce this? 
 How has the farmer’s attitude towards quality changed?  
o What has caused this? 
 Do buyers have an incentive to search for high quality?  
o How important is this to your overall strategy? 
 In certain circumstances is the buyer forced to sacrifice quality?  
 Do any LBC’s actively pursue lower quality to gain greater market share? 
 Has the buyer’s inability to reject cocoa only occurred recently?  
o Or is the greater incidence of quality failure due to farmers producing lower 
quality? 
 When PC’s accept lower quality cocoa what are the main reasons for this? 
 Do you think that the PC has less regard for quality than the LBC? 
 In cases where quality is failed at the port is it possible to hold the PC accountable? Do 
you think this affects the PC’s regard for quality? 
 Have lower finance charges translated into less of a rush to buy cocoa? 
 Do you think that some LBC’s try and buy more cocoa than are capable of handling? 
 
 Do you think that the role of the QCD is justified based on the impact which 
competition has on quality? 
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 How do you think that a system of differential pricing, would affect the buyers attitude 
towards quality? 
 
 
3.  Organisational Risk  
 
 How do you recruit your PC’s? 
 How common is it for the PC to buy for more than one LBC? 
 Do you think that your PC’s are pursuing their own individual strategy? 
 Do PC’s continue to pre-finance against your wishes?  
o Why?  
o Is it necessary for the market to function? 
 How does the PC attempt to monitor/control the farmer to avoid default?  
 Where a PC pre-finances how does this affect quality? 
 What is the main reason for using an ‘agent’ to buy in the field? 
 How can you reduce the level of risk created by the PC system? 
 Why do buyers not try and create a greater attachment for the PC by offering a 
salary? 
 Have buyers ever experimented through different types of PC contract? 
 Do you attempt to prosecute cheating PC’s?  
o Is the court system improving? 
 If a PC is found cheating how easy is it for him to move to a different LBC? 
 Where a PC cheats and you do not feel it is fair to hold the LBC responsible?  
 What sort of cheating is taking place when you do not accept responsibility? 
 Where a PC is found to be selling cocoa to a rival buyer, who do you hold 
responsible the PC or your rival buyer? 
 
 To what extent are DM’s held accountable for problems with PC’s?  
 To what extent do you suffer problems with district managers cheating? 
 How do you attempt to control the risk of cheating DM’s? 
 
 How do you control the distribution of finances to reduce the level of risk at the 
district level? 
 
 If you could control risk at the PC level would this enable you to offer credit to 
farmers with less risk? 
 What could the Cocobod do to help control this problem? 
 How do you think this problem will develop in the future? 
 
4.  Buyer Networks. 
 
 What is the main incentive for buyers to work together in the association? When 
and why did this develop? 
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 Within Licobag is there an awareness of the results that can be achieved if buyers 
work together?  
 Do buyers associate recent market improvements with Licobag? 
 In your opinion what are the main constraints to Licobag improving its 
performance?  
 Why can buyers not work together to eradicate the problems of PC’s cheating in the 
field?  
 If an agreement was made regarding competitive practices in the field, do you think 
that it could be credibly enforced?  
o Why is this?  
 EXAMPLE - Could you conceive of a situation where a buyer could give a farmer a 
loan without the threat of another buyer trying to buy that farmers cocoa?  
 Do you see consider farmer side-selling to be the result of aggressive and predatory 
buying practices from your competitors? 
 What is stated in the Licobag code? Are these rules that all buyers are aware of and 
attempt to maintain? 
 Do you feel that certain LBC’s have different objectives in the market? 
 Which LBC’s display the greatest commitment to the Licobag? Why is this? 
 If there were a smaller number of buyers in the market how do you think this 
would affect the performance of Licobag? 
 Do you feel that all members of the Licobag have a common goal in what they want 
to achieve through the association? 
 Do you think that the Licobag would be more effective if it focused on a smaller 
number of issues? 
 What are you able to achieve through your relationships with other buyers outside 
of the Licobag?  
o Do you feel that overtime such relationships will develop in Licobag? 
 Has the Licobag made any attempts towards developing its infrastructure this 
season? 
 
 In your opinion what can realistically be achieved through the Licobag? 
 Do you feel that the Licobag could be used to help regulate the market in absence of 
the Cocobod? 
 
5.  The PBC  
 
 How does the PBC affect competition in the LBC market? 
 Do you think that the PBC has an unfair advantage in the market?  
 Do the PBC get any preferential access in the areas of quota, seed-fund, inputs. 
 Why do you think it has taken the PBC several seasons to respond to market 
conditions and operate like a private sector organisation? 
 Do you think that the PBC could compete in the market without any additional 
support from the state?  
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 If the PBC were not in the market would cocoa buying die out in marginalized 
areas? 
 As a competitor do you feel that you are able to compete for the PBC’s market 
share?  
o What are the major constraints in this area?  
 If the Cocobod were not on the PBC’s board, how would this affect your opinion of 
them? 
 To what extent is the PBC involved in Licobag? 
 On what issues might the PBC not be fully committed?  
o For example, how did the PBC respond when buyers stopped buying cocoa 
during the purple bean problem? 
 Where the PBC is committed do you feel this increases the Licobag’s chances of 
success?  
 Does the nature of the PBC’s involvement effect your own, and other buyer’s 
motivation towards Licobag?  
 
6.  Market Concentration. 
 
 As the number of buyers in the internal market has increased how has this affected 
market performance and the operations of LBC’s? 
 How do you think it would affect market performance if there were a smaller 
number of buyers in the market? 
 Is there a feeling that Cocobod have allowed too many buyers to enter the internal 
buying market?  
 How do you think the market would be structured in absence of the Cocobod’s 
involvement? 
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Section 4 – Linkages between buyers and the Cocobod. 
 
1. How would you describe your own company’s relationship with the Cocobod? 
 
2. Do you have regular communication with the Cocobod?  
 
3. Do some LBC’s have stronger links with the Cocobod than others? 
 
4. Change of leadership in the Cocobod – has the continued to have a positive effect on 
the relationship between LBC’s and the Cocobod? 
 
5. Have the changes at the top of the Cocobod encouraged change throughout the 
entire organisation? 
 
6. What level of participation do LBC’s now have in Cocobod decision-making?  
 
7. Do you feel that the Cocobod are increasingly recognising the importance of the 
LBC function in the market?  
o Why is this? 
 
8. In your opinion are there any areas of the Cocobod model where LBC’s have a 
greater capacity to effect change than others? 
 
9. How has your attitude towards the Cocobod changed since the changes at the start 
of the season? 
 
10. In your opinion what motivated the Cocobod to improve the conditions for LBC’s at 
the start of the season? 
 
11. How have the improved margins offered by the Cocobod affected LBC operations? 
Where have the additional funds been directed? 
 
12. Do you have to expend many resources competing in areas such as quota allocation 
at the ports and seed-funding? 
 
13. How would you assess the Cocobod’s credibility as a regulator? 
o Subsidiary management this season. 
o Can you make investments with the confidence that policy will not change? 
o Examples of Cocobod taking action to increase credibility. 
 
14. How would you assess the Cocobod’s reaction to the problem of congestion along 
the supply chain?  
o What caused this?  
o Is this reflective of the Cocobod’s overall regulation?  
 
 
464 | P a g e  
 
464 
 
Section 5 – Change and LBC development    
 
 
1. As an LBC, what would be your main fear resulting from the removal of the 
Cocobod? 
 
2. Do you feel that you could compete in completely liberalised market? 
 
3. How would you feel about the opportunity to manage your own risk in areas such 
as finance and cocoa pricing? [explore]   
 
4. Do you think that this is an attitude that would be shared by other LBC’s in the 
market? 
 
5. In what areas would you like to further your capabilities in the future? 
 
6. Example - Would you consider the development of your own haulage capabilities as 
an opportunity in the future? What are the major constraints to LBC’s developing 
such a capability? 
 
7. Do you feel that the Cocobod constrains your opportunities to develop? 
 
8. In absence of the Cocobod do you think that LBC’s in Ghana would have the 
possibility to form linkages with international exporters?  
o In your opinion what would be the benefits of this? 
 
9. As LBC’s develop greater capabilities in the coming years, how do you think this 
will affect your attitude towards the Cocobod’s role in the market? 
 
10. Would you like the opportunity to export cocoa in the future?  
o Do you think LBC’s will be able to export cocoa in the future?  
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Section 6 – Change and the future of the partial liberalisation model. 
 
1. How would you describe the Cocobod’s attitude towards change? 
 
2. In your opinion has there been any difference in the Cocobod’s attitude towards 
change in recent years?  
 
3. What do you think are the main constraints to change facing the Cocobod? 
 
4. In your opinion will further liberal reform in the Cocobod model take place in the 
next ten years?  
 
5. Would you perceive further liberalisation to be a risk or an opportunity?  
o Do you think this attitude would be shared by the other LBC’s? 
 
6. In what areas would you encourage reform? 
 
7. Do you think there are certain functions, which should remain the role of the 
Cocobod in the long run?  
 
8. Example - Earlier we spoke about the Cocobod’s bias treatment of their subsidiaries 
i.e. the QCD, CMC and PBC. To what extent do you think the Cocobod is justified in 
favouring these organisations, based on the important role which cocoa plays in 
Ghanaian development?   
 
9. Without making any major changes, where would you like to see the Cocobod 
improve its current operations? 
 
10. Do you think that the Cocobod is aware of the need to improve in these areas? 
 
11. Do you think that the Cocobod will attempt to involve LBC’s more actively in future 
changes? 
 
12. How do you think a change in government will affect the cocoa market? 
 
13. How do you think the growth of the oil market in Ghana will affect cocoa? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
466 | P a g e  
 
466 
 
Section 7 – Comparative Questions [Olam and Armajaro only]  
 
1. How does the partial liberalisation model compare against the alternative models 
used in other countries? 
 Levels of risk faced by buyers. 
 Incentives for investment. 
 Rewards available. 
 Infrastructure development. 
 
2. How does the nature of competition in the Ghanaian internal buying market differ 
from the competition in other producing countries? 
 
3. Do the congestion problems associated with Ghana, occur in the supply chains of 
other West African Cocoa producers? 
 
4. Who could act as an independent arbitrator in issues of dispute, between LBC’s and 
Cocobod? Does such a system exist in other markets? 
 
5. How does the policy environment and degree of positive communication with the 
market regulator in Ghana, compare with that experienced in other producer 
countries?  
 
6. Is the Ghanaian model dependent on the specific role of the Cocobod, or do you 
think the same model could be used in other countries? 
 
7. Do farmers in Ghana demonstrate a more advanced level of skills and capacity than 
farmers in other countries?  
 
8. As a global buyer as well as a local buyer do you have a greater respect and 
understanding of the Cocobod model, based on: 
o The Cocobod’s role within the external market. 
o Experiences of buying in other countries. 
 
9. Is there greater justification for the role of the Cocobod due to the instabilities 
witnessed in other cocoa producing nations in recent years? 
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Appendix Eleven – External Buyers Round Two Interview Guide 
 
Section 1 – Export Market Supply Requirements  
 
The objective of this section is to understand the extent of Ghana’s competitive advantage 
in the export market for cocoa.  It is also important to understand how cocoa buyer’s 
quality requirements have changed in recent years and the capacity for the Cocobod to 
fulfil such requirements.  Finally, this section will also explore both the challenge of 
achieving quality in absence of state intervention, and also the challenge of fulfilling niche 
market requirements within the Ghanaian system. 
 
Section 2 – The Incentive for Processing in Ghana 
 
The objective of this section is to explore the incentive of origin processing in Ghana. In 
particular this section will focus on quality requirements when processing at origin and 
the value of semi-processed products produced in Ghana.  The logistical implications of 
origin processing will also be explored. 
 
Section 3 – Bean Supply Requirements  
 
This section will explore both the advantages and disadvantages in terms of bean supply 
arrangements when processing at origin.  The value and security of bean supply 
agreements will also be explored, alongside the implications of growing competition in the 
processing segment. The implications of purchasing cocoa through the CMC as opposed to 
local buyers will also be examined. 
 
Section 4 – Ghanaian Support for Origin Grinding  
 
The objective of this section is to understand the extent of Cocobod and government 
support for processing, as well as the potential benefits available to Ghana from processing 
50% of their crop at origin.  The Cocobod’s response to processors concerns over bean 
supply will also be explored.  
 
Section 5 – Competition and Buyer Networks 
 
This section will examine the extent of competition in the origin grinding segment in 
Ghana, and the potential for competitors to form a buyer’s association/network. 
 
Section 6 – Local Level Linkages 
 
This section will look at alternatively supply option for local processors in Ghana, with a 
specific emphasis on links with LBC’s.  
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Section 7 – The Future of the Cocobod Model 
 
This section will look at the risks and opportunities resulting from change in the Cocobod 
model. Processors expectancy of change and the extent of processor support towards 
change will also be examined.   
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Section 1 – Export Market Supply Requirements    
 
 
1. What are the main advantages of buying Ghanaian cocoa?  
 
2. Which of these factors could not take place in absence of the Cocobod? 
 
3. Can Ghana’s quality performance be directly attributed to the role of the Cocobod? 
 
4. How does the CMC reduce the supply risk faced by cocoa buyers?  
 
5. How do market price fluctuations affect the incentive to trade through forward 
contracts? 
 
6. How has the Cocobod’s reputation changed in recent years? 
 
7. In your opinion what are the main sources of Ghana’s premium? 
 
8. Given the current quality produced in other origins is Ghana’s premium a fair 
reflection of the quality they produce?  
o Why might this not be the case? 
 
9. If the same quality of cocoa was produced in the Ivory Coast, would industry pay 
the same for that quality as they do for Ghana?  
o Would industry still pay Ghana a premium if quality went up in Ivory Coast? 
 
10. Has the standard of Ghana’s cocoa changed in recent years? 
 
11. Without quality control would the CMC be able to operate through forward 
contracts?   
 
12. Do external buyers have to carry out a third party check to verify the quality of 
Ghanaian beans?  
 
13. How have the cocoa industries quality requirements changed in recent years? 
 
14. To what extent is the industry now dependent on Ghanaian quality, as result of 
quality decline in other origins?  
 
15. Do external buyers play close attention to changes in Ghana’s quality control 
system?  
o How would the market perceive any changes? 
 
16. Why have industry not attempted to put in place a rigorous quality control system 
within other producing countries? 
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17. Do you think that industry would make the required investments to maintain the 
quality of Ghana’s cocoa in absence of the Cocobod? 
 
18. What is your experience of trying to establish sourcing arrangements for quality 
cocoa in other origins?  
o Does this normally entail the establishment of a farmer cooperative?  
 
19. Is it possible to source quality from other origins at an acceptable cost?  
 
20. In this regard is the cost of Ghana’s quality lower than the cost of sourcing 
individually from an alternative origin? 
 
21. Why has it not been possible for the industry to replicate Ghana’s quality 
performance in other origins? 
 
22. To what extent does the industry support the production of quality in other 
origins? 
 
23. Is the homogeneity of Ghana’s quality seen as an advantage from industries 
viewpoint? 
o Would the production of a greater variety of grades and standards be 
preferred? 
 
24. Is quality likely to remain a viable source of competitive advantage in the future?  
 
25. Would the industry maintain the QCD in absence of the Cocobod? 
 
26. Are private grades and standards of importance to future supply arrangements in 
the mainstream cocoa market? 
 
27. Do the Cocobod/CMC actively engage with the cocoa industry on aspects of the 
industries supply requirements? 
 
28. Do you think the Cocobod is justified to maintain its focus on homogenous quality 
cocoa? 
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Section 2 – The incentive for processing in Ghana. 
 
1. What are the main incentives to setting up origin processing facilities in Ghana? 
 
2. What has been the main motivation behind the recent surge in investment activity? 
[State policy, supply security, technology, competition] 
 
3. What level of discount do processors receive on beans sold at origin?  
 
4. What are the factors affecting any fluctuation in this area? 
 
5. Are processed cocoa products taxed differently than raw beans?  
 
6. How do your quality requirements differ if you are processing at origin compared 
with if you are processing in Europe? 
 
7. Are there any advantages in processing premium quality beans at origin? 
 
8. Why is it desirable to process premium quality beans in Europe, but not in Ghana? 
 
9. How does your quality requirement depend on the product you are producing i.e. 
liquor, butter, or powder? 
 
10. Do you receive a premium on semi-finished products produced using only 
Ghanaian quality beans?  
o Is this considered an advantage of processing in Ghana?  
 
11. Does a semi-processed product from Ghana carry a similar quality reputation as 
raw beans from Ghana?  
o Or is this based more on the processing factory? 
 
12. How have improved transport infrastructure and information systems throughout 
the supply chain affected the incentive to process at origin in origin processing?   
 
13. Do semi-processed goods from Ghana traditionally get delivered straight to the 
client, or are they sent to a factory in Europe for blending? 
 
14. How does grinding at origin affect the efficiency of your supply chain? 
 
15. How has the increased importance of traceability affected the incentive for origin 
grinding?  
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Section 3 - Bean Supply 
 
1. Is the increase in origin grinding in Ghana reflective of the way in which processors 
now control their bean supply arrangements?  
 
2. To what extent has increased origin grinding been motivated by the growth in 
outsourcing from chocolate manufacturers?  
 
3. At what scale can origin grinders achieve economies of scale? Is it your objective to 
reach that scale in Ghana?  
 
4. What assurances are grinders given that once they have invested they will be able to 
fulfil their bean supply requirements in Ghana? 
 
5. What are the factors affecting the volume of discounted beans made available to origin 
grinders?  
 
6.  What do processors do for bean supply outside of the light crop season?  
 
7. How will bean supply agreements adjust to the possibility of a decreasing light crop in 
the coming seasons?  
 
8. How can processors know the amount of light crop that is produced each season?  
 
9. Do bean supply agreements go beyond the distribution of light crop beans?  
 
10. Beyond your bean supply agreements, is it easier to gain access to Ghanaian beans on 
the open market when you are operating at origin?  
 
11. Are the buyers for your Ghanaian factories actually located in Ghana?  
 
12. By locating in Ghana does this offer you the chance to form a relationship with the 
CMC? 
 
13. Can this enhance your capacity to get beans?  
 
14. When buying at origin, what are the advantages of buying through the CMC?  
 
15. Are these advantages less pronounced than when you are buying on the export 
market?  
 
16. Do the CMC demonstrate the same ‘reliability’ in delivering on bean supply 
agreements, as they do when selling forward on the export market?  
 
 
 
473 | P a g e  
 
473 
 
Section 4 - Ghanaian Support for Origin Grinding 
 
 
1. In your opinion what are the main benefits Ghana can expect to gain from increased 
origin processing? 
 
2. Do you think the government and Cocobod fully understand the implications of 
processing 50% of their crop at origin? 
 
3. Did you receive greater encouragement from the government or from the Cocobod to 
invest in a processing plant in Ghana? 
 
4. Do you communicate more regularly with the Cocobod or with the government?   
 
5. Do you think that Cocobod are fully committed to origin processing? 
 
6. In your opinion who’s responsibility is it to ensure that your supply requirements are 
fulfilled after investing in Ghana? 
 
7. Has the rate of market entry into the Ghanaian processing market been a surprise to 
you?  
 
8. Do you think the Cocobod fully understand the requirements of processors operating 
at origin?  
 
9. Have you been surprised by the Cocobod’s response to your concerns in this area? 
 
10. Have you been able to communicate regularly with the Cocobod over your concerns 
with bean supply? 
 
11. Do the Cocobod communicate with you before enacting any policy changes in this area? 
 
12. In your opinion has this current supply issue affected the Cocobod’s credibility? 
 
13. Is the level of uncertainty that you have experienced over this issue something you are 
not accustomed with?  
o How does this compare with the risk of sourcing cocoa in the Ivory Coast?  
 
14. How concerned were you about the possibility of under capacity in Ghana’s light crop 
before investing in Ghana?  
 
15. How concerned were you about the Cocobod’s credibility in bean supply arrangements 
prior to investing in Ghana? i.e. Wamco.     
 
16.  To what extent was your decision to set up a factory in Ghana, based on the Cocobod’s 
stated objective of reaching 1,000,000 tonnes? 
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17. Do you think your company would have still invested in Ghana, even if all Ghanaian 
beans were being sold at the export market price? 
 
18. If the current supply issue remains for sometime will you continue to operate your 
factory in Ghana?  
o Will you continue to operate in Ghana at a loss? 
 
19. If the Cocobod do not offer a discount on main crop beans, do you think this will change 
the level of support external buyers have for the quality system in Ghana?  
 
20. Do you think Ghana’s premium will hold in response to the Cocobod placing 1,000,000 
tonnes on the market? 
 
21. Do you understand the Cocobod’s logic of increasing the level of origin processing in 
order to keep their beans of the market? 
 
22. If a large amount of Ghana grade 1 is processed at origin do you think this will reduce 
the demand for Ghana grade 1 on the export market? 
 
23. To what extent do processors differentiate between semi-processed products made 
using Ghana grade 1 at origin, and the semi-processed products made using Ghana 
grade 1 in Europe?    
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Section 5 - Competition 
 
 
1. How would you describe competition amongst origin grinders in Ghana? [market share 
figures for each grinder] 
 
2. To what extent do origin grinders compete for beans in the Ghanaian market? 
 
3. Origin grinding as a ‘strategic investment’? 
 
4. Do you have concerns that some of your competitors may have more favourable bean 
supply agreements than you? 
 
5. What assurances do the Cocobod give you that all processors are treated the same? 
 
6. Given concerns over transparency, would buyers actually want to reveal their bean 
supply agreements to competitors?  
o How could the Cocobod improve transparency without doing this? 
 
7. To what extent do you think the CPC still receives support from the Cocobod? 
 
8. Without the support of the Cocobod do you think that the CPC can compete in this 
market? 
 
9. In what ways can the large processors manage risk more effectively than the smaller 
processors? 
 
10. Have the origin grinders in Ghana considered the formation of an association? 
 
11. In your opinion what would be the advantages of this? 
 
12. What are the main constraints to network activity amongst grinders?  
 
13. How effective have buyer networks proven in other producing countries? 
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Section 6 - Local Level Linkages  
 
 
1. Have you ever considered the possibility of forming linkages with firms with LBC’s in 
Ghana? 
 
2. Do you think this could be developed as a potential solution to the supply problem 
facing processors? 
 
3. In your opinion what would be the advantages of this for grinding companies?  
 
4. What would be the advantages for LBC’s? 
 
5. What would be the risks of buying of local buyers?  
o Would this risk outweigh the potential efficiency benefits of skipping out the CMC?  
o Do you consider the CMC to be a necessity? 
 
6. Have you ever discussed this option with the Cocobod? 
 
7. How do you think that such a linkage would affect your incentive to make investments 
at the farmer level? 
 
8. Could this stimulate the development of farmer cooperatives as seen in other 
countries? 
 
9. Without this link, what is the likelihood of grinding firms making investments towards 
the sustainability of production in the Ghanaian cocoa chain?  
 
10. Have the Cocobod tried to engage with industry to encourage these investments? 
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 Section 7 - The Future of the Cocobod model. 
 
1. In a future reform scenario what aspects of the Cocobod model what you not wish to 
change? 
 
2. From your perspective what would be the major risks resulting from change in the 
Cocobod model?  
 
3. In what areas would you like to see change? 
 
4. In your opinion what is the likelihood of change in these areas? 
 
5. Are you expecting change in the current supply arrangements for local processors? 
 
6. In your opinion who/what has the potential to influence change in the Cocobod? 
 
7. What do you think are the major constraints to change in the Cocobod? 
 
8. How do you think a change in government will affect the Cocoa market? 
 
9. How do you think the growth of the oil market in Ghana will affect cocoa? 
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Appendix Twelve – District Managers Round Two Interview Guide 
 
 
1.  Quality Control and QCD credibility 
 
 In your opinion, what is the main reason for Ghana’s quality performance? 
 What is the role of the QCD? 
 What is the buyer’s role in the quality control function? 
 What sort of relationship do you have the QCD officers that grade your cocoa?  
 Do you experience many delays waiting for the QCD to grade and seal? 
 Do you have many disagreements with the QCD over quality grading? 
 Where quality is passed upcountry and then failed at the ports, what is the main 
cause of this? 
 Where this problem occurs who is held responsible? 
o  Under what circumstances will the district manager be blamed for this 
problem? 
 From your experience do QCD officers attempt to solicit bribes?  
 Do you report QCD officers when they engage in this activity? 
 In your opinion, do the Cocobod hold the QCD officer’s accountable for poor 
performance? 
 What changes would you recommend in the quality control system in Ghana?  
 
2.  Competition 
 
 How has the ‘level’ of competition between buyers changed since you entered the 
market? 
 How has this change in competition impacted upon the operations of buyers? 
 How has the ‘nature’ of competition between buyers changed since you entered the 
buyer’s market?   
 What is considered unhealthy competition at this level? 
o  Does this sort of practice occur regularly? 
 Under what circumstances is it acceptable for your PC to sell cocoa to a rival buyer? 
 
 In your opinion what is the dominant strategy for an LBC to pursue in the market? 
 
3.  Quality Decline and Competition  
 
 In your opinion what are the main reasons behind the quality decline experienced 
in recent seasons? 
 In your opinion, how has competition in the internal buying market impacted upon 
quality? [*] 
 Do you suffer less quality problems in areas where there is less competition? 
 Does the farmer have a responsibility to produce quality? If so how can the buyer 
enforce this? 
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 How has the farmer’s attitude towards quality changed? What has caused this? 
 Do buyers have an incentive to search for high quality? How important is this to 
your overall strategy? 
 To what extent can the PC check quality at the local level? 
 In certain circumstances is the buyer forced to sacrifice quality?  
 Do any LBC’s actively pursue lower quality to gain greater market share? 
 Has the buyer’s inability to reject cocoa only occurred recently? [when] 
 When PC’s accept lower quality cocoa what are the main reasons for this? 
 Do you think that the PC has less regard for quality than the LBC? 
 
 Is there any particular stage of the season where quality problems occur with 
greater frequency? 
 What impact do you think increasing production will have on quality? 
 What would happen to quality in absence of the QCD? 
 
 Without fixed prices what do you think would happen to quality in Ghana? 
 What are the disadvantages of the fixed pricing system?  
 How did it affect LBC’s when prices were revised upwards? [planning] 
 
4.  Organisational Risk 
 
 How do you recruit your PC’s? 
 Do PC’s continue to pre-finance against your wishes? Why?  
 Is pre-financing necessary for the market to function? 
 Can you compete without pre-financing? 
 Are farmers dependent on pre-finance? 
 Where a PC has pre-financed, how do they attempt to monitor/control the farmer 
to avoid default? 
 Where a PC pre-finances how does this affect quality? 
 
 How common is it for the PC to buy for more than one LBC? 
 Do you think that your PC’s are pursuing their own individual strategy independent 
of the LBC? 
 From experience do you think PC’s are more concerned with maintaining good 
links with farmers, than following orders from the LBC? 
 How do you monitor the actions of your PC’s? 
 How can you attempt to control the actions of your PC’s? 
 How can you encourage your PC’s to be loyal to the LBC? 
 Do you attempt to prosecute cheating PC’s? Is the court system improving? 
 If a PC is found cheating how easy is it for him to move to a different LBC? 
 If a PC moves to another LBC will the farmers move also? 
 Do you try and develop good relationships with farmers yourself? 
 
 To what extent are you held accountable for problems with PC’s? 
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 If you could control risk at the PC level would this enable the LBC to offer credit to 
farmers with less risk? 
 What could the Cocobod do to help control this problem? 
 How do you think this problem will develop in the future? 
 
 How would you describe your relationship with the company you work for? 
 How often do you communicate with top management? 
 
 How do you think it would affect market performance if there were a smaller 
number of buyers in the market? 
 
5.  Buyer Service Provision and Competition 
 
 What is your experience of providing services, such as input on credit, or an end of 
season reward to farmers? 
 What type of services have you provided in the past? How did u structure these 
arrangements? 
 Do you find that in recent seasons you have been more reluctant to provide services 
for farmers? To what extent have you retracted? Why is this? 
 Is this trend common across the LBC market? 
 
 What are the main incentives to invest at the farmer level? 
 What are the different factors affecting your choice of incentives for farmers? 
 Do buyers use this as a mechanism to compete, or, simply make the market 
function? 
 How do you choose which farmers to invest in? What are the factors affecting the 
level of risk presented by a particular farmer? 
 How has the relationship between the buyer and farmer changed in recent years? 
Do farmers have a negative attitude towards private buyers? 
 What % of your farmers do you consider to be loyal? 
 How can you attempt to develop loyal relationships? 
 What mechanisms can buyers use to reduce risk, i.e. limit the risk of default? Is this 
something that LBC’s will actively pursue at the farmer level, or does this always 
take place through the PC? 
 What can you do in response to a farmer defaulting? 
 Is it a common for a farmer to give a PC cocoa on trust? 
 How often do farmers switch between buyers? 
 
6.  Buyer Networks  
 
 What is the extent of communication between managers at the district level? 
 Do managers in this district work together in a network/association? 
 In your opinion how strong is this network? 
 What are the objectives of working together at this level?  
481 | P a g e  
 
481 
 
 What has been achieved through past network activity? [cheating PC’s] 
 
7.  The PBC 
 
 In your opinion how do the PBC affect competition in the LBC market? 
 Do the PBC have an advantage over other competitors? 
 In your opinion do the PBC gain any additional assistance from the Cocobod? 
 To what extent do the PBC participate in local level buyer networks? 
 
8.  Market Regulation 
 
 How would you describe the Cocobod’s enforcement of sanctions in the market? 
 Is there a clear understanding of what actions are prohibited in the market? 
 In your opinion, are the Cocobod’s sanctions effective in reducing mal-practice in 
the field? Why is this? 
 
9.  Cocobod Input Provision  
 
 How would assess the Cocobod’s performance in the provision of fertilisers? 
[Current subsidy program – LBC participation] 
 How would you assess the Cocobod’s performance in the provision of mass 
spraying? [pbc access] 
 How does the Cocobod’s role in this area affect your motivation to provide inputs to 
farmers? 
 How would the LBC’s respond if the Cocobod were to completely withdraw from 
providing inputs to farmers? 
 How have the Cocobod attempted to involve LBC’s in the provision of fertilisers [or 
pesticides] in the past? What were the problems with this? 
 
 Who has the responsibility for farmer training? 
 Under what circumstances do you provide training for farmers? How does the risk 
of farmers changing buyer affect your decision in this area? 
 Do you think the Cocobod have an advantage in this area?  
 What would happen to farmer training in absence of the Cocobod? 
 
10.  Farmer organisation 
 
 How do you think that the development of farmer Cooperatives would affect the 
operations of LBC’s?   
 In your opinion what are the advantages of this system? 
 Do you feel that this would reduce the risk of investment at the farmer level? 
 Do you think that cooperatives will develop in the future? 
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11.  Change  
 
 In your opinion how has the Cocobod changed in recent years? 
 What has been the impact of improved market conditions this season? 
 In your opinion what aspects of the Cocobod model are in greatest need of change? 
 What do you think would be the opportunities resulting from change? 
 In your opinion what aspects of the Cocobod model should not change? 
 What do you think would be the risks resulting from change in this model? 
 In your opinion what are the main constraints to change in the Cocobod model? 
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Appendix Thirteen – Purchasing Clerk Round Two Interview Guide 
 
 
1.  Competition and Quality 
 
 How has the ‘level’ of competition between PC’s changed since you entered the market? 
 How has this change in competition impacted upon the operations of PC’s? 
 How has the ‘nature’ of competition between PC’s changed since you entered the 
buyer’s market?   
 What is considered unhealthy competition at this level?  
o Does this sort of practice occur regularly? 
 Under what circumstances is it acceptable for your PC to sell cocoa to a rival buyer? 
 
 In your opinion what are the main reasons behind the quality decline experienced in 
recent seasons? 
 In your opinion, how has competition in the internal buying market impacted upon 
quality? 
 Do you suffer less quality problems in areas where there is less competition? 
 Is there any particular stage of the season where quality problems occur with greater 
frequency? 
 Does the farmer have a responsibility to produce quality?  
o If so how can the buyer enforce this? 
 How has the farmer’s attitude towards quality changed?  
o What has caused this? 
 Do buyers have an incentive to search for high quality?  
o How important is this to your overall strategy? 
 To what extent can the PC check quality at the local level? 
 When PC’s accept lower quality cocoa what are the main reasons for this? 
 Do any PC’s actively pursue lower quality to gain greater market share? 
 Has the PC’s inability to reject cocoa only occurred recently?  
 Do you think that the PC has less regard for quality than LBC management? 
 
 What would happen to quality in absence of the QCD? 
 Without fixed prices what do you think would happen to quality in Ghana? 
 
2.  Organisational Risk  
 
 How would you describe your relationship with the company you work for? 
 As a PC do you feel that you are working as an individual or do you feel that you are 
part of the LBC? 
 How often do you switch between LBC’s? 
 What would cause you to switch to a different LBC? 
 Are you encouraged to join other LBC’s? 
 What can the LBC do to help you stay loyal to them? 
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 Do you buy for more than one LBC? - Is this common practice amongst PC’s? 
 Under what circumstances might you sell cocoa to a different LBC, i.e. not the LBC you 
normally supply? 
 
 In your opinion what is the dominant strategy for a PC to pursue in the market? 
 As a PC are you more concerned with maintaining your farmers, or satisfying the 
demands of the LBC you sell to?  
 If you move to another LBC will your farmers move also? 
 
 How often do farmers switch to a different purchasing PC? 
 Why might a farmer switch?  
 What is the best method to compete for farmers? 
 How do you try and maintain a good relationship with your farmers? 
 Do you pre-finance your farmers? 
 How do you choose which farmers to pre-finance? 
 Is this practice supported by the LBC that you sell to?  
o If not why do you continue to pre-finance? 
 How does pre-financing affect quality?  
 Can you compete without pre-financing? 
 Are farmers dependent on pre-financing?  
 Where do you gain the money to pre-finance your farmers? 
 Do you experience many problems with farmers defaulting on loans? 
 How can you attempt to control this risk? 
 What can you do in response to a farmer defaulting?  
 To what extent are you held accountable for any losses that occur whilst pre-financing? 
 If you are fired, how easy is it to then find a new job with another LBC? 
 To what extent do PC’s work together at the local level? 
 
3.  Cocobod Input Provision/Extension  
 
 How would assess the Cocobod’s performance in the provision of fertilisers? [Current 
subsidy program – LBC participation] 
 How would you assess the Cocobod’s performance in the provision of mass spraying? 
 
 Who has the responsibility for farmer training? 
 Under what circumstances do you provide training for farmers? How does the risk of 
farmers changing buyer affect your decision in this area? 
 
 How do you think that the development of farmer Cooperatives would affect the 
operations of PC’s?   
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4.  Change  
 
 What has been the impact of improved market conditions this season? 
 In your opinion what aspects of the Cocobod model are in greatest need of change? 
 What do you think would be the opportunities resulting from change? 
 In your opinion what aspects of the Cocobod model should not change? 
 What do you think would be the risks resulting from change in this model? 
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Appendix Fourteen – Template Analysis Example 
 
  
Building on the conceptual diagram developed in Appendix four the following eleven 
stages represent a detailed example of the coding, memoing and template development 
that took place for all themes developed in this study.  The final four stages [12-15] have 
not been included as they are largely analytical and therefore difficult to demonstrate by 
example. These stages are, however, described in full within the main body of the 
methodology chapter.  
 
For the purpose of this example the theme of ‘Governance and Power’ has been selected to 
demonstrate how themes are developed and refined throughout the template analysis 
process.  As discussed earlier the template approach has been closely integrated with the 
development of interview guides, enabling the process of data collection to develop 
alongside the process of data analysis.  Indeed, the iterative nature of the research process 
is clearly evident within the following example.  
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Stage One: External Buyers Round 1 Interview Guide 
 
 
Below there are two sections of the round one interview guide for 
external buyers.  These sections have been selected based on the 
relevance to the theme of governance and power, which will be 
developed throughout this appendix.  In each of the two interview 
guide sections below, the text box at the end of each question 
signals the ‘initial theme’ had been identified a priori of round one 
research.  These themes also make up the ‘initial template’ which 
follows the interview guide.  
 
 
Section 1: Foreign Direct Investment - Origin Grinding 
 
1. What are the main incentives to setting up origin 
processing facilities in Ghana?  
 
 
2. What has been the main motivation behind the recent 
surge in investment activity?  
 
 
3. Are beans purchased at origin priced differently to beans 
purchased for export? 
 
 
4. Are processed cocoa products taxed differently than raw 
beans?  
 
 
5. What are the implications of processing premium quality 
beans? 
 
 
6. Is bean flavour an important as aspect of processing at 
origin? 
 
 
7. Will processing firms fulfil their entire supply requirement 
from the Ghanaian crop? 
 
 
8. Do processing firms have the option to purchase beans 
from other origins to use in the Ghanaian factories? 
 
Logic of Vertical Integration 
Logic of Vertical Integration 
Logic of Vertical Integration 
-  government incentives 
  
Local Processor Supply Needs 
– price/quality 
Local Processor Supply Needs 
- quality 
Local Processor Supply Needs 
– supply deficit 
Local Processor Supply Needs 
– supply deficit 
Logic of Vertical Integration 
-  government incentives 
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9. Do you think the growth of origin processing in Ghana will 
require adjustments in the Cocobod model? 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 2: Coordination: Cocobod and local processors 
 
 
1. Do you have regular communication with the Cocobod?  
 
 
2. Example outcome of communication at the individual 
level? 
 
 
3. Do some processors have stronger links with the Cocobod 
than others? 
 
 
4. How are the processors represented at a policy level? 
 
o Is this effective? 
o Is it representative of the processors? 
o Is communication regular? 
o Examples in this area? 
 
 
5. How have the changes in the structure in the cocoa supply 
chain impacted upon the model of the Cocobod? [Methods 
of transporting, bulking, purchasing, links with trade 
houses, contracting] 
 
 
6. Have origin grinders been working with the Cocobod to 
facilitate learning and industrialisation in Ghanaian cocoa? 
– Examples. 
 
 
7. Do you think the environment in Ghana and the role of the 
Cocobod helps to facilitate this process? Examples. 
 
 
Buyer Power 
 
Government Governance – 
credibility of government 
action 
Government Governance - 
communication 
Government Governance – 
communication and credibility 
Buyer Power  
 
Government Governance - 
communication 
Power – buyer power  
Government Governance – 
functional upgrading  
Government Governance – 
functional upgrading 
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8. How does the policy environment and degree of positive 
communication with the market regulator in Ghana, 
compare with that experienced in other producer 
countries?  
 
 
9. Key differences of processing in Ghana, as compared other 
producer country markets? 
 
 
10. Do you recognise a link between the Cocobod’s role as the 
monopoly exporter and the supply performance of the 
Ghanaian internal market? 
 
 
11. Do you recognise the importance of the link between the 
role of the Cocobod and the country perspective of Ghana?   
 
 
12. Changes in the Cocobod environment in recent years? 
 
 
13. How has the Cocobod’s regulation of the industry changed 
since the growth in market entry?  
 
 
14. What aspects of the Cocobod model would you choose to 
keep in the situation of further reform?  
 
 
15. What aspects of the model do you think other cocoa 
markets would learn from? 
 
 
16. Credibility of Cocobod as a market regulator? 
 
Possible topics -   
o Risk of policy reversal/unilateral policy decisions  
o Credibility in complementary investments. 
o Risk of free riding – i.e. rent capture. 
o Examples of Cocobod taking action to increase 
credibility. 
Government Governance 
Logic of Vertical Integration 
in Ghana 
Quality Control and the Role 
of the government 
Power – Cocobod power 
Government Governance - 
credibility 
Power – Cocobod power 
Government governance -
credibility.  
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Stage 2: Initial Template: Governance and Power 
 
 Logic of Vertical Integration 
o Control Supply Risk 
o Market Control 
o Processing  Incentives 
 
 Local Processor Supply Needs 
o Quality 
o Efficiency 
o Local processing supply deficit 
 
 Government Governance  
o Functional Upgrading 
o Credibility of Government Action 
o Communication  
 
 Power  
o Buyer Power 
o Cocobod Power 
o Power Struggle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key  
 
 Primary Theme 
o Secondary Theme  
 Sub-level theme 
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Stage 3: Round One Coded Processor Interview 
 
In the passage below the themes that are present within 
the initial template will be highlighted in black, whilst the 
themes that have ‘emerged’ during the process of coding 
will be highlighted in red.  
 
                         ................................................... 
 
 
 
[R]Over the years how has the Cocobod engaged with industry on 
its different supply requirements?  
 
[P] I’m not sure that the Cocobod fully understands the economics 
of cocoa processing, they still view it theoretically that we want to 
add value to our crop...we want the value rather than the 
European man...for them to fully understand that in today’s 
competitive world your factory must run twenty- four-seven they 
find it hard...this chief executive is flamboyant, aggressive and 
direct, a very fine communicator and he’s following the 
government line of let’s move towards fifty percent...you don’t 
process Ghana main crop at a profit, you can only process Ghana 
light crop at a profit and there are some fundamental economics 
in there, that I think the Cocobod has got to take on board as they 
are allowing too many people in. 
 
[R] As a player within the industry do you see that as Cocobod’s 
responsibility to make your investment economically viable? 
 
[P] No, no...I think they should have said we only have 200,000 
tonnes of light crop and therefore we are going to restrict our 
processing capacity to that tonnage. 
 
[R] Do you think they have overshot? 
 
[P] I think so. 
 
[R] What are the implications of this for processors and for the 
Cocobod?      
 
 
 
Government Governance – 
development policy – light 
crop shortage 
Government Governance 
– functional upgrading - 
this issue is raised twice, 
implication that the 
Ghanaian government is 
aggressively pursuing 
growth without 
recognising the supply 
needs of local processors 
– light crop shortage  
Bean Specifications – 
need for light crop 
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[P] For the processors my worry is that there are too many 
relatively smaller people in, the big boys will survive in this world 
because the big boys control their risk very carefully, the smaller 
grinders around don’t do that and I suspect they are not funded 
well enough to carry big stocks, so there will come a day when 
some of the smaller boys will begin to hit the wall, which will 
cause political rumps.  
 
[R] Is that because some of the smaller boys are Ghanaian 
companies? 
 
[P]...and then the playing field may stop being level, and there will 
be trouble and that will distort the whole thing, people will begin 
to move away...presently we now know there is a level playing 
field, or relatively...it would worry Cocobod greatly if CPC at Tema 
went down. 
 
[R] Does industry have much room to negotiate with Cocobod on 
bean supply agreements? 
 
[P] Not once have a supply agreement in place. 
 
[R] Is that understood across industry? 
 
[P] Yes.  
 
[R] What are the main incentives for setting up a processing 
facility in Ghana?  
 
[P] Access to the light crop...processors can take light crop beans, 
which are slightly smaller, it doesn’t trouble the major processors 
if beans are smaller...they [cocobod] are selling that at a significant 
discount, as they don’t want to sell it on the outside market, as it 
takes away from the premium to the main crop...I can understand 
that, it’s like a second grade, and they want to keep the second 
grade at home, however, it’s still good quality cocoa, there’s no 
problem there...so the industry can see the opportunity to get that 
at a significant discount, the intrinsic value of that cocoa is 
probably higher than the industry is paying, for example if it was 
exported buyers in London could afford to pay a little bit more 
than what we are getting it for...therefore it is an incentive given 
to industry...one, processors get the light crop, two, that’s good 
value, and three, there are financial tax breaks from being around.  
 
[R] What assurances do processors have that the light crop will be 
kept for them? 
Government 
Governance – credibility 
of bean supply 
agreements 
Power – Buyer Power 
Supply Needs – risk of 
supply deficit.  
Supply Priority – 
emphasised as the key 
reason for investment 
Logic of vertical 
integration – processors 
gain preferential access 
to quality supply at good 
value 
Logic of vertical 
integration – tax 
incentive 
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[P] I don’t know what everybody’s supply agreement is but my 
understanding is that light crop will be offered first to local 
industry. 
 
[R] Are there any grey areas in that? 
 
[P] I think is some of the agreements there is a grey area.      
 
Logic of vertical 
integration – bean supply 
agreements  
Government Governance 
– credibility of bean 
supply agreements 
494 | P a g e  
 
494 
 
Stage 4: Round one Memoing - Key Points 
Processors Supply Priority – Throughout round one of data collection access to supply 
emerged very strongly not only as the main reason behind the recent surge of investment 
into Ghanaian cocoa processing, but also as an issue which has huge strategic relevance 
within the global processing industry.  As such the primary theme of ‘processors supply 
priority’ was developed to emphasise the importance processors place on this issue.  In 
turn ‘the logic of vertical integration’ and ‘local processor supply needs’ have become 
secondary themes under the more encompassing and prevalent theme of ‘ processors 
supply priority’. 
Bean Supply Agreements – During round one of research this theme emerged as one of 
the main reasons behind vertical integration into local processing in Ghana.  In the initial 
template ‘control supply risk’ was seen as one of the main justifications for integration, and 
to some extent bean supply agreements fulfil this role in the Ghanaian cocoa processing 
industry.        
CMC Relationship – During round one of research this theme emerged as a potential 
reason why Ghanaian processors may be able to access supply more easily than processors 
located outside of Ghana. Within interviews respondents noted that personal relationships 
were very important within cocoa trading in order to establish trust and understanding.  In 
light of this, the theme of ‘CMC relationship’ merited further investigation in round two of 
research.  
Credibility of Bean Supply Agreements – Throughout round one of research, all 
respondents made implicit reference to issues surrounding the credibility of bean supply 
agreements.  This theme is therefore considered a secondary theme, because of its great 
significance in reference to the issues of supply security and public sector governance.  
Indeed, this theme has replaced ‘the credibility of government action’, as during round one 
of research it emerged that cocoa supply is the only area where government action greatly 
affects the operations of the local processors.  
495 | P a g e  
 
495 
 
CMC Legitimacy – Whilst it was never explicitly referenced within any processor 
interview, based on round one research it was clear that from a vertical coordination 
perspective, the role played by the CMC is of less benefit to local processors as compared 
foreign export buyers.  Indeed, to a large extent the role of the CMC essentially stops local 
processors from integrating further down the chain as they have dome in the Ivory Coast.  
As such, the theme of CMC legitimacy requires further exploration in round two of 
research.    
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Stage 5: Template Two - Governance and Power 
 
 
 Processors Supply Priority  
o Logic of Vertical Integration 
 Bean Supply Agreements 
 CMC Relationship   
o Bean Specifications  
o Local Processing Supply Deficit 
o Processing Incentives  
 
 Goverment Governance  
o Functional Upgrading  
o Credibility of bean supply agreements  
o Communication 
 
 Power 
o Buyer Power 
o Cocobod Power 
o Power Struggle 
 CMC legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key  
 Primary Theme 
o Secondary Theme  
 Sub-level theme 
        Emergent theme 
497 | P a g e  
 
497 
 
Stage 6: External Processors Round 2 Interview Guide  
 
Below there are three sections of the round two interview guide 
for external buyers.  Again, these sections have been selected 
based on the relevance to the theme of governance and power.  
Three sections have been selected, as compared the two sections 
chosen from round one, in order to highlight the greater focus in 
questioning throughout round two of research.  Text boxes at the 
end of each question highlight the theme, or themes, that were 
targeted with each question.   
 
 
Section 1: The incentive for processing in Ghana 
 
1. What are the main incentives to setting up origin processing 
facilities in Ghana? 
 
 
2. What has been the main motivation behind the recent surge in 
investment activity? 
 
 
3. What level of discount do processors receive on beans sold at 
origin?  
 
 
4. What are the factors affecting any fluctuation in this area? 
 
 
 
5. Are processed cocoa products taxed differently than raw 
beans?  
 
 
6. How do your quality requirements differ if you are processing 
at origin compared with if you are processing in Europe? 
 
 
7. Are there any advantages in processing premium quality 
beans at origin? 
 
 
8. Why is it desirable to process premium quality beans in 
Europe, but not in Ghana? 
Logic of vertical 
integration 
Processors supply priority 
& Functional upgrading 
Bean supply agreements 
Processing incentives 
Bean specifications 
Bean specifications 
Bean specifications  
Credibility of bean supply 
agreements 
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9. How does your quality requirement depend on the product 
you are producing i.e. liquor, butter, or powder? 
 
 
10. Do you receive a premium on semi-finished products 
produced using only Ghanaian quality beans? Is this 
considered an advantage of processing in Ghana?  
 
11. Does a semi-processed product from Ghana carry a similar 
quality reputation as raw beans from Ghana? Or is this based 
more on the processing factory? 
 
 
12. How have improved transport infrastructure and information 
systems throughout the supply chain affected the incentive to 
process at origin in origin processing?   
 
 
13. Do semi-processed goods from Ghana traditionally get 
delivered straight to the client, or are they sent to a factory in 
Europe for blending? 
 
 
14. How does grinding at origin affect the efficiency of your supply 
chain? 
 
 
15. How has the increased importance of traceability affected the 
incentive for origin grinding?  
 
 
 
Section 2: Bean Supply   
 
 
1. Is the increase in origin grinding in Ghana reflective of the way 
in which processors now control their bean supply 
arrangements? 
 
 
2. To what extent has increased origin grinding been motivated 
by the growth in outsourcing from chocolate manufacturers?  
 
 
Logic of Vertical 
Integration 
Bean specifications  
Bean specifications  
Bean Specifications  
Logic of Vertical 
Integration 
Logic of Vertical 
Integration 
Exploratory Question  
Processors supply 
priority 
Processors supply 
priority 
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3. At what scale can origin grinders achieve economies of scale? 
Is it your objective to reach that scale in Ghana?  
 
4. What assurances are grinders given that once they have 
invested they will be able to fulfil their bean supply 
requirements in Ghana?  
 
 
5. What are the factors affecting the volume of discounted beans 
made available to origin grinders?  
 
6.  What do processors do for bean supply outside of the light 
crop season?  
 
 
7. How will bean supply agreements adjust to the possibility of a 
decreasing light crop in the coming seasons?  
 
8. How can processors know the amount of light crop that is 
produced each season?  
 
 
9. Do bean supply agreements go beyond the distribution of light 
crop beans?  
 
 
10. Beyond your bean supply agreements, is it easier to gain 
access to Ghanaian beans on the open market when you are 
operating at origin?  
 
 
11. Do the buyers for your Ghanaian factories actually located in 
Ghana? 
 
 
12. By locating in Ghana does this offer you the chance to form a 
relationship with the CMC? 
 
 
13. Can this enhance your capacity to get beans?  
 
 
14. When buying at origin, what are the advantages of buying 
through the CMC?  
 
 
Supply Priority 
Credibility of bean 
supply agreements  
Processors supply 
priority & Bean supply 
agreements 
Light crop shortage & 
Credibility of bean 
supply agreements 
Bean specifications  
Light Crop Shortage 
Bean supply 
agreements  
CMC relationship 
CMC relationship 
CMC relationship 
CMC relationship 
CMC legitimacy 
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17. Are these advantages less pronounced than when you are 
buying on the export market?  
 
 
18. Do the CMC demonstrate the same ‘reliability’ in delivering on 
bean supply agreements, as they do when selling forward on 
the export market?  
 
 
 
Section 3: Ghanaian Support for Origin Grinding 
 
 
1. In your opinion what are the main benefits Ghana can expect 
to gain from increased origin processing? 
 
 
2. Do you think the government and Cocobod fully understand 
the implications of processing 50% of their crop at origin? 
 
 
3. Did you receive greater encouragement from the government 
or from the Cocobod to invest in a processing plant in Ghana? 
 
 
4. Do you communicate more regularly with the Cocobod or with 
the government?   
 
 
5. Do you think that Cocobod are fully committed to origin 
processing? 
 
 
6. In your opinion whose responsibility is it to ensure that your 
supply requirements are fulfilled after investing in Ghana? 
 
 
7. Has the rate of market entry into the Ghanaian processing 
market been a surprise to you?  
 
 
8. Do you think the Cocobod fully understand the requirements 
of processors operating at origin?  
 
 
Functional upgrading  
Credibility of bean 
supply agreements  
CMC legitimacy 
Functional upgrading 
Functional upgrading  
government governance  
government governance 
Processors supply 
priority & government 
governance 
government governance 
government governance 
501 | P a g e  
 
501 
 
9. Have you been surprised by the Cocobod’s response to your 
concerns in this area? 
 
 
 
10. Have you been able to communicate regularly with the 
Cocobod over your concerns with bean supply? 
 
 
11. Do the Cocobod communicate with you before enacting any 
policy changes in this area?…or indeed any other areas related 
to origin processing? 
 
12. In your opinion has this current supply issue affected the 
Cocobod’s credibility? 
 
13. Is the level of uncertainty that you have experienced over this 
issue something you are not accustomed with? - For example 
how does this compare with the risk of sourcing cocoa in the 
Ivory Coast?  
 
 
14. How concerned were you about the possibility of under 
capacity in Ghana’s light crop before investing in Ghana?  
 
 
15. How concerned were you about the Cocobod’s credibility in 
bean supply arrangements prior to investing in Ghana? i.e. 
Wamco.     
 
16.  To what extent was your decision to set up a factory in Ghana, 
based on the Cocobod’s stated objective of reaching 1,000,000 
tonnes? 
 
 
17. Do you think your company would have still invested in 
Ghana, even if all Ghanaian beans were being sold at the 
export market price? 
 
 
18. Will grinders continue to operate in Ghana at a loss? 
 
 
19. If the Cocobod do not offer a discount on main crop beans, do 
you think this will change the level of support external buyers 
have for the quality system in Ghana?  
government governance 
government governance – 
communication  
government governance - 
communication 
Power struggle 
government governance  
Processors supply 
priority 
Credibility of bean 
supply agreements  
Logic of vertical 
integration – bean 
supply agreements  
Processors supply 
priority & Cocobod 
power 
Buyer power  
Buyer power & Supply 
Requirements  
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20. Do you think Ghana’s premium will hold in response to the 
Cocobod placing 1,000,000 tonnes on the market? 
 
 
21. Do you understand the Cocobod’s logic of increasing the level 
of origin processing in order to keep their beans of the 
market? 
 
 
22. If a large amount of Ghana grade 1 is processed at origin do 
you think this will this reduce the demand for Ghana grade 1 
on the export market? 
 
 
23. To what extent do processors differentiate between semi-
processed products made using Ghana grade 1 at origin, and 
the semi-processed products made using Ghana grade 1 in 
Europe?    
 
Cocobod power   
Bean specifications 
Bean specifications  
Functional Upgrading 
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Stage 7: Minor adjustments made post round 2 data collection   
 
 
The following minor adjustments were made to the template prior to stage two coding.  
These adjustments were based on the analysis and memoing that took place during round 
two of data collection.   
 
 
CMC Relationship – This theme was removed based on the observation that despite some 
very minor gains in personal relationships with the CMC, this is not taken into 
consideration when deciding whether or not to vertically integrate.  Foe two out of the 
three major processors interviewed, all trading with the CMC is carried out from their 
trading desks in Europe.  
 
Further Vertical Integration – During stage two field the possibility of processors 
vertically integrating with LBC’s was explored as a means of reducing the level of supply 
risk facing processors. Whilst it is not in the original interview guide, local processors and 
key informants were asked questions on this issue and therefore the theme of processor 
vertical integration has been included in template three. 
 
 
 
504 | P a g e  
 
504 
 
Stage 8: Template Three - Governance and Power 
 
 
 
 Processors Supply Priority  
o The Logic of Vertical Integration 
 Bean Supply Agreements  
o Bean Specifications 
o Light crop shortage  
o Processing Incentives 
 
 Public Sector Governance  
o Functional Upgrading 
o Credibility of Bean Supply Agreements 
o Communication 
 
 Power  
o Buyer Power 
o Cocobod Power 
o Power Struggle 
 CMC Legitimacy 
 Further Vertical Integration   
 
 
 
 
Key  
 Primary Theme 
o Secondary Theme  
 Sub-level theme 
        Emergent theme 
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Stage 9: Round Two Coded Processor Interview 
 
 
In the passage below the themes that are present within the 
template number three will be highlighted in black, whilst the 
themes that have ‘emerged’ during the process of coding will be 
highlighted in red.  
 
........................................................... 
 
 
[R] What guarantee’s are the Cocobod able to offer you in the 
current bean supply arrangements? 
 
[P] The contract says they will share the light crop between all 
local processors based on used capacity, so that everyone gets the 
same share of light crop...but off course Cocobod should have seen 
the inefficiencies in the system, they should have talked to the 
incumbent local processors to see how much local processing to 
attract, in order to maintain a viable economic environment.  
 
[R] That isn’t something they discussed with you?  
 
[P] No they just want as much as possible. 
 
[R] So you were surprised? 
 
[P] We were assuming off course, that potential new entrants 
would make their own calculations and based on that they would 
say that it doesn’t make sense to invest, so normally even without 
Cocobod talking to us the market should have played its role, but I 
think what has happened is that a few of the companies coming in 
are not very experienced in cocoa processing and they just copied 
a successful example without thinking of their own business plan.  
 
[R] Obviously the larger processors would have realised the 
situation, why do you think that they came in? 
 
[P] For them it will be a strategic decision, maybe it is not the 
most financially attractive investment, but given that Barry 
Callebaut, Cargill and ADM are the top three processors in the 
world you can probably not afford to be present in the second 
largest producer...it is more a strategic decision in case there are 
problems with bean supply in the next three, four, five years...if 
Cocobod Adaptability 
 
government governance – 
reckless pursuit of 
functional upgrading? 
Government Governance 
Government governance – 
should the regulator have 
played a more active role in 
screening investments? 
Buyer power – Strategic 
investments  
Processor supply priority 
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you are in the second biggest producer you probably stand a 
better chance of getting access to beans. 
 
[R] You talked about Ghana overselling on the export market and 
making up the difference on main crop contracts with light crop, is 
that a major problem? 
 
[P] Yes that is a very important issue...it was a major problem last 
years when there was only very limited light crop available, our 
estimate show’s that they have sold about half of the light crop for 
export, and kept half for local processors, which has created a 
situation where over the last six months a lot of local factories 
have had to shut down due to the lack of beans. 
 
[R] So you have your own forecasts to judge this? 
 
[P] There is a lot of market intelligence available if you look at the 
press releases, news articles, you will see breakdowns of grading 
and sealing, so based on that you can see               
 
[R] Will they ever tell you that they have exported light crop? 
 
[P] They try to avoid the subject. 
 
[R] What is their justification for the diminishing size of the light 
crop in Ghana?  
 
[P] It is difficult to forecast the total crop, particularly in an 
environment where smuggling happens both ways...but it is even 
more difficult to forecast the bean count in a crop, it is very 
difficult to anticipate how much light crop there will be next year 
and the variability can be very very high....  
 
[R] Beyond access to light crop to you gain preferential access to 
main crop as compared Ghana’s export clients, if you are prepared 
to pay the same price? 
 
[P] Not at the moment and that is something they have to change, 
they have to structure their forward selling strategy to make sure 
the local processors are first served before they start selling for 
export...but it is not something that is currently done. 
 
[R] So even if you sign a supply agreement there is no guarantee 
they will give you that quantity? 
 
[P] That is possible...    
Processors supply priority – 
Logic of vertical integration  
Credibility of bean supply 
agreements  
Cocobod Adaptability 
Credibility of bean supply 
agreements – processors have 
market intelligence   
Cocobod Adaptability 
Credibility of bean supply 
agreements – perhaps 
Cocobod have not sold light 
crop externally, there is some 
element of doubt 
Credibility of bean supply 
agreements  
Credibility of bean supply 
agreements  
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Stage 10: Round Two Memoing - Key Points 
Cocobod Adaptability – In this final template, the theme of adaptability has replaced that 
of communication, due to the Cocobod’s seeming inability to adapt their mode of operation 
to address the needs of the processors.  Indeed, the escalation in the supply problem facing 
local processors in round two is further evidence of this.  During round one of research, 
processors appeared to feel that improved communication between themselves and the 
Cocobod would lead to the supply problem being solved.  However, during round two both 
processor and Cocobod responses indicated the problem went beyond the issue of 
communication, and instead it seemed the Cocobod were not willing to make any 
compromise that may lead to the problem being solved.  
Buyer Power – The theme of buyer power has been promoted to primary importance 
within the final template in light of the growing level of unrest in the local processing 
industry and the subsequent indications that the power of the larger processors may soon 
be observed within the market. This may not involve direct action against the Cocobod, 
however, power will still be implicitly observed through the massive economies of scale 
held by the large companies, enabling them to outperform their smaller rivals.  Buyer 
power, itself is a challenging theme to observe through interview data alone and at the 
current time the larger buyers are not acting in a way which reflects their significant 
power advantage.  However both within the processor and key informant interviews from 
round two there was an implicit recognition that the power of the larger buyers may be 
seen more visibly in the coming seasons.   
Strategic Investments – the concept of strategic investments emerged very strongly in 
the second round of research in response to a number of factors including a] the current 
level of global supply risk b] the recent investments made by ADM and Cargill in Ghana, 
and c] the growing recognition that losses in the local processing industry will be endured 
in the short term, in order to achieve greater supply security in the long term.  In reality 
only the most powerful buyers have the financial strength to support such investments 
and it therefore considered an example of buyer power.  
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CMC Legitimacy – the removal of CMC legitimacy as a theme for analysis has come about 
in response to the recognition that despite processors concerns over supply, the Cocobod 
remains a very powerful organisation.  In effect the theme of CMC legitimacy has been 
eclipsed by that of Cocobod power, and the potential of the CMC being removed does not 
appear realistic based on evidence gathered.   This is also reflected in the removal of the 
theme power struggle, as although there was tension between the Cocobod and 
processors in round two research, there was little evidence to suggest that the processors 
will threaten the Cocobod’s dominance in the coming seasons.  
Further Vertical Integration - the prospect of further vertical integration was ruled out 
in round two, unless a situation of complete liberalisation was to emerge.  Given that this 
appeared very unlikely based on research findings, the theme of further integration was 
removed from the template.  
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Stage 11: Template Four356 - Governance and Power   
 Processors Supply Priority  
o The Logic of Vertical Integration 
 Bean Supply Agreements  
o Bean Specifactions 
o Light Crop Shortage 
o Processing Incentives  
 Public Sector Governance  
o The Benefits of Functional Upgrading 
o The Credibility of Bean Supply Agreements 
o Cocobod Adaptability 
 Buyer Power 
o Strategic Investments  
o Cocobod Power
                                                 
356
 In the case of Governance and Power the final stages of ‘chunking’ and ‘data immersion’ did not produce any 
changes in the organisation of the template and therefore template four is the same as the final template.  As 
described in the section on ‘chunking and immersion’ in the methodology this was a relatively common 
occurrence across several templates, where the previous eleven stages had exhausted all relevant changes in the 
template.  When this was the case the final stages were simply used to deepen the analysis of the themes in 
template four.    
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Appendix Fifteen – Cocoa Contacts E-mail 
 
Private Sector Participants  
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
   
My name is Michael Granleese and I am a PhD student at the University of 
Bournemouth; Institute of Business and Law.  I have been awarded a studentship 
for my PhD proposal analysing the role of market organisation in commodity 
market development, using the Ghanaian Cocoa industry as the focus of the 
study.  
                     
At this early stage, I am particularly interested in the development of a 
competitive internal purchasing market in Ghanaian cocoa and the role of foreign 
investors in the development of Ghanaian cocoa. Occupying a crucial position in 
the world market for cocoa products company x have a crucial role to play in the 
future development of the global cocoa market.    
   
I feel Ghanaian cocoa research will be off specific value, not only by adding to the 
current research on commodity chains, but also by helping to understand the 
future role of the private sector in Ghana’s successful cocoa sector. Furthermore, 
having received some negative press in recent years, the growing interest of the 
private sector in cocoa market sustainability has created the environment where 
a much more facilitative and positive engagement between producer countries 
and the cocoa industry.  
   
My background includes a first class MA in International Business from the 
University of Edinburgh and post graduation I spent around 19 months working 
on and leading rural development projects throughout Africa. I have around 9 
months experience of working in Ghana.  
   
I will be travelling to Ghana in the summer and then again in 2008 to carry out 
my research.  Before I travel to Ghana it is my intention to carry out interviews in 
the UK and Europe.  Through achieving an understanding of the development 
objectives at both the international, as well as the local level it should be possible 
to achieve greater consistency in project activity, thus aiming towards the 
'sustainability' objective widely commented on in the current period.   
I truly hope your company can take an interest in this study as they obviously 
have a key role to play in the future development of this important market.   
I look forward to hearing from you soon.  
   
Kind Regards,  
   
Mike Granleese
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Appendix 16: Data Collection Round One - 22/08/07 – 19/09/07 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
22-23 Aug 07 
 Travel to Ghana  
 Prepare for interviews 
 Begin setting up interviews and 
making contacts  
24 Aug 07 
 Interview with Mr Tei Quartey – 
Chief Executives Office – 
Cocobod. 
  Interview with Mr Moussa 
Lenboni – Senior trader CMC – 
Cocobod  
26 Aug 07 
 Informal discussion with Mr 
Nelson Kpodo-Tay – operations 
manager Armajaro.   
27 Aug 07  
 Interview – Akuafo Adamfo 
office Accra -  participant wished 
to remain anonymous.  
25 Aug 07 
 Transcribe first interviews 
 Make any required adjustments 
to interview guides. 
28 Aug 07  
 Interview – Mr Joseph Asiamah 
– Finance Director – Fedco.  
 Key informant interview – Mr 
Chris Jackson – The World Bank  
29 Aug 07 
 Informal discussion with Mr 
Charles Kukah – Senior research 
manager – Cocobod. 
 Interview – Mr   Gorkeh-Sekyim 
– Deputy Executive Director 
QCD – Cocobod  
30 Aug 07 
 Day at the University of Ghana  
 Key informant interview – 
Professor Daniel Sarpong – 
Department head – Agricultural 
Economics. 
  Key informant interview – Dr 
Isaac Ossei-Atoke.   
31
 
Compl tion of interview with Mr 
Tei Quartey – Cocobod. 
Interview –  Mr Charl s Boateng 
– Deputy Managing Director 
PBC.   
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1 Sept 07 
 Planned interview with Mr Sona 
Ebai [Copal] – cancelled. 
 
  
2 Sept 07 
 Completion of interview with Mr 
Charles Boateng – PBC – 
cancelled   
4 Sept 07 
 Travel to Kumasi 
 Interview Mr Pascal Bouvery – 
Managing Director – Armajaro 
Ghana. 
 Interview Mr Damon Otto – 
Financial Manager – Armajaro 
Ghana  
5
 
Sept 07  
 Interview – Mr Kofi Asare – 
Managing Director – Diaby  
 Interview – Mr Kwabena 
Ohemeng-Tinyase – Managing 
Director – Kuapa Kokoo  
3 Sept 07 
 Interview – Mr Koffi Addo – 
Analyst - Barry Callebaut  
 Completion of Interview – Mr 
Charles Boateng - PBC  
 Interview – local processor - 
participant wished to remain 
anonymous 
6 Sept 07  
 Interview – Mr Ali Basma – 
managing director – Akuafo 
Adamfo  
 Interview – Completion of 
interview with Mr Kwabena 
Ohemeng-Tinyase – Kuapa 
Kokoo 
7 Sept 07  
 Interview – Mr Guarav Trivedi – 
General Manger of Cocoa – 
Olam Ghana. 
 Completion of interviews with  
Mr Damon Otto & Mr Pascal 
Bouvery – Armajaro Ghana 
 Travel back to Accra 
8 Sept 07 
 Rest 
9
 
Sept 07  
 Interview – Mr Nelson Kpodo-
Tay – Operations manager – 
Armajaro Ghana 
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10 Sept 07 
 Key informant interview –Mr  
Francois Ruf – CIRAD 
 Key informant interview – Mr 
Colin Taylor - Nestle  
11 Sept 07 
 Interview –Local processor - 
participant wished to remain 
anonymous 
 Interview – Mr Yaw Chei – 
Managing Director Transroyal  
13 Sept 07  
 Interview – Mr Lawrence Ayisi-
Botwe – Operations Manager – 
Cocoa Merchants  
 Interview – Mr Ali Issaka – 
General Manager – Adwamapa 
Buyers  
14 Sept 07  
 Field Trip to Suhum District – 
research assistant – Mr Eric Doe. 
 Interview – Suhum district 
manager – Akuafo Adamfo. 
 Interviews with two purchasing 
clerks – Akuafo Adamfo  
12 Sept 07  
 Key informant interview – Mr  
Isaac Gyamfi  - STCP  
 Key Informant Interview – Mr 
Shashidhara Kolavalli – senior 
research fellow – IFPRI  
15 -16 Sept 07 
 Rest 
17
 
Sept 07 
 Interview – Mr Charles Kukah – 
Senior research manager - 
Cocobod 
18 Sept 07 
 Interview – Mr Taco Terheijden 
– Commercial Director – Cargill 
Ghana 
19 Sept 07 
 Completion of interview with Mr 
Isaac Gyamfi – STCP  
 Travel back to UK.   
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Appendix 17 – Data Collection Round Two – 21/04/08 – 19/05/08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 May 08 
 Travel to Ku 
 
 
 
 
21 April 08 
 Travel to Ghana  
22 April 08  
 Visit Cocobod headquarters  
 Informal discussions with Mr Tei 
Quartey – deputy director of 
research & Mr Charles Kukah – 
senior research manager  
24 April 08 
 Interview – Mr Lawrence Ayisi-
Botwe – Operations manager – 
Cocoa Merchants  
 
23
 
April 08 
 Interview – Mr Joseph Asiamah 
– director of finance –Fedco. 
 Interview – Mr Nicholas Akpebu 
– managing director – Fedco 
 Interview – Mr Charles Boateng 
– deputy managing director - 
PBC 
26-27 April 08 
 Rest 
28 April 08 
 Interview – Mr Tei Quartey – 
Deputy Director of research – 
Cocobod. 
 Key Informant interview – Mr 
Kwasi Kpodo – Rueters    
29 April 08 
 Interview – Mr Kofi Addo – 
Analyst – Barry Callebaut  
 Interview – Local processor – 
participant wished to remain 
anonymous.  
30 April 08 
 Interview – Mr Gorkeh-Sekyim – 
Deputy Executive Director – 
QCD [Cocobod]. 
 Interview – Mr Joe Forson – 
Principle Trader – CMC 
[Cocobod] 
25 April 08 
 Interview – local processor – 
participant wished to remain 
anonymous.  
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1 May 08 
 Ghana Public Holiday – Rest  
2 May 08 
 Interview – Mr Nana Amo 
Adade Boamah – Managing 
Director – Cocoa Merchants  
 Interview -  Mr Yaw Chei – 
Managing Director – Transroyal  
4 May 08 
 Interview – Mr Nelson Kpodo-
Tay – Operations Manager – 
Armajaro Ghana 
3 May 08 
 Rest 
6 May 08 
 Interview – Mr Ali Basma – 
Managing Director – Akuafo 
Adamfo. 
7 May 08 
 Interview – Mr Rahul Gopinath 
Nair – General Manager Cocoa – 
Olam 
 Interview – Mr Kofi Asare – 
Managing Director – Diaby   
8 May 08 
 Interview – Mr Samuel Yeboah – 
Finance Manager – Evadox  
5 May 08 
 Travel to Kumasi 
 Interview – Mr Ali Issaka – 
General Manager – Aduwamapa 
Buyers  
9 May 08 
 Interview – Mr Pascal Bouvery 
Managing Director - & Mr 
Dammon Otto – Finance 
Manager – Armajaro Ghana.  
 Interview – Ms Mary Mabel 
Tagoe – Research Department – 
Kuapa Kokoo 
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10 -11 May 08 
 Travel back to Accra 
 Rest 
12 May 08 
 Key informant interview – Mr  
Isaac Gyamfi – STCP  
14 May 08 
 Key informant interview – 
Shashidhara Kolavalli – Senior 
Research Fellow - IFPRI 
13 May 08 
 Interview – Mr Charles Ntim – 
Deputy Chief Executive – 
Cocobod 
 Interview – Mr Francis Osei-
Owusu – Deputy Director of 
Research – Cocobod  
16 May 08 
 Interview – Kwame Obaug 
Adjinala – National Coordinator 
– Codepac [Cocobod] 
 Interview – Taco Terheijden – 
Commercial Director Cargill  
 
17-18 May 08  
 Rest 
 
19 May 08 
 Interview – local processor – 
respondent wished to remain 
anonymous.  
 Travel back to the UK. 
15 May 08 
 Field Trip – Suhum District – 
Research Assistant Eric Doe. 
 Interview –Aduse Sannie - 
District Manager Suhum – 
Transroyal 
 PC interviews – 6 in total  
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Appendix Eighteen – Interview Participants 
 
Pilot Interviews and Meetings* 
 Dr Julie Flood, Dr Mike Rutherford, Mr Mark Holderness - Cabi Commodities 
UK - 21/02/07  
 Mr Nicko Debenham [EB**]- Armajaro  Trading – Director -28/02/07   
 Mr Sona Ebai [EB]– Cocoa Producers Alliance – Secretary General - 24/04/07 
 Ms Anna Laven - University of Amsterdam – 21-22/05/07  
 WCF Amsterdam Conference – 23-24/05/07  
 Emmanuel Ohene Afoakwa – University of Strathclyde – Ghanaian Crop 
Scientist - 12/06/07 
 Anonymous Cocoa Exporter [EB]- 30/07/07 
 
*All Pilot Interviews were carried out in the UK. 
** [EB] stands for expert in the external buying market.  In total there are seven 
pilot interviewees and key informants with the acronym [EB].  These particular 
key informants have been highlighted as they have been highly useful in 
formulating the response to research question number five.  Please see footnote 
259 in section 7.5 for further explanation of the importance of these 
interviewees. 
Research Sample  
Seventy in-depth interviews were carried out throughout rounds one and two of 
data collection.  In the sections below participants are organised within their 
appropriate unit of analysis and listed in chronological order. 
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Round One: 22/08/07 – 19/09/07 
Cocobod Participants    
 Mr Tei Quartey - Chief Executives Office – 24/08/07 - 31/08/07 
 Mr Moussa Lenboni  - Senior trader CMC -24/08/07 
 Mr Gorkeh-Sekyim – Deputy Executive Director QCD – 29/08/07 
 Mr Charles Kukah – Senior Manager – Dept of Research, Monitoring and 
Evaluation – 17/09/07 
 
 In reference to footnote 213 five in section 7.1, the symbol denotes those 
Cocobod respondents who were asked to comment on Cocobod’s role across the 
domestic supply chain.    
 In reference to footnote 261 in section 7.5, the symbol  denotes the Cocobod 
respondents who were asked to comment on the Cocobod’s role in the external 
market.  
LBC Participants  
 Akuafo Adamfo Office Accra -  participant wished to remain anonymous -
27/08/07  
 Mr Joseph Asiamah – Federated Commodities [Fedco] - Finance Director – 
28/08/07 
 Mr  Charles Boateng – Produce Buying Company [PBC] – Deputy Managing 
Director – 31/08/07 – 3/09/07 
 Mr Pascal Bouvery – Armajaro Ghana – Managing Director – 4/09/07 – 
7/09/07 
 Mr Damon Otto – Armajaro Ghana – Director of Finance – 4/09/07 – 7/09/07 
 Mr Kofi Asare – Diaby – Mananging Director – 5/09/07 
 Mr Kwabena Ohemeng-Tinyase – Kuapa Kokoo - Managing Director – 
5/09/07 – 6/09/07 
 Mr Ali Basma – Akuafo Adamfo – Managing Director – 6/09/07 
 Mr Guarav Trivedi – Olam - General Manger of Cocoa – 7/09/07  
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 Mr Nelson Kpodo-Tay – Armajaro Ghana - Operations manager – 9/09/07 
 Mr Yaw Chei – Transroyal – Managing Director – 11/09/07 
 Mr Lawrence Ayisi-Botwe – Cocoa Merchants – Operations Manager – 
13/09/07 
 Mr Ali Issaka – Adwamapa Buyers – General Manager – 13/09/07 
 
Local Processors [external buyers]   
 Mr Kofi Addo – Barry Callebaut – Commodity Analyst - 3/09/07 
 Anonymous Local Processor – 3/09/07 
 Anonymous Local Processor – 11/09/07 
 Taco Terheijden – Cargill – Commercial Director – 18/09/07 
 
Key Informants  
 Mr Surabah Mehra [EB] – Olam Coco Trader - 13/07/07 
 Mr Colin Taylor [EB] - Nestle – 10/09/07 
 Mr Chris Jackson – The World Bank – 28/08/07 
 Professor Daniel Sarpong – The University of Ghana Department head; 
Agricultural Economics. 
 Dr Isaac Ossei-Atoke – The University of Ghana – ISSER  
 Mr  Francois Ruf – CIRAD – 10/09/07 
 Mr  Isaac Gyamfi  - STCP – Country Manager – 12/09/07 – 19/09/07 
 Mr Shashidhara Kolavalli – IFPRI - Senior research fellow - 12/09/07 
 
Rural Participants  
 14/09/08 – Field Trip No.1 to Suhum district – Respondents included; four 
farmers*, the district manager for Akuafo Adamfo, and, two purchasing clerks 
for Akuafo Adamfo. 
* The farmer study was only a pilot study and therefore these participants are 
not included in the research sample.   
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Round Two: 21/4/08 – 19/05/08 
Cocobod Participants  
 Mr Tei Quartey – Deputy Director of Research, Monitoring and Evaluation 
– 28/04/08 
 Mr Gorkeh-Sekyim – Deputy Executive Director –QCD – 30/04/08 
 Mr Joe Forson – Principle Trader – CMC – 30/04/08 
 Mr Charles Ntim– Deputy Chief Executive – 13/05/08 
 Mr Francis Osei-Owusu – Deputy Director of Research of Research 
Monitoring and Evaluation – 13/05/08 
 Mr Kwame Obaug Adjinala – National Coordinator of the Codepac program – 
16/05/08 
 
 In reference to footnote 213 five in section 7.1, the symbol denotes those 
Cocobod respondents who were asked to comment on Cocobod’s role across the 
domestic supply chain.    
 In reference to footnote 261 in section 7.5 the symbol  denotes those 
Cocobod respondents who were asked to comment on the Cocobod’s role in the 
external market. 
LBC Participants  
 Mr Joseph Asiamah – Federated Commodities [Fedco] – Director of Finance – 
23/04/08 
 Mr Nicholas Akpebu – Federated Commodities [Fedco] – Managing Director – 
23/04/08 
 Mr Charles Boateng – Produce Buying Company [PBC] – Deputy Managing 
Director – 23/04/08 
 Mr Lawrence Ayisi-Botwe – Cocoa Merchants – Operations Manger – 
24/04/08 
 Mr Nana Amo Adade Boamah – Cocoa Merchants – Managing Director – 
2/05/08 
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 Mr Yaw Chei – Transroyal – Managing Director – 2/05/08 
 Mr Nelson Kpodo-Tay – Armajaro Ghana – Operations Manager - 4/05/08 
 Mr Ali Issaka – Aduwamapa Buyers – General Manager – 5/05/08 
 Mr Ali Basma – Akuafo Adamfo – Managing Director – 6/05/08 
 Mr Rahul Gopinath Nair – Olam - General Manager Cocoa – 7/05/08 
 Mr Kofi Asare – Diaby - Managing Director – 7/05/08 
 Mr Samuel Yeboah – Evadox – Finance Director – 8/05/08 
 Mr Pascal Bouvery – Armajaro Ghana - Managing Director – 9/05/08 
 Mr Damon Otto – Armajaro Ghana – Director of Finance – 9/05/08   
 Ms Mary Mabel Tagoe – Kuapa Kokoo – Research Manager – 9/05/08 
 
Local Processors [external buyers]  
 Anonymous Local Processor – 25/04/08 
 Mr Kofi Addo – Barry Callebaut – Commodity Analyst – 29/04/08 
 Anonymous Local Processor – 29/04/08 
 Mr Taco Terheijden – Cargill - Commercial Director – 16/05/08 
 Anonymous Local Processor – 19/05/08 
 
Key Informant Interviews  
 Mr Sona Ebai* [EB] – Cocoa Producers Alliance – Secretary General – 
15/01/08 
 Mr Philip Sigley* [EB] – Federation of Cocoa Commerce – Chief Executive – 
8/10/08 
 Mr Kwasi Kpodo – Reuters – Journalist – 28/04/08 
 Mr Isaac Gyamfi – STCP – Country Manager – 12/05/08 
 Mr Shashidhara Kolavalli – IFPRI - Senior Research Fellow – 14/05/08 
 
*Mr Sona Ebai and Mr Sigley were both interviewed in the UK.  
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Rural Participants  
 15/05/08 – Feild Trip No.2 to Suhum district – Respondents included; the 
district manager for Transroyal, three purchasing clerks from PBC, one 
purchasing clerk from Aduwamapa, one purchasing clerk from Akuafo 
Adamfo, and, one purchasing clerk from Kuapa Kokoo. 
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Appendix Nineteen – Consent Form 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
The Business School 
University of Bournemouth 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
This study is for my PhD and is designed to explore the organisation of the cocoa 
market in Ghana.  My main objective is to understand how the organisation of the 
cocoa market in Ghana differs from other cocoa markets in the world, and what 
lessons can be learnt from this. In order to do this I am carrying out a series of 
interviews with market participants. The information that you provide in this 
interview is for the purpose of academic study. Where requested the content of this 
interview will be kept confidential. Therefore, if at any time you wish for 
information to remain confidential, then please request for this to be the case.  If you 
have any other requests or concerns regarding confidentiality then please express 
them.  You are also free to withdraw at any time. 
 
PhD student: Michael Granleese. 
(Under the supervision of Professor Philip Hardwick) 
 
I understand the nature and purpose of this study and am willing to give 
informed consent to participate. 
 
 
Signed:                                                                  Dated: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
524 | P a g e  
 
524 
 
Appendix 20 – Cocobod Letter of Consent 
 
 
Please turn over to see the letter of consent granted by the 
Cocobod for 2007 fieldwork.  
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Appendix Twenty Two – Letter of Recommendation 
 
 
Please turn over to see the official letter of recommendation 
granted by my supervisor prior to fieldwork in 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
527 | P a g e  
 
527 
 
528 | P a g e  
 
528 
 
   
Appendix Twenty Two – Amended Round One Cocobod 
Interview Guide 
 
 
Please turn over to see the original round one Cocobod 
interview guide that was amended throughout the course of 
fieldwork in 2007. 
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Appendix Twenty Three 
 
Coded Interview Section – The accountability of the QCD 
 
[R] – Researcher  
[LBC] – LBC participant  
 
 
[R] Last time we talked about the problem that had been occurring where    
quality would be given one grade upcountry and then given a different 
grade when it reaches the port. As you see it what is the main cause of that 
problem? 
 
[LBC] The main cause is the subjectivity, individuals, there isn’t any 
scientific way of determining this, so it is by visual examination that the 
QCD determines the quality in this respect, so off course once you have two 
different people examining this they may have two different opinions about 
what causes this and for me that is what gives rise to it. 
 
[R] Is there anything that has been done to improve upon this? Is it getting 
better or worse, has there been any change? 
 
[LBC] That is a situation we have been fighting with the authorities all 
along, I wouldn’t say the situation has improved but we hope that it will 
improve in the future. 
 
Question related to 
inconsistent 
grading. 
Information 
asymmetry caused 
by subjectivity. 
 
Room for moral 
hazard?  
Credibility of 
reform – clearly a 
source of tension 
and limited 
response of 
„institutional 
change‟ from 
Cocobod 
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[R] Has this problem become worse as more buyers have come into the 
market?  
 
[LBC] Well, one argument thinks like you are saying, but I think that is not 
really the case, the past when we have had a unitary buying system it was 
only one company buying and off course whatever you wanted them to do 
you could get them to do it if they needed to be compensated in terms of 
helping them to bear the cost, that was easy to do, again, it was a 
government organisation so they could understand themselves much 
better, now that we have private organisations all of these things will have 
to be costed so if you needed to get something done which is not the norm 
you need to look at the cost of this, but generally I think that all companies 
would wish that quality improves by the day.      
 
[R] When you have different grades between upcountry and the port do the 
Cocobod hold the QCD accountable for that? 
[LBC]  Unfortunately that is where the buyers argument has been, why for 
the same organisation, if they under-grade or over-grade at that end why 
should they not be held accountable, why should the buyers not have any 
recourse and this is something that we are still talking about, we hope that 
one way of getting this resolved is to also maybe introduce competition in   
that area, the other thing for us is to also make sure that an institution like 
the Ghana standards board or another standards organisation could 
arbitrate the case of dispute, but as it stands now, the QCD is the one that 
Competition and 
Quality [Key theme 
7.3] – before the 
introduction of 
private buyers it 
was easier for the 
PBC to achieve 
quality under the 
monopsony system. 
 
LBC‟s taking 
responsibility for 
quality. 
Private companies 
more efficient and 
cost conscious than 
former government 
buying company  
Accountability of 
Subsidiaries 
Sanction – 
underperforming 
graders are not held 
accountable 
 
 
Arbitration - buyers 
have no recourse at 
all.  
Arbitration - 
suggestion of an 
arbitration 
institution. 
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grades up country when the grade changes at the other end you have 
nothing but to say thank you and yes I will do it back to them. 
 
[R] What do you think would happen if they brought competition into the 
upcountry grading, would that cause problems or would it create 
improvements? 
 
[LBC] From the buyers perspective we don’t think that it will create any 
problems, because if the standards are clear then any standards agency 
should be able to take what the specifications are and then match it with 
the produce and come up with a grade, so for us we don’t think that it will 
create any problems rather we think that it will bring efficiency. 
 
[R] You mentioned the problem of subjectivity, do you think that would be 
increased if you had different graders? 
 
[LBC] I don’t think so, I think that now the QCD has monopoly they can do 
whatever they want to do and go about without question, there isn’t any 
specific system that you can appeal to, that is why we have this situation.           
 
[R] The problems that you have with the QCD are they specific only to the 
QCD or are they reflective of problems that you have working with the 
Cocobod in general?  
 
 
Supports 
competition 
 
Associates the 
private sector with 
efficiency. 
Accountability - 
Lack of 
accountability has 
led to behavioural 
problems in the 
QCD 
 
Good Governance – 
the LBC‟s have no 
way of having a fair 
hearing 
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[LBC] The QCD is a division of the Cocobod and so if they would be granted 
the autonomy to operate then you could deal with them as buyers and a 
service provider, but as it is Cocobod is the regulator and a division of the 
regulatory body is the one that is doing it, so the fairness for us it is not 
seen.   
  
 
Accountability of 
subsidiaries – links 
with Cocobod 
reduces credibility 
and fairness. 
 
If the QCD were 
independent of 
Cocobod then 
buyers would view 
them differently.    
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Appendix Twenty Four 
 
Coded Interview Section – The Quota System 
 
 
[R] I understand you are given a quota for the amount of trucks you are 
allowed to send to the ports…if during the course of the season you decide 
you want to expand purchases can you gain the additional quota you need 
to fulfil that? 
 
[LBC] The quota system is something which came up four or five years back 
but this has primarily been to restrict the inflows and help Cocobod manage 
stocks, but it has affected LBC’s in a slightly adverse manner, there is no 
direct recourse for increasing quota during the season off course you can 
apply for a quota increase and based on certain parameters being met 
which is not revealed to the LBC but it is an internal discussion by the 
Cocobod the quota gets increased but it is not a very common feature, so 
let’s say if you have a ten truck quota but you are able to offload twelve 
trucks you might actually have to live with that, so that is one inefficiency 
the Cocobod has currently in their port operations.    
 
[R] What is the alternative to the quota system? Is it only to expand 
warehousing space or are there other alternatives you can perceive? 
 
[LBC]   I believe the quota has come in because the warehousing has not 
caught up with the tonnage produced by the country so if they would 
increase the warehousing and improve the efficiency of offloading at the 
port, currently port offloading is very labour intensive…which means that 
when you have labour strikes you have problems offloading, when you have 
shipment issues you will have problems of offloading because the same 
gangs will be going for the shipment while offloading happens…if they were 
able to do a larger amount of bulk storage then it would help, but bulk 
Restrictive 
Environment – no 
formal system to to 
increase. 
 
 
 
 
 
LBC Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incentive to build 
market share? – Have 
to accept inefficiencies  
Infrastructural 
Limitations – 
improvement here is 
the key.  
 
 
 
 
 
Public Sector 
management – Change 
– need to modernise 
the takeover centres.  
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storage also means that you are losing all of the traceability of the cocoa, the 
moment you start cutting out the bags and taking the cocoa out into a large 
heap you would be able to channel it easier, but you would not be able to 
trace it back to the purchasing clerk level which currently Cocobod has. 
 
[R] In your opinion why has the Cocobod been relatively slow in upgrading 
the ports to increase efficiency?  
 
[LBC] I would say labour itself is an issue they have been trying to handle 
over the last couple of months they have had multiple strikes by the labour 
at the port causing delays at Takoradi and at Tema, so it is not easy to 
change, to lay off all the labour gangs and take in machines…but they are 
trying to do that, I believe that one of things that has been in the pipeline 
recently is putting on weigh bridges, so manual weighing of cocoa over a 
scale is going to stop…half of the rejections that currently happen at the 
port are because of weight issues and the moment you cut down on those 
weight issues offloading will become faster. 
 
[R] So you are expecting change? 
 
[LBC] I am expecting change but I have not seen anything on the ground yet. 
 
[R] Have there been any efficiency improvements in takeover this season? 
 
[LBC] Though efficiency has improved in terms of their offloading, the 
efficiency has decreased in terms of the rest of the chain…you need to have 
a cash to cash cycle when you talk about a private company like ours, so we 
get our stocks offloaded, but beyond the stocks offloading, collecting the 
CTO’s [receipt for payment], and getting the payment for that has actually 
reduced this year, that again is due to issues that they have had with their 
staff, they have had a couple of issues in the last year, they had a couple of 
scams that got caught at the beginning of the year and as a result of this 
they have tried to tighten their systems of control and when you tighten 
Public Sector 
Management – Change 
– Cocobod constraints 
– labour issues.  
 
Public Sector 
Management – civil 
servant motivation – 
significant delays in 
takeover. 
 
 
 
 
Public Sector 
Management – civil 
servant motivation – 
Cocobod encourages 
staff towards caution 
rather than efficiency.  
Public Sector 
Management – 
expectations of change 
have not been met.  
Weigh bridges - 
modernisation would 
bring significant 
benefits in terms of 
both efficiency and 
cocoa rejections. 
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your systems of control in terms of people you will surely have a fall in 
efficiency.  
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Appendix Twenty Five 
 
Coded Interview Section – Supply Chain Infrastructure and Privatisation 
 
 
[R] Have there been any efficiency improvements at the port this season? 
 
[LBC] When this current CEO came, I believe he supervised the building of a few 
more warehouses at Tema, and that has eased the problem at Tema a little, but at 
Takoradi you will realise that most of the cocoa is coming from the Western 
Region of Ghana and Takoradi is close by so all that cocoa goes to Takoradi and I 
believe that Takoradi is where we have to get a lot more sheds but I believe that if 
they through the challenge to the private sector then I believe they would be able 
to solve that problem.  
 
[R] Why in particular do you think the private sector would be better? 
 
[LBC] Yeah! people want business, they want money, they do business for 
money…currently they are hiring some storage facilities from some individuals, 
but I believe the capacity is quite small but I believe that if people know the 
Cocobod is ready to hire a lot more people will put up. 
 
[R] Would the private sector have a different attitude? 
 
[LBC] Yeah! People are business like, they like business, Cocobod is…it is not 
Cocobod‟s business to do business, so I believe that they are not very much 
concerned about it, but I believe that if the private sector knows that we can have 
business in this storage kind of thing, I believe it will work for them, it will work 
for Cocobod.             
 
  
 
Signs of change? 
 
Western region has 
the worst 
congestion – 
Takoradi port. 
 
Privatisation – 
raises this issue of 
topic, shows his 
feeling in this area.   
 
Privatisation - high-
powered incentives. 
 
Private sector 
willing to make 
investments. 
 
Public Sector 
Management – 
different attitude to 
the private sector. 
 
He believes that 
Cocobod do not 
recognise the 
financial gains from 
change. 
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Appendix Twenty Six 
 
Coded Interview Section – The Link between Competition and Quality 
 
 
[R] In your opinion how has competition amongst LBC’s impacted upon 
quality at the farmer level? 
 
[LBC] I don’t think it is very positive, because there are so many companies 
operating, if like I said earlier if a farmer sends his cocoa to one company 
and it is not bought, he can easily send it to someone else to buy, because 
people are scrambling for the cocoa beans, they are tempted to buy beans 
which are not of very good quality, if it is not thoroughly dried it is not good 
quality cocoa and many times people buy cocoa which is not thoroughly 
dried.  
 
[R] Last time you were saying that you could not reject cocoa from a farmer, 
is this still the case? 
 
[LBC] At the purchasing clerk level they do reject some of the farmers 
cocoa, the reason is that if you bring cocoa to the purchasing clerk to 
purchase and he finds much foreign matter in it I don’t think he will buy it, 
and we advise them not to buy poor quality cocoa...it is illegal to buy poor 
quality cocoa. 
 
[R] In any circumstances do you think the purchasing clerk would sacrifice 
quality? 
 
[LBC] Sometimes…some buy poor quality cocoa for financial gains, like the 
cocoa from the Ivory Coast it is cheap but it is not of a good quality, in the 
past like I told you earlier the quality of cocoa in Ghana has reduced, thirty 
years ago if the cocoa past here in the last thirty minutes you would still 
Quality Decline 
 
Buyer Practices. 
 
Farmers are aware of 
that they can sell bad 
quality cocoa. 
 
Buyers regularly 
accept bad quality.  
Buyer responsibility 
for quality? 
Quality Control 
appears to be taking 
effect, the same buyer 
said no rejection in 
round one. 
However, buyer is 
inconsistent  
Quality Decline – 
buyer practices 
 
Quality Decline – 
organisational risk.  
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smell the aroma, these days its not like that because of the fermentation, 
because of the problems with fermentation. 
 
[R] Why do you think the farmer’s attitude has changed? 
 
[LBC] Because of the competition he wants to sell quickly, because 
previously farmers were fermenting cocoa for seven days, now the 
maximum is about four days.   
 
[R] Do you think the purchasing clerk has less regard for quality than the 
LBC? 
 
[LBC] Yeah, the LBC’s would want to purchase quality cocoa because then 
we would not have any problems at the port, but it is not the same for the 
purchasing clerk. 
 
[R] Where cocoa is failed at the port do you trace it back to the purchasing 
clerk? 
 
[LBC] Well are supposed to do that but it is sometimes difficult, because the 
longer the cocoa stays with you the more you lose, so we attempt to work 
on it quickly at then send it back [to takeover], sometimes you send the cost 
back to the district manager to pay so that the district manager will take it 
from the purchasing clerk, but it is sometimes difficult, they don’t pay and it 
becomes a cost to the LBC. 
 
[R] Do you think that any purchasing clerks would deliberately be buying 
low quality cocoa just to build market share? 
 
[LBC] Yes, but not even to increase your market share, just for financial 
gains, you buy low quality cocoa at a lower price, especially those at the 
border areas, you buy at a lower price and sell to you the company at a 
higher price.   
Farmer attitude – 
motivated to sell early 
and competition allows 
him to do this 
Quality Decline - 
Organisational Risk 
 
Quality Control – LBC 
management afraid of 
QCD sanction.   
Organisational Risk – 
holding the PC 
accountable for poor 
quality is difficult once 
cocoa leaves the 
upcountry level. 
Organisational Risk – 
the PC achieves 
financial gain by 
passing of low quality 
cocoa as high quality 
cocoa.  
Quality Decline 
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Appendix Twenty Seven 
 
Coded interview segment – Interlocking Risk 
 
 
[R] What is your experience of providing inputs to farmers on credit? 
 
[LBC] I wouldn’t want to talk about that, it doesn’t work, because I think 
that farmers loyalty to individual companies is very minimal so it is 
difficult, when PBC was the sole buyer it was possible for them to do 
anything because they were buying cocoa alone so you could be sure that if 
you don’t play ball nobody will buy your cocoa, but under the current 
system it is very difficult…you can get two out of ten farmers who will be 
very genuine and honest, but I afraid to say I wouldn’t want to balance my 
home on it. 
 
[R] Do you find that if you had the money then investing in farmers rewards 
is that a worthwhile investment? 
 
[LBC] No if I were to have the money it is okay, it is good, when you are 
trying to build a relationship with them, particularly when you give them 
soft loans, especially when the schools are opening during the critical 
period if you can organise some things for them then it is good, but the only 
thing is you cannot be sure whether they will reciprocate your gesture. 
 
[R] So in balance do you think it is worthwhile? 
 
[LBC] I believe it is still good helping to build the loyalty, like I said you can 
get two out of ten who are very genuine, so why don’t you encourage the 
two so if you will continue to do that the two will grow to three and four, it 
Strategic Default – 
farmer credit does not 
work. 
 
 
Competition has 
increased the 
opportunity for default. 
LBC interface – 
competitive strategy – 
credit good for 
building relationships  
 
Highlights risk of 
default. 
LBC interface – 
competitive strategy 
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is a gradual process, but we are not doing it because we are in financial 
stress. 
 
[R] What can you do if a farmer defaults? 
 
[LBC] That is also the problem, you do it if he defaults, if you resort to the 
police you will create a bad name for yourself and that will even work 
against you more, look at that company they have arranged for the police to 
pick two or three farmers and it will do more harm than the good name you 
have tried to build for yourself.     
 
 
Strategic Default – 
LBC‟s have very little 
security against default 
due to the risk of 
damaging their 
reputation. 
 
Negative farmer 
attitude towards 
repayment reinforced 
by zero accountability 
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Appendix Twenty Eight 
 
Coded Interview Section – LBC input provision 
 
 
[R] But at the current time are you still providing that service to farmers? 
 
[LBC]  As we speak Cocobod has some inputs that they even want the LBC‟s to 
be the channel of distribution and that is under consideration at all LBC‟s, but 
the difficulty like I said is the recovery of credit. 
 
[R] Before we talk about the new program...what is your experience of Cocobod 
trying to involve LBC‟s in the past?      
 
[LBC] It was nothing to write home about, the default rate was very very high, 
and there is a certain perception that whatever comes to the farmer from 
Cocobod or from us is perceived to be for free, and this is something that we are 
gradually getting out of the minds of farmers, but we haven‟t been successful.    
 
[R] In the past program, what did Cocobod do that made the farmers think the 
inputs were for free? 
 
[LBC] I wouldn‟t say Cocobod per say, but for instance it was alleged in some 
circles that government officials went into certain localities and when farmers 
raised the input issue they said they should get worried as eventually the 
recovery will stop, so once it comes from government officials it goes into the 
farmers mind and they are reluctant to pay. 
 
[R] With the new program how will you try to change the farmer‟s attitude? 
 
[LBC] Well it‟s a big challenge and that is why I said it is for various companies 
to determine their participation, because for me nothing seriously has changed, 
Public Private 
Partnership 
 
LBC constraints – 
strategic default 
Public private 
partnership - strategic 
default – farmer 
attitude is a big 
constraint  
 
Farmer attitude 
embedded 
Partnership – the 
government not acting 
as a credible partner? 
 
Link with government 
creates negative farmer 
attitude and high 
default rates.  
Public Private 
Partnership – the main 
constrain remains 
strategic default.  
 
Nothing much has 
changed? 
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rather the repayment period has shortened and so for an LBC this is a big risk if 
farmers default.   
 
[R] Is this something you seriously considering? 
 
[LBC] We as a company are, they wrote to us…giving us two days and we have 
responded and want certain clarifications to be made, if they respond and make 
certain clarifications then we could make a firm decision. 
 
[R] And what sort of things do you want clarified? 
 
[LBC] The repayment period, the price they will give to LBC‟s, these are very 
basic issues. 
 
[R] If the government was prepared to offer you good repayment period and a 
subsidised input price would you be willing to get involved?   
 
[LBC] We are ready to help farmers, and like I said earlier we in our own small 
ways also help them, but we don‟t want a big burden on us, so before we make a 
firm decision on this we need to make sure that we are ready to manage and 
manage it well.       
LBC interface – 
despite the risk they 
are considering it, 
shows the strategic 
value of this program.  
Partner Credibility – 
bad planning by 
Cocobod, not 
providing very basic 
information.  
LBC interface – ready 
to help farmers- 
competitive advantage 
 
Partner Credibility – 
this is a risky decision 
for LBC‟s to take.  
Cocobod have not 
given them the 
opportunity to make 
the necessary plans.  
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Appendix Twenty Nine 
 
Coded Interview Section – Quality Control and the CMC 
 
Key  
[R] Researcher 
[P] Processor  
 
 
 
[R] Dealing with the CMC, what are the advantages of this system above and 
beyond the guaranteeing of contracts? 
 
[P] Well CMC is part of Cocobod and Cocobod has within its compass the 
QCD as well, CMC, QCD etc etc, and QCD ensures quality, the system is as 
such that you should get a quality bean out of a Cocobod contract, so 
dealing with the CMC you will have a quality aspect that is not certain out of 
a private a trader... that’s not to say that if you could in fact buy of the LBC’s 
they could also guarantee you quality as well, however the whole thing 
about the Cocobod at the moment is that Cocobod through the QCD and 
selling through the CMC is putting a quality product on the table, that’s 
really the security you are getting as opposed to what is happened in the 
Ivory Coast where this year the quality has been dreadful and or certain 
other places.  
 
[R] Do you see the QCD and CMC as having a symbiotic relationship? 
 
[P] Whenever you ask Cocobod about their long term plans they will say 
they will always have the QCD, that will always make Ghana premium 
cocoa, in theory the QCD could still operate with private buyers and private 
sellers, it would be very much more difficult to enforce, I think that the two 
are interlinked in a way that they both go to support Cocobod and Cocobod 
CMC role – creates 
quality security 
through link with 
QCD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emphasis on security: 
reduce supply risk  
 
 
Global quality 
decline: Ivory Coast  
Liberalised market - 
difficult to enforce 
quality. 
 
  
 
 
CMC link with QCD. 
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at this period of time is still fairly well perceived by the international 
powers that be i.e. the world bank and such like.    
 
[R] Have you seen much fluctuation in Ghana’s premium?  
 
[P] From what I understand it has hardened due to the appalling quality 
problems in the Ivory Coast. 
 
[R] Last time you said that Ghana was not getting as much of a premium as   
they should, has that now changed? 
 
[P] I don’t think so, the premium might have gone up but this is due to 
reasons of poorer quality somewhere else. 
 
[R] If the Ivory Coast produced the same quality as Ghana would they get 
the same price? 
 
[P] Quality is one factor, the CMC’s good standing for contractual interface 
is another, punctuality is another, but if the qualities got to an equivalent 
level and this happened overtime the prices may converge, with a small 
premium to Ghana for contract sustainability.  
 
[R] Has the quality of Ghana’s cocoa changed at all in recent years? 
 
[P] Generally it has been fairly constant, they are beginning to look at it so 
carefully that they are beginning to see seasonal fluctuations in size…so 
they are talking about super mains and special lights, maybe you know 
these things evolve.    
 
[R] Without the QCD would the CMC be able to sell forward on the market? 
 
[P] They would be able to sell forward…yeah they would be able to sell 
forward but it would be much more difficult to enforce quality standards 
Market demand – 
Ghana premium is 
increasing. 
Ghana quality is 
that much above the 
rest that even the 
current premium 
does not reflect its 
superiority 
Quality Reputation - 
consistency is a 
factor in the 
premium.  
 
CMC role – 
contributes to 
premium 
Reputation – quality 
consistency. 
 
Professionalism of 
the QCD and CMC  
Market Demand – 
external support for 
Cocobod 
 
550 | P a g e  
 
550 
 
and if quality standards began to slip then people would begin to move 
away from the forward market, what happened in the Ivory Coast is that 
when it liberalised and became a melting pot, it then became a spot market.  
 
[R] At the moment do buyers carry out a third party check on Ghana cocoa 
before it is shipped? 
 
[P] No because it is traded on a good contract…if Ghana’s cocoa comes in 
inferior to the contract then there is a claim.  
 
[R] Has there been any change in the industries quality requirements in 
recent years? 
 
[P] Left to their own devices I don’t think the industry would have varied 
their quality requirements, they might have done for residues etc, but in 
terms of sheer quality of the cocoa I don’t think they would have, but at the 
same time you see industry being forced to use quantities of poorer quality 
cocoa coming out of the Ivory Coast…if you put current Ivorian cocoa in 
front of buyers ten to fifteen years ago they would have said they weren’t 
taking it, gradually speaking the baseline is moving down.    
 
 
Reputation - 
Forward sales based 
on consistent 
quality consistency.   
 
Difficult to maintain 
this in a liberalised 
market. 
CMC Role – ease of 
coordination due to 
buyer confidence. 
Market Demand – 
industry did not 
want quality to 
decline, however 
rather than enforce 
quality they have 
adapted to using 
low quality. 
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Appendix Thirty 
 
Coded interview Segment: The Incentive to Process in Ghana 
 
[R] What are the main incentives to set up a processing facility in Ghana?  
 
I would say there are probably four reasons why you would come to Ghana 
to set up a processing factory, the first thing is the availability of quality 
beans, the second thing is the fact that you can get a discount on the light 
crop, but this is an issue now, we will come back on that one, the third is the 
political stability and the fourth is the reliable counter party of the CMC and 
the fifth one if you like is that most of these processors sell for export so 
they can set up a free-zones company which is fiscally advantageous, so lets 
say that these are the five reasons that would bring you to Ghana. The 
second one that I mentioned the discount on the light crop was sufficient 
reason in the past to come to Ghana but as it works today it is not at all 
sufficient because there are way too many processors and there is not 
enough light crop, we think that you should be able to process about two 
thirds of light crop in your factory to have a very financially viable set up. 
Why do you need this big incentive…because for us from a logistics point of 
view it is much better to process your end product close to the end 
consumer and for us the consumer is in Europe and not in Ghana. So you 
bring in some inefficiencies in the process if you have to process your cocoa 
liquor here because you have to solidify it for the transport process and 
then you have to melt it again at the other side. Solidifying means 
additional investment in equipment, additional energy consumption, 
additional manpower, and at the other side to melt it you have the same, so 
to overcome this you need an incentive, an incentive which compensates 
for a sub-optimal localisation worldwide, this incentive used to be a 
discount on light crop, but if you only have twenty, thirty or forty percent 
then the incentive isn’t big enough, so we are now trying to lobby with the 
government a little bit to see if we can change the incentive system a little 
bit so that it remains attractive as an investment.  
Processors Supply 
Priority -Focus on 
bean supply as the 
main reasons to come 
to Ghana. Quality and 
efficiency aspects both 
advantages. 
 
Light crop shortage – 
concerns in this area. 
Light crop shortage – 
driven by market entry 
– need 66% to be 
financially viable.  
 
 
 
Implies that the light 
crop is a „big‟ 
incentive – it was 
„formally‟ sufficient.  
Processing Incentive – 
„sub-optimal 
localisation‟ – 
processing at origin 
leads to inefficiencies 
in the supply chain.  
 
Incentive required to 
compensate for this. 
 Implication that light 
crop was the main 
incentive. 
Buyer Power – 
lobbying the 
government 
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[R] You said that solidifying and re-melting the liquor is a major efficiency 
loss, are there any efficiency gains from being in Ghana?  
 
[P] An advantage is that you can put twenty-five tonnes of beans in a forty 
foot container, if you transport liquor you can put twenty four tonnes of 
beans in a twenty foot container, which corresponds to thirty tonnes of 
beans. 
 
[R] Is that the only gain, what about lead times to market? 
 
[P] That is a disadvantage of being here, it is much easier to transport your 
beans ahead of time and then process them just in time for your customer, 
also storing in this environment is much more difficult from a quality point 
of view and in terms of pest and disease than storing in the climates of 
Europe, the other disadvantage of setting up here is electricity supply is not 
reliable, gas supply is not reliable, telecom’s are very unreliable, water is 
not always available, so you have to overcome all these problems.  
 
 
  
Processing Incentive 
- required to 
compensate for the 
logistical 
disadvantage of being 
at origin. 
 
 
European climate 
advantage. 
 
 
Ghana infrastructural 
problems. 
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Appendix Thirty One 
 
Coded interview segment: Government Governance 
 
[R] Do you think Cocobod understood the implications of bringing 350,000 
tonnes of processing into Ghana? 
 
Em…no…we are trying to start a conversation with the Cocobod and the 
Ministry of Finance, but so far we haven’t managed, we even brought the 
processors together to organise an open forum to discuss the issues, I think 
they are still looking at us as trying to make money out of Ghana and they 
don’t believe the signals that we have been giving them now for more than 
a year that it is not viable if we don’t get enough light crop, so we still have 
a long way to go. 
 
[R] But do you think they understood what they were doing when they 
allowed so many processors to come into the country? 
 
[P] I think they don’t, they don’t understand the dynamics of the industry, 
the disadvantage that you create by being so far away from the consumer in 
a difficult environment when it comes to energy and so on and so on, they 
haven’t fully grasped that the system as it is today cannot continue to work. 
 
[R] Do you think they are fully committed to trying to find a solution? 
 
[P] Yes I think so, because now in the next few years if some of these 
companies were to go bankrupt it would create a very very bad image for 
Ghana as a place to invest. 
 
[R] Are they listening to your concerns? 
 
Cocobod Adaptability – 
poor communication.  
 
 
 
Negative attitude 
towards the private 
sector? 
 
 
Cocobod Adaptability – 
not listening – they 
don‟t appreciate the 
significance.  
Government 
Governance – poor 
industrial policy. 
 
Cocobod Adaptability – 
they don‟t understand 
processing. 
 
Processing incentive 
required at origin. 
 
Risk of market exit? 
Processor bankruptcies 
would greatly affect 
Cocobod credibility.  
 
Potential to affect the 
future of the local 
processing industry. 
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[P] At the moment they seem to be having other priorities so the dialogue 
isn’t there. 
 
[R] Has that been a surprise to you? 
 
[P] It is a surprise to me. 
 
[R] Is that because you feel this is an issue that has the potential to affect 
their credibility? 
 
[P] It is a pity, they don’t seem to be willing to plan ahead of time, they 
seem to be taking a position, let’s wait and see, if the companies go 
bankrupt, let’s do something.    
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cocobod Adaptability – 
again highlights poor 
communication on an 
issue of great 
importance. 
Government governance – 
poor industrial policy 
 
 – Cocobod Adaptability - 
failure to act will cause 
bankruptcies.  
Cocobod Adaptability – 
he expected more from 
them. 
